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Neuro Linguistic Programming argues that repeating previous behaviour will only 
succeed in delivering previous outcomes.  Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard is 
about getting different results.  For successful change, managing complex and higher 
functions such as managing motivation and the beliefs of staff members must take 
their place alongside environmental and capability issues such as physical 
equipments.  Mechanistic processes such as the Balanced Scorecard can nevertheless 
be used to manage softer aspects of change such as culture, as part of an integrated 
holistic management system.  This needs to be done through adoption of key 
Balanced Scorecard processes.  A principal feature of the Balanced Scorecard which 
can be applied here is the development of a cause-and-effect model of cultural issues 
with clear and measurable linkages to organisational performance.  The degree to 
which national or organisation culture supports or conflicts with these processes needs 
to be considered.  However, the Balanced Scorecard must be implemented properly in 
order to be effective in managing the organisation. 
 
This research examines the Balanced Scorecard implementation in one organisation 
and examines the inter-relationship with associated cultural issues.  Criteria are 
defined for managing and assessing Balanced Scorecard implementations.  From the 
main case study a model for understanding the importance of organisational culture is 
developed.  A cultural measurement tool is then developed and tested within this 
organisation to show how the cultural measurement can be integrated into the 
Balanced Scorecard regime.  Effective measurement is an essential precursor to 
effective culture management.  The results of cultural measurement are used to 
explore potential management issues.  The strands of work are merged in a final set of 
case studies that use the developed models to assess Balanced Scorecard 
implementations in other organisations.  These case studies illustrate how cultural 
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Abbreviation: Explanation: 
1* Commodore, Brigadier, Grade 5 or Management Level 3 
Civil Servant. 
1SL First Sea Lord - also Chief of Naval Staff. 
2* Rear Admiral, Major General, Grade 3 or Management 
Level 2 Civil Servant. 
2SL Second Sea Lord - a TLB within MOD, responsible for 
the recruitment, training and management of Naval 
Personnel - part of the Navy Sector. 
2nd PUS Second Permanent Under Secretary. 
3* Vice Admiral, Lt General, Air Marshal. 
4* Admiral, General, Permanent Under Secretary. 
9F Cartwright’s Nine Factors model of organisational 
assessment. 
A400M The Airbus military transport programme.1 
ABC Activity Based Costing. 
Access Microsoft Access - a database program. 
ACDS(RP) Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Resources and 
Programmes). 
ACNS Assistant Chief of Naval Staff. 
ACOS (eg ACOS(T)) Assistant Chief of Staff (eg Assistant Chief of 
Staff(Training)). 
Adm Admiral (although this is a formal rank, the term is also a 
courtesy title for Rear Admirals and Vice Admirals). 
AG Adjutant General – Principal Personnel Officer for the 
Army. 
AMS Army Medical Services. 
Annuality Funds granted by Parliament under the old Parliamentary 
Voting procedure, ie prior to RAB, had to be consumed 
within the financial year or surrendered.  Consequently, it 
was typical that organisations would try to spend any 
remaining resources near the end of the financial year, 
often on lower priority items whose purchase could be 
completed quickly.  This had the impact of diverting 
resources away from higher priority tasks that had a 
much longer-term funding profile. 
AOC 3 Group, HQSTC Air Officer Commanding 3 Group, HQ Strike Command 
- head of naval aviation. 
ASI Accounting systems integrator.  (This title was used for 
the contractor providing leadership in the implementation 
of the RAB accounting systems in MOD.) The contract 
was awarded to Coopers and Lybrand, but subsequently 
the organisation merged to become 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
ASW Anti-submarine warfare. 
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Abbreviation: Explanation: 
BAe British Aerospace. 
Benchmarking The use of performance indicators to drive improvement 
through intra or inter-firm comparisons. 
BPR Business Process Re-engineering. 
BSC An informal abbreviation used frequently to refer to the 
Balanced Scorecard. 
Bubblehead Royal Navy slang for a diver. 




The model used by EFQM as its guide to excellence.  
Subsequently this terminology was changed to become 
the EFQM Model or the EFQM Excellence Model. 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications and Computing, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. 2 
C130J A version of the Lockheed Hercules transport aircraft. 
Capital The MOD's programme to introduce RAB. 
CAS Chief of the Air Staff – Head of the RAF 
CAS Continuous Attitude Survey. 
Cdr Commander. 
Cdre Commodore. 
CDS Chief of Defence Staff. 
CE Chief Executive. 
CED Chief Executive Dockyards - an organisation that 
formerly existed within MOD that was responsible for 
the Royal Naval Dockyards. 
Central Sector A grouping of TLBs within MOD reporting to VCDS and 
2nd PUS. 
CEO Chief Executive Officer. 
CFS Chief of Fleet Support - Head of the NSC, and formerly a 
TLB within MOD and part of the Navy Sector, 
responsible for Naval Logistics support issues - now part 
of the DLO. 
CGRM Commandant General Royal Marines. 
Chots Corporate Headquarters Office-automation Technology 
System - the IT system used in Headquarters and other 
locations for administrative support. 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency. 
CIMA Chartered Institute of Management Accountants. 
CINCFLEET Commander in Chief Fleet - a TLB within MOD, 
responsible for the operational Naval Fleet - part of the 
Navy Sector. 
CINCNAVHOME Commander in Chief Naval Home Command - a TLB 
that formerly existed within MOD that was responsible 
for Naval Shore Establishments - subsequently the 
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Abbreviation: Explanation: 
CMG A major international consultancy firm used by 
CINCFLEET in the balanced scorecard development 
work. 
CMMI  Capability Maturity Models Integrated. 
CNS Chief of the Naval Staff. 
COM(Ops) Commander (Operations) - responsible for directing the 
operational units within CINCFLEET. 
Command Secretary Responsible for civilian personnel and the financial 
management of the organisation.  After the Fleet First 
Headquarters Reorganisation Command Secretary 
CINCFLEET also became responsible for planning. 
COMNA Commodore Naval Air - an HLB in CINCFLEET 
responsible for the management and direction of naval 
anti-submarine helicopters. 
COMRFA Commodore Royal Fleet Auxiliaries - an HLB in 
CINCFLEET responsible for the management and 
direction of supply ships and other auxiliary vessels. 
COMUKAMPHIBFOR Commander United Kingdom Amphibious Forces - the 
UK's 2* operational commander for amphibious forces. 
COMUKMARFOR Commander United Kingdom Maritime Forces - the UK's 
2* operational commander afloat for the maritime 
environment. 
COMUKTG Commander United Kingdom Task Group - the UK's 2* 
operational commander afloat. 
COO Cost of Ownership - an annualisation of the WLC. 
COS Chief of Staff. 
COS(Spt) Chief of Staff (Support) - responsible for equipment 
availability and sustainability and for personnel. 
COS(W) Chief of Staff (Warfare) - responsible for warfare 
capability and the operational force elements. 
CPO Chief Petty Officer. 
CS&S and Land Systems Customer Solutions and Support and Land Systems – a 
division of BAE Systems. 
CSAs Customer Supplier Agreements - annual agreements 
between different budgetary areas within MOD for the 
delivery of service from one area to another. 
CSO Chief Staff Officer. 
CSO(P) Chief Staff Officer (Plans). 
CTC Commando Training Centre. 
Culture The culture metaphor points towards another means of 
creating organised activity: by influencing the language, 
norms, folklore, ceremonies, and other social practices 
that communicate the key ideologies, values and beliefs 
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Abbreviation: Explanation: 
CVF The Royal Navy’s Future Carrier programme; 
replacements for the Invincible class. 
DBSA Data base systems administrator - although the term is 
misused in some places to effectively refer to the 
Database and the collection of data. 
DCE Deputy Chief Executive. 
DCF or DCINC Deputy Commander in Chief Fleet. 
DCSA Defence Communication Services Agency. 
DCS(RF) Deputy Command Secretary (Resources and Finance). 
DGA(N) Director General Aircraft (Navy) - responsible for the 3rd 
and 4th Line maintenance of naval aircraft. 
DGFM Director General Financial Management - responsible for 
management and development of the financial processes 
in MOD. 
DGST(N) Director General Supplies and Transport (Navy) - 
responsible for the purchase and supply of materiel 
support to the Navy. 
DLO Defence Logistics Organisation - a TLB within MOD, 
responsible for Tri-Service logistics issues having been 
formed from CFS, QMG and RAF Logs Command - part 
of the Central Sector. 
DMB Defence Management Board. 
DNRP Directory of Naval Resources and Plans. 
DNRP BD Directory of Naval Resources and Plans Business 
Development. 
DPA Defence Procurement Agency. 
DP+A Director of Plans and Analysis - responsible for 
managing and maintaining the MOD's Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Drill-down Within Balanced Scorecard reports this allows high-level 
PIs to be interpreted in relation to accumulated lower 
level PIs.  Where reports are presented in soft-copy the 
drill-down linkages may be automated. 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry. 
EFQM European Foundation for Quality Management - owners 
of the (Business) Excellence Model usually referred to by 
the same initials. 
EG Executive Group - group of 1* officers in CINCFLEET. 
EOY End of Year. 
EP2M Effective progress and performance measurement. 4 
Ethics Moral philosophy. 5 
Ethos The characteristic spirit and beliefs of a community, 
person, or literary work. 6 
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Abbreviation: Explanation: 
FEB Fleet Executive Board - the most senior management 
board of CINCFLEET post the Fleet First reorganisation. 
Fleet First Fleet Future Integrated and Rationalised Study Team. 7  
The Change Programme within CINCFLEET between 
1999 and 2002 that was responsible, among other things, 
for the reorganisation of the CINCFLEET HQ.  
Originally the title only applied to the HQ Restructuring 
workstream within the Fleet First programme. 
FMB Fleet Management Board - the main management 
committee of CINCFLEET prior to the Fleet First 
Reorganisation in April, 2002.  Subsequently the senior 
management board was reduced in size and consisted of 
the CINC, DCINC, Comd Sec and the non-executive 
directors. 
FMG Fleet Management Group - the main management 
committee of CINCFLEET post the Fleet First 
Reorganisation in April, 2002. 
FONA Flag Officer Naval Air - an HLB in CINCFLEET 
responsible for the management and direction of naval 
aircraft. 
FOSF Flag Officer Surface Flotilla - an HLB in CINCFLEET 
responsible for the management and direction of surface 
warships. 
FOSM Flag Officer Submarines - an HLB in CINCFLEET 
responsible for the management and direction of 
submarines. 
FOST Flag Officer Sea Training - responsible for sea training of 
naval vessels and auxiliaries. 
FPMG Financial Planning and Management Group - fore-runner 
of the DMB. 
HLB Higher Level Budget - the budgetary formation below 
TLB, normally at about 2* level. 
HO Home Office. 
HQ Headquarters. 
HQRM Head Quarters Royal Marines. 
HR Human Resources. 
IAW In accordance with. 
IiP Investors In People (also sometimes referred to as 
Investors in Paperwork in recognition of the systems 
invented to achieve accreditation in the early days of the 
scheme in MOD). 
ILS Integrated Logistics Support.  
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Abbreviation: Explanation: 
IPT Integrated Project Team - the multidisciplinary teams 
used in procurement and logistics support areas. 
ISO International Standards Organisation. 
JIT Just in time. 
JSF Joint Strike Fighter – the Jaguar/Harrier and Sea Harrier 
replacement.  Also known as the F-35, this programme is 
led by Lockheed Martin in the USA. 
KPI Key Performance Indicator. 
KSA Knowledge, Skill and Ability. 
Lagging indicators Also known as "outcome measures", these report on past 
performance. 
Leading indicators Also known as "performance drivers", these help to 
predict future outcomes. 
LSD(A) Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) – a replacement for the 
Sir Lancelot class of Landing Ship Logistics. 
Lt Lieutenant. 
Lt Cdr Lieutenant Commander. 
Lynx Anti-submarine helicopter used by the Navy and also 
used by the Royal Marines and Army as utility transport 
and anti-tank helicopter. 
M777 A lightweight 155mm howitzer for the US Marines and 
US Army. 
MBA Master of Business Administration. 
MBDA A company specialising in the development and 
manufacture of guided missiles, incorporated in France 
and partly owned by BAE Systems.8 
MBO Management by Objectives. 
MBTI Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. 
MCMV Mine Counter Measures Vessel. 
MDA Master of Defence Administration. 
Merlin Merlin helicopter - developed to meet ASW and 
Transport requirements. 





MM Managed Migration – a Directorate with the Home Office 
Immigration and Nationality Directorate. 
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Abbreviation: Explanation: 
Moral component The moral base underpins the motivation of the armed 
forces.  It is founded on public support and on the 
political will of the government to maintain and, when 
necessary, use effective armed forces.  It also 
encompasses the concept of propriety, which seeks to 
ensure that the activities of the armed forces are viewed 
universally as being justified, fair, and apolitical.  
Effective leadership at a national level is essential to 
provide clarity of direction and to inspire the effort and 
self-sacrifice demanded in conflict.  National history, 
tradition and ethics are the sources from which the 
standards of armed forces have been developed.  The 
moral base also embraces the national will to ensure the 
welfare of military personnel and the efficient 
management to provide it. 9 
Morale The psychological state of an individual, or group of 
individuals, arising from their relationship with an 
organisation and its external environment and giving rise 
to discernable attitudes, intentions and actions.  The 
psychological state may be that which is perceived or 
measured. 
N5 The planning branch within CINCFLEET HQ prior to 
Fleet First. 
N8 The finance branch within CINCFLEET HQ prior to 
Fleet First. 
NAVB Navy Board - Excluding the political representation, the 
key members are CNS, CINCFLEET, 2SL, 2nd PUS, 
CFS (subsequently a senior representative from the 
DLO), Controller of the Navy (subsequently a senior 
Naval representative from the DPA). 
Navy Sector A grouping of the Navy TLBs within the MOD reporting 
to CNS. 
NBSA Naval Base and Supplies Agency - an HLB of CFS 
dealing with the provision of naval bases and the delivery 
of supplies ashore.  It was subsequently absorbed into the 
DLO and then amalgamated with the SSA to form the 
WSA. 
NLP Neuro Linguistic Programming. 
NSC Naval Support Command - formerly a TLB within MOD 
and part of the Navy Sector, responsible for Naval 
Logistics support issues - now part of the DLO. 
NVA North Vietnamese Army. 
OC Operational Capability. 
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Abbreviation: Explanation: 
OD Organisation Development – the application of 
behavioural science knowledge in a long-range effort to 
improve an organisation’s ability to cope with change in 
its external environment and increase its problem-solving 
abilities. 10 
Op Fresco Operation Fresco - Military Aid to the Civilian 
Community - provision of service personnel and facilities 
to overcome the effects of a Fire-fighters' strike. 
Op Telic Operation Telic - British military action in support of the 
American led Operation Iraqi Freedom, to overthrow the 
regime of Sadam Hussain in Iraq in early/mid 2003. 
OPV Offshore Patrol Vessel. 
Outcome measures See "Lagging indicators". 
Paradigm The core assumptions at the heart of the organisational 
culture. 
Performance drivers See "Leading indicators". 
PFI Private Finance Initiative – private financing and 
ownership of assets rented to Government organisations, 
usually in conjunction with a contractor servicing or 
support arrangement. 
PIs Performance Indicators. 
Performance 
Management 
A workstream within the Fleet First programme aimed at 
consolidating and developing on the Balanced Scorecard 
work. 
PM Performance Measurement. 
PMQ Performance Measurement Questionnaire. 
PMS Performance Measurement System. 
PO Petty Officer. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
(PWC) 
A major international (accountancy and) consultancy 
firm used by CINCFLEET in the balanced scorecard 
development work.  (The consultancy arm was 
subsequently devolved and became part of IBM.) 
Project Capital The MOD's programme to introduce RAB. 
Proxy indicator Also referred to as a "surrogate measure", this is a PI that, 
whilst not meeting the precise business need, is an 
adequate representation of the issue.  A proxy indicator 
might be used because it would be too expensive to 
collect the required data. 
PSA Public Sector Agreement. 
Psychological Contract The unwritten contract that binds individuals to an 
organisation or group, which regulates conduct and 
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Abbreviation: Explanation: 
Purple organisation A tri-service organisation.  The Royal Navy is 
symbolised by Navy Blue, the Army by Red and the 
Royal Air Force by the light Air Force Blue.  Mixing the 
blues and reds produces a purple colour that therefore 
symbolises a tri-service organisation. 
PWC PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
QA Quality Assurance. 
QMG Quarter Master General - formerly a TLB within MOD, 
responsible for Army Logistics support issues - now part 
of the DLO. 
Qtrly Quarterly. 
RAB Resource Accounting and Budgeting. 
RAF Logs Command Royal Air Force Logistics Command - formerly a TLB 
within MOD, responsible for RAF Logistics support 
issues - now part of the DLO. 
RALEIGH HMS RALIGH, the initial training establishment for all 
junior entry into the Royal Navy. 
RAPC Royal Army Pay Corps – now absorbed in the AG Corps. 
RCE Rexam Custom Enterprises. 
RFA Royal Fleet Auxiliary. 
RM Royal Marines. 
RMC Royal Marine Command. 
RMCS Royal Military College of Science. 
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle. 
RUSI Royal United Services Institute. 
Savings wedge An initially unattributable saving in the budget of an 
organisation that represents the difference between the 
cost of running the existing programme and the funding 
that is available. 
SBS Small Business Service 
(Note: Normally in MOD this would refer to the Special 
Boat Squadron, the Special Forces arm of the Royal 
Marines.  Here the term is from the DTI.) 
SBU Strategic Business Unit - distinct businesses within a 
corporate organisation. 
SCDC Suffolk Coastal District Council. 
Scimitar A British tracked armoured reconnaissance vehicle. 
SHAR Sea Harrier - A naval version of the Harrier aircraft. 
Silos See “stovepipes”. 
SKF The world's largest manufacturer of roller bearings. 11 
SLAM Single Living Accommodation Modernisation. 
SO1 Staff Officer (level) 1 - headquarters staff at Cdr, Lt Col 
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Abbreviation: Explanation: 
SSA Ships Support Agency - an HLB of CFS dealing with the 
maintenance of naval vessels.  It was subsequently 
absorbed into the DLO and then amalgamated with the 
NBSA to form the WSA. 
Stovepipes (or silos) Management thinking that restricts views and actions to 
narrow hierarchical responsibilities and ignores impact 
on work elsewhere in the organisation.  Actions and 
attitudes tend to be very parochial and organisationally 
suboptimal. 
Sub FMB A management committee within CINCFLEET prior to 
the Fleet First Reorganisation in April, 2002.  Chaired by 
DCF/D CINC and consisting of HQ and Type Command 
representatives.  Its aim was to filter out issues that need 
not then be presented to the full FMB. 
Surgeon General (Surg 
Gen) 
The professional head of Defence Medical services. 
Surrogate measure See "proxy indicator". 
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats - a 2x2 
matrix to evaluate organisation fit to the external 
environment. 12 
Tableau de Bord (TdB) A French pre-cursor to the Balanced Scorecard using a 
broad range of financial and non-financial performance 
measures to guide organisational performance 
management. 
TLB Top Level Budget - a system of articulating organisations 
and responsibilities, derived from the budgetary regime. 
Topmast A programme to improve the management of manning 
within the Royal Navy.  A key element was to allocate 
staff to "squads" controlled by CINCFLEET that would 
improve the flexibility of deployment and ability to meet 
"Harmony" rules regarding limiting separation time from 
family. 
Tornado GR4 Tornado is the name of the principle strike and fighter 
aircraft of the RAF.  The GR4 version is a rework of 
previous airframes that are used for “Ground Attack” and 
“Reconnaissance”.  Fighter aircraft have a slightly 
different airframe and carry an “F” designation. 
TQM Total Quality Management. 
TWIST Tesco Week in Store Together. 
Type 45 The Royal Navy’s Daring Class destroyer replacements 
for the Type 42 Sheffield Class destroyers. 
UAVs Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. 
USMC United States Marine Corps. 
USVs Unmanned Surface Vehicles. 
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Abbreviation: Explanation: 
Values Standards or principles considered valuable or important 
in life. 13 
VCDS Vice Chief of the Defence Staff. 
VFM Value for money. 
Wedge See “Savings wedge”. 
Westland Company producing helicopters for British forces. 
WLC Whole Life Costing. 
WO Warrant Officer. 
WRNS Women’s Royal Naval Service - the separate female 
branch of the Royal Navy in the days before they were 
combined.  Even subsequently the term was retained for a 
time to distinguish female naval personnel. 
WSA Warship Support Agency - and HLB in the DLO formed 
by the amalgamation of the NBSA and SSA. 
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Chapter 1: Outlining an issue. 
 
1. The Balanced Scorecard. 
 
The Balanced Scorecard was a management tool introduced by Kaplan and Norton in 
1992. 1  Their aim in introducing this tool was to improve organisational performance 
by encouraging management to use a broader view of the business than is available 
through the sole use of traditional financial measures.  The Balanced Scorecard did 
this by providing four different perspectives of the business (see Figure 1.1).  Each 

















Figure 1.1: The original four Balanced Scorecard 
perspectives. 
(From: Kaplan and Norton (1992). The Balanced Scorecard - Measures 
that drive performance. Harvard Business Review. Jan/Feb.) 
 
 
Some see the Balanced Scorecard concept as of great importance.  It has been 
described as, "…one of the most influential new business concepts developed in the 
modern age”. 2  Another writer says, “It is almost common sense that all 
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organisations need a balanced scorecard …”. 3  And, Boyes notes that, “The 
Harvard Business review in its 75th Anniversary issue, cites the BSC as being one of 
the most important concepts introduced via articles in the magazine.” 4  These are 
bold claims. A more substantive recommendation is reported by Niven,  
 
“Bain and Company recently released the findings of their eighth 
annual management tools survey.  The survey examines the usage, 
satisfaction, and effectiveness of 25 widely used management tools 
among senior executives across more than 30 industries.  The 
Balanced Scorecard was cited as a leading instrument of success 
for these executives.”  5  
 
Thus the Balanced Scorecard is something worthy of detailed consideration. 
 
Lingle and Schiemann claim that organisations that use Balanced Scorecard concepts 
successfully reap rich reward. 6  Yet not all organisations achieve success with the 
Balanced Scorecard.  One researcher highlights a failure rate of 70%. 7  This raises the 
issue of why the Balanced Scorecard is apparently so successful in some 
organisations, whilst being seen as a failure in others.  It also begs the question of 
whether there is a “recipe for success”.  Lewy and du Mee, 8 supplemented by Mc 
Cunn, 9 present “11 Commandments” for the successful implementation of the 
Balanced Scorecard.  Mc Cunn also suggests that people’s motivations for employing 
the Balanced Scorecard may be wrong and that this will contribute to ultimate failure: 
 
“It looked good on my CV …” 
“My friend at the golf club has one …” 10
 
Thus, for some the Balanced Scorecard is just the latest “Management Fad”.  Holtham 
11 proposes a five-phase life cycle for management fads that might indicate that the 
Balanced Scorecard is living on borrowed time (see Table 1.1). 
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Table 1.1: The five phases of Management Fads applied to the 
Balanced Scorecard. 
(After Jackson and Holtam) 
Phase: Description: Length of Phase: 
1 Initial research and conception. No set number of years. 
(For Balanced Scorecard 
– to 1992) 
2 Conversion of academic concepts into 
consulting orientated products for 
enthusiastic mass-market promotion and 
consumption. 
3 years. 
(For Balanced Scorecard 
– 1992 to 1995) 
3 Idea gains corporate momentum; negative 
experiences and conceptual problems 
begin to emerge. 
2 years. 
(For Balanced Scorecard 
– 1995 to 1997) 
4 Enthusiasts begin to run out of steam.  
Dramatic benefits fail to emerge 
consistently.  New competitors emerge. 
1 to 2 years. 
(For Balanced Scorecard 
– 1997 to 1999) 
5 Falls into disrepute and disuse. 2 years. 
(For Balanced Scorecard 
– 1999 to 2001) 
 
Continued interest in the Balanced Scorecard suggests that it is not yet ready to die.  
The attributed success highlighted above may have something to do with the 
continued interest, or that the commercialisation of the concept, discussed later, may 
be the means by which interest is being sustained.  Alternatively one could argue that 
the concept was effectively relaunched in 1996 with the publication of Kaplan and 
Norton’s first major work on the topic, when a linkage to strategy implementation was 
explained in detail. 12  Re-baselining the Balanced Scorecard to 1996 would suggest 
that it is now heading into its declining years. 
 
2. Purpose of the Research. 
 
If the Balanced Scorecard is in terminal decline, does it have real flaws or is it simply 
changing fashion?  Conversely, if it really is the success that has been claimed then 
we should continue to learn lessons from the experience of those who have 
implemented the system, and these will aid its introduction and retention in 
organisations.   
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This research therefore sets out to study in detail the experience of one organisation 
that has used the Balanced Scorecard.  Are there any new insights that would be of 
value to other organisations?  A further study of six additional organisations looks to 
establish commonality or new identify new issues. 
 
3. The starting point. 
 
The researcher’s first involvement with a live Balanced Scorecard, in 1998, 
highlighted some contradictions.  Although the scorecard was only in the early stages 
of development and use, it was already being proclaimed as successful.  Yet it was 
also obvious that there were flaws in the performance indicators being used to provide 
the broad view of the business that Kaplan and Norton said was necessary for the 
organisation to be successful.  For example, the scorecard substantially lacked the 
“Financial” and the “Innovation and Learning” perspectives. 
 
This contradictory situation led to curiosity 13 as to what was meant by “success”, and 
began to raise a number of questions in the mind of the researcher: 
 
• Why has the Balanced Scorecard been constructed with seemingly little or no 
underpinning reference to, or understanding of, the basic concepts? 
• Is there a set format, process and content for a Balanced Scorecard that will 
create success, or are there key features, or issues, that have been addressed 
that are creating success? 
• Why is the organisation committed to the Balanced Scorecard, particularly 
when there are so many problems associated with the measures being used, 
and the outputs that are identified? 
• Why is the Balanced Scorecard perceived as so successful? 
• Has the Balanced Scorecard had, and if so how and why, a big impact on 
organisational culture? 
 
Some of these issues even start to point to a core question of, “What is a Balanced 
Scorecard?”  Early reading confirmed that this was a legitimate question, since, as 
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will be highlighted in Chapter 2, some organisations have departed from the 
archetypal model. 
 
4. The Hypothesis and aim. 
 
All the above questions will be addressed in this research, but the core issue that 
remained unanswered by early reading was the relationship between the Balanced 
Scorecard and organisational culture.  Yet the key benefit being articulated in the 
early stages of the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard in the researcher’s own 
organisation was that it was improving the way that the Management Board was 
identifying and dealing with its business.   
 
This change in the business culture, “…how things are done around here…” 14, gives 
rise to the question: 
 
Should the organisational culture be managed through the 
Balanced Scorecard, and if so how? 
 
Srinivasan 15 asks the question as to why the Balanced Scorecard has taken so long to 
emerge, and suggests that it is an issue of culture.  Only when the culture is ready will 
the organisation be ready to learn and use the Balanced Scorecard effectively.  Clearly 
organisations will not wish to sit passively until they are culturally ready for both the 
Balanced Scorecard and the organisational performance improvement that it aims to 
deliver.  This therefore suggests that organisational culture may have to develop in 
order to accept and utilise the Balanced Scorecard, if it is not ready.  However, since 
the Balanced Scorecard is designed to initiate change, in the form of improved 
organisational performance, it is argued that cultural suitability is an issue that should 
be managed by the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve the chances, or the degree, 
of success of implementing the Balanced Scorecard.   
 
This leads to the hypothesis that will be tested in this research: 
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Implementing the Balanced Scorecard impacts the culture of the 
organisation. 
 
This will open the way to deciding whether the Balanced Scorecard is a potential 
mechanism to manage organisational culture and thus examine how this might be 
achieved.   
 
Thus the aim, the deliverable, from the research is: 
 
To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational 
culture through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve 
culture and thus the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to 
deliver benefit. 
 
This research is conducted in the context of one particular organisation.  To 
understand the applicability of the lessons learned it is necessary to provide both the 
broad and specific contextual information about that organisation.  Thus the 
mechanism developed for cultural management within the organisation can be 
expected to have a varying degree of applicability to other organisations.  By 
providing the contextual information, readers should be able to determine the type and 
extent of any adaptation to the measurement tool that would be required for other 
organisations.  For the supporting case studies presented later there is inevitably less 
contextual support but the aim is to provide enough to create a clear picture, and some 
of the context provided initially will read across to other organisations. 
 
5. Structure of the Research Project. 
 
From the above it will be seen that there are three objectives.  These will be tackled as 
follows: 
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Table 1.2: Research objective summary. 
Objective: Proposed methodology: 
Demonstrate that implementing the 
Balanced Scorecard impacts the culture 
of the organisation. 
Case studies and literature review. 
Identify the issues relating to the 
management of culture through the 
Balanced Scorecard. 
Literature review. 
Demonstrate a mechanism for managing 
organisational culture through the 
Balanced Scorecard. 
Develop and test an appropriate 
cultural measurement tool. 
 
This research is a phenomenological study since it involves understanding human and 
organisational behaviour, and thus the cause of any action or outcome is uncertain. 16  
However, since this research aims to both address a business issue and make a 
contribution to knowledge it falls into the category of Action Research. 17  In addition, 
the core of this work represents a case study of one organisation, which should thus 
provide a resource for future researchers. 18
 
6. Structure of thesis. 
 
This chapter outlines the purpose, direction and structure of the research.  To facilitate 
this, and support this through the rest of the thesis, the structure is presented below in 
the form of a road map.  This will be used at the start and end of each chapter to 
provide respectively the aims of the chapter and a summary.  At the end of Chapter 10 
there is a comprehensive summary of the thesis.  Figure 1.3 introduces the road map 
and summaries Chapter 1. 
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Outline of the research project. 
Chapter 1 highlights a perceived status of the Balanced Scorecard 
that suggests it is a key management system.  Yet many 
implementations fail.  Is it just another management fad?  This and 
other questions demonstrate the issues that underpin this research.  
The Chapter goes on to set out the hypothesis for the research that, 
• Implementing the Balanced Scorecard impacts the culture of 
the organisation. 
It then goes on to state the aim of the research, which is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational 
culture through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve 
culture and thus the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to 
deliver benefit.
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the 
Balanced Scorecard. 
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool 
for use with the Balanced Scorecard.
Supporting case studies. 




The roadmap represents a linear guide through the research.  Figure 1.3 maps the 
journey in a different manner in order to demonstrate the prime linkages between 
chapters.  The content could be rearranged but the combination of two topics and 
multiple case studies means that it would be unlikely to improve the logical flow. 
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Chapter 1:Outlining an issue.
Chapter 2: What 








Chapter 5: No organisation is 
an island, entire of itself. 
Chapter 6: The 
study of the 
implementation 















Chapter 9: Validating 
case studies. 
Chapter 10: Summary.
Figure 1.3: Logical flow of research. 
 
 
In particular, note that Chapter 5 and its appendices provide the background to 
Chapters 6 to 8.  The linkages from Chapters 3 and 6 to Chapter 9 are not particularly 
strong, for reasons that will become obvious later. 
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7. Study value. 
 
This study examines two issues: the Balanced Scorecard and organisational culture.  






- set through the 
Balanced Scorecard 
People  
- hold the organisational 
culture and operate the 
processes to deliver 
objectives 
Processes  
- used to deliver the 
organisational 
objectives 





Figure 1.4 highlights the fact that it is “people” who maintain the culture and who 
operate the processes in order to deliver organisational objectives. Achievement of 
organisational objectives helps set the organisational culture from both internal and 
external perspectives, ie by developing a reputation for delivering certain products or 
services to a certain standard.  Processes, “the way we do things round here”, are a 
fundamental part of organisational culture.  Nevertheless, fundamentally, it is the 
“people” who hold maintain, sustain and communicate the culture.  Therefore each 
element of the above is integral to both the Balanced Scorecard and organisational 
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culture.  This research therefore seeks to explore this relationship in order to enable 
organisations to gain a new perspective on Balanced Scorecard implementation. 
 
Action research aims to provide benefits to the organisation being studied and to make 
a new contribution to knowledge.  The expected value is therefore categorised as 
shown in Table 1.3: 
 
Table 1.3: Categorisation of study value. 
Organisational benefits: Contribution to knowledge: 
Greater understanding of the issues 
affecting or driving the introduction of 
new management systems within the 
Ministry of Defence (MOD). 
Provision of a new case study on the 
introduction of the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Provision of a cultural measurement 
tool for use in association with the 
Balanced Scorecard. 
Examination of the relationship 
between Balanced Scorecard and 
cultural issues. 
Greater understanding of cultural issues 
affecting MOD. 
Provision of a new case study on 
culture and culture change in MOD. 
 
From greater understanding of the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard 
organisations will be better placed to select and implement future management 
processes.  The provision of the related case study will also enable organisations to 
implement the Balanced Scorecard more successfully by identifying issues addressed, 
or missed, by another organisation. 
 
The development of the understanding of relationships between the Balanced 
Scorecard and cultural issues will enable all organisations to improve the 
implementation of the Balanced Scorecard.  The provision of a cultural measurement 
tool for use within a particular area of MOD will facilitate the wider development of 
such models and thus improve the management of culture in organisations committed 
to the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Examination of the cultural issues, and culture change, in MOD will facilitate greater 
understanding of such issues and thus improve management of these issues and future 
changes. 
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Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Kaplan and Norton set out to discover how some organisations succeed, 
whilst companies, which have succeeded in building quality into their 
products and processes, fail.  Their answer is based on the need to take 
a wide and balanced view of the organisation.  This they built into their 
Balanced Scorecard management tool. 
This Chapter seeks to answer the question, “What is a Balanced 
Scorecard”?  It goes on to look at how it produces success.  The 
Chapter highlights tools seen as alternatives or competitors, and 
particularly highlights the French Tableau de Bord. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard. 
Supporting case studies. 
Summary of conclusions. 
Figure 2.1 
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Figure 2.1 is the road map of the thesis which sets out the aims for this Chapter.  
Whilst Chapter 1 gave a very brief outline of the Balanced Scorecard, this chapter 
seeks to provide a much more detailed answer to the question, “What is a Balanced 
Scorecard?”  Couwenberg, Dallas, Hardjono, Koster and Meines have compared the 
Balanced Scorecard with another currently widely used management tool, the EFQM 
Quality Model (see below). 1, 2  They assess the Balanced Scorecard as being, “… 
somewhat narrow but open to tailoring, while the quality model is broader but more 
prescriptive.” 3  Whilst to describe the Balanced Scorecard as “narrow” may seem 
extreme, the comparison highlights the contrast between the EFQM model, which is 
strictly controlled, and the Balanced Scorecard that is tailored for each 
implementation.  That is, a spectrum of management tools exists where on the one 
hand tools are tautly prescribed and controlled, and at the other end are open to 
adaptation and tailoring to meet individual situations or local need.  So, for the 
Balanced Scorecard, how much tailoring is permissible?  When have the fundamental 
principles ceased to apply?  Indeed, what are the fundamental principles?  As will be 
shown, Kaplan and Norton’s own ideas developed over the years.  They also highlight 
“versions” of their concept that they do not believe are true Balanced Scorecards.  
This suggests that there may not be a single answer to this question, but that not 
everything that rejoices in the name of “Balanced Scorecard” does so legitimately. 
 
This chapter therefore looks at the origins of the Balanced Scorecard; how Kaplan and 
Norton originally defined it; and the subsequent development of thinking.  This will 
draw on those who have contributed to the debate by providing additional comment; 
information on users; and those who challenge the ideas.  The aim is thus to enable 
the reader to gain sufficient information to determine whether something is a true 
“Balanced Scorecard” or simply something that masquerades under the name. 
 
However, one of the key claims that Kaplan and Norton make is that the Balanced 
Scorecard will help transform organisational performance.  Since this seems to be a 
key objective, it will be necessary to explore this and look at how the success of the 
Balanced Scorecard is defined.  One aspect of this is the degree to which the Balanced 
Scorecard is truly successful or whether it has merely been given “hype” for 
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commercial reasons.  The danger is that quasi-Balanced Scorecards, either because 
they are successful or because they are failures, might lure people away from a true 
and, potentially, successful concept.  
 
2. The starting point. 
 
Inevitably the origins of the Balanced Scorecard lie in the perceived failures of other 
models and tools.  If something else were successful then there would be no reason to 
change: no reason to develop new ideas.  “Build a better mousetrap and the world will 
beat a path to your door”, is still true today. 4  This section therefore looks at the 
pressures for change and the problems arising from previous management tools. 
 
Pressure for change arises from the dynamics of the surrounding environment.  
Political, social, economic, technological, environmental and legal changes have been 
enormous in the last 50 years of the 20th Century.  Some, such as A Brown, see these 
changes as likely not only to continue, but for the pace of change to increase. 5  Kotter 
too talks of, “… significant, often traumatic, change in organisations …” 6 over the 
last two decades.  He suggests that, “Powerful macroeconomic forces are at work 
here, and these forces may grow even stronger over the next few decades.” 7  Senge, 
Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, Roth, and Smith, point to the enormous changes in, “… 
technology, biology, medicine, social values, demography, the environment, and 
international relations …”. 8  They then go on to argue,  
 
“… but one thing is reasonably certain: Continuing challenges 
will tax our collective abilities to deal with them.  Failure to 
rethink our enterprises will leave us little relief from our current 
predicaments: rising turbulence causing rising stress; increasing 
disconnection and internal competitiveness; people working 
harder, rather than learning how to work smarter; and 
increasingly intractable problems beyond the reach of any 
individual or organisation.” 9
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Senge, et al, are not alone in calling for change.  Referring to the Security First Bank 
of Anaheim, California and the need for organisations to adopt the Balanced 
Scorecard, Chow, Haddad and Williamson comment,  
 
 “The restructuring at Security First is only one example of how 
American companies are making major changes in responding to 
an increasing global economy.  Indeed, the need for fundamental 
change is so strong that some leading authorities from academia 
and industry have called for a complete rethinking and 
reengineering of Corporate America.” 10  
 
Yet this is despite the radical change that had taken place in many organisations over 
preceding decades.  Just-in-time, 11 Business Process Re-engineering (BPR),  12 
systems thinking, 13 Economic Value Added, 14 Value Chain Analysis, 15 and many 
more, are all techniques that were developed to help improve business performance.  
These are essentially process level tools to drive efficiency and effectiveness rather 
than strategic management tools like the Balanced Scorecard, which aims to set and 
drive organisational direction.  Of considerable influence during this period was the 
rise of Japanese industry as it was reconstructed following World War II. 16, 17  In 
particular, and largely attributable to Deming, was the rise of the quality philosophy, 
aimed at delighting customers.  This has spawned a number of management tools and 
techniques: Total Quality Management (TQM), Quality Circles, The Deming Model, 
The Baldrige Awards, 18 and the European Foundation for Quality Management 
(EFQM) Excellence Model.  These latter three tools, based on “quality models” 
promoted quality through inter-organisational competition. 19  Meanwhile, Wills, 
quoting Sovie, highlights that the search for quality and the introduction of new 
management tools also affected government organisations such as the NHS,  
 
“Quality Management as part of the New Culture.  Hospital 
leaders are responding to the external forces and demands by 
adopting approaches that industrial leaders have used with great 
success.  New partnerships, continuous quality improvement, 
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bench-marking, outcome management, employee participation, 
project and work teams and system staff and management 
development are important components of the cultural change that 
leaders are working to integrate into organisational norms.” 20   
 
Thus the search for organisational excellence was widespread.  Nevertheless, in the 
late 1980s poor economic conditions contributed to the business failure of a number 
of Baldrige Award winners. 21  This has cast some doubt on the validity of their 
business excellence model, and the quality philosophy, as an indicator of good 
organisational performance.  M G Brown commenting on the pursuit of quality in 
American industry during the 1990s says, “The price of quality, however, often was 
lower financial results.  Some companies with the best quality in their industries went 
out of business.” 22  Kaplan and Norton also illustrate the point with the example of an 
American electronics company that made dramatic improvements in quality, 
productivity and customer service without improving overall financial performance. 23  
But, M G Brown also highlights the demise of the quality movement, “Since 1995, 
quality has had a bad reputation.  Even the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality 
Award has removed most of the reference to quality from its 1995 criteria.” 24
 
Kaplan and Norton’s work was thus directed at seeking to establish an alternative 
regime to improve the chances of organisational survival and success.  The work done 
was partly an analysis of successful organisations and partly an application and 
assessment of lessons learned.  Twelve large US organisations were involved in this 
assessment phase. 25  A key conclusion of the research undertaken by Kaplan and 
Norton was that, in order to be successful, a company had to address long-term issues 
and not just simply rely on producing good short-term results.   
 
Typically pressures for success are expressed and monitored in relation to financial 
performance.  Huang supports the deficiency of financial accounting performance 
measures in manufacturing businesses; but from Kaplan and Norton’s work these 
deficiencies would seem to have wider applicability in terms of businesses suffering 
this problem. 26  Financial markets convert information about a company into an 
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assessment of the impact on profits, which in turn will impact the share price.  Other 
factors will also affect share price, such as liquidity, the balance of equity and debt, 
asset holdings and wider market and industry pressures; these will need to be taken 
into account.  Nevertheless, since shareholdings may be very short-term, and much of 
the trade in shares is based on price movement rather than true worth, share prices 
may not substantially reflect long-term profitability.  Consequently financial data is 
seen much more as a short-term issue rather than having substantial long-term impact.  
However, since the financial aspects of performance exert such a strong influence, 
management is typically seen as concentrating its efforts on managing these issues.  
This means that management has a short-term focus.  Kaplan and Norton thus 
believed that the focus of management needed to change in response to the dynamic 
pressures of the external environment. 
 
3. The Balanced Scorecard as a Management Tool. 
 
In Chapter 1 a basic description of Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard is given.  
However, even the early writings of Kaplan and Norton suggest that there is much 
more to the Balanced Scorecard than might be immediately apparent.  Indeed, M G 
Brown comments, “I’ve seen a few organisations that claim to now have a balanced 
scorecard because they have begun measuring nonfinancial areas of performance.  If 
it were only that simple.” 27  Brown is only one of a number of people writing at 
length on the Balanced Scorecard, whilst there are many others making shorter 
contributions on some aspect or other.  This section therefore seeks to develop the 
basic description of the Balanced Scorecard and its associated processes as outlined 
by Kaplan and Norton.  Chow, Haddad & Williamson make a somewhat curious 
comment that, “More than others, Kaplan and Norton probably deserve much of the 
credit for elucidating and increasing awareness of this [the Balanced Scorecard] 
concept.” 28  Curious, since inevitably Kaplan and Norton articulated their concepts in 
order to demonstrate it and gain acceptance of their ideas.  Therefore it is inevitable 
that this section will draw heavily, although not exclusively, on Kaplan and Norton’s 
writings. 
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The original structure of the Balanced Scorecard, as shown in Kaplan and Norton’s 















Figure 2.2: The original four Balanced Scorecard 
perspectives. 
(From: Kaplan and Norton (1992). The Balanced Scorecard - Measures 
that drive performance. Harvard Business Review. Jan/Feb.) 
 
 
These four perspectives were to drive the short and long-term actions of the 
organisation through the use of a balance between leading and lagging indicators. 30  
The financial perspective would concentrate on historical issues in terms of financial 
results and would examine how the key financial stakeholders view the organisation.  
The innovation and learning perspective would concentrate on the ability of the 
organisation to sustain itself into the future by developing future capability.  This 
leaves the customer and internal business perspectives to concentrate on issues that 
are fairly current.  Thus the customer perspective examines meeting and exceeding 
customer expectations.  The internal business perspective looks at current processes to 
ensure these are efficient and effective, eg in relation to producing output.  This can 
be represented as shown in Figure 2.3: 
 



















Figure 2.3: Time perspectives of the four Balanced 
Scorecard perspectives. 
(Adapted from: Olve, N-G. Roy, J. and Wetter, W.  (1999).  
Performance Drivers - A practical guide to using the Balanced 
Scorecard.  Published in Swedish in 1997, English translation 







Early on in the development and implementation of the Balanced Scorecard, 
companies argued that the Innovation and Learning perspective did not reflect the 
way that their companies operated.  Change was seen as an integral part of the 
business process, as the organisation searched for improvements.  Change was 
therefore integrated into internal business process rather than a distinct and separate 
activity.  A separate innovation and learning perspective was seen by some to be 
inappropriate.  Kaplan and Norton responded to this by adapting their original 
proposals.  The innovation and learning perspective therefore became the Learning 
and Growth perspective.  So, whilst product or process development could be covered 
by the internal process perspective, it did not fully embrace the “learning” issues for 
organisations or individuals. 31  Niven refers to this as the “Employee Learning and 
Growth” perspective. 32  This too may be rather narrow. 
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As already indicated, it is important to recognise that the Balanced Scorecard 
represents a framework and it is not a prescriptive tool of the manner of the EFQM 
Excellence Model.  The EFQM Excellence Model measures organisations against an 
assessed common standard that aims to articulate good practice in business. 33  The 
Balanced Scorecard must reflect the individual needs of each different organisation 
that uses it.  Consequently there is a need for tailoring.  Indeed Kaplan and Norton 
acknowledged the requirement to adapt the Balanced Scorecard to meet local needs 
and aspirations.  Therefore, if a scorecard is to be successful, key concepts highlighted 
by Kaplan and Norton do need to be addressed.  In particular, the scorecard must be 
“balanced” to reflect long and short-term issues as well as ensuring that the full 
breadth of business activity is properly reflected.  For example M G Brown 
comments,  
 
“What I like about the Kaplan and Norton model is that it asks for 
measures of innovation, learning, and growth; company 
scorecards often neglect measures in these areas.  Furthermore, 
all of their measures focus on past and present time periods.” 34
 
Failure to adopt the key principles could well lead to a set of measures being arranged 
in, say, the four usual perspectives and thus purport to be a Balanced Scorecard 
without providing any of the benefits claimed for the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
The fact that the Balanced Scorecard is so flexible adds to the complexity of the 
implementation.  Whilst there are fairly standardised methodologies and processes for 
implementing the Balanced Scorecard, the individuality of requirements and 
outcomes means that each implementation is unique.  Consequently the degree of 
learning about the implementation of Balanced Scorecard from individual 
implementation processes for a Balanced Scorecard will be limited compared to 
implementing a standardised rigid model.  But in contrast, the potential to learn about 
the Balanced Scorecard from each implementation is much greater, because different 
issues may need to be addressed.  This is illustrated in Figure 2.4 below. 
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 of Tool 
Figure 2.4: Learning from implementation of different 
types of management tool. 
(Source: Author.) 
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Thus the Balanced Scorecard is a flexible management tool that is complex to 
implement, because each implementation is different.  As will be seen, in due course, 
the format of the Balanced Scorecard may even change provided basic principles are 
adopted.  In the following sections the key issues of: 
 
• Strategy and internal communication, 
• Performance Indicators, 
• Reward, 
• External communication, 
• Business plan, 
• Breakthrough performance, 
• Linking to resourcing and management processes, 
 
will be discussed and developed. 
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 4. The importance of strategy and internal communication in Balanced 
Scorecard concepts. 
 
A key issue in the development of a Balanced Scorecard for an organisation is that of 
the vision and strategy, which Kaplan and Norton saw as being at the heart of the 
Balanced Scorecard. 35  “A mission statement defines an organisation's purpose.  It is 
not the same as a vision statement, which focuses on the future and defines what a 
company wants to become.” 36  The Balanced Scorecard is a tool for monitoring 
achievement against targets and aims.  Consequently these targets and aims must be 
agreed before the scorecard is constructed.  Without agreement and consistent focus 
the Balanced Scorecard will only serve to destroy the organisation as individuals drive 
it towards conflicting aims. 
 
However, it has to be said that the true strategic nature of the Balanced Scorecard 
really only emerged later in Kaplan and Norton’s writings.  For example in early 1996 
they wrote, “Recently we have seen some companies move beyond our early vision for 
the scorecard to discover its value as the cornerstone of a new strategic management 
system.” 37  Thus having established the concept in their earlier works, the strategic 
perspective becomes the focus of their message in later works. 38  They also start their 
second major work outlining the need for effective strategy implementation rather 
than good strategy. 39  The importance of strategy implementation is highlighted by 
research reported by Becker, Huselid and Ulrich, 
 
“Strategy implementation is more important than strategy content.  
A 35 percent improvement in the quality of strategy 
implementation, for the average firm, was associated with a 30 
percent improvement in shareholder value.  A similar improvement 
in the suitability of the strategy itself had no effect on firm 
performance.”  40
 
2 - 11 
Kaplan and Norton attribute the problem of poor strategy implementation to the lack 
of strategy measurement tools in the modern knowledge based business environment. 
41
 
Argyris and Schon articulated the concept of double loop learning in 1991, as 
illustrated below in Figure 2.5. 42  Essentially they have defined the traditional 
feedback loop as the first loop, where plans are implemented, monitored and adjusted 
in order to ensure that action achieves the original intention.  Double loop learning 
takes the process of learning from the outcome of actions a stage further.  It seeks to 
understand why the actions planned and implemented did not achieve the original 
aims, and therefore whether the original aims are achievable by the planned route, or 
whether the aims themselves should be adjusted.  Thus it is not simply the tactics 
employed that are challenged but the strategy itself.  Clearly this strategic learning is 
essential if organisations are to be successful.  Employment of a strategy that fails to 
achieve its overall objectives is flawed.  The danger is that if the strategy itself is not 
reviewed, resources required to achieve the aim will be adjusted, when an alternative 
strategy may more easily achieve the aim.  Kaplan and Norton capitalise on Argyris 
and Schon’s ideas as supporting their concepts for use of the Balanced Scorecard 
stating,  
 
“Improving existing operations to achieve pre-specified strategic 
goals is a good example of single-loop learning.  But companies 
are starting to use the Balanced Scorecard to extend their 
operational and management review processes into a strategic 
learning process, which extends single-loop operational learning 
to double-loop strategic learning at the management team and 
SBU level.”  43
 



















Figure 2.5: Double loop learning.
(Developed from the ideas of Argyris and Schon as articulated by 
Kaplan, R. and Norton, D.  (1996).  The Balanced Scorecard: 




A Brown articulates single and double loop learning at a much more simplistic level.  
Brown sees single loop learning as incremental improvement, and double loop 
learning as innovation. 44  There is probably a degree to which this does apply but this 
does appear to miss the fundamental principles referred to by Kaplan and Norton. 
 
Kaplan and Norton highlighted the Double Loop Learning concept in order to stress 
the need for strategic learning.  Their clear aim was to encourage learning about 
strategy development not simply strategy delivery.  Delivery of the wrong strategy 
may be damaging to an organisation in the same way as is failure to deliver the 
articulated strategy.  Thus strategy development is an ongoing process driven from 
achievement of current business activities.  However, whilst Becker, et al, highlight 
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the benefits of delivering a poorer strategy over failure to deliver a strategy at all, 
double loop learning will aid the improvement of strategy as it is implemented.  
Within this there is inevitably a need to understand the external environment to ensure 
that the organisation adapts its actions and strategy to change needs and 
circumstances.  The Balanced Scorecard, if used according to Kaplan and Norton’s 
developed thinking, will articulate the internal issues and thus prompt examination of 
the external environment.   
 
The Balanced Scorecard is also seen as a key communication tool of the 
organisation’s strategy.  This is because the Balanced Scorecard should reflect the key 
actions required in pursuit of the strategic plan.  The one page representation of 
strategy and performance must provide clarity of objectives for the organisation.  In 
so doing it helps to orientate the activities of all employees towards these commonly 
stated objectives.  However, for many staff, particularly in large organisations, the 
overall objectives of the organisation may be too remote.  This would be particularly 
so in conglomerate organisations where overall objectives may have no focus into the 
lower levels of any subsidiary organisation.  Consequently it is beneficial for the 
scorecard to be broken down at lower levels to provide clear articulation of the 
contribution each lower level makes to the overall objective.  Clearly the linkages 
between the scorecards at different levels need to be understood.  If these 
relationships are not articulated individuals may become isolated from the wider 
organisation and its objectives. 
 
5. The importance of the Performance Indicators in Balanced Scorecard 
concepts. 
 
The development or selection of the Performance Indicators (PIs) is important 
because these are the substance of the Balanced Scorecard.  Kaplan and Norton argue 
that the number of PIs used should be kept to about 15 to 20 linked measures, in order 
to keep the focus on key issues. 45  Because the aim is to keep the number of PIs to a 
minimum it is essential that they are carefully designed. 
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An early issue underlying the development of the Balanced Scorecard was the desire 
to overcome the domination of standard financial measures used as business measures 
and drivers. 46  These standard PIs allow comparisons to be made with other 
organisations externally, and internally between departments or business proposals.  
This will be important for investment decisions.  However, the Balanced Scorecard is 
meant to serve a different purpose: a monitor of achievement against a strategic 
agenda. 47  Therefore, since all organisations are unique, each scorecard should be 
unique too.  This might imply that all the measures used in the scorecard or, at the 
very least, the combination of measures in the scorecard would be unique.  However, 
in their book “The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action” Kaplan 
and Norton spend some considerable space discussing the typical type of performance 
measure that might be included in a scorecard.  M G Brown 48 and Olve, Roy and 
Wetter49 also employ this tactic.  The implication is that there is a core set of 
performance measures that organisations can draw on to change and adapt for their 
own particular circumstances.  Indeed, although the Balanced Scorecard concept 
seeks to move organisations away from an over-domination of traditional financial 
measures, it is likely that at least some such measures will appear in the financial 
perspective of many organisations.  This is because these traditional measures will 
continue to have some importance and relevance outside of the organisation, ie they 
will continue to be business drivers.  Thus, in reality, whilst organisational scorecards 
will probably be unique, some of the individual measures may occur in other 
scorecards. 
 
A key example of such repetition of performance measures will be where an 
organisation breaks its scorecard down to lower level business units that perform 
similar functions.  In such instances the measures may be the same but the targets and 
achievement will vary.  For example, a large retailer that breaks its Balanced 
Scorecard down to store level may have many of the same performance measures in 
the parent and subsidiary level scorecards. 
 
One of the temptations perceived by Kaplan and Norton for those developing a 
Balanced Scorecard is the potential for people to take the easy option and merely 
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specify performance measures for which data can be easily collected.  This has the 
advantage that the system is cheaper to run.  Niven highlights a related issue, “Taking 
an existing group of measures and placing them into conveniently predefined 
perspectives does not a Balanced Scorecard make.”  50  He goes on to highlight that it 
is essential to have measures that specifically relate to, and assist in the delivery of, 
the strategy.  However, the danger is that reliance on past PIs will fail to highlight 
what it is important for managers to focus on in future decisions and management 
actions.  Also obsolete measures will engender the wrong behaviour in employees, 
who will concentrate on delivering more of the output being measured by 
management.  The result is that such indicators will show improvement whilst overall 
the organisation performance may be declining. 
 
Thus whilst the use of surrogate measures should not be ruled out, they should be 
used with caution.  In some instances it may be impossible to obtain the required data, 
particularly in respect of leading indicators.  In such instances everyone must 
understand why a particular measure is being used.  Clearly there is a balance to be 
struck between the cost of collection and the utility of the data used for a balanced 
scorecard measure. 
 
Similarly there is discussion about the use of complex measures that combine a 
number of components to help reflect a broader range of issues than would be 
reflected by a single source data set.  Here the danger is that combining different data 
streams could: 
 
• Hide what is actually happening in some key area, ie one improvement may 
more than offset a decline in performance in another data set. 
• Produce a performance measure that is not properly understood and which 
consequently promotes wrong behaviour that is detrimental to organisational 
interests. 
 
Nevertheless, performance measures that are combined to produce a complex 
composite indicator should not be ruled out since this may be an effective way to 
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highlight trends.  It must be remembered in this context that the users of the Balanced 
Scorecard may not all be management who will be used to dealing with complex data.  
The cascade of scorecards down to individuals and working groups is advocated; 
therefore it is essential that all staff can readily appreciate even the complex 
performance measures.  Without positive understanding it will be impossible to 
engender, or maintain, appropriate behaviour based on feedback of achieved 
performance. 
 
However, the selection of an appropriate performance measure may not be a simple 
task.  This may be particularly true in the early stages of development and use of the 
Balanced Scorecard.  In such instances Kaplan and Norton advocate the used of 
narrative as a substitute.  The expectation is that over time the narrative will start to 
highlight what are perceived to be the key issues in relation to the performance 
against the relevant strategic issue.  The narrative would thus harden into measurable 
data over a period of time. 
 
Several adages have been used in the literature to emphasise the importance of 
selecting and reporting the right issues. “What gets measured gets done” 51, “You are 
what you measure” or “What you measure is what you get” 52, these emphasise the 
important relationship between measurement, reporting and the subsequent action.  
This clearly links with the issues on reinforcing desired behaviour through the reward 
system.  “Measure what is important not what is easy to measure” emphasises the cost 
of producing a worthwhile reporting system, and thus implicitly the dangers of having 
a low cost system that does not add value to management process.  Nevertheless, 
Brown raises an interesting issue.  He argues that you should not measure what you 
already know. 53  Doing so is a waste of resource.  However, this raises the question 
that if something is very important, and you are not measuring it because it is already 
known (in general terms), do you end up distorting the picture and misleading people 
by presenting an unbalanced picture?  In such circumstances the overall needs of the 
business must take priority, but perhaps there is no need to measure in great detail in 
such circumstances, ie just present aggregate data.  However, measurement is not the 
total solution,  
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 “If measurement alone changed behaviour, there would be no fat 
people, no one would smoke, and everyone would exercise, 
because all of these behaviours and their results can be easily 
measured.”  54
 
Another issue to consider when building the Balanced Scorecard is that of the 
frequency of reports.  This is an issue for any management reporting system, but 
because of the wider issues involved here it may be more important for the 
management information systems developed to support the Balanced Scorecard.  It is 
also an issue that will vary with the nature of the business.  The expectation might be 
that in a volatile business environment reporting periods would be shorter in order to 
increase the frequency of reports. 
 
However, again it is necessary to emphasise that the purpose of the Balanced 
Scorecard may be different from the management reporting systems used historically.  
Such systems tend to have reported short-run, historic information (ie lagging 
indicators) and thus management have responded reactively.  The Balanced Scorecard 
aims to address long-term strategic issues, and should contain a reasonable proportion 
of leading indicators.  This more forward-looking approach suggests a less reactionary 
approach to management issues is appropriate.  Proactive management will probably 
be less interventionist because the cause-and-effect model underpinning the Balanced 
Scorecard will provide better guidance of what action is required and when. 
 
Srinivasan 55 emphasises the need for the Balanced Scorecard to be balanced.  He sees 
this as a key issue in the approach to the organisation’s strategy.  Whilst mentioning 
particularly the “financial” versus “non-financial”, and “outcome” or “results” versus 
“performance drivers” or “process” dimensions, it is also clear that he believes that all 
aspects of the organisation’s strategy need to be balanced if a successful scorecard is 
to be constructed.  Nair provides a simple mechanism to help ensure that scorecards 
are properly balanced; using graphical presentational techniques on four different 
competing perspectives. 56  Failure to build balance into the scorecard would lead to a 
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vicious circle of decline due to a lack of investment in process and customer 
perspectives failing to produce adequate short-term financial returns, leading to a 
demoralised workforce who are unable to effectively utilise the declining 
discretionary investment in the future organisation.  Thus Srinivasan might be seen to 
be supporting Kaplan and Norton’s arguments that it is not the structure of the 
scorecard that is important, but that it is balanced.  He argues that a “balanced” 
scorecard will support a virtuous circle of investment in the future of the organisation, 
which results in better services and relations with the customer, which in turn produce 
better financial results resulting in improved internal stakeholder morale resulting 
from increased internal investment that will facilitate capitalisation on investment in 
research and development. 
 
6. The importance of reward in Balanced Scorecard concepts. 
 
In their second major work on the Balanced Scorecard, Kaplan and Norton introduce 
the concept of Strategic Maps.  These are designed to help build and communicate the 
organisation’s strategy.  They then plot the translation of organisational mission into a 
hierarchy of desired outcomes. 57  This hierarchy moves from the low level, “What I 
need to do”, to the high level concept of, “Why we exist”.  Neuro-Linguistic 
Programming embodies a comparative hierarchy of communication, starting at the 
low level of environmental interaction through to the high level of spiritual issues 
about fundamental questions of purpose and existence. 58  This is illustrated at Figure 
2.6 below. 
 










Figure 2.6: NLP Logical levels.




Referring to this model developed by Dilts, Seymour and O’Connor argue that if an 
individual is to change their actions and beliefs at one level there must be effective 
communication at a higher level.   
 
“Change on a lower level will not necessarily cause any change 
on higher levels.  A change in environment is unlikely to change 
my beliefs.  How I behave may change some beliefs about myself.  
Change at a higher level will always affect the lower levels.  It will 
be more pervasive and lasting.  So if you want to change 
behaviour, work with capability or belief.  If there is a lack of 
capability, work with beliefs.  Beliefs select capabilities which 
select behaviours, which in turn directly build our environment.  A 
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supportive environment is important, a hostile environment can 
make any change difficult.”  59
 
This suggests that in order for organisations to get employee buy-in to their strategy 
there needs to be clear communication at a deeper, ie higher, level than simply telling 
them what to do.  A Brown also highlights the need for cognitive and behavioural 
changes if individuals are to be actively involved in supporting cultural changes. 60  
Using the Balanced Scorecard to communicate must therefore be viewed in-terms of 
improving the psychological buy-in from the employee to the organisational activities 
and processes.  The question is whether such commitment can be obtained from 
careful communication, or whether it has to be reinforced by financial reward: a topic 
discussed below. 
 
In some organisations the cascade of the scorecard is taken to the ultimate level with 
small groups of workers or even individuals having their own scorecard.  This 
provides even greater clarity and direct linkage between action and contribution to the 
overall outcomes.  Individuals can thus be set personal objectives inline with 
organisational needs and objectives. 
 
Reporting against the Balanced Scorecard objectives enables individuals to 
understand what progress is being made towards strategic aims.  By monitoring and 
reporting against lower level and personal scorecards contribution to strategic aims is 
articulated for the staff in a much clearer way.  Indeed, the strategic aims should also 
be more clearly visible and understood.  This in turn will promote consistency of 
action and direction across the organisation.  Thus the Balanced Scorecard can play a 
significant role in the overall internal corporate communication strategy. 
 
A key principle articulated by Kaplan and Norton is that, if individuals are to work 
towards organisational goals, they must not only understand what is required they 
must also be given financial incentives.  “Alignment of the organisation towards the 
strategy must ultimately be motivated through the incentive and reward systems.” 61 
The issue of reward linked to the Balanced Scorecard is a complex and difficult topic, 
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and the somewhat categorical position adopted by Kaplan and Norton cannot 
therefore be supported.  Some would argue that man is an economic animal and will 
respond best to reward, particularly financial reward, positive KITA. 62  Kaplan and 
Norton would probably fall into this camp, since they make a number of references to 
the work of Kerr, which advocates aligning reward systems with organisational goals. 
63  Others argue that intrinsic reward is more important than extrinsic reward. 64  
Herzberg argues for job enrichment through addressing positive motivational factors 
such as responsibility, recognition, personal achievement, growth and learning. 65  
Niven argues the case for and against intrinsic reward, 66 before going on to 
demonstrate how the Balanced Scorecard can be used effectively to support a 
financial reward structure.   
 
“The debate over intrinsic versus extrinsic rewards and motivation 
has been raging for decades.  Intrinsic rewards may produce 
fulfilment and a sense of price, while extrinsic rewards hold the 
possibility of sharpening our focus on what must be done in order 
to succeed.” 67
 
Kaplan and Norton themselves highlight one public sector organisation where 
significant improvements were made using the Balanced Scorecard without any 
linkage to compensation. 68  However, the underpinning principle here is that the 
Balanced Scorecard has to become an all pervasive management tool and philosophy.  
There is a strong belief underpinning the Balance Scorecard philosophy that, “What 
you measure is what you get”. 69  The fact that an aspect of performance is constantly 
measured should send signals to the workers that this is what management deems to 
be important, and staff will thus concentrate on producing what is required.  Thus the 
necessity for reward systems to reinforce what individuals already know is unclear.  
The suggestion, from the Department of Energy Procurement case cited by Kaplan 
and Norton, and implicit in the title of Kerr’s work, is that, provided the people are 
not rewarded in a manner too inconsistent from organisational goals, specific 
incentives to achieve organisational goals are not required provided people are 
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correctly motivated and orientated.  This reinforces the NLP concept that people will 
act in accordance with their identity and beliefs. 
 
In many instances the measures included in the Balanced Scorecard will be different 
from those traditionally used.  This goes back to the underlying principle that a key 
aim is to promote longer-term views of the organisation based on a broad perspective 
of activities and actions, rather the short-term focus on the financial indicators.  This 
is why a degree of internal conflict may arise if the reward structure for employees 
continues to be linked to the long-standing financial objectives.  In such 
circumstances individuals will continue to pursue objectives that increase personal 
reward rather than the corporate good.  Previous financial objectives may actually be 
counter to the new organisational objectives.  Consequently management may find 
their strategic objectives, as articulated through the Balanced Scorecard, are 
frustrated. 
 
Reorientation of staff effort is theoretically achieved easily by building a reward 
structure linked to the Balanced Scorecard.  However, in practice, this may not be 
easy.  Financial objectives are usually fairly easy to measure and relate to a financial 
reward structure.  Balanced Scorecard objectives represent a wider range of issues that 
may or may not be easily linked to financial outcomes.  Because some objectives, 
particularly those in the learning and growth perspective of the scorecard, are longer-
term measures, the short-term impact may be detrimental to the short-term financial 
position.  That is, effectively the organisation will be starting to reward individuals for 
taking action that reduces short-term profitability, such as rewarding investment in 
training that will not benefit the organisation until it is completed. 
 
Another aspect of this problem is that staff will contribute to more than one 
perspective of the scorecard.  Therefore reward structures then start to become multi-
dimensional.  It is inevitable that some aspects of performance will be easier to 
achieve than others.  Where there are trade-offs between various scorecard measures 
there may be a temptation for individuals to try to manipulate the reward system for 
their own personal advantage, with suboptimal results on overall organisational 
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performance.  For example, if the reward structure does not properly balance reward 
between short and long-term issues, managers might deliberately choose to invest 
effort in improving short-term financial performance to gain greater bonuses, but at 
the expense of long-term prospects. 
 
The reward system will thus be complex if it has to reflect achievement against a wide 
range of measures, reflect the relationships between these measures, and perhaps even 
place bounds on the required performance.  Kaplan and Norton thus found a degree of 
reluctance among organisations to replacement of existing reward systems that were 
fairly simple and easy to operate, as well as being well understood by employees. 70  
Introducing a new reward system linked to the Balanced Scorecard will be difficult 
because: 
 
• It will be complex and thus difficult and expensive to administer. 
• Uncertainty on the part of the company on the benefits and impact, including 
cost of bonuses, resulting from the new system.   
• There is likely to be resistance from employees because of a dislike of change, 
uncertainty over the likely rewards, uncertainty of the linkage between action 
and reward, perceptions of reduction in the ability to manipulate the system in 
order to gain reward. 
 
There will also be concerns about the developmental nature of an early Balanced 
Scorecard.  Even though the Balanced Scorecard may take two years to develop, there 
is a significant prospect that there will be subsequent changes.  These may result, for 
example, from changes to objectives resulting from strategic learning.  The 
probability of these changes may make management reluctant to build a new reward 
system that is likely to change within a short space of time.  Because there is likely to 
be a degree of scepticism about the Balanced Scorecard, and there is a recognition that 
the scorecard will change over time, management may be reluctant to make an early 
change in the reward system; preferring to wait until they have experience and 
confidence in the future of the scorecard.  Olve, Roy and Wetter highlight issues in 
this area because, whilst management must seek to reward behaviours, the outcome of 
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the required action may not materialise due, for example, to external environmental 
change. 71  It might be anticipated that this will happen more with an immature cause-
and-effect model, but it still represents an additional cost with no benefit.  In such 
circumstances management must not be seen to renege on its commitment to the new 
reward system or it will lose the commitment of the employees. 
 
Conversely management can demonstrate strong commitment to their Balanced 
Scorecard by making a firm commitment to a new reward system based on the 
scorecard.  Otherwise there may initially be a feeling among many workers that the 
Balanced Scorecard is just another management fad. 
 
7. The issue of external communication in Balanced Scorecard concepts. 
 
The previous sections have already talked much about the importance of 
communication in relationship to the Balanced Scorecard.  This section goes on to 
explore this issue in more detail in relation to its potential for use in external 
communication. 
 
Internally the Balanced Scorecard is used to direct action and communicate with 
employees.  Required action may need to be reinforced through the use of reward 
systems.  However, the question is raised that if the Balanced Scorecard is so 
fundamental to internal management process, does it also have a role externally?  
Clearly in the past the use of financial ratios were used both internally and externally 
to assess achievement.  If an organisation using the Balanced Scorecard internally to 
direct management activity were to continue to be monitored externally using 
traditional financial ratios there is considerable risk of mismatch of expected 
outcomes.  Two issues are raised in relation to using the Balanced Scorecard 
externally to manage expectations of desired or anticipated outcomes: 
 
• Comparability – One of the main reasons financial ratios are used in 
assessing organisational performance is that they provide standard means of 
comparing one organisation with another.  This is particularly important for 
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investors in a company who will be deciding between the performances of 
various companies in order to find the organisation with the best return, 
compared to their needs: eg capital growth or income.  Clearly such 
comparability is best achieved in the same business sectors where risk is 
consistent.  But financial ratios can also be used to compare different business 
sectors.  On the other hand, Balanced Scorecards will be specific to individual 
companies since, even within the same business sector, they can be expected 
to have different objectives and different strategies for achieving them.  This 
means that Balanced Scorecards cannot be used in an objective manner for 
comparison purposes between different organisations.  The likelihood is 
therefore that markets and investors will continue to assess organisations using 
traditional financial measures.  Visibility of the Balanced Scorecard externally 
will merely provide information for subjective analysis.  However, it is also 
argued that financial and accounting data is of diminishing value in assessing 
organisational performance and prospects.  Therefore, particularly for 
investment purposes, Balanced Scorecard information represents a much 
better basis for assessing likely performance, even if it has to be done on the 
basis of subjective comparison. 72  As Olve, Roy and Wetter go on to point 
out, there must be debate about who can actually usefully use the data 
presented. 73 
• Visibility – Whilst exposure of the Balanced Scorecard externally will enable 
(potential) investors and markets to assess the organisation’s potential future 
performance, the same is true for competitors.  The Balanced Scorecard, in 
order to be truly effective, should make the organisation’s strategy transparent. 
74  The reason for this is that it has to provide employees with clear guidance 
on requirements.  However, once the Balanced Scorecard is available outside 
the organisation it will only be a matter of time before competitors see it.  
They will then have a clear picture of their competitor’s strategy and can adapt 
their own strategy to undermine that of the opposition.  The original strategy 
will therefore fail to deliver the anticipated results and will need to be 
changed. 
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Thus these two issues suggest that there is no great value in revealing the Balanced 
Scorecard externally.  Nevertheless, it is argued that external visibility of the 
scorecard may have benefits: 
 
• Controlled release – External visibility of the Balanced Scorecard as part of a 
business case in support of, for example, a loan application should help give 
visibility of intended action and thus help build confidence.  In such 
circumstances the information remains subject of customer/client 
confidentiality and should not get into the hands of potential competitors.  
Release may therefore be beneficial in such circumstances. 
• Open access – Similarly, in order to attract investors and ensure that they have 
confidence in the long-term performance of the company, information on 
business plans must also be revealed.  Since the Balanced Scorecard best 
represents that information it is a logical medium to be used to provide 
visibility.  Revealing such information would enable investors to make 
informed decisions about the long-term security of their investment and on the 
likely returns to be made.  However, as already discussed above, such open 
access, including almost certainly to competitors, is likely to be counter-
productive.  It would be necessary to tailor or limit the information released 
such that it gives broad indications without giving too much specific detail.  
This might be done by summarising or generalising information, or by leaving 
out key components of the Balanced Scorecard.  Clearly in such circumstances 
the information revealed reduces in value to investors as well as competitors.  
A balance needs to be struck between the level of information released and its 
value to the company and its value to the different stakeholder and competitor 
groups. 
• Lack of competition – Where there is no competition, for example in public 
service monopoly, the release of the Balanced Scorecard may be an effective 
way of helping to articulate organisational direction or achievement.  This 
could facilitate public debate and thus empower the population, giving them 
greater ownership or involvement of the strategic direction of the organisation. 
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In summary, whilst some would advocate the release of the Balanced Scorecard to 
external bodies, care must be exercised over the value of the information and the 
potential losses or gains that might result.  This perception that the Balanced 
Scorecard has internal value that might be destroyed by external release is one 
possible reason why it can be difficult to obtain details about an organisation’s 
Balanced Scorecard.  In particular, few commercial organisations openly publicise 
their Balanced Scorecard or allow its contents to be revealed even in academic 
publications.  Indeed, Olve, Petri, Roy and Roy highlight that they have uncovered a 
new issue; the need to limit the availability of Balanced Scorecard information within 
commercial organisations to avoid staff being accused of “insider trading” if they buy 
or sell shares in their own company. 75  In contrast, the benefits of public release may 
be greater for public or not-for-profit organisations. 
 
8. The importance of the business plan and model in Balanced Scorecard 
concepts. 
 
Once the overall objectives are agreed and it is clear what these are, they will need to 
be expressed in individual measurable goals.  Plans will need to be developed that aim 
to achieve these goals, and interim targets will need to be set to ensure that progress is 
according to expectations. 76  It is during this phase that work will certainly need to 
begin to involve middle and lower level management.  This is because at this stage 
issues begin to move from the strategic to the tactical.  Consequently there is a need 
for an education programme.  Here the issues will be aimed at ensuring that the 
Balanced Scorecard concepts are accepted and not treated as just another management 
fad.  Potentially too the changes will challenge existing processes, authorities and 
comfort zones of familiarity.  For example, in order to monitor the achievement of the 
tactical plans proposed, new measurements may be required involving new data sets.  
This would require additional work to set up new data flows and processing 
capabilities.  However, this is essential if the true measures of achievement are to be 
used.  Therefore performance measures will not only need to measure the 
achievement of the long-term strategic goals, but measures will also need to determine 
the degree of progress against the plans being used to achieve those goals.   
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 “An effective scorecard or set of metrics includes a few strategic 
measures that link back to the plan, but most of them tell the 
executives and managers how the organisation is performing on a 
daily or monthly basis” 77
 
Kaplan and Norton argue strongly that the measures and plans need to be built into a 
business model.  This enables management to determine the “cause-and-effect” 
relationships between various issues. 78  Thus there should be greater understanding of 
the business operations and the environment in which the organisation operates.  The 
model is key to assessing the interaction between the tactical plans designed to 
achieve the individual goals, and also to assessing the effectiveness of the proposed 
strategy.  This is likely to be a complex task.  Relationships between different actions 
will neither all be linear or positive.  Once the model has been produced it can be used 
to help test the whole vision on an ongoing basis to aid understanding of internal and 
external pressures and changes in relationships over time that might indicate the 
necessity for a change of plans or strategy.  Olve, Roy and Wetter support the idea of 
creating a cause-and-effect model, “… it is a natural idea to try to create a model 
showing how the different measures in our scorecard are interrelated”. 79  They also 
highlight that the cause-and-effect model is a key tool for learning about the strategy, 
but they also report that they had not found examples of the model being used in any 
rigorous way for scenario testing. 80  This suggests that the cause-and-effect model is 
not being used significantly as a learning tool.  At the Halifax Bank the tendency to 
perceive the different perspectives as independent was overcome with “Theory Z” 
(see Figure 2.7 below), which is effectively a high-level cause-and-effect map. 81
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“If we have the 
right staff…” 
Figure 2.7: Halifax’s “Theory Z”.
(Olve, N-G. Roy, J. and Wetter, W.  (1999).  Performance Drivers - A 
practical guide to using the Balanced Scorecard.  Published in Swedish 
in 1997, English translation published by Wiley.  
 
 
Selection of candidate measures to be used will also enable work to start on building 
the Balanced Scorecard.  The arrangement of the measures can be customised to the 
individual organisation but the scorecard should conform to the original concepts and 
ensure that the four perspectives are properly addressed.  Consideration will need to 
be given as to what measures most adequately reflect the requirements.  This may 
necessitate the construction of new measures rather than using existing data.  Clearly 
such changes will need to recognise not only the cost but also the practicality of 
obtaining the required information.  It may therefore be more cost effective to use a 
proxy or surrogate measure.  Some measures may be compound indicators combining 
several data streams.  In such instances it must be clear to users what is meant, where 
the data comes from and how it is combined.  The difference between leading and 
lagging indicators will also need to be recognised.  Lagging indicators will indicate 
historic trends.  Leading indicators will provide information about future trends.  In 
some instances objective measures will not be available.  In these instances a 
subjective narrative record might be included until such time as it has been possible to 
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determine an appropriate objective measure.  The aim will be to select 15 to 20 key 
indicators that best reflect and measure the strategic objectives and the progress 
towards achieving them.  Once constructed the scorecard will need to be approved by 
the management board/directors.  Interestingly, while some see the financial 
dimension as historic, the learning and growth as future orientated and the other 
perspectives as focussed into the present, there is an alternative view.  M G Brown 
suggests that future perspectives should be included throughout the scorecard and that 
all but the learning and growth perspective should include current and past 
perspectives also.  This is to enable the organisation to determine its effectiveness at 
achieving its current mission, as opposed to future vision. 82
 
9. The importance of Breakthrough Performance in Balanced Scorecard 
concepts. 
 
In recent years there has been some advocacy of the benchmarking concept, which 
aims to drive improvement programmes through a process of matching process and 
results of higher performing organisations as measured by standardised performance 
measures.  The quality programmes, including the EFQM Excellence Model, 
emphasise this as a means of helping to gain improvements. 
 
When developing a Balanced Scorecard, organisations will need to consider how they 
intend to use the scorecard to drive change.  Benchmarking is one process that can be 
considered.  In such an instance there may be a need to select performance measures 
that facilitate inter or intra-organisational comparisons.  Alternatively, the 
organisational uniqueness may be recognised by the development of the most 
appropriate performance measure for the organisation, in isolation from other internal 
or external performance comparison issues.  The arguments for using benchmarking 
are that if other organisations can perform the same functions more efficiently and 
effectively then copying the way that they undertake these functions should result in 
performance improvements.   
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In contrast it is argued that this means the benchmarking organisation will never 
outperform other organisations in individual business processes.  Using this strategy 
therefore will not enable organisations to create the defining differential performance 
that enables the organisation to be distinctly different and thus excel.  Kaplan and 
Norton refer to this as the “breakthrough performance”: later defined by Norton as 
where, “… somebody moves on [a] quartile in terms of competitive performance 
within two years”. 83  Kaplan and Norton acknowledge the potential benefits of 
benchmarking, whilst also highlighting some of the problems.  On the one hand they 
acknowledge that it can be a useful means of driving performance improvement. 84  
However, they are also quite critical of benchmarking, 
 
“Unfortunately, benchmarking is one of those initially good ideas 
that has turned into a fad.  About 95% of those companies that 
have tried benchmarking have spent a lot of money and have 
gotten very little in return.  And the difference between 
benchmarking and the scorecard helps reinforce the difference 
between process measures and output measures.  It's a lot easier to 
benchmark a process than to benchmark an output.”  85   
 
Essentially the issue is that benchmarking will perhaps highlight that breakthrough 
from existing poor performance is possible by copying other more effective 
organisations.  Nevertheless, this may not give competitive advantage, and indeed 
copying other organisations may help drive towards outcomes that are not compatible 
with the organisation’s strategy.  The emphasis must therefore be on new ideas.  M G 
Brown also cautions against the benchmarking process because to use it effectively 
requires careful research and appropriate matching of process, and perhaps even of 
industry.  For example, service standards in a private sector business may be 
expensive but essential to remain competitive.  Such cost structures may be 
inappropriate in a public sector monopoly. 86  Brown highlights how some 
organisations are able to adopt strategies of monitoring competitor activity in order to 
create “me-too products”, or capitalising on the intellectual capital tied up in 
competitors’ products, by purchase and careful analysis of the products.  This may 
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save enormous research or development costs and thereby enable the organisation to 
create a distinct niche for itself through cost leadership. 87  In this sense therefore 
copying may enable breakthrough performance.  In contrast Cartwright argues that 
business transformation comes from creativity and innovation. 88  This seems to 
conform much more to Kaplan and Norton’s thinking. 
 
10. The issue of linking to resourcing and management processes in Balanced 
Scorecard concepts. 
 
There is an almost indisputable logic that if the scorecard forms the basis of the 
planning function then it should also be a key part of the Budgeting process.  For 
example Kaplan and Norton argue,  
 
“Once a scorecard has been designed and introduced, concerns 
soon arise if the scorecard is not tied into other management 
programmes, such as budgeting, alignment of strategic initiatives, 
and setting personal targets.  Without such connections, the effort 
devoted to developing a Balanced Scorecard may not deliver 
tangible benefits.” 89   
 
They also state, 
 
“Strategic planning and operational budgeting processes are too 
important to be treated as independent processes. … You must 
expand your traditional budgeting process beyond financial 
targeting to encompass short-term targets for all balanced-
scorecard measures.  The budgeting process should translate the 
first year of a five year plan into operational budgets for strategic 
objectives and measures in all four balanced-scorecard 
perspectives.” 90
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It has already been stated that a key factor in the development of Balanced Scorecard 
was the perceived over-reliance on financial performance measures.  Partly this stems 
from the key role that the budgeting process has always had in the planning process.  
However, it is sometimes, perhaps cynically, argued that budgeting and planning are 
frequently divorced, but only the budget is used as a regular monitoring mechanism. 
 
Consequently if there is to be any attempt to move away from the dominance of 
financial reporting tools the budget must be subsumed into the Balance Scorecard 
process.  Niven provides a comprehensive discussion of the issues and articulates a 
process for achieving this. 91  If the objectives characterised by the Balanced 
Scorecard are to be achieved, not only must staff be motivated to achieve those 
through the reward system, but also the objectives must be properly resourced.  Thus 
as tactical action plans are built to achieve the strategic objectives it should be 
possible to build budgets directly linked to those plans.  This will increase the 
importance and relevance of the “cause and effect” model underpinning the Balanced 
Scorecard since it should help to show how varying the resources allocated to each 
tactical plan will vary the achievement of the objectives. 
 
It can therefore be seen that if the Balanced Scorecard is to be a major management 
tool in the organisation is should not compete with or duplicate other processes.  Olve, 
Roy and Wetter argue that the financial controller could be a key player in the 
development of the Balanced Scorecard. 92  However, they suggest that there is not a 
great deal of evidence of the Balanced Scorecard being developed widely in a large 
number of companies 93 and they go on to suggest that the scorecard might have 
limited application in some areas of the organisation. 94  This would seem to cast 
doubt, or at least uncertainty, over the role of the Balanced Scorecard as a budgetary 
mechanism.  Indeed Olve, Roy and Wetter also cite evidence that accountants are 
sometimes specifically excluded from management of the scorecard because of fears 
that they might be too financially focussed in their perspectives. 95  Similarly Kaplan 
and Norton argue that no functional specialism should have overall control of the 
balanced scorecard for fear that it might be seen as being owned by that specialism. 96
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11. Summary of key principles underpinning the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
The Balanced Scorecard is a key mechanism for guiding the implementation of 
strategy.  This is achieved by developing plans against specific targets that will 
achieve the strategic goals.  These plans and the achievement of the strategic goals are 
monitored using a range of performance indicators that are both predictive and 
historic in their focus.  A key issue is that these PIs should cover a broad range of the 
important business processes and perspectives, both internal and external.  However, 
the number of PIs used should be limited to aid understanding and retain 
organisational focus on key issues. 
 
It is the PIs that articulate the business strategy and objectives.  The Balanced 
Scorecard is therefore a key means of articulating the organisation’s strategy to all 
staff.  Kaplan and Norton argue that the Balanced Scorecard is so effective at 
communicating the strategy that its general release could damage the competitive 
situation of commercial organisations. 97  However, in limited circumstances, release 
outside of the organisation may be of benefit, eg in gaining financial support for 
business development, or for creating greater public awareness of activities in public 
sector organisations. 
 
The PIs should link to a reward structure for people within the organisation.  Kaplan 
and Norton argue that this reward system motivates staff and supports the 
achievement of organisational goals. 98  These organisational goals should aim to 
achieve “breakthrough performance”; a significant increase in overall organisational 
achievement. 99  This is not simply the result of setting stretch targets but through the 
construction and implementation of a sound, integrated, transformational plan, linked 
to learning about the organisational achievement, the external environment, and the 
interaction between the two. 
 
For the Balanced Scorecard to be successful it needs to be embedded into the 
organisational process.  It must not be an adjunct but must become the core of the 
management process; indeed it can be a core process for resource allocation.  Failure 
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to achieve this could cause other processes to detract, and lead to the Balanced 
Scorecard being seen simply as another management fad. 
 
12. Recipe for success, management fad or commercial hype? 
 
Kaplan and Norton seem to have set out to develop an improved performance 
management system.  As the system developed and usage increased, the perception 
was that the Balanced Scorecard was a strategic management tool.  Implicit in both 
concepts is that improving the management process will bring organisational success.  
Much of what is written is aimed at improving the effectiveness of individual 
developments and implementations of the Balanced Scorecards.  Theoretically this 
would therefore lead to improved organisational performance.  The question is, “Does 
implementing the Balanced Scorecard actually produce real benefits?” 
 
Most of the claims for the benefits of the Balanced Scorecard derive from the 
individual case studies that litter the literature.  It is almost inevitable that those 
organisations that are prepared to share, or publicise their experience will claim 
benefits from the system.  Unless organisations, or authors, are attempting to 
“rubbish” the system, failures in the use of the Balanced Scorecard are unlikely to be 
publicised.  For example, although McCunn states that, “Professor Claude Lewy of 
the Free University of Amsterdam, claims that 70% of scorecard implementations 
fail” there is no attempt to highlight name or publicise individual failures. 100
 
However, Kaplan and Norton, referring to case studies, report that the “evidence of 
success is larger than these individual stories”. 101  They go on to report a study by 
the Metrus Group Inc that compares companies using measurement with those that do 
not.  Organisations with “Balanced Measurement” were perceived as performing 
better: 
 
• 83% “had financial performance in the top third of their industry”, 102 
• 74% “were perceived as industry leaders by their peers”, 103 
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• 97% “were perceived as pioneers or leaders on changing the nature of their 
industry”. 104 
 
Kaplan and Norton then go on to report three other studies that also seem to 
demonstrate that companies using Balanced Scorecard, or performance management 
systems linked to strategy, on average, had higher performance. 105  These surveys are 
important, since although quoted by Kaplan and Norton, these form an independent 
view of the effectiveness of Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Nevertheless there is a huge contrast between the results reported by Kaplan and 
Norton and those reported by Lewy.  Why should 70% of firms fail with their 
Balanced Scorecard implementations, yet some of the top performing companies 
apparently benefit so much from using the system?  One issue might be the degree of 
commercial promotion of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
In recent years the commercial exploitation of academic research has become much 
more important.  The rewards of successful business activity have grown relative to 
historic recognition and reward arising from academic work.  Consequently, coupled 
with reduced income from Governments, and greater demands being placed on 
academic institutions for mass education, Universities, and the like, have had to 
become more commercially orientated in order to generate income to maintain, not 
only traditional status, but the quality of the service provided.  Universities have thus 
developed a “commercial arm” through such methods as establishing “business parks” 
where research output is exploited in conjunction with commercial organisations. 
 
Some individuals and organisations have sought to exploit their management 
processes through controlled use, eg the EFQM model and “Economic Value Added” 
have both become registered trademarks.  Harvard Business School has exploited its 
position through the quality of its published articles.  The Harvard Business Review is 
a bi-monthly journal addressing business issues, and the Harvard Business Press 
publishes books on business topics.  Thus Harvard have promoted and capitalised on 
the Balanced Scorecard concepts, while Kaplan and Norton have capitalised on their 
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ideas through lectures, published articles and the software produced by Renaissance 
Solutions Inc.  For example, following publication of Kaplan and Norton’s second 
book, Kaplan took part in a one-day seminar in Britain at which the concepts 
contained in the new book were promoted.  This seminar cost approximately £1200 to 
attend, although this included a free, signed copy of the book.  Good quality seminars 
of a similar duration would normally be expected to cost something around £500 to 
£750.  The Balanced Scorecard Collaborative Inc, another venture involving Kaplan 
and Norton, has also established a “Hall of Fame” as a means of promoting awareness 
and use of the Balanced Scorecard. 106, 107  A Brown makes similar comments about 
the financial interests of those who advocate culture change, but who have vested 
interest in the process they promote. 108
 
Any perceived success of the Balanced Scorecard may thus owe something to 
commercial pressures and the position and authority of Harvard Business School, as 
well as to the influence and actions of Kaplan and Norton themselves.  It is somewhat 
inevitable therefore that other commercial enterprises would also seek to exploit the 
concept.  There are numerous commercial courses available and most management 
consultancies will undoubtedly claim some expertise in the field.  Thus for example 
the work undertaken by Lewy and du Mee seems to be linked to promoting the 
knowledge and expertise of KPMG Consulting.  The Balanced Scorecard has thus 
become something of a “commercial” product to be exploited, 109 until the next 
management philosophy arrives.  
 
All this seems to deny what Brown writes in “Winning Score”,  
 
“Another common output metric used in R&D and academic 
institutions is publication.  Publish or perish is still the law in 
academia, and you get what you measure.  In the field of business 
alone there are over 1,000 new books published each year, and the 
vast majority sell less than 500 copies during their entire print 
cycle.  Writing a book that sells is often not part of the criteria, 
because academic institutions don't want to encourage 
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commercialism from their professors.  In fact, scientists like Carl 
Sagan, who have written bestsellers, have often been scorned by 
their colleagues for chasing royalties.” 110
 
Anthony similarly refers to this problem in the measurement of Universities’ 
performance. 111  It is not clear how commercial pressures influence the perception of 
success of the Balanced Scorecard, but clearly there are strong commercial pressures 
promoting the system.  Such commercial pressure does not necessarily create the 
success reported by Kaplan and Norton.  Therefore, it is necessary to look further at 
the factors that might create success or failure. 
 
The eleven commandments for implementing the Balanced Scorecard, see Table 2.1, 
originate from two works.  Lewy and du Mee wrote the original 10 Commandments 
112, and Mc Cunn, who translated the original from the Dutch, added an eleventh 113; 
although it was directly referred to in the original article.  All three were associated 
with the management consultancy firm KPMG, and the articles seem to be, at least in 
part, an attempt to highlight company knowledge and expertise of implementing the 
Balanced Scorecard.  Lewy and du Mee’s work is based largely on seven case studies.  
Using the 10 Commandments they had derived, they assess the likelihood of success.  
However, they avoid defining too closely what they mean by “success”, but it appears 
to be limited to “…have successfully rooted their balanced scorecard in their 
planning and control processes …”. 114  This raises the question, “What is the purpose 
of embedding the Balanced Scorecard into the planning and control processes?”  This 
is related to such activities as strategy implementation, resource allocation and 
learning, but this needs to be clarified, which links back to the 11th Commandment, 
“…do not start unless you know what you are trying to achieve…”. 115  Clearly there 
is little benefit in building a costly Balanced Scorecard system simply to create greater 
awareness of the benefits of non-financial indicators; although this appears to have 
been the objective of two of the organisations studied.  In that sense therefore there is 
a difference of opinion between the researchers and the subject organisations as to 
whether their projects were successful.  It would seem unlikely that Kaplan and 
Norton would have sided with the organisations either.  But organisations are 
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theoretically better placed to know their own culture and climate, and thus hopefully 
be in the best position to decide how they spend their own money.  Nevertheless Mc 
Cunn highlights some seemingly bizarre reasons that have been given for 
implementing a Balanced Scorecard, 
 
• “It looked good on my CV …” 116 
• “My friend at the golf club has one …” 117 
 
Nevertheless there is nothing to suggest that the organisations did not ultimately 
obtain benefit from the process.  
 
 
 Table 2.1: Factors likely to impact Balanced Scorecard implementation. 
 Issue: Lewy & Du Mee, 
plus McCunn 118, 
119
Kaplan & Norton 
120
Olve, Roy and 
Wetter 121
M G Brown 122 Niven 123
1. Top Level 
Commitment 
Ensure top level 










participation in the 
process by a large 
proportion of the 
organisation. 
  No executive
sponsorship 
2. Involving more 
than Top 
Management 
  Keeping the
scorecard at the top 
   Lack of cascading 




     Too few
individuals 
involved 
Wide range of 
disciplines 
involved in the 
project group. 







     No strategy
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Use the scorecard 
for implementing 
strategic goals 
 The BSC must be 
based on the 
organisation's 
vision and strategy. 
Measures are not 
linked to the 
strategic plan 
Premature links to 
management 
processes 








     Tracking Output/
Outcome metrics 




      Gathering data that
tells you what you 
already know 
 
      Gathering data for
its own sake 
 
    Superstitious
process metrics 
 
6. Avoid focussing 
on worthless 
measures 








     No new measures7. Adapt the 
scorecard to meet 
local 
requirements Conduct entry 





    










9. Using terms 
consistently 
     Performance
measures must be 
clearly and 
consistently 
defined and used. 
Terminology






 Avoid too wide a 
scope for the 
project, eg consider 
a pilot project first. 
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12. Avoid misusing 
the Balanced 
Scorecard 




    




  There should be a 
balance of 
measures in the 









14. Use the Balanced 
Scorecard to drive 
the compensation 
process 




  The BSC must be 




      Realistic short- and
long-term goals 
need to be set and 
reviewed regularly. 
      Develop a Learning
organisation. 





       The BSC must be
regularly reviewed. 
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16. Balanced 






required for the 
system 




and ensure that 
adequate data 




17. Properly balance 
the IT issues 
    Treating the
balanced scorecard 
as a systems 
project 
 The data collection 
and presentation 
system must be 
appropriate, almost 





 Recognise the need 
to provide adequate 
publicity and 
training. 








      Explain the role
and position of the 
BSC in the 
management 
process and avoid 
it just being seen as 
flavour of the 
month. 
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and the search for 
perfection 




as a one-time 
measurement 
project 
 Reporting data that 
is difficult to read 
and analyse 
 




Be clear about the 
objectives 






 Whilst some of these rules for good practice in Table 2.1 are specifically associated 
with implementation, some echo the key concepts of the Balanced Scorecard 
highlighted above.  There is some commonality between the rules provided by the 
different sources indicating that there are key issues that ensure success in 
implementing and running the Balanced Scorecard.  Looked at from the opposite 
perspective, there are rules that, if ignored, mean that Balanced Scorecard 
implementation is unlikely to be successful.  If 70% of implementations are 
unsuccessful then it suggests that the majority of these fail to adopt sound principles, 
eg due to a lack of understanding of the requirements or concepts.  If people are 
implementing “Balanced Scorecards” without understanding the basic concepts, there 
is perhaps a linkage between the use of the Balanced Scorecard as the latest “fad” and 
unsuccessful scorecards.  Thus potentially the Balanced Scorecard may either be 
successful, where implemented properly, or just a management fad, where the rules 
are not properly followed.  Arguably the “hype” may be seen either as helping to 
cause the problem, by encouraging people to adopt the concept, or as attempting to 
resolve the problem, by promoting good practice. 
 
13. Following the rules or making your own. 
 
Whilst Kaplan and Norton articulate a structure and process for the Balanced 
Scorecard, one of the rules in the Table above is that the concept should be tailored 
for each individual implementation.  This raises the question of when tailoring follows 
the rules or when it breaks them.  This section therefore examines some of the writers 
who disagree with Kaplan and Norton.  Some of the competing ideas that will be 
examined here are: 
 
• The need for a fifth perspective. 
• EVA dispenses with the need for a scorecard. 
• “Customer” or “Customers’” perspective. 
• Stakeholder and KPI scorecards. 
• Centralised control. 
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• Importance of financial performance measures. 
• Measuring knowledge. 
• Driving goal congruence down the organisation. 
 
Firstly, there have been arguments about the need for a fifth scorecard perspective to 
cover the human resource issues, eg at Skandia 124, whereas SKF chose to have an 
employee perspective in place of the Learning and Growth perspective. 125  Kaplan 
and Norton record a debate they had with a company about an “environmental 
perspective”. 126  It is argued that the customer perspective and the financial 
perspective cover the key external stakeholder interests.  The internal process and 
innovation and learning perspectives address the remaining organisational interests.  
However, employees represent a very significant stakeholder community, and a key 
internal resource, whose issues are best highlighted separately in a fifth perspective.  
Kaplan and Norton have adopted a somewhat detached ambivalence to these 
arguments.  Their position is that what is important is the selection and inclusion of 
appropriate indicators into the scorecard.  Such indicators can be adequately 
accommodated within their original concepts without the need for a separate, 
additional human resources perspective. 127  Nevertheless they also maintain that the 
original four-perspective scorecard does not represent a “straight jacket” 128 that must 
be imposed.  Consequently, therefore organisations are at liberty to structure their 
scorecard how they wish.  Such action does raise additional questions about the best 
number of perspectives and an appropriate number of measures to be included.  
Kaplan and Norton’s position is that measures need to be grouped into an appropriate 
number of perspectives, but that about four or five represents the optimum.  Similarly, 
in order for individuals to retain a clear understanding of the overall position, there is 
an optimal number, of about 15 to 20 measures, that can be included in the scorecard.  
Beyond this, managers will start to lose the ability to manage the relationships 
between the various measures and will therefore start to lose focus.  Therefore the 
inclusion of additional perspectives must not lead to any substantial increase in the 
number of measures used.  Thus a fifth, or even a sixth, perspective therefore seems to 
be within the rules.  However, in a tenth anniversary review, of the Balanced 
Scorecard, Olve, Petri, Roy and Roy suggest that those who have moved away from 
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the four original perspectives, “…may have harmed the basic [Balanced Scorecard] 
concept.” 129
 
Learning may be considered to be an investment rather than a process.  Olve, Roy and 
Wetter refer to this as an investment in “good costs” 130, ie those costs which 
represent an investment in the future of the organisation, but which for accounting 
purposes are normally treated as expenses and not capitalised.  Olve, Roy and Wetter 
go on to say that financial measure may thus need to be built on internal management 
accounts that reflect a different treatment of these costs, rather than relying on 
published accounts.  One method of doing this is to use Economic Value Added 
(EVA).  But the proponents of this methodology then argue that using accounts 
adjusted for investments in intellectual capital suggests that the Balanced Scorecard is 
unnecessary as the revised accounting system provides an adequately adjusted 
perspective. 131  Chow, Haddad & Williamson highlight the importance of the 
Learning and Growth perspective, “The objectives in the learning and growth 
perspective should be the drivers of successful outcomes in the other three 
perspectives.” 132  Without this long-term focus the more short-term and historical 
measures in the other dimensions have no value to the ongoing management of the 
business.  A Brown argues that the ability of the organisation to learn is dependent on 
the organisational culture, but there is a need to resolve three fundamental issues: 
 
• How the organisation learns, 
• The identification of barriers to learning, and 
• Determining how organisations store and retrieve the lessons identified. 133 
 
Thus learning, both individual and organisational, is of key importance to the 
Balanced Scorecard.  It is unlikely that single performance measures, even substantial 
ones such as EVA, would be able to drive organisational learning as effectively as 
specifically tailored and strategic measures. 
 
There has been another debate about a subtle wording change in some scorecards.  
The original scorecard promoted the idea of looking at the organisation from the 
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“customers’ perspective”, ie “How the customer sees us”.  In contrast others have 
merely looked at the “customer perspective”, ie issues related to customers.  This 
change is much more significant than might initially be apparent.  There is a question 
as to which is more important, “The way we see our customers” or “The way our 
customers see us”.  Clearly both aspects are important and need to be included in the 
scorecard in some form or another.  However, Kaplan and Norton’s perception was 
that, as a key external stakeholder group, the perception of customers was of vital 
importance to the organisation.  They argue that the development of this part of the 
Balanced Scorecard is one of the most valuable parts of the process. 134  This is 
because a good external perception is more likely to generate sales than a good 
internal perception of customers. 
 
However, external perception may be wider than simply the existing customer base.  
Other key stakeholder groups may influence the purchasers.  Some argue that it is 
legitimate to broaden the “Customers’ Perspective” to include all other external 
stakeholder groups other than those represented by the financial stakeholders whose 
interests are covered by the “Financial Perspective”.  Alternatively the “Financial 
perspective” might be enlarged to become an “Owners’ Perspective”. 135  Arguably 
issues related to these wider groups might alternatively be included in one of the other 
dimensions, because just as the financial stakeholders represent a particularly 
important group deserving of their own dimension so also do the customers who make 
the purchases.  Kaplan and Norton discuss the development of “Stakeholder 
Scorecards”, and whilst they do not condemn them conceptually, they suggest they 
often fail to reflect the strategic agenda. 136
 
Kaplan and Norton then go on to discuss KPI scorecards.  These are simply 
aggregations of previously conceived measures into four dimensions.  However, again 
they generally do not articulate a clear strategy, although if this has been built at a 
higher level in the organisation, Kaplan and Norton suggest that in these 
circumstances a KPI scorecard might be used at lower levels.  They go on to warn, 
“Unless the link to strategy had been thought through, however, the KPI scorecard 
can be a dangerous illusion.” 137   
2 - 50 
 Gering and Rosmarin argue that the Balanced Scorecard is often used to impose 
centralised control.   
 
“Once the scorecard becomes viewed as a central planning tool, it 
rapidly becomes part of the corporate politics.  Central office uses 
it to look over managers’ shoulders while promising openness and 
disclosure.  For their turn, the managers use the scorecard to 
cover themselves while claiming to follow strategy.”  138
 
They advocate that managers should be allowed a greater degree of local autonomy in 
the development of their scorecards.  The impression thus created is that these two 
aims are mutually exclusive: central planning and local scorecards.  Clearly central 
management will be keen to see that their strategy is being implemented at a local 
level.  However, instead of “management by interference” from above there should be 
proper delegation and a degree of local autonomy.  Thus essentially what Gering and 
Rosmarin are criticising is, either poor management practice or, poor understanding 
and incorrect implementation of Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard concepts.  
For example, one of  Lewy and Du Mee’s “10 Commandments” 139 also emphases the 
need to avoid using the Balanced Scorecard as an additional means of imposing 
centralised control, because of the risk of alienating staff. 
 
Another article that seems to unfairly represent Kaplan and Norton’s position, leading 
to criticism, is that of Butler, Letza and Neale.  They state,  
 
“However, the RCE template represents a radical departure from 
Kaplan and Norton's quadripartite representation which they 
regard as generic and to be used in all cases.” 140
 
Whilst the RCE scorecard is a radical departure from Kaplan and Norton’s basic 
concepts, Kaplan and Norton do not see their model as generic.  Similarly where 
Butler et al state,  
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 “In our view, very few UK firms will accept (for whatever reasons) 
that financial results are of secondary or even equal importance to 
the drivers of strategy.  To UK managers the danger with the 
Kaplan and Norton representation is that it may downplay the 
importance of financial results”. 141
 
This seems to conflict with Kaplan and Norton’s statement,  
 
“The Balanced Scorecard must retain a strong emphasis on 
financial outcomes.  Ultimately, causal paths from all the 
measures on a scorecard should be linked to financial objectives.  
The scorecard obtains the benefits from keeping financial 
measurements as ultimate outcomes, without the myopia and 
distortions that come from an exclusive focus on improving short-
term measures.” 142
 
So it seems the argument here is about emphasis.  However, as the Butler et al article 
continues by saying, “Kaplan and Norton have devised an approach which seems to 
have overlooked the importance of the corporate mission” 143, this conflicts with 
Kaplan and Norton who state that individual businesses must develop their own 
Balanced Scorecard to fit their own “…mission, strategy, technology, and culture …” 
144, and “Formulating a Balanced Scorecard that links a business unit's mission and 
strategy to explicit objectives and measures is only the start of using the scorecard as 
a management system.” 145  Independent support comes from Chow, Haddad & 
Williamson who state, “The specific objectives and measures of an organisation's 
Balanced Scorecard are derived from the firm's vision and strategy.” 146  Thus taken 
together these conflicts tend to cast doubt on the understanding of Kaplan and 
Norton’s work by Butler et al. 
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Some articles that refer to the Balanced Scorecard seem to add little, except perhaps 
confusion, to the overall debate.  Typical of these is an article by Skryme and Amidon 
who when promoting their own topic of “Knowledge Management” claim,  
 
“One method for measuring knowledge that is growing in 
popularity is that of the balanced scorecard, devised by Robert S. 
Kaplan and David P. Norton and first described in a seminal 
Harvard Business Review article in 1992.” 147
 
It is true that Kaplan and Norton highlight the emergence of the “information age” as 
a fundamental argument for moving from existing performance management systems 
to the Balanced Scorecard. 148  However, it is difficult to see anywhere in Kaplan and 
Norton’s work evidence that supports a contention that the Balanced Scorecard is 
primarily about knowledge management.  Kaplan and Norton’s work is about driving 
long-term performance through effective use of information.  Nowhere is there a 
description of the measurement of, presumably the value of, knowledge.  It is 
expected that the outcomes of using the Balanced Scorecard is improved long-term 
financial performance.  The cause-and-effect model should link measures to this 
objective and thus it might theoretically be possible to value knowledge through some 
form of discounting methodology.  Skryme and Amidon go on to refer to the work of 
Skandia, whose “Navigator” management tool is often quoted as an example of a 
Balanced Scorecard, 
 
“The Navigator provides what Skandia describes as a “taxonomy 
of intellectual capital reporting,” where intellectual capital is 
“hidden values of an organisation.”  It is a management and 
reporting model that helps managers visualise and develop 
measures that reflect the intangible assets.” 149
 
Whilst this is true, it is different to saying that the Balanced Scorecard is a means of 
measuring knowledge. 
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Few articles have been found that attempt a real critical analysis of the Balanced 
Scorecard.  For example, Smith asserts, without presenting supporting evidence, “It 
[the Balanced Scorecard] has rightly been criticised for being weak in the following 
areas: …”. 150  He then lists a number of issues including: 
 
• Bias towards shareholders. 
• Failure to adequately acknowledge the contribution of employees and 
suppliers. 
• “Silence” on PI selection and the role of targets. 
• Failure to address strategic uncertainty. 
 
The article also goes on to criticise assumed causal links between financial and non-
financial issues; in particular that, effective organisational learning, process 
management and good customer relations have any effect.  This seems to ignore 
Kaplan and Norton’s instruction that organisations: must determine what is important 
to themselves and must ensure; that their scorecard only includes what is relevant; and 
that organisational learning takes place as the relationships between issues are 
determined. 
 
However, one article that does attempt such an appraisal is “Management by 
Objectives and the Balanced Scorecard: Will Rome fall again?” 151  This compares the 
demise of Management by Objectives (MBO) with the problems of implementing the 
Balanced Scorecard.  Dinesh and Palmer’s conclusion is that the time and cost of 
implementing the Balanced Scorecard may produce lack of goal congruence at the 
lower levels and inflexibility of action.  There is also a perceived need to be 
sympathetic to the needs of individuals rather than imposing management’s agenda.  
This article therefore supports contentions within the rules for the implementation of 
the Balanced Scorecard.  Dinesh and Palmer quote Newing in support of their 
argument. 152  Newing suggests that the cost of implementation may outweigh the 
benefits of the Balanced Scorecard and it is this that Dinesh and Palmer argue could 
cause organisations to limit the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard to the 
higher levels.  This might be seen as supporting the argument of Ganapathy and Goh 
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that, “… the balanced scorecard is mainly designed for high level management to 
provide them with an overall view of organisational performance.  It is not designed 
for the shop-floor level.” 153  This denies Kaplan and Norton’s ideas of a Balanced 
Scorecard cascade that would ensure relevance at the lower levels.  Hacker and 
Brotherton also compare the Balanced Scorecard with MBO. 154  They conclude that 
MBO is more concerned with outcomes rather than process.  Conversely the Balanced 
Scorecard has a perspective devoted to process, and the cause-and-effect model is also 
concerned with process.  However, Hacker and Brotherton go on to suggest that the 
Balanced Scorecard is an, “ …extension of MBO, which also provides individuals 
with tools and techniques to achieve performance objectives, thus enabling 
individuals to be successful.” 155
 
14. The Balanced Scorecard in the Public Sector. 
 
Reference has already been made to the use of the Balanced Scorecard in the Public 
Sector.  However, this is an important issue because the issues and drivers in the 
public sector are often substantially different to the private sector with its profit 
motive.  Kaplan and Norton demonstrated early on that the Balanced Scorecard would 
operate effectively in the not-for-profit sector. 156  This section explores these issues 
further. 
 
Harold Wilson made a famous statement that “a week is a long time in politics”. 157  
Underlying this is the thought that, for example, a new crisis or issue will quickly 
bury older newsworthy items; a minor domestic problem tends to take precedence 
over a more significant foreign issue; the tax-reducing budget shortly before an 
election is widely recognised as dulling the memory of the electorate.  Thus too Public 
Sector management may be perceived as having a short-term perspective.  This 
applies even though management may be permanent whilst it is the political masters 
who drive the short-term action agenda.  Olve, Roy and Wetter also seem to support 
this political short-termism in their examination of the use of the Balanced Scorecard 
in public sector organisations. 158  Thus one of the key reasons for developing the 
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Balanced Scorecard also applies to the public sector.  Tonge and Callaghan emphasise 
the growing similarities between the pressures of the public and private sectors. 159
 
Nevertheless, Kaplan and Norton themselves unwittingly also emphasise the Balanced 
Scorecard’s strong private sector origins when they argue,  
 
“But one of the principal contributions of the Balanced Scorecard 
is to highlight the opportunities for enhancing financial 
performance through revenue growth, not just by cost reduction 
and asset utilisation.” 160   
 
Since generally the public sector will not be looking for organic “revenue growth”, 
due to its impact on taxes or borrowing, this would suggest that one fundamental 
principal of the Balanced Scorecard is flawed, when applied to the public sector.  
Indeed, Kaplan and Norton go on to say that companies who only use the Balanced 
Scorecard to look at productivity issues will gain less benefit.  This could therefore 
throw into question the cost benefit of investment in the Balanced Scorecard as a 
management system, unless its perspectives are radically refocused to recognise the 
substantially different issues reflected in the public sector.  In their defence it is 
accepted that Kaplan and Norton did recognise that the financial dimension of the 
Balanced Scorecard might not be the top priority for non-profit and government 
organisations.  Unfortunately they immediately go on to suggest that the customer 
dimension should be placed at the top of the BSC hierarchy for such organisations. 161  
Again this would create some confusion for organisations that do not have a well-
defined customer base. 
 
Not only do Kaplan and Norton, and Olve, Roy and Wetter support the use of the 
Balanced Scorecard in the public and not-for-profit sectors, but so do two other major 
writers on the Balanced Scorecard: M G Brown, who reports on its use in the US 
military environment; 162 Niven discusses the specific issues for public and not-for-
profit organisations. 163  He also lists what he sees as the critical differences for the 
Balanced Scorecard in this environment: 
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 • “What I do is not measurable…” – because such organisations are concerned 
more with “outcomes” rather than “output”. 
• “Results will be used to punish…” – the public sector frequently suffers from 
a blame culture. 
• “What is Mission? …” – public sector organisations often face multiple and 
conflicting objectives. 
• “The public won’t understand negative results…” – because any 
underachievement, even against stretch targets, is likely to be attributed to 
inefficiency or ineffectiveness without recognising real achievement. 
• “Why invest in something that will only last with the current administration? 
…” – changes in government frequently lead to wholesale changes objectives 
or even administrative process. 
• “Culture of not trusting business solutions…” – public sector distrust business 
management “fads”. 
• “No burning platform for change…” – long-run continuity of objectives not 
affected by profitability issues. 
• “Technical constraints…” – cost pressures result in public sector 
organisations rarely keeping up-to-date with technology. 
• “Staff skills…” – personal skills tend to be focussed on organisational skills 
and staff tend not to have supplementary business skills. 
• “Developing innovative measures…” – organisations and staff tend to be 
conservative in their perception of the need for change and innovation in the 
area of performance measurement. 
• “Can’t show the money! …” – the reward structure rarely incorporates any 
substantial motivational element. 
 
Thus Niven supports the conclusion that the Balanced Scorecard adapts well to the 
public and non-profit sectors, but that the focus is on customer perspectives rather 
than financial objectives.  This could have a profound affect on the perceived 
timeframe for the Balanced Scorecard.  This means that Figure 2.3 can be developed 
further. 
















Figure 2.8: Customer focussed mission for Public and 
Not-for-profit organisations. 
(Source: Author, developed from Kaplan and Norton and Niven.) 
Largely current issues 











Figure 2.8 then suggests that, if these perspectives are swapped then the short-term 
drivers in the public and not-for-profit sectors are the delivery of service to customers, 
and that this is measured in “historic” terms.  Financial issues move to become 
“current” issues.  Even if the “Financial perspective” were to remain a largely historic 
issue, the addition of the “Customer perspective” to the historic issues will still result 
in a very different view of the organisation.  What this does suggest is that in the 
Public Sector “Mission” is more related to service delivery than to financial 
objectives. 164
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15. From cause-and-effect maps to strategy maps. 
 
In 2004 Kaplan and Norton published their third book on the topic of the Balanced 
Scorecard, “Strategy Maps: Converting intangible assets into tangible outcomes”.  
This starts with an overview of the developments and key issues related to the 
Balanced Scorecard.  They state, 
 
“The focus on objectives led to a breakthrough: Objectives should 
be linked in cause-and-effect relationships.  Executives, as they 
listed objectives in the four perspectives, instinctively started to 
draw arrows to link the objectives. …Soon we were coaching all 
the executive teams to describe their strategy by explicit cause-
and-effect relationships among the objectives in the four BSC 
perspectives.  We name this diagram a strategy map.” 165
 
Thus there is now even more emphasis on, and development of the cause-and-effect 
map, which Kaplan and Norton had emphasised earlier.  However, Kaplan and Norton 
have now presented their basic four perspective model in two new formats to 
represent the differences between private and public sector.  This accords with the 
discussion above (see Figure 2.8).  The two new models, in Figure 2.9, particularly 
the private sector model, form a key component of the strategy map concept. 166
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Private Sector Balanced 
Scorecard Perspectives as 
now presented in Kaplan 
and Nortons’ Strategy 
Maps. 
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Organisation Balanced 
Scorecard Perspectives as now 
presented in Kaplan and 











Figure 2.9: Changes in the presentation of the Balanced 
Scorecard Perspectives. 
(Kaplan, R. and Norton, D.  (2004).  Strategy Maps: Converting 




















The earlier Kaplan and Norton works, through to The Balanced Scorecard: 
Translating Strategy into Action, concentrated on helping organisations to develop 
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measurement, and highlighted the sort of measures that might be used widely by 
different organisations.  Strategy Maps effectively does the same but with strategic 
concepts.  Most of the strategic maps presented are based on the hierarchy offered for 
Private Sector organisations.  Kaplan and Norton go on to argue that,  
 
“The strategy map template … provides a normative checklist for 
a strategy’s components and interrelationships.  If a strategy is 
missing an element on the strategy map template, the strategy is 
likely flawed.” 167
 
Within the Learning and Growth Perspective of the strategy map are three key 
elements: 
 
• Human Capital, 
• Information Capital and  
• Organisational Capital, which is sub-divided into five elements: 
o Culture, 
o Leadership, 
o Employee alignment  
o Teamwork and 
o Knowledge Management. 168 
 
This is seen as being the means by which the organisation’s intangible assets are 
managed.  However, within this group it is argued,  
 
“None of these intangible assets has value that can be measured 
separately or independently.  The value of these intangible assets 
derives from their ability to help the organisation implement its 
strategy.” 169
 
The necessity is to align the components of the Learning and Growth Perspective with 
the strategy to create organisational readiness for change and sustained development.  
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In particular there is perceived to be the need for, “Culture, leadership, alignment, 
and teamwork [to] reinforce the changes to organisational climate required to execute 
strategy.” 170
 
Thus cultural concepts start to play an important part in Kaplan and Norton’s thinking 
about what should appear in the Balanced Scorecard.  Indeed they go on to say,  
 
““Shaping the culture” is the most often-cited priority in the 
learning and growth section of our Balanced Scorecard database.  
Executives generally believe that (1) strategy requires basic 
changes in the way of conducting business, (2) strategy must be 
executed through individuals at all levels of the organisation and, 
hence, (3) new attitudes and behaviours – culture – will be 
required throughout the workforce as prerequisites for these 
changes.” 171
 
Strategy Maps includes a number of examples of organisational strategies which 
feature aspects of culture management, and Kaplan and Norton emphasise a number 
of issues: 
 
• Continuous process improvement. 172 
• A customer centric culture. 173 
• Creativity and innovation. 174 
• Acquisition of knowledge. 175 
• Social awareness and responsibility. 176 
• Core value development and reinforcement. 177 
• Awareness and internalisation of shared mission, vision and values. 178 
• Product strategy: better, faster, cheaper. 179 
 
However, these are only seen as particular aspects that an organisation may select 
from according to the specific culture that the organisation wishes to develop. 
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Whilst highlighting that culture can be either an enabler or an inhibitor of change they 
go on to argue that they believe strategy dictates culture rather than the other way 
round. 180  However, particularly in a more closed culture like the military, where it is 
less easy to bring in new senior managers from a completely different background, it 
is suggested that culture is more likely to shape strategy.  An issue, which will be 
addressed in Chapter 3, is that organisational commitment to long-term capital 
investments, for example major investments in infrastructure or military equipment 
programmes that cannot be quickly replaced, will tend to be the cornerstones of 
strategy that will only evolve slowly.  Thus “maritime air components” and nuclear 
submarine based strategic deterrence are key issues for many large navies and 
provide, and are protected by, successive senior officers who owe their position to 
serving in these major force components.  Similarly organisations such as the Royal 
Navy can only be sustained by retaining key elements of their culture that have 
existed for centuries.  “It takes the Navy three years to build a ship.  It would take 
three hundred to rebuild a tradition.” 181  (Of course it all depends on who wins the 
war and writes the history.  The historian Edwyn Gray accuses Cunningham of “war 
crimes” over the treatment of Italian frogmen in Alexandria in December, 1941. 182  
Yet Cunningham is often regarded by the Royal Navy as a “Nelsonian” character; for 
the raid on Toranto.) 
 
Kaplan and Norton go on to discuss the measurement of culture and the distinction 
between culture and climate.  They also highlight the problem of subcultures created 
by internal organisational boundaries and different activities, and thus the potential 
problems that this creates in the development of an holistic agreement on 
organisational values. 183  They conclude, 
 
“The existence of an instrument like the [Organisational Culture 
Profile] OCP indicates that culture has now become a measurable 
construct.  But instruments like the OCP have been influenced by a 
psychological literature that stresses constructs such as motivation 
and climate.  Since the strategy literature has not perceived culture 
as essential for effective implementation, existing instruments to 
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measure culture do not capture individuals’ beliefs and 
understanding of the strategy.” 184  
 
Whilst the Cartwright Nine Factors Model, which will be covered in Chapter 3, is 
heavily linked to the perceived values required to deliver a “quality focussed culture” 
and assessed motivation, Denison’s model, also discussed in Chapter 3, includes 
strategy as one of the issues measured.  However, Denison does not seek to elicit a 
description of the strategy, merely to identify whether it is clearly understood, 
accepted and the basis for corporate organisational and individual employee activity: 
similar to the way strategy is treated by the EFQM.  Thus Denison would seem to 
meet Kaplan and Norton’s requirements.  Their final statement on this issue supports 
the aims of this research,  
 
“Developing improved instruments for measuring culture along 
dimensions relevant to the strategy is clearly an opportunity for 
further work.  Alternatively organisations will have to develop and 
rely on ad hoc questionnaires of their own to measure this 
important dimension.” 185
 
This acknowledgement of the need to incorporate the measurement, and management, 
of culture is a new emphasis in Kaplan and Norton’s work and is missing from earlier 
work.  This suggests that development of the concepts and the understanding of the 
mechanisms for effective use of the Balanced Scorecard are still continuing some 10 
or 12 years after the initial concepts were publicised.  This suggests that the Balanced 
Scorecard concepts are progressing well beyond the timescales outlined in Table 1.1 
in Chapter 1.  “Strategic Maps” thus suggests that the Balanced Scorecard has 
progressed beyond the “management fad”.  This is notable during a period where the 
pace of change is increasing. 
 
Nevertheless, despite its new insights to the Balanced Scorecard concepts, “Strategy 
Maps” is not without its critics.  Marr and Adams object to the new articulation of 
intangible assets as not being consistent with any existing classification; although they 
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are forced to admit that there is no overall agreement yet on any classification.  But 
they do highlight the continuing problems in developing measures for the Learning 
and Growth perspective, and the way that the term “balanced scorecard” is becoming 
misapplied to many performance management systems. 186  However, in so doing they 
refer to the “hostility” of Neely, et al who promote the Performance Pyramid as 
alternative, based on perception that the Balanced Scorecard does not address a full 
range of stakeholder interests. 187  It is this researcher’s perception that any such 
failure is attributed to implementers rather than Kaplan and Norton’s concepts. 
 
16. Alternatives to the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
So far we have seen little in terms of substantial criticism of the Balanced Scorecard.  
Most “criticism” has tended to focus around the issues of content of individual 
perspectives.  As has been shown, Kaplan and Norton have tended to back away from 
such issues, emphasising the “framework” nature of the concept.  Indeed many of the 
case studies quoted in their work tend not to have used a “purist” approach to 
presenting their scorecards.  The emphasis has been on using a thorough 
methodology, and tailoring the scorecard to the individual organisational needs, 
strategy, perceptions and culture.  Thus whilst substantial harm may be done to the 
Balanced Scorecard by those who adopt it but fail to implement it properly, perhaps 
the biggest criticism comes from those who fail to adopt the system, opting for an 
alternative. 
 
But what are the alternatives?  Kaplan and Norton have for some time argued that the 
Balanced Scorecard is a strategic management tool, yet ten Have, et al classify it as an 
“Organisation” management tool (see Table 2.2 below). 188  This may seem to place it 
in competition with some strange bedfellows: 
 
Table 2.2: Selection of key strategy and organisational models. 
Models: Strategy Organisation 
Adizes PAEI management roles – looking at the 
characteristics of the management team. 
 x 
2 - 65 
Ansoff’s product/market grid – looking at the 
strategic direction of the organisation in terms of 
product and market development. 
x  
Balanced Scorecard – “integral performance 
measurement to track and adjust business 
strategy”. 189
 x 
BCG Matrix – balanced portfolio of products 
across the product development cycle. x 
 
Business process redesign – creating customer 
value through internal business process 
improvement. 
 x 
Change quadrants – perceptual model of 
organisational preparedness for change. 
 x 
Chaos model – conceptual model of desirability 
for organisational change. 
 x 
Competing values of organisational effectiveness 
– model to develop organisational understanding 
of internal tensions for improving effectiveness. 
x x 
Porter’s five forces – assessment tool for 
pressures affecting the organisation’s industry. x 
 
Core competencies – assessment tool to identify 
existing organisational strengths and 
organisational development needs. 
x  
Deming cycle – continuous improvement through 
a process of “Plan, Do, Check, Act”. 
 x  
The Baldrige and EFQM models – organisational 




However, this table highlights the difference between “strategy development” and 
“strategy implementation”.  Thus whilst ten Have, et al may have defined strategy 
development models, thus relegating the Balanced Scorecard to an organisational 
management tool, it is questioned whether the Balanced Scorecard should not be seen 
in a category of its own.  Here the Balanced Scorecard needs to be seen as a strategic 
management as opposed to development tool.  Arguably none of the other tools listed 
drive strategy in quite the same way.  Instead they are process assessment and 
development tools.  Yet some are seen as direct competitors of the Balanced 
Scorecard.  Principal among the “competitors” are the Baldrige and EFQM models.  
Nevertheless, many people do not see these tools as competitors but rather as 
complementary management systems.  Indeed, in the “Keeping Score” M G Brown 
substantially aligns his chapter headings to the Baldrige model rather than the 
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Balanced Scorecard perspectives. 190  Couwenberg, et al classify the Balanced 
Scorecard as an organisational assessment tool along with SWOT analysis and 
EFQM. 191  Bourne and Bourne when looking at “…other balanced performance 
measurement frameworks…” cover the SMART Performance Pyramid, the 
Results/Determinants Matrix and the EFQM model, plus several derivations of the 
Balanced Scorecard. 192  Olve, Roy and Wetter in addition to looking at the 
Performance Pyramid also discuss Maisel’s Balanced Scorecard Model, 193 and Adam 
and Robert’s “Effective progress and performance measurement” (EP2M) tool. 194  
Huang, again in addition to the Performance Pyramid, provides an assessment of the 
Performance Measurement Questionnaire (PMQ). 195  However, as already shown 
Olve, Roy and Wetter also highlight the argument in favour of using EVA in place of 
the Balanced Scorecard. 196  
 
Maisel’s Balanced Scorecard Model is merely a local variation of Kaplan and 
Norton’s Model replacing the Learning and Growth perspective with Human 
Resource Measures, whilst the EP2M tool has four dimensions where there are slight 
changes from Kaplan and Norton’s perspectives, the major one being that there is no 
specifically “financial” perspective and instead there is one looking at Managing 
Strategy and Change.  As already discussed, EVA is too narrow a process to drive 
strategy on its own, and similarly SWOT and EFQM are only assessment tools that 
are used in association with other methodologies to effect change.  The 
Results/Determinants Matrix, like the EFQM model that is divided into Enablers and 
Results, is divided into Results and Determinants, again is only an assessment tool.  
The SMART Performance Pyramid is a measurement tool that cascades measures 
down the organisation to drive performance.  Each level in the business has its own 
layer within the pyramid.  However, because it offers a more specific framework of 
measures at each level, it may been seen as being more rigid and inflexible than the 
Balanced Scorecard and may present too complex a picture for ease of interpretation 
at the lower levels.  Perhaps its strength is its emphasis on cascade and thus the 
consistency of use across the organisation.  In contrast, the Balanced Scorecard may 
require to be reworked at each level in order that it can be cascaded down the 
organisation.  PMQ is described as an assessment tool for determining the degree of 
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congruence of performance measures between desired and actual organisational 
strategy and actions.  PMQ is seen as failing to provide assistance in developing an 
appropriate measurement system. 
 
One further alternative measurement system deserves examination: The Tableau de 
Bord.  Epstein and Manzoni in their Insead Working Paper 197 describe the Balanced 
Scorecard as a “…welcome addition…” to the management tools on offer in 
monitoring company performance.  They also describe the Tableau de Bord as a 
“…dashboard…”, which is imagery that is often used to describe the Balanced 
Scorecard.  However the Tableau de Bord is somewhat older, dating from around 
1900, but it is less widely used.  The underlying principles are the same in terms of 
the search for a strategic set of indicators to guide organisational performance through 
a cause-and-effect model.  However, it seems that the origins are different, and the 
model seems to have derived much more from the process side of business rather than 
the management and financial performance dimensions.  This may simply reflect the 
age of “Scientific Management” 198 with its internal focus, as opposed to looking at 
current financial drivers and the external focus arising from customer and global 
competition factors. 
 
Clearly Kaplan and Norton were aware of the Tableau de Bord, but dispute that their 
Balanced Scorecard is similar.  For example, whilst acknowledging the “dashboard” 
analogy for the Tableau de Bord, they liken the Balanced Scorecard much more to a 
“…flight simulator…” because of the multiplicity of inter-related effects that one 
change will have on overall outcomes reported by the measures. 199  It is suggested 
that Tableau de Bord should be “…integrated in a nested structure, like the one 
illustrated by a set of Russian dolls…”. 200  Actually what is being described is in 
principle essentially the same as Kaplan and Norton proposed as a hierarchy.  The 
illustration is thus weak or misleading.  At the lower levels of the organisation there 
will be many scorecards, particularly if the idea of individual employee scorecards is 
adopted.  However, with Russian dolls there is only one doll at each successive level.  
Thus whilst Epstein and Manzoni attempt to use different images and illustrations in 
their article it is quite clear that in a great many respects the Tableau de Bord is 
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essentially the same as the Balanced Scorecard.  However, Epstein and Manzoni go 
on to say, “In practice, however, French Tableau de Bord tend to fall significantly 
short of Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard.” 201
 
However the failures seem to relate much more to failure to implement the Tableau de 
Bord properly than any failure of the concept.  The perceived failures are: 
 
• Over use of financial indicators. 
• Targets and goals being set against internal historic trends rather than against 
an external demand. 
• Too internally focused and at too low a level in terms of the strategy, ie it 
focuses more on tactical objectives. 
• Insufficient regard for the Tableau de Bord as routine management tool rather 
than as a long-term monitoring and warning system. 
 
In a later article 202, which clearly owes much to the earlier paper, a fifth difference is 
also highlighted: 
 
• Tableaux de Bord tend to be larger than Balanced Scorecards and contain 
performance measures used historically within the organisation rather than 
developing new and more appropriate measures. 203 
 
These criticisms could no doubt be targeted at many Balanced Scorecards.  But the 
key difference between the Tableau de Bord and the Balanced Scorecard seems to be 
that the former does not provide for a specific structure to help ensure that a proper 
balance is maintained between the measures.  Thus Kaplan and Norton’s four 
perspectives add significantly to the concept.  And it is because of this that Epstein 
and Manzoni claim that some recent French authors regard the Balanced Scorecard as 
a “…special case…” of the Tableau de Bord.  However, Epstein and Manzoni do 
suggest that the Balanced Scorecard may be having a positive influence on individual 
Tableau de Bord.  This suggests that the French are continuing to use the Tableau de 
Bord rather than move to the Balanced Scorecard.  This may say more about the 
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degree of self-imposed French cultural isolation, which is sometimes recognised, than 
the relative merits of the two systems, and this may also help explain why the Tableau 
de Bord was not more widely used previously. 
 
Mendoza and Zrihen seem keen to highlight the growing importance and use of the 
Tableau de Bord.  They highlight similarities between the Balanced Scorecard and 
Tableau de Bord (which they translate as meaning “…performance scorecard…”).204  
Mendoza and Zrihen describe some perceived weaknesses of the Balanced Scorecard, 
these seem to be related to the way the implementation process is structured.  They 
also highlight the growing role for the Tableau de Bord in guiding the implementation 
of strategy, using a process similar to that advocated by Kaplan and Norton.  
Regrettably, despite some comparison between the two models, Mendoza and Zrihen 
do not come up with any substantial differences and make no strong case for one 
process or the other.  Neither do they explain why the Tableau de Bord is apparently 
preferred in France, despite the success of the Balanced Scorecard elsewhere.  
Interestingly Mendoza and Zrihen talk specifically about the Balanced Scorecard’s 
success in “the US” 205 and do not comment on its wider use despite using examples 
of its use in France.  Thus again one is led to the conclusion that there are cultural 
influences at play rather than substantive criticisms of the Balanced Scorecard itself.  
This is borne out by the English translation of a French article that appeared in an 
Australian magazine. 206  Although principally about Activity Based Costing (ABC) 
accounting issues it does seek to suggest that differences in accounting, industrial 
contexts, and in the way management concepts are disseminated mean that this 
“Anglo-Saxon” concept does not readily translate to the French culture and 
management tradition.  However, this article is interesting in that it seems to suggest 
that:  
 
• Tableau de Bord has been reinvigorated by the development, at lower 
organisational levels, of performance measures arising out of Japanese style 
quality programmes. 
• There are clear linkages between Tableau de Bord, and in particular its use of 
non-financial indicators, and the costing systems. 
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 Kaplan and Norton also highlighted a linkage between ABC and the Balance 
Scorecard.  For example,  
 
“In general, ABC analysis will enable organisations to obtain 
process cost measures that, along with quality and cycle time 
measurement, will provide three important parameters to 
characterise internal business processes.” 207
 
Thus the French article agrees with the concept but not the actual use of management 
philosophies and tools originating elsewhere, indeed they almost claim the process as 
originating in France,  
 
“Therefore, when reading certain US publications, we can 
justifiably feel that the Americans are merely reinventing, 60 years 
later, the costing method developed in France by Colonel Rimailho 
and the Commission generale d'organisation scientifique 
(CEGOS) in the late 1920s and 1930s!  Apart from boosting 
French national pride, this reflection does not lead us very far, 
however.”  208
 
Therefore if there is any real criticism of the Balanced Scorecard it is that it not new 
and not sufficiently distinctive from other similar concepts.  Also because it is only a 
framework concept it lacks an obvious defining characteristic.  Many organisations 
use the Balanced Scorecard alongside other management tools and therefore its 
contribution lacks distinction. 
 
17. Analysis of literature reviewed. 
 
Inevitably there is the question as to whether the literature reviewed reflects all the 
key issues and opinions.  A review of published material conducted in October, 2003 
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revealed that there were 478 articles listed from Management Journals by 
ABI/Inform.  The distribution of these, by publication date, is shown below.   
 
Figure 2.10: Balanced Scorecard articles listed by 
ABI/Inform
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This shows that the volume of information is still increasing at a significant rate and 
thus the concept is far from being a fading “management fad”.  However, this forms 
only a small proportion of the published material since it fails to include: 
 
• Major published works. 
• Articles published in non-Management periodicals. 
• Academic work. 
• Material published by organisations using, or promoting the use of, the 
Balanced Scorecard. 
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• Unpublished material, eg seminar or conference material. 
• References to the Balanced Scorecard in published material that is subsidiary 
to the main topic. 
• Material available on the Internet. 
 
It is assumed that by including a wide range of material in the review, particularly 
from the first three categories, that a substantial proportion of the key issues and 
opinions will have been captured.  Authors, particularly the originators of the 
Balanced Scorecard, will wish to address any substantive issues or challenges to their 
concepts.  It must also be recognised that many of the smaller works will add little to 
the debate, falling into one or other of the following categories: 
 
• Book reviews of the major published works, which will generally only 
summarise the key messages of the publication. 
• Interviews with major authors, which will only repeat the key issues or add 
additional anecdotal evidence that was not deemed worthy of inclusion in their 
publication. 
• Publications “piggy-backing” on the success of the Balanced Scorecard by 
linking their ideas to the concept. (“The HR Scorecard” 209 might be seen as a 
prime example of this, because its main thrust is to promote effective HR 
policies and adds little or nothing to the overall concept of the Balanced 
Scorecard.) 
• Publications “piggy-backing” on the success of the Balanced Scorecard by 
criticism of the concept. 
 
These latter two categories make reference to the Balanced Scorecard primarily to 
gain wider exposure to their own ideas, through reference in their abstract or list of 
key words.  However, in neither case do they add substantially to the debate. 
 
Appendix A to this Chapter lists a sample of the material reviewed in this research.  It 
is noted that the majority of the material from management journals represents short 
articles relating to the basic concepts or particular implementations of the Balanced 
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Scorecard.  Few of the journals from which material was taken are thought to be “peer 
review journals”, most seeming to be the journals of professional associations.  Thus 
the few substantial books and academic works assume a significant importance. 
 
18. An assessment of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
The Balanced Scorecard was born out of perceived failures of the quality movement 
to deliver long-term sustainable growth.  Environmental factors such as increasing 
pace of technological change and the globalisation of competition represented new 
dynamics that undermined previous business philosophies that tended to be dominated 
by short-term profitability measures.  The Balanced Scorecard sought to broaden the 
range of issues considered by management, both in terms of: 
 
• Covering a broader range of organisational performance measures away from 
the financial, and  
• Increasing the time-horizon of the measures by expanding into leading 
indicators, away from the historic, lagging indicators normally used. 
 
At the same time the aim was to focus more closely on the key issues, by limiting the 
range of measures used to drive organisational performance.  This narrowing of focus: 
 
• Enables greater clarity of objectives. 
• Improves the potential for agreement and communication of objectives. 
• Facilitates the understanding of the relationships between competing 
objectives, for example through the cause-and-effect model, or strategic map. 
 
However, to achieve these aims requires considerable investment in: 
 
• Time – commitment of staff effort, particularly at senior management levels to 
resolve strategic issues. 
• Money – the development of new measurement and reporting systems, and the 
infrastructure to support them. 
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• Commitment – particularly the sacrificing of personal objectives or “sacred 
cows” on the altar of better corporate goals. 
 
The strategic nature of the Balanced Scorecard only emerged over time, as more 
organisations began to use the system effectively and take it to the heart of their 
management process.  Not all organisations that have started out to use the Balanced 
Scorecard have been successful.  Success seems to be based on following, reasonably 
closely, a set of rules.  This Chapter has consolidated these rules, from various 
sources, into one list.  Some organisations seem to derive enormous benefit from the 
Balanced Scorecard, and thus Kaplan and Norton seem justified in claiming some 
success for their developing concepts.  The issue here seems to be about the degree to 
which the impact of the Balanced Scorecard can be isolated or specifically articulated 
as a (major) contributor to success. 
 
An underpinning concept of the Balanced Scorecard is the need to develop and utilise 
individual and organisational capability.  This is where the long-term profits come 
from.  Since each implementation must be tailored to the individual organisation the 
difference between learning about the implementation of the process and learning 
from the process must be recognised.  Whilst the implementation rules guide the use 
of the Balanced Scorecard, the organisation must continually learn from the process in 
order to develop and refine organisational direction and capability.  Thus 
implementing the Balanced Scorecard as a “management process” could be, 
theoretically, undertaken successfully, according to the rules, but still lead to failure 
because the missing “organisational learning” could completely undermine 
everything.  The Balanced Scorecard must not therefore be regarded simply as a 
performance measurement process, but as a strategic management tool.  The “double-
loop” learning concept is important here (see Figure 2.5). 
 
Consequently, the concept that you “get what you measure” only applies if proper and 
effective management action is planned and put in place to achieve the required 
results.  This is a continual process not a “one-off” initial process.  The matrix below 
attempts to explain this issue: 
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Unlike many such simple grids, the bottom right and top left quadrants are no 
substantial improvement on bottom right quadrant.  This is because the classic 
feedback loop only operates in the top left quadrant.  Double-loop learning is a step 
beyond simple feedback loops and thus represents the extreme top right of the 
diagram.  Good planning is a waste of resources if there is no feedback to indicate 
achievement or the need for adjustment.  Measurement costs money.  However, 
available resource must be split between planning and measurement.  The top left 
quadrant probably equates to the KPI Scorecard, whilst the bottom right would equate 
to a scorecard where the measures do not represent strategic issues, but simply “what 
is easy to measure”.  Those in the bottom left quadrant probably would not know what 
a Balanced Scorecard is. 
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Similarly, whilst there has to be an effective mix of planning and performance 
measurement, there must also be implementation brought about by clear 
communication of organisational objectives.  This must be a corporate approach; 
corporate in the sense that all staff within the organisation must be orientated towards 
the objectives and motivated to achieve them, not that it is driven by Head Office.  
The NLP logical levels will assist in understanding what must be communicated to 
produce that orientation and motivation.   
 
Although considerable support has been included in Kaplan and Norton’s work for the 
idea of motivation through financial reward, this is not seen as essential.  Effective 
communication of aims and objectives; a sense of equity and equality within the 
organisation; shared beliefs concerning future goals and the means of achieving them; 
these are seen as more important than financial reward, although a reward system that 
is not geared to supporting these will undermine the situation.  An organisation based 
solely on the concept of financial reward to drive achieve might be seen by many, 
particularly in the government and non-profit sectors, as being naïve or culturally 
poor.  
 
The model at Figure 2.11 above attempts to link the issues of planning and 
performance measurement in an explanation of where organisational deficiency may 
lie in the development of Balanced Scorecard process.  However, a deeper 
understanding is necessary in terms of the organisational commitment.  Figure 2.12 
therefore attempts to develop a model of Balanced Scorecard success based on 
organisational commitment to the tool and organisational success relative to the 
external environment. 
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Under pinning this model is the idea that many organisations will not make the 
commitments necessary to ensure success.  As has been highlighted previously in this 
Chapter, not all organisations retain the Balanced Scorecard.  It is logical that not all 
those that retain the Balanced Scorecard will do so for the right reasons.  
Organisations that make that initial commitment for the wrong reasons, and fail to 
implement successfully, may retain the tool for the wrong reasons, eg dropping the 
tool may appear to show management failure or incompetence.  Similarly, it seems 
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logical that some organisations will drop the tool even though it has been successful, 
for example because the organisation may be concerned about the investment of time 
and money in a system without recognising the true benefits of the process.  The issue 
here then is about ensuring that employees at all levels have a positive understanding 
of and attitude towards the Balanced Scorecard process as well as towards the 
organisational objectives.  Learning about the benefits and achievement of the process 
must also be part of the objectives if the value and investment in the tool is to be 
recouped.  
 
So what is the Balanced Scorecard?  It was introduced as a management tool to 
improve organisational performance by encouraging management to use a broader 
view of the business than is available through the sole use of traditional financial 
measures.  However, Kaplan and Norton subsequently redefined the Balanced 
Scorecard as a tool to manage the implementation of strategy.  Niven suggests that, 
“… what sets the Balanced Scorecard apart is the concept of cause and effect 
linkages.” 210  Certainly, although Kaplan and Norton defined a clear framework, the 
freedom provided means that there is no one set model and this can make it hard to 
truly determine and assess whether what is presented is a sound Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Part of the problem of understanding the Balanced Scorecard process is the volume of 
literature available.  However, analysis of the literature suggests that the majority of 
the literature adds little value to the concepts; being case-studies of individual 
organisations that apply only to the relevant sector.  The core material is available 
from a few substantial books.  Nevertheless, it might be possible to be easily put off 
when researching the literature to find that much of the literature provides little or no 
help in developing concepts and processes, or is confusing because of its complexity.  
Thus clear implementation rules probably have a significant benefit in providing a 
high-level guidance on requirements, whilst also provides implementers with a guide 
for further research. 
 
The production of an effective Balanced Scorecard is a difficult, costly and complex 
task.  Whilst the Balanced Scorecard should represent a product that can easily be 
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digested by staff at all levels, there is room for an underpinning degree of complexity 
that is transparent for the majority of users.  The issues are about understanding the 
broad picture rather than the detail.  Consequently there is a place for complex PIs and 
a need for the management team to be able to drill down through the data to an 
appropriate level.  Indeed it is unlikely that all the issues that contribute to the 
organisational success, or the success of the Balanced Scorecard, will be able to be 
represented by simple statistics.   
 
One of the key factors here is about ensuring a performance management culture 
exists, as opposed to a performance measurement culture; particularly one that seeks 
to apportion blame.  But neither should complex PIs be used as a means of hiding 
problems and issues or avoiding responsibility.  Responsible and accountable 
management is a clear requirement to support the Balanced Scorecard concepts.  
Proper delegation is a key issue here: too much interference will undermine the 
process.  Nevertheless, complex PIs can be used to communicate a broad situation and 
thus strengthen the Balanced Scorecard measures.  In contrast, the use of simple 
traffic-lights or dials can be used to simplify the presentation to allow broader, more 
rapid communication of issues and performance.  Similarly, whilst the four original 
Kaplan and Norton perspectives may be effective in terms of developing and 
presenting issues, there is scope, even the necessity, to tailor the Balanced Scorecard, 
and the terminology, to the individual organisation in order to improve organisation 
coherence with the concepts. 
 
In implementing the Balanced Scorecard the following are the key issues: 
 
• Incorporating strategy into the scorecard and using it as a means of internal 
communication, 
• Defining a balanced set of specific Performance Indicators, both leading and 
lagging, that guide and drive the organisation to achieve the strategy, 
• Ensuring that the system of reward is clearly linked to strategy in order to 
drive behaviour that will help achieve the strategic aims, 
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• Using the scorecard for external communication only where this provides 
advantage, and avoid revealing strategy outside the organisation when 
disclosure would enable competitors to undermine or frustrate the objectives, 
• Build business plans unpinning the scorecard to manage the implementation of 
the strategy, 
• Aim for Breakthrough Performance to transform the business rather than 
seeking incremental improvement rather than copying other organisations’ 
processes, eg through benchmarking, and 
• Linking the Balanced Scorecard to the resourcing and management processes 
to ensure that there are no other processes that will detract or undermine the 
Balanced Scorecard process. 
 
These key features and issues of the Balanced Scorecard are supported by the lessons 
learned from implementation: 
 
• Gaining and maintaining Top Level commitment, 
• Involving more than Top Management in the development process, 
• Ensuring a broad spectrum of the organisations is represented in development 
of the Balanced Scorecard, 
• Agreeing strategy before developing the scorecard, 
• Focusing the scorecard on strategic objectives, 
• Avoid focussing on worthless measures, 
• Failure to adapt the scorecard to meet local requirements, 
• Ensuring that Executives use the Balanced Scorecard strategically, 
• Using terms consistently, 
• Utilise pilot projects in the implementation process, 
• Use experienced consultants to support implementation process, 
• Avoid misusing the Balanced Scorecard as a means of imposing unnecessary 
control, 
• Construct and understand the cause-and-effect map, 
• Use the Balanced Scorecard to drive the compensation process, 
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• Use the Balanced Scorecard to support organisational learning, 
• Balanced Scorecard must be properly resourced, 
• Properly balance the IT issues to support and not take-over the process, 
• Ensuring a proper understanding of Balanced Scorecard issues within the 
organisation, 
• Avoid over-complex and lengthy development, and 
• Establish clear objectives for Balanced Scorecard programme. 
 
Understanding these key issues and following these rules for implementation is likely 
to increase the chance of success for the Balanced Scorecard in an organisation.  
Failure to apply these lessons could result in a product that has a superficial “look and 
feel” of a Balanced Scorecard, but which fails to meet the requirements and 
consequently fails to deliver the desired strategy and business improvement. 
 
The expectation is that successful use of the Balanced Scorecard will result in 
significantly enhanced organisational performance.  However, whilst the Balanced 
Scorecard may become a key part, or even a core part, of the management process, it 
is not likely to be the sole mechanism to drive business success.  Thus reported 
business improvements are not seen as exclusively derived from the Balanced 
Scorecard, even if it is a major contributing factor. 
 
This chapter represents a thorough, but inevitably incomplete, description and 
appraisal of the Balanced Scorecard.  Nevertheless it should suffice for the purposes 
of examining the relationship with cultural issues.  The adequacy of the literature 
survey is considered further in Chapter 4. 
 













Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
The Chapter has shown that a core of literature can be used to build a 
good understanding of the concepts of the Balanced Scorecard.  This 
core literature has enable 20 rules for implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard to be produced.  Use of the scorecard itself, and its 
associated “cause-and-effect” model, drives the strategic agenda of the 
organisation, through the concept of “double loop learning”.  Because of 
its comprehensive nature, the other tools available either do not cover 
the same scope or are merely similar sorts of concepts.  French 
preference for the Tableau de Bord appears to be a culturally based “not 
invented here” syndrome. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard.
Supporting case studies. 
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Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Does creating a successful organisation, and making all the associated 
changes involved, change the culture of that organisation?  This Chapter 
sets out to define culture and look at the inter-relationship between 
culture and the Balanced Scorecard. 
But is it only organisational culture that is important, or does national 
culture also have an impact on use of the Balanced Scorecard?  The 
Chapter goes on to look at whether organisational culture is important to 
success, and whether it is possible to measure culture, and to look at 
culture management issues. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard. 
Supporting case studies. 
Summary of conclusions. 
Figure 3.1 
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1. Why look at culture? 
 
The Balanced Scorecard is designed to improve organisational performance.  It does 
this by providing data on the achievement of strategic goals through a mix of leading 
and lagging performance indicators.  These should focus the attention of staff at all 
levels on what are perceived to be the key success factors for the business.  However, 
through a process of learning, the understanding of the issues facing the organisation, 
and thus of the actions required, should develop over time. 
 
Even within this summary it will be evident that there are issues that lie deeper than 
simple business process and outcomes.  As Figure 3.1 illustrates, this Chapter 
therefore examines further the issues of the relationship between the Balanced 
Scorecard and culture.  This will be done by looking at how the Balanced Scorecard 
derives from the culture of the organisation and links to the motivational processes, 
building on the earlier references to NLP.  The Chapter will then look at the way that 
the Balanced Scorecard links to wider aspects of organisational culture.  In looking at 
the Tableau de Bord, in Chapter 2, it was shown that cultural variations will create 
different attitudes towards the Balanced Scorecard.  This Chapter will examine the 
issue of national culture further.   
 
The Balanced Scorecard is essentially a management tool, which relies on 
measurement to guide management.  Thus a key aim of this chapter is to examine, 
conceptually, whether the linkage between culture and the Balanced Scorecard is 
sufficiently strong to make it worthwhile, or necessary, to link the two through hard 
measurement.  There is also a consideration of culture management issues. 
 
Culture is one of four key metaphors for organisations described by Morgan. 1, 2  
These are shown in Table 3.1 below: 
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The Balanced Scorecard is seen as focusing on organisational purpose and goals, in 
the manner of a machine metaphor organisation.  But it also relies heavily on a 
Biological or Organism metaphor in that it recognises the sub-elements of the 
organisation and seeks to orientate them towards a common objective.  It does not 
thus totally ignore the human element in the way that machine metaphor management 
system might; indeed there is a strong emphasis on the human component.  However, 
that emphasis is strongly organisationally directed and goal orientated.  Thus looking 
at issues from a cultural perspective would broaden out the horizon of the Balanced 
Scorecard as a management tool. 
 
Like Chapter 2, this Chapter is based on a review of some of the available literature.  
Culture is a large subject in its own right and it is therefore essential to limit the scope 
of our examination. 3  It cannot, and will not, therefore be an exhaustive review but 
will aim to build a credible and robust summary of the issues. 
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There are numerous effective definitions of culture, which are useful in helping to 
understand this phenomenon. 4  Here we will use one provided by Morgan, 
 
“The culture metaphor points towards another means of creating 
organised activity: by influencing the language, norms, folklore, 
ceremonies, and other social practices that communicate the key 
ideologies, values and beliefs guiding action.” 5 
 
This definition has been chosen because it seems to emphasise the individual’s 
absorption into the culture through a subtle learning process.  However, it must also 
be remembered that, as Anthony points out, organisations are not simply like cultures, 
they are cultures. 6 
 
2. Linking the Balanced Scorecard to the core values of the organisation. 
 
Whilst Kaplan and Norton articulate the view that the Balanced Scorecard is based on 
the Mission Statement and the organisational Strategy, which derives from the Vision, 
M G Brown and Niven also place a great deal of emphasis on Values.  Hacker and 
Brotherton highlight the importance of Values in delivering the organisation’s 
mission. 7  Indeed they go on to say that an, “ …effective measurement system has the 
power to change culture, making it more performance orientated.”  The Balanced 
Scorecard is more than a measurement system, but the description is apt. 
 
In Chapter 2 we looked at the issue of how the NLP Logical Levels demonstrate the 
need to work at the levels of beliefs and values in order to change behaviours. 
 











Figure 3.2: NLP Logical levels.




Mission, Strategy, Vision and Values link to the NLP Logical Levels shown in Figure 
3.2. 
 
• Mission – delivering products and services to customers – impacting the 
environment through actions/behaviours, based on belief about purpose. 
• Strategy – creating and delivering changes – developing capability to impact 
the environment through change. 
• Vision – a future picture of the organisation – embedding beliefs in the 
organisation to change the internal and external environment of the 
organisation through changed capabilities and behaviours. 
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• Values – the underlying beliefs of the organisation – beliefs that create 
corporate identify and that impact on behaviour. 
 
Thus the NLP Logical Levels show: 
 
• Who we are – the corporate identity. 
• What we believe – about others and ourselves. 
• What our capabilities are – what assets and resources we possess. 
• How we behave – how we use the assets and resources to demonstrate our 
beliefs. 
• Where we operate or have impact – the way we interact with the 
environment. 
 
Many of these issues surface again as we start to look at culture because as 
Cartwright, the founder of the Culture Management Research Association, at the start 
of his book “Cultural Transformation” states, “…cultural values are the key to the 
effective management of organisations for their continuous business improvement.” 8  
M Smith argues that organisational culture will impact the ability to conduct change.  
He states, “Culture at a number of levels, notably group, corporate and societal, will 
impact the change process”. 9  He highlights Schein’s threefold classification of 
culture of: 
 
• Assumptions – that represent the invisible core elements, such as a shared 
vision or established social attitudes. 
• Values – that represent the preferences that guide behaviour, such as attitudes 
within an organisation or ethics within a society. 
• Artefacts – that represent the tangible material elements of culture, such as the 
language used to articulate the policies and procedures of the organisation, the 
use of acronyms, and the spoken word and dialects of the society. 
 
Thus change, which is what the Balanced Scorecard aims to achieve by making 
organisations more successful, is also about culture.  Schein’s definition incorporates 
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issues such as, “shared vision”; “values”; “behaviour”; “artefacts” and other elements 
of the environment such as “procedures” and “language”.  All these combine to create 
the sense of identity that unites or divides individuals into or from a society or 
organisation. 
 
Neuro Linguistic Programming is essentially the study of excellence at individual 
level.  It aims to help individuals improve their performance through the systemisation 
and articulation of the methods people employ to achieve success.   
 
“NLP is generative psychology.  It is also ‘the psychology of 
excellence’.  It has a vision of a world in which there is no 
shortage of excellence and where education is about helping 
everyone to be outstanding.” 10 
 
The Balanced Scorecard aims to articulate a system by which organisations can 
achieve success.  Thus the two are linked conceptually in that both seek to enable 
improvement; one at an individual level and the other at organisational level.  Indeed, 
it could be argued that the Balanced Scorecard is thus a subsystem within NLP.   
 
“The starting point of NLP is curiosity and fascination about 
people.  It is the study of the structure of subjective experience.  
How do we do what we do?  How do we think?  How do we learn?  
… And how do outstanding people in any field get their results?  
To answer these questions NLP explores how we think and feel and 
studies or ‘models’ excellence in every walk of life.  The answers 
can then be taught to others.  The goal is excellence for all.” 11 
 
The Balanced Scorecard aims to systematise a process by which organisations can 
improve.  This can then be copied by others in order to improve their own 
performance.  Learning is a key feature of both systems: NLP emphasises learning 
from others and from personal experience, the Balanced Scorecard emphasises 
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organisational learning about strategic success utilising the cause-and-effect model 
and the double-loop learning concepts, as outlined in Chapter 2.   
 
Here the logical levels of understanding articulated by NLP help understanding of the 
motivational factors that drive individual performance.  It can also be seen that failure 
to address the higher levels will obstruct progress since they fail to affect the attitudes 
and address the value system of the individual, whilst at the lowest level culture is an 
environmental factor that will also need to be addressed.  Some writers see these value 
systems as a core part of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
3. The Balanced Scorecard and organisational culture. 
 
M Smith argues that in attempting to promote new management practices the 
organisational culture will be impacted, particularly when attempting to translate 
systems across national and organisational divides.  Denison too argues,  
 
“The values and beliefs of an organisation give rise to a set of 
management practices - concrete activities that are usually rooted 
in the values of the organisation.” 12 
 
He goes on to say,  
 
“Concrete policies and practices are often difficult to separate 
from the core values and beliefs and the system of shared meaning 




“Effectiveness (or lack of it) is a function of the values and beliefs 
held by the members of an organisation”. 14 
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This would support the contention that any attempt to change the practices and 
procedures of the organisation in order to improve effectiveness would result in a 
change in the organisational culture.  Introduction of the Balanced Scorecard thus falls 
into this category. 
 
Although it is often argued that culture impacts organisational effectiveness, A Brown 
commends Denison’s work as being one of the few that have proved a direct linkage 
between culture and effectiveness. 15  Kaplan and Norton argue that the businesses 
have changed to become more knowledge based. 16  It would be valid to argue that if 
the nature of the organisation has changed then its culture has changed too.  Kaplan 
and Norton also argue that the Balanced Scorecard enables tangible and intangible 
assets to be linked through the cause and effect model, to enhance organisational 
value. 17  This raises the question of the degree to which the Balanced Scorecard 
should incorporate culture as a key intangible asset for value creation.  But not 
everyone sees culture as an asset.  A Brown, reports that Kan sees culture as 
exploitative in that it freezes inequalities and existing power domination structures. 18  
This view would suggest that culture is a liability. 
 
M G Brown argues that to build a Balanced Scorecard it is also necessary to embed in 
it the organisational values.  He attributes the identification of organisational values to 
the TQM movement and articulates a link to the Baldrige Award. 19  This suggests 
that the Balanced Scorecard should articulate the culture of the organisation, because 
the values are part of culture.  Cartwright sees culture as being unique to an 
organisation. 20  Similarly, M G Brown sees culture as something that cannot be 
copied from one organisation to another, and quotes the example of Southwest 
Airlines, which has been able to create a unique opportunity for itself through its 
culture. 21  Southwest Airlines is so concerned about its culture that it selects 
employees on the basis of personality rather than skills and ability, because these 
latter issues can be “trained” whilst personality cannot. 22  Bowen, et al, echo these 
sentiments. 23  However, M G Brown sees the role of the CEO as of crucial 
importance and highlights organisational vulnerability to changes at the senior level 
where culture is driven. 24  M G Brown also admits that he rarely sees Balanced 
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Scorecards that attempt to monitor the degree to which the desired culture has been 
adopted.  But then he also suggests that once the desired culture has been adopted the 
relevant metrics might be dropped. 25  This raises the issue of whether measurement 
promotes change whilst lack of measurement creates stability, is discussed below.  
Cartwright argues that senior managers drive culture.  Looking at the work of Kotter 
and Heskett, and also that of Dyer, it might be suggested that in strong cultures the 
leadership only has an impact when changed as a result of a crisis. 26, 27  Dyer’s model 
might be seen as implying that existing management will have no impact in the crisis 
and will need to be replaced. 28  This may be because existing management and the 
culture they have created (or vice versa) are part of the problem that has created the 
crisis.  Kotter and Heskett go on to argue that cultural issues are of increasing 
importance. 29  The danger is that, unless management and the organisation recognise 
culture as an issue, the cultural development process is likely to be haphazard. 
 
This highlights something of a conflict.  If organisational culture can be changed, eg 
through plans derived from appropriate scorecard measures, once change has occurred 
what is to prevent further, undesirable change if appropriate measures do not reinforce 
the required culture?  That is, you get the culture you desire through its measurement.  
If you don’t measure it, you don’t get it.  Although written specifically in the context 
of “process metrics”, M G Brown’s comment that, “When it comes to human 
behaviour, you get what you measure, most of the time” 30 is probably still valid in 
cultural terms.  Against this is the question of the degree to which culture reaches 
some form of stable equilibrium based on internal action, or whether external 
influences can upset the equilibrium. 
 
A Brown points out that some writers distinguish between the organisational culture 
and its identity.  The issue of what an organisational identity is, and how it differs 
from the organisational culture, is somewhat unclear.  He argues that “identity” may 
be synonymous with the espoused culture, ie how those external to the organisation 
perceive the internal culture.  This may be different from the real culture. 31 Adapting 
the Johari window concepts helps explain the issue of different perceptions of the 
cultural identity. 32  For many organisations the collective understanding of the culture 
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(A and C in Figure 3.3 below) will be quite high.  There is, however, an issue about 
how this information is collected and utilised.  In contrast for many individuals 
external to the organisation the understanding of the culture will be limited.  Indeed 
some of the individual perceptions and beliefs may be false, but these too can be 
important to the organisation because they will represent a view of the organisation 
which has to be overcome.  There are always likely to be things that an organisation 
does not know about itself; eg the roots of traditions lost in time, government or 
competitors plans that will have a detrimental impact on performance.  Note that the 
boundaries between the perspectives are not necessarily central, and will move over 
time.  This is indicated by the arrows.  The model highlights how the perceived 
identity of the organisation will be different internally to that held externally. 
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Figure 3.3: Cultural Window.
Source: Author, adapted from the concepts of the Johari Window. 
 
 
Anthony supports these ideas of multiple perspectives, 
 
“But organisations are also prone to take a particular view of 
themselves, for purposes of advertising or public relations or, 
sometimes, to motivate their employees to greater loyalty and 
effort.  This inspirational view of what the culture of the 
organisation is may differ from the way it seems to its inhabitants 
or to an observer.  It may not even be meant to be accurate 
because it is intended to influence rather than describe …”. 33 
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Anthony thus distinguishes between the “espoused” “corporate culture” and the 
“real” “organisational culture”, although he suggests that it may be difficult to 
separate the two. 34  Note too that different collectives of individuals within the 
organisation may have different views.  Thus blocks A and C in the above can be seen 
to have meaning at individual, team or group level, and corporate level. 
 
M G Brown, when looking at the US retailer Sears reports a perceived link between 
employee morale, customer satisfaction and then to profit.  A study was undertaken 
that proved that this relationship existed, but the relationship was minimal.  Pursuit of 
this as a viable route to improved business performance was thus not worthwhile. 35, 36  
But the general contention cannot be dismissed on the basis of one particular example.  
Instead it is necessary to consider Denison’s general thrust that organisational success 
is based on a balanced culture.  One issue is the degree to which that culture must 
connect with its customer or stakeholder base.  Consideration must also be given as to 
how significant morale, or culture, is to an organisation.  However, since culture 
reflects so much of the organisation it is logical that it will have a major impact.  This 
issue is, “How can culture be influenced in a way that adds greatest benefit to 
business objectives for a given input of resource?”  Ainslie, in his work, 37 does not 
examine this issue in a numerical manner, but merely quotes widely on the recognised 
importance of this relationship.  His overall aim is to produce a mechanism to 
facilitate more systematic measurement of organisational ethos, because this is seen as 
important to achieving organisational objectives.  A Brown highlights the general 
perception that a “strong culture equals a successful organisation”.  However, he goes 
on to suggest that there is not a great deal of evidence to support this, and some 
evidence to contradict it, a position supported by Bowen, et al. 38  But Brown also 
suggests that a dysfunctional culture may lead, or contribute to organisational failure. 
39 
 
Commenting on the growth of the study of organisational culture, A Brown says, 
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“It was the apparent failure of traditional approaches, which 
stressed the importance of formal organisational structure and 
environment relations, to offer convincing explanations that 
persuades many commentators to consider organisational culture 
seriously.” 40 
 
Thus he can be seen to be somewhat in contrast with Kaplan and Norton who argue 
that it is the successful implementation of strategy and effective understanding of, and 
interaction with, the environment, through the Balanced Scorecard, that will produce 
success.  In that sense Kaplan and Norton might be seen as “traditionalists”, whilst M 
G Brown, who argues more for the management of the culture through the Balanced 
Scorecard, might be seen to stand between these two viewpoints.  Similarly it is 
important to recognise that only if one adopts the perspective that a culture is, “A set 
of behavioural and or cognitive characteristics” 41 can one contemplate measuring 
aspects of culture and set about determining its relationship to organisation activity 
and outcomes.  If Kaplan and Norton are right when they argue that the Balanced 
Scorecard is about implementing strategic plans and vision, is this not directly 
addressing cultural issues?  Strategic plans and the vision need to be made explicit, in 
the same way that cultural issues need to be made explicit.  Implementing strategy 
will impact culture.  For example, putting new emphasis on particular products and 
changing cost structures, as in the case of Mobil 42, can also be seen as having created 
a new cultural regime that changed what the organisation valued previously, including 
changing employee behaviours.  The question is whether the Balanced Scorecard can 
be used to reconcile staff to changes in their organisational importance in the same 
way that it can be used to reconcile competing strategic objectives. 43  Certainly 
Cartwright is convinced that in order to manage culture it must be defined and 
measured. 44  Cartwright goes on to remind his readers that organisations with deeply 
entrenched traditional management styles must be more flexible if they are to survive 
the challenge of external environmental change. 45  This raises the issue of the degree 
of change that is acceptable without the effective destruction of the organisation.  That 
is, if an organisation abandons many of its traditional values, is it truly the same 
organisation? 
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A Brown highlights the problem that national cultures that emphasise individualism as 
opposed to collectivism will tend to result in the creation of multiple organisational 
subcultures. 46  As we shall see when we look at Hofstede’s work, Great Britain’s 
national culture would therefore tend to promote organisational subcultures.  This 
raises the issue of whether subcultures are detrimental or supportive to the overall 
organisational culture, and whether attempting to promote a single culture is therefore 
beneficial or detrimental to the achievement of overall organisational goals.  
Interestingly, Cartwright implies that if the organisational culture is too powerful then 
it will mask the individual subcultures making it difficult to identify and manage 
issues at the lower level.  However, this seems to deny the way he advocates that his 
Nine Factors measurement instrument should be used.  Nevertheless, he does go on to 
make the point that,  
 
“ … by the identification and measurement of individual sectors or 
departmental cultures, it will be possible to link business 
performance indicators directly to the motivating factors in each 
individual culture.” 47 
 
This tends to suggest that whilst it is important to consider and manage culture, the 
impact and relationship with subcultures could be extremely important.  Thus 
Cartwright goes on to emphasise the need to measure cultural issues at a sub-
organisational level in order to distinguish the different issues in different parts of the 
organisation. 
 
Kaplan and Norton describe the Learning and Growth dimension of the Balanced 
Scorecard as addressing the cultural shifts required to deliver strategic objectives. 48  
They then go on to say that, “The learning and growth perspective defines the 
competencies, know-how, technology, and climate needed to support these high 
priority processes and activities.” 49  Some would argue that culture and climate are 
the same, but as has been argued above, competencies, know-how, and technology are 
an integral part of culture.  There is thus perhaps a question, not so much as whether it 
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is legitimate to include cultural issues in this dimension of the Balanced Scorecard, as 
to degree to which the Learning and Growth dimension, in particular, already reflects 
cultural issues.  Thus driving technology change would be tantamount to driving 
cultural change, and the inter-relationships need to be clearly understood.  But then 
this again raises the comment made by Kaplan and Norton that executives fail to fully 
understand the issues in the learning and growth dimension. 50  Nevertheless, Kaplan 
and Norton do argue that one of the roles of a corporate Balanced Scorecard is to 
articulate the, “… values, beliefs, and ideas that reflect the corporate identity and 
must be shared by all SBUs …”. 51  This would suggest that they perceive a role for a 
“culture measure” in corporate level scorecards, although they do not emphasise this 
in their earlier works.  
 
Do executives really understand cultural issues?  Some argue that these are implicit 
rather than explicit, and consequently many fail to understand them.  Even though the 
culture is not explicitly recognised, people will conform to it.  A Brown argues that, 
“A common culture promotes consistency of perception, problem definition, 
evaluation of issues and options, and preferences for action.” 52  Cartwright similarly 
states that,  
 
“The cultural identity will be institutionalised in the organisation's 
code of ethics or mission statement, its code of conduct, personnel 
policies and quality standards.  It will be externalised in its 
symbols, house-style, ceremonies and style of dress of its 
members.” 53 
 
Cartwright goes on to suggest that one of the key functions of a culture is its ability to 
instruct its members and the group as a whole. 54  This perhaps puts the issue of 
culture more at the heart of the Balanced Scorecard: in the same category of the 
strategy and mission statements, which express the culture of the organisation.  But 
one of the biggest problems that seems to emerge from reading these various authors 
is that an organisation faces considerable difficulties in: 
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• Developing consensus on its mission, strategy, goals;  
• Developing means of achieving goals;  
• Identifying the criteria to measure achievement of goals; 
• Identifying alternative strategies for correcting variation from goals; 
• Understanding how to communicate internally;  
• Distributing reward. 
 
These are all issues articulated by Kaplan and Norton as needing to be resolved in 
developing the Balanced Scorecard.  This therefore suggests that the issues of the 
Balanced Scorecard and Culture are similar if not inextricably bound.  For example, 
“The cultural assessment … becomes part of the overall organisational culture that 
can be effectively managed for its continuous improvement.” 55  This is not dissimilar 
to the objective of implementing the Balanced Scorecard.  It is also argued that 
Continuous Improvement, TQM, EFQM, etc are not tools that can simply be picked 
up, used for a while and then thrown away.  A real, and long-term, commitment has to 
be made to them.  There is a danger in any of these issues being seen as a 
“management fad”, or even as an experiment by those advocating them. 
 
What needs to be determined is what the relationship is between these management 
tools or processes and the organisational culture.  It is also necessary to consider how 
that relationship is managed.  Interestingly both Cartwright and Denison see the need 
for a balanced management of cultural issues.  In his cultural measurement tool 
developed from his earlier work Denison balances “involvement” with “mission” and 
“consistency” with “adaptability”.  Cartwright argues, “The organisation needs to 
strike a balance between continuity and change, between stability and flexibility, 
between long-termism and short-term considerations…”. 56  It is therefore questioned 
whether a good Balanced Scorecard can also be judged by these cultural criteria in 
terms of the performance measures it contains.  Cartwright also highlights Goodwin’s 
ideas that “internal adaptation” and “consistent management behaviour” are both 
required. 57  Thus Goodwin aligns to some degree with Denison. 
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One of Srinivasan’s main arguments also picks up on issues relating to culture.  He 
argues,  
 
“We may well ask why so elegant an idea as the balanced 
scorecard has taken so long to germinate in the corporate world.  
The reason perhaps lies in our culture - the way we do things.” 
 
He concludes,  
 
“The extent to which organisations can reconcile these tensions 
depends on their culture.  It is only at our own peril that we ignore 
culture's consequences in dealing with contrasting issues in the 
strategy process and the balanced scorecard.” 58  
 
The way that we do things is based on our understanding of the different options.  But 
A Brown reports that Weick suggests that many researchers see no distinction 
between culture and strategy. 59  However, whilst A Brown then comments that 
“…most commentators…” see a distinction between culture and strategy, he does 
suggest that strategic planning documents can be regarded as “…cultural 
artefacts…”. 60  If this is so, and the Balanced Scorecard articulates the strategy, then 
the Balanced Scorecard articulates culture.  Green suggests that strategy also modifies 
culture. 61   
 
Throughout the writings on the Balanced Scorecard there are implicit references to the 
impact on organisation culture and the way that it changes as the scorecard takes 
effect.  The relationship between the two is complex.  But then anything that happens 
within, or even outside, an organisation has impact on the culture.  The issue is thus 
the degree to which there is a need to take a specifically “cultural” perspective of the 
organisation and its activities, rather than the more “business objective” focus of the 
traditional Balanced Scorecard perspectives.  That does not mean that there has to be a 
separate “fifth” “Cultural Perspective” embodied in the scorecard model, since such 
issues could be incorporated in the other perspectives, particularly the “Learning and 
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Growth” perspective.  If Kotter and Heskett are to be believed, failure to manage 
change effectively will undermine Balanced Scorecard objectives.  Change will be 
resisted by culture, and thus culture must be managed effectively. 
 
4. The Balanced Scorecard and national culture. 
 
In Chapter 2 reference was made to the Tableau de Bord as a competitive 
management tool to the Balanced Scorecard.  Few see the Tableau de Bord as having 
advantage over the Balanced Scorecard, yet there is a French commitment to the 
system that is seen nowhere else.  Thus there is a need to consider whether this arises 
from cultural differences.  As is shown below, the French culture is different to that of 
the United States.  It may thus be that the Balanced Scorecard is using a management 
language that is alien to French culture.  Brooks highlights this issue,  
 
“It is also interesting to note that many of the early problems faced 
by Eurodisney near Paris were cultural in origin and were partly 
the result of American management coming into contact with 
French culture.” 62 
 
This issue about potential conflict with national culture is highlighted in an article by 
Smith,  
 
“ … we must beware of attempting to transfer management 
practices based on US theory to hosts with different cultural value 
systems; if we do so without taking these differences into account, 
then transfers will be doomed to failure.” 63   
 
Smith highlights that differences in national cultures will have particular importance 
for multinationals.  This suggests therefore, that multinationals operating in France are 
much more likely to encounter problems in introducing the Balanced Scorecard to 
their French speaking areas than they are likely to experience in areas that are better 
disposed towards the US culture.   
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Hofstede, when working on culture in IBM noted that, whilst there appeared to be a 
common organisational culture, nationality distinguished the individuals within IBM 
to a significant degree. 64  He measured the differences on four dimensions, which are 
set out in the Table 3.2 below.  (Consideration of the fifth dimension, of “long-term 
orientation”, does not extend to providing a complete set of data for all the countries 
in the sample and therefore this dimension is not considered.)  Taking the origins of 
some of the major works on the Balanced Scorecard, and comparing them to France, 
it is notable that the French culture shows considerable variation from the English 
speaking countries.  Statistics for Japan are also included below, as this is the origin of 
many new management practices in recent years. 
 
Table 3.2: National culture measures for selected countries. 
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USA 40 91 62 46 
Great 
Britain 
35 89 66 35 
Australia 36 90 61 51 
Sweden 31 71 5 29 
France 68 71 43 86 
Japan 54 46 95 92 
Taiwan 58 17 45 69 
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This is also presented graphically in Figure 3.4. 
 

















































































National cultures have been categorised into eight clusters using these characteristics.  
France falls into the “More developed Latin” cluster, Japan into the “More developed 
Asian”, Taiwan into the “Less developed Asian”, Sweden into the “Nordic” cluster, 
and Australia, Great Britain and the USA into an “Anglo” cluster. 69 
 
This suggests that the French culture is significantly different from that of the USA, 
Australia and Great Britain, with the result that cultural issues, eg related to 
management, might not translate easily on the basis of nationality, although the 
unifying influence of corporate culture might help overcome this in a multinational 
organisation.  However, the same might be said also for Sweden, although the 
difference is not so great, particularly if the “masculinity” index is discounted as 
having less impact on the use of a management tool.  The Japanese culture also seems 
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to differ significantly.  Thus Hofstede’s work can be seen as supporting the argument 
that cultural differences might prevent adoption of the Balanced Scorecard in France, 
but equally raises the issue about why Japanese Quality Management processes might 
have been so readily adopted by the West.  Indeed, Cartwright, in proposing cultural 
management as a key method for successful quality management, states that male-
orientated macho values are counterproductive in a quality culture: perhaps thereby 
undermining the case for their success in Japan. 70  This suggests that the issues 
driving effective management cannot be looked at simply in terms of a stylised 
national or management culture. 
 
In a rather acrimonious exchange, Hofstede challenges the work of Gooderham and 
Nordhaug who suggest that in Europe the international differences in culture may be 
on the decline. 71  If there is a decline in international cultural distinctions then 
theoretically the way might be more or less open to the acceptance of a particular 
management tool, as part of the process, value system and therefore the culture of 
organisations.  However, it is also necessary to determine how the Balanced 
Scorecard as a process maps against culture if one is to determine whether it will 
become more or less acceptable.  It is also necessary to understand the relationship 
between national culture and individual organisational culture within the national 
context, and to see if the organisational culture transcends national culture, eg because 
the organisation is international.  However, it must be recognised that Hofstede’s 
original work identified national cultures within an international organisation, ie IBM. 
 
The weakness of Hofstede’s work is that it is based on one organisation with its own 
strong culture.  Although Hofstede’s work is regarded highly, Brooks notes that, 
 
 “One of the biggest problems faced when looking at national 
culture is to find an acceptable definition.  Kroeber and Kluckholm 
(1985) found over 160 definitions of culture in their research.  
This may be because culture can be viewed from an 
anthropological or sociological perspective as opposed to an 
organisational one …” 72 
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He goes on to point out that Hofstede’s work results in people viewing culture in 
“national” terms rather than on more regional ethnic groupings.  However, “In some 
countries subcultural differences may follow social class, gender, age, ethnic origin, 




• Legal system, 
• Values, 
• Education, 
• Political system, and  
• Religion. 74 
 
Kluckholm and Strodtbeck provided one of the earliest classifications of culture, but 
Adler, Laurent, Mead and Campbell took this work further variously. 75  From these 
various works is derived an alternative classification of national culture as perceived 
in management: 
 
• “managers’ attitudes towards hierarchy; 
• the willingness to bypass lines of hierarchy in the 
organisation;  
• managers’ relationships with subordinates; 
• the importance of managers in society.” 76 
 
Based on this Laurent measured the culture of managers in various countries.  Again 
this demonstrates a difference between the cultures of US, UK, Sweden and France, 
as shown in Table 3.3 and Figure 3.5. 77 
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Table 3.3: Analysis of managers’ roles. 
Country: Agreement 






























France 43% 43% 53% 76% 
Sweden 30% 26% 10% 54% 
UK 34% 35% 27% 40% 
USA 17% 32% 18% 52% 
 


















































































This suggests that whilst French culture is distinctly different from the other three.  
Lauren’s analysis perhaps suggests that managers are expected to be “superior”, with 
a consequent disenfranchisement of employees who merely obey orders without 
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understanding the vision.  This chimes with the findings of Hofstede where there is 
distance between power figures and subordinates and a requirement for low 
uncertainty in France.  However, it is noted that there is less commonality between 
any of the other three cultures than there is under Hofstede’s categorisation.  
(Tropenaars and Hampden-Turner provide an alternative assessment of national 
cultures and similarly identify substantial difference between France and the 
Scandinavian and Anglo-American cultures, although the Antipodean cultures are 
seen as closer to the French under their classification, whilst the South Korean culture 
is even further from the Anglo-American cultures than the French. 78) 
 
Huang, in his research into a Balanced Scorecard based performance measurement 
framework, largely ignores the issues of culture, despite the fact that his work is 
aimed at organisations undergoing considerable change.  He even concludes that his 
performance measurement system could be used across cultural boundaries, but since 
this is assessed on the basis of interviews with six organisations – three Taiwanese 
military organisations moving to the private sector, and three UK companies (one of 
which appears might be a Taiwanese subsidiary) – the findings cannot be considered 
robust. 79  However, as can be seen from Hofstede’s work, the Taiwanese culture is 
substantially different from that of the other nations shown above.  It is nearest to that 
of France, except in the individuality dimension, and thus transporting the Balanced 
Scorecard to Taiwanese culture may not be a simple matter. 
 
This therefore suggests that organisational culture will be impacted by the national 
culture in which the organisation operates.  There may therefore be difficulties in 
adopting management systems across national boundaries where characteristics of the 
national culture mitigate against adoption of such a management tool.  Trompenaars 
comments,  
 
“The Dutch author became interested in this subject before it grew 
popular because his father is Dutch and his mother is French.  It 
gave him an understanding of the fact that if something works in 
one culture, there is little chance that it will work in another.  No 
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Dutch “management” technique his father tried to use ever 
worked effectively in his French family.” 80 
 
Antipathy towards the origins of a management tool may also be an important factor.  
However, since multinationals operate their management systems on an international 
basis, national cultural issues may not be insurmountable, particularly if national 
cultures differences are being eroded, eg by the strong influence of the American 
culture.  What is needed is clear understanding and management of such issues, but it 
may be that a standardised “American” management process will need to be modified 
to fit easily into another culture. 
 
5. Culture and organisational success. 
 
Deal and Kennedy in the introduction to their book “The new corporate culture” 
highlight Schein’s view that the really important role of the leader in an organisation 
is to manage the organisational culture.  They then go on to say that,  
 
“Other books, most notably, John Kotter and James Heskett’s 
Corporate Culture and Performance and James Collins and Jerry 
Porras’s Built to Last, offered solid quantitative evidence to 
demonstrate that companies with strong cultures outperform run-
of-the-mill companies by a massive margin.” 81 
 
Their view is very much that it is organisations with strong cultures that are successful 
and that downsizing, outsourcing and mergers play havoc with the internal culture that 
is the instrument of success.  Such tactics are the result of short-term management 
obsessions.  In that sense they agree with Kaplan and Norton whose work was based 
on the need to instil a longer-term perspective into managers.  However, Deal and 
Kennedy also believe that these tactics fail to recognise where the organisation has 
come from and where it is now.  Essentially this is a plea to take a cultural perspective 
of the organisation to the heart of the management process.  In their analysis of events 
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since their original book, 82 they admit that some of the companies that they had 
highlighted as having strong effective culture no longer exist.  However, they argue, 
 
“Nevertheless, had we put out 1982 money where our mouths were 
and purchased one share of stock in each of the companies we so 
admired (which were then listed on the stock market) our initial 
stake would have increased by 987% through midyear 1998.  In 
contrast, had we invested our money in the Standard & Poor’s 
average, the most broadly based stock market performance, our 
stake would have increased by only 538% …” 83 
 
Kotter and Heskett argue that, 
 
• “Corporate culture can have a significant impact on a firm’s long-term 
economic performance … 
• Corporate culture will probably be an even more important factor in 
determining the success or failure of firms in the next decade … 
• Corporate cultures that inhibit strong long-term financial performance are not 
rare; they develop easily, even in firms that are full of reasonable and 
intelligent people … 
• Although tough to change, corporate cultures can be made more performance 
enhancing.” 84 
 
The summary of their findings is in Table 3.4 below:  
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Table 3.4: Kotter and Heskett’s findings on longer-term 
performance for organisations based on perception of culture. 
(Kotter, J.P. and Heskett, J.L.  (1992).  Corporate Culture and Performance.  
Free Press.  Page 11.) 
Performance 
improvements 
over an 11-year 
period. 
Firms whose cultures 
emphasise the key 
stakeholder groups 
(customers, stockholders 
and employees) and 
whose managers provide 
leadership at all levels in 
the organisation: 
Firms that do not exhibit 
such cultural traits: 
Average increase 
in revenue: 682% 166% 
Average expansion 
of workforce: 282% 36% 
Average growth in 
stock price: 901% 74% 
Average increase 
in net income: 756% 1% 
 
Collins and Porras identified ten cultural characteristics of strong companies and 
showed that over the period 1926 to 1990 one dollar invested in each of their 
“visionary companies” would have produced $6,356 compared to $415 for an 
investment in the general stock market average over the same period. 85 
 
Cameron and Quinn referring to Porter’s “Five Forces model”: 
 
• High entry barriers, 
• Threat of substitution, 
• Buyer bargaining power, 
• Supplier bargaining power, and  
• Industry competition, 86 
 
suggest that a favourable representation of these issues does not necessarily produce 
success, but that organisations can thrive in adverse conditions through the presence 
of an appropriate culture. 
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“The top five performers in the last two decades – those who have 
literally blown away the competition in financial returns – have 
not been the recipients of any of the so-called prerequisites for 
success.  These highly successful firms are Southwest Airlines 
(21,775% return), Wal-Mart (19,807% return), Tyson Foods 
(18,118% return), Circuit City (16,410% return) and Plenum 
Publishing (15,689% return) …The major distinguishing feature in 
these companies, their most important competitive advantage, the 
most powerful factor they all highlight as a key ingredient in their 
success, is their organisational culture.” 87 
 
Peters and Waterman’s “In search of Excellence”, and Goldsmith and Clutterbuck’s 
“The Winning Streak” are seen as prime movers in the belief that a strong culture is 
important to organisational success. 88, 89  A strong culture is defined by Luthans as 
one where there is a high degree of homogeneity in relation to the core values, and 
one where there is a high degree of commitment to these shared values. 90  A Brown 
criticises this supposed link between strong culture and enhanced organisational 
performance.  He cites five issues: 
 
• Strong cultures may align goals across the organisation, but the goals 
themselves may not be ethical or may not encourage good performance. 
• Strong cultures and high levels of staff motivation may not be synonymous. 
• Organisations may become too wrapped up in their past to focus effectively on 
the present situation or the future. 
• There may be no causal link between strong cultures and strong economic 
performance in the organisations being used as examples.  Strong performance 
may lead to strong culture rather than the reverse. 
• Even in companies with a strong culture, it is unlikely that the organisation has 
a single unitary culture. 91 
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Thus whilst simply arguing that the “strong culture” produces strong performance, it 
may be that other factors are also involved.  For example, Rollinson and Broadfield 
go on to highlight that a strong culture may be successful if it is, “… suitable for 
coping with the conditions faced by an organisation …” 92  For example, in 
identifying four organisational types, Handy lists the advantages of each culture and 
the circumstances in which they will be most successful. 93  Kotter and Heskett argue 
that the strong culture must also be adaptive. 94  
 
J Martin argues that systematic studies of the relationship between organisational 
profits and culture are rare for good reasons. 95  She argues that this is because 
profitability is caused by many factors, including those outside the control of the 
organisation.  A large sample needs to be studied, making it difficult to examine the 
culture of each individual organisation.  Martin goes on to highlight the article she 
wrote with Siehl that suggests that the difficulties in undertaking such research are so 
large that, “… it would probably not be a practical dissertation topic.” 96  If this view 
is accepted then it leaves us in something of a quandary.  How does one determine 
any potential linkage between culture and organisational success?  Siehl and Martin 
go on to argue that attempting to study the relationship between culture and 
organisational performance is limiting because it narrows our perspectives on culture.  
Studying culture also produces a bias towards management perspectives rather than 
studying individual and societal impacts. 
 
“We would conclude by asserting that, rather than continuing in 
this quest, [for a positive relationship between culture management 
and organisational performance] as culture researchers we should 
instead seriously consider the issues raised above.   The concept of 
culture holds too much promise to be sold short as just another 
intervening variable in existing models of the determinants of 
organisational performance.” 97 
 
Such a view seems naïve, even bearing in mind the difficulties.  The growth in the 
number of cultural measurement tools might be seen as a means of improving cultural 
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description as opposed to the descriptive systems used by many of the studies 
examined by Siehl and Martin. 
 
This chapter has attempted to show that culture is an integral part of the organisation 
process, in particular in relationship to the Balanced Scorecard.  Even the common 
definition of, “the way we do things round here” means that culture must have a 
bearing on performance.  The very fact that organisations seek to change the way they 
do things in order to succeed suggests that culture and organisational success are 
linked.  That is, only those that succeed in improving the way they do things reap the 
success.  The real issue is thus not that an individual organisation may improve its 
performance at a specific point, relative to other organisations, but that it can do so 
consistently over time.  However, unless one adopts the perspective that there is an 
“adaptive culture” which enables the organisation to metamorphose according to 
internal and external pressures then it would seem unlikely that an organisation could 
consistently outperform others.  Theoretically this adaptive organisation style must 
also enable an organisation to remain static when conditions demand as well as to 
adapt and change when required.  Monitoring organisations’ culture over a protracted 
period would undoubtedly be difficult since Deal and Kennedy recognise the changes 
and even the demise of organisations over a period of ten years. 
 
6. Measuring culture. 
 
Clearly if the culture is important enough to be included in the Balanced Scorecard, 
then there must be an appropriate measurement system.  This has to be linked to a 
clear definition of what is to be measured.  Thus the organisation will need to agree 
how culture is to be described in order to build organisational coherence and 
consistency in communicating and tackling cultural issues.  Cartwright defines his 
own cultural model (see Figure 3.6), 98 and argues that measurement is the key to 
culture change. 99  He may be partly arguing this through a desire to sell his “Nine 
Factors” products, but a more altruistic outlook might counter such a cynical view.  
Cartwright’s believes his model measures employee motivation resulting from quality 
and effectiveness of the organisational culture. 










8. Group dynamics 
9. Internalisation 
Figure 3.6: Cartwright’s Nine Factors (9F) model of 
culture. 
(Cartwright, J.  (1999).  Cultural Transformation - Nine factors for 
continuous business improvement.   Financial Times/Prentice Hall.)   
 
 
There are other similar models, eg the Innovation Climate Questionnaire (ICQ), run 
by the Innovation Centre Europe. 100  This uses 13 different features of the 
organisation to assess organisational climate (see Figure 3.7).  Climate is seen by 
some as closely linked to culture; as being the attitudes and beliefs that individuals 
hold about the organisation, but perhaps as a more short-term view rather than the 
longer term attitudes and beliefs that individuals hold as part of the organisation. 101  
(See also Chapter 4, Section 7.)  Specifically this questionnaire, based on the work of 
Ekvall, assess the degree to which the organisation is “Innovative” or “Stagnated”.  
However, the use of 13 dimensions may seem to make this a rather complex model. 
 













Figure 3.7: Innovation Climate Questionnaire (ICQ) 
model of climate. 












Cameron and Quinn in presenting their “Organisational Culture Assessment 
Instrument” (OCAI), summarised in Figure 3.8, claim, “It has been used in more than 
a thousand organisations that we know of, and it has been found to predict 
organisational performance.” 102  This is a much simpler model at a highest level, 
although Cameron and Quinn go on to demonstrate that it has sophistication and 
broad functionality. 103 
 
3 - 35 
 
 FLEXIBILITY AND DISCRETION
Figure 3.8: Organisational Culture Assessment 
Instrument. 
(Cameron, K. S. and Quinn, R. E.  (1999).  Diagnosing and changing 
















































































































































































OCAI is based on a “Competing Values Framework”.  The competing values 
framework is derived from the work of Campbell, et al 104 who identified 39 
indicators that were analysed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh 105 into the two dimensions 
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shown in Figure 3.8 above.  This leads to organisations being classified into four 
types, and shows some similarity to the work of Harrison/Handy and their 
organisational culture types, but also to the work of Dension and his competing 
tensions that require to be balanced.  This simple and easy to use model is designed to 
measure the perception of the organisational culture as it is currently, and match this 
against a perception of where the organisation needs to be in the future.  These two 
perceptions are represented graphically and thus so the degree to which organisational 
change may be necessary.  Using descriptions of the different organisational cultures 
given in Figure 3.8 above it is potentially possible to determine whether the 
organisational culture is appropriate to the pressures of the operating environment. 
 
There are a number of other culture questionnaires available. 106  Indeed, an Internet 
search in November, 2003 identified over 3.3 million such references.  It was 
immediately obvious that this included much duplication (multiple pages on the same 
web site) and surveys related to the broadest aspects of culture.  Consequently it 
would be a major research project in its own right to identify and categorise the 
available cultural surveys.  This section will therefore concentrate on the need for 
cultural measurement and examine the potential of a limited number of surveys.  Not 
all cultural surveys are linked to clear cultural models in the way that Cartwright has 
developed his model, see for example R W Bauer and S S Bauer. 107  In contrast other 
models may help describe culture but do not readily lend themselves to measurement.  
Thus Johnson’s Culture Web merely aids description of the culture through the 
provision of a wider framework than that provided by Schein’s tripartite 
classification. 108  Whilst the culture web analysis tool assists in surfacing the culture 
it does not itself aid the measurement of the culture or even to determine whether the 
culture is effective. 109 
 
Key to the measurement and management of the culture of the organisation is the 
principle of setting targets and objectives.  Failure to be clear about the objectives of 
cultural management is tantamount to saying, “We are going on a journey, but we 
don’t know where to”.  The required culture must therefore be specified.  This 
philosophy underpins the Balanced Scorecard, because it is from such targets that 
3 - 37 
plans are derived to achieve the desired outcomes.  Cartwright makes this point in 
relation to organisational culture,  
 
“To gain the maximum benefit from culture measurement it is 
necessary to be able to predict future performance against a 
known measure that will be periodically checked to monitor 
progress.” 110 
 
Without some underlying meaning or definition of the measurements, issues cannot 
be managed effectively.  That is, defining what is measured is one thing, being clear 
about why that issue is being measured is another.  Thus there is a need for some form 
of cause-and-effect model for culture management, just as there is for any other 
element included in the Balanced Scorecard.  This is certainly what Cartwright’s 9F 
model provides.  Shiron and Harrison advocate the use of multiple diagnostic models 
for assisting in organisational change.  They argue that no single model can fit all 
organisations.  They go on to argue that the advantages in using explicit models are, 
 
• Practitioners will probably obtain a better understanding of organisational 
issues when using explicit models rather than relying on intuitive examination, 
because this is more likely to drive them into using the biases of their own 
“…personal mental maps…”. 
• It improves the quality of diagnosis because it is easier to validate the results 
in terms of coverage of issues. 
• It results in more orderly diagnostic work and in a more sound and systematic 
change process. 
• They are powerful tools for management development by providing holistic 
and logically structured ways of looking at an organisation that contribute to 
organisational learning. 111 
 
The issue is whether culture requires its own model or is merely integrated into the 
overall Balanced Scorecard cause-and-effect model.  It is suggested that complexity 
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of cultural issues is such that like any complex PI it would require its own model to 
understand in detail what the issues are and what the PI means. 
 
Cartwright believes that employees will effectively only demonstrate real 
commitment to the organisation when they have internalised the organisational 
beliefs.  Indeed he suggests that this concept is the summation of his other eight 
factors, and results in a matching between the behaviours of the individual and the 
organisation.  The individual will then have pride and commitment in the 
organisation. 112  A Brown refers to the work of Golden that suggests people have a 
hierarchy of strategies for dealing with the dominant culture of their organisations: 
 
• Unequivocal adherence – people conform to the culture because they fully 
accept the efficacy of the organisation culture in framing their actions and 
decisions. 
• Strained adherence – people conform to the culture but experience some 
tension because they do not fully accept that it correctly frames their actions 
and decisions.  This may result in the individual voicing some concerns, eg in 
an oblique way such as through jokes. 
• Secret non-adherence – people overtly conform, particularly in the presence 
of senior managers, but may rebel against the culture in a covert manner when 
they judge it is safe to do so. 
• Open non-adherence – people who are personally secure or uncaring about 
what the organisation thinks may openly rebel against the organisational 
culture. 113 
 
Similarly Handy identifies three types of psychological contract to describe the nature 
of relationship between individual and group or organisation: Coercive, Calculative 
and Cooperative. 114 This highest level of “Unequivocal adherence” would appear to 
be the same as Cartwright’s “Internalisation”.  This arises in his model of 
“enculturation”: 
 
• Identification – with the cultural influences. 
3 - 39 
• Motivation – resulting from expected outcomes arising from adherence to the 
culture. 
• Internalisation – the individual adopts the values and beliefs for himself. 115 
 
From Handy’s work there is also the concept of the “psychological contract”, which is 
the degree to which the individual has psychologically, as well as physically, bought-
into the organisation, its aims, objectives activities and its culture. 116  Whilst not 
perhaps exactly the same, internalisation and the psychological contract represent 
similar issues.  Handy attempts to measure the psychological contract through his 
cultural measurement tool on the basis that the closer the fit between the individual 
and the organisation the stronger the bond.  Similarly, internalisation of organisational 
beliefs by the employee will illustrate a strong bond.  Cartwright in contrast attempts 
to measure motivational levels as an illustration of cultural commitment.  Denison 
attempts to measure the culture in order to determine its effectiveness.  But it is 
argued that this is only a perceived culture: as it is with the other measurement 
systems.  Consequently all these are measuring are the relationship between the 
individual and the organisation as they perceive it.  Thus this illustrates something 
about the individual(s) and about the organisation.  Whilst perception measures do not 
have the rigor of objective measures, Balanced Scorecard theory argues that 
perception measures can be used as a reasonable surrogate.  This is a particular 
instance where a surrogate is appropriate since it is attempting to measure both sides 
of an entity that is rarely properly articulated and will be constantly evolving. 
 
One of the other reasons that the psychological contract and internalised beliefs are 
important is because they relate to the stress that the individual will experience.  
McDermott and O’Connor argue,  
 
“You may not be used to thinking of beliefs and values as capable 
of causing stress or as resources against it, but this is the area 
where change can have the greatest effect.  We carry our beliefs 
with us so they will cause stress wherever we are.  The more rigid 
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our beliefs and expectations, the more stress we will experience, as 
the world is not going to go out of its way to meet our needs.” 117  
 
This stress will be dysfunctional as far as the organisation and the individual are 
concerned and could be considered as directly related to morale and staff attitude, but 
must also therefore be recognised as affecting organisational performance. 
 
Thus with Harrison/Handy’s measurement tool 118 the emphasis is about measuring 
the distance between the individual and the organisation.  The work is based on a 
classic categorisation of organisations: 
 
• Power or web culture, 
• Role or temple culture, 
• Task or net culture, and  
• Person or cluster culture. 
 
A summary of the Harrison and Handy’s classification is at Appendix B to this 
chapter.  The questionnaire is also included as Appendix A (as used in Chapter 6 with 
minor formatting changes).  These four cultural types seem to equate, at least 
superficially to Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’s Family, Eiffel Tower, Guided 
Missile and Incubator cultures, respectively. 119 
 
By looking at the acceptability to the individual of 15 characteristics of each cultural 
style, it is possible to determine how acceptable each organisational style is to the 
individual.  Each organisational style is scored between 15 and 60.  Using the same 
ranking system the individual is also able to describe their perception of the 
organisation in which they work.  Deducting one score from the other for each 
organisational style will demonstrate the psychological distance between the 
individual and the organisation.  Whilst this articulates potential mismatches at the 
individual level, this may not truly reflect what the organisation is like, ie the 
individual’s perception may be erroneous.  Arguably this does not matter since it 
could be said that it is the individual’s view of what (s)he gets from working in the 
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organisation that will signify contentment.  Nevertheless, both have invested 
something in the contract and should thus seek to maximise their return by seeking to 
move closer together.   
 
An aggregate view of the organisation may be obtained by taking views of the 
organisation from many different employees.  Similarly the organisation may wish to 
build up a picture of its employees by aggregating the perceptions of employee 
desires.  This richer picture may assist in the management of psychological distances 
between employee and employer.  However, what this model does not show is, “What 
is the best organisational style to deliver organisational objectives in the current, and 
future, operating environment?”  This can only be assessed crudely on the basis of 
what organisational structure seems to best fit the need.  Within this context it must 
also be recognised that the organisation will be a conglomeration of subcultures.  
These might appear to conflict, whilst perhaps individually they are effective due to 
their being populated by people who desire and operate effectively within, a particular 
culture.  Thus whilst the model and associated questionnaire may be effective in a 
descriptive sense, it is by no means clear that it helps determine and drive 
organisational effectiveness, although improving the psychological distance between 
organisation and individual should help improve performance. 
 
Dension’s model (Figure 3.9) in contrast was designed around organisational 
effectiveness. 
 






Figure 3.9: Denison’s cultural survey model.
(Denison, D. R.  (1990).  Corporate Culture and Organisational 
Effectiveness.  Wiley & Sons.) 
 
 
Denison argues that for an organisation to be effective it needs to have a balanced 
approach towards managing internal and external issues.  Focusing on the internal 
issues will mean that the external issues, eg customer issues, will receive insufficient 
attention.  Similar there is a need for the organisation to be both flexible enough to 
adapt to changing circumstances and stable enough to enable employees to know what 
is required.  By keeping a balance between these competing perspectives the 
organisation can respond to pressures from where ever they come.  Denison 
demonstrated that organisations that performed well against all four dimensions were 
more effective. 
 
Having developed and proved this basic model, Denison developed the model into a 
questionnaire that measures how well the organisation performs against these 
different dimensions.  In the questionnaire the four quadrants are each represented by 
3 sectors, tested by five statements.  The statements are assessed on a Likert scale by 
organisational members.  The average scores are deemed to represent organisational 
performance. 120  Organisations are measured against each other rather than against a 
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set standard.  Thus for each of the twelve sectors, and sixty statements, there is a 
representation of how the organisation is performing compared to the highest scoring 
organisations.  This highlights perceived weaknesses in the organisational 
performance that can be addressed in order to improve organisational effectiveness. 
 
Cartwright’s 9F model measures employee morale based on the effectiveness of the 
culture.  Harrison/Handy’s model measures the psychological distance of employees 
from the organisation.  Denison takes an aggregated view of organisational culture as 
a means of determining likely organisational effectiveness.  It is not clear how much 
difference there is between these different perceptions of what is being measured.  
None is using totally objective measures.  In each case the questionnaire relies on the 
individual’s perception of issues.  If Cartwright’s concept is correct, then this suggests 
that people’s attitudes will affect their perceptions of the issues being measured.  Thus 
people may distance themselves from factors seeming to cause problems within the 
organisation and opt for what they see as the “greener pastures” of different 
managerial or organisational behaviour, even if they have no experience of such 
behaviour.  Consequently Harrison and Handy’s work may not truly reflect 
organisational perceptions of issues, merely personal prejudices.  This will distort the 
outcomes.   
 
Similarly, perceptions of cultural dimensions listed by Denison’s questionnaire may 
reflect personal desire rather than performance.  This may under or overstate 
organisational performance, leading to a misinterpretation of true organisational 
performance.  Such perceptions will be affected by the morale of the individual.  By 
taking a large sample of staff these issues may be averaged out. 
 
Denison’s questionnaire is seen as defining and measuring an effective culture.  In 
contrast Cartwright defines the means by which an organisational culture might be 
effective; he suggests that measurement only determines motivation.  However, both 
systems might be regarded as measuring the effect of the organisational culture, either 
on the individual or on organisational outcomes.  In either case it is argued that 
cultural impact is being measured.  Thus either would provide a prospective measure 
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of culture, and the underpinning model provides a management tool for defining and 
improving organisational culture.  If Denison is right, that improving organisational 
culture improves effectiveness, then theoretically even using Cartwright’s model will 
help improve organisational effectiveness.  Other clear cultural models might 
similarly be expected to help if they provide a management regime. 
 
In contrast it is suggested that cultural questionnaires, or cultural definition 
frameworks (such as Johnson’s culture web), will provide little or no benefit.  This is 
because they do not describe any relationship between organisational culture and a 
desirable outcome, be it desired cultural style (eg OCAI) or organisational 
performance (Denison).  Arguably, using a defining cultural model, eg for training 
and helping people integrate into the culture may have a negative impact by helping to 
create an organisation that is “stuck” in a particular culture.  Kaplan and Norton, and 
Denison, argue that organisations need to be flexible and changing in order to meet 
the changes in the external environment.  Only if the existing culture incorporates that 
flexibility and development potential will further emphasis on that culture be 
effective. 
 
The question remains however as to whether it is truly possible to measure culture, 
and whether it is right to do so.  Cameron and Quinn argue that it is right to do so in 
order to present it in a form that can more easily recognised and understood by 
people. 121  Rousseau highlights that, “Quantitative assessment of culture is 
controversial.” 122  She concludes that, “Culture research remains an unpaid 
promissory note in the field of organisational behaviour.” 123  It remains to be seen 
whether this promissory note has been bought out.  J Martin examines the issue of 
whether, “To count or not to count?”  Essentially she is arguing that quantitative and 
qualitative, or indeed hybrid methodologies, have their place in cultural assessment.  
Her conclusion is not that one or other of these methodologies is better or worse but 
that each should be valued for the contribution they make, recognising also their 
limitations. 124  A key point to be recognised though is that the description of the 
culture by one individual is not the culture, but neither is the aggregated views of 
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many individuals, whether taken from quantitative or qualitative assessments.  
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner describe it thus, 
 
“People within a culture do not all have identical sets of artefacts, 
norms, values and assumptions.  Within each culture there is a 
wide spread of these.  This spread does have a pattern around an 
average.  So, in a sense the variation around the norm can be seen 
as a normal distribution.” 125 
 
They go on to argue that, whilst the true culture is probably around the norm of the 
cultural values, the culture will probably be perceived as the extreme elements of the 
culture that are not shared by the observer.  This suggests that measurement is likely 
to be more objective than observation. 126  But, even if hard measurement techniques 
are used to measure culture for inclusion in the Balanced Scorecard, and where these 
are set against “targets”, this will be an oversimplification, and one which is certainly 
no worse than a “descriptive” assessment that is recognised or admitted particularly 
for embryonic scorecards. 
 
7. Managing culture. 
 
This section will not deal with managing change, although this may demand the 
management of culture, but aims to deal with more substantial interventions.  Stewart 
talks of organisational change, because she sees changing the culture as only a small 
part of this process.  The difference in emphasis perhaps reflects differences in 
perceptions about where that emphasis must lie to achieve successful change; 
although Stewart does go on to highlight the need to change attitudes in order to 
achieve effective organisational change. 127 
 
Lessen suggests that there are four reasons for the rise of organisational culture 
management: 
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• Management has become more rational and “human” – overturning the 
more traditional economic and scientific management philosophies in favour 
of more social, behavioural and humanistic approaches. 
• A return to the basics of management – the acceptance of the 
anthropological view of management that seeks to understand the values that 
unite and motivate organisational communities. 
• Managers have become “cultivators of meaning” – managers have to create 
meaning within the organisation and its products so that people can relate to 
one another and to the activities they undertake. 
• Recognition of the role of myth and ritual – understanding, development 
and linking to synergistic benefits of the “spiritual” aspects of an organisation 
and its people, through the creation of visions, heroes and legends. 128 
 
Anthony points out that culture and the environment are mutually linked and therefore 
the issue of managing culture could become “… the management of everything …”. 
129  The issue that is addressed here is the direct and ongoing management of the 
organisational culture in order to achieve a performance culture.  This might require a 
substantial one-off effort in order to reshape the culture (a shift of the organisational 
paradigm), and this may be associated with other changes, such as organisational or 
process changes, for example as will be described in Chapter 5 and its Appendices.  
Here we are considering changes to the culture in response to ongoing pressure. 
 
This presents something of a problem because a significant change programme will 
likely result from substantial pressures and result from the use of structural power.  It 
then remains for the cultural issues to be manipulated in accordance with the other 
changes taking place.  Pfeffer points out that, “A well-developed paradigm, or a 
strong culture, is overturned only with great difficulty, even if it fails to account for 
data or to lead to new discoveries …”. 130  Essentially, he is arguing that small shifts 
will be resisted by a strong culture, even if it is failing, because if will reject the 
evidence as not conforming to the underlying paradigm or culture. 131  Significant 
change is overt, but there are ethical issues as well as managerial issues in any more-
subtle or covert cultural change work, particularly where consultants are used in some 
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form of “Organisation Development” (OD). 132  The issues are fundamentally about 
how individuals change their beliefs sufficiently to change their actions or accept 
changes imposed upon them.  This relates back to the earlier discussion of NLP 
Logical Levels; but also raises the question of how individuals come to accept 
evidence which undermines current beliefs.  There are thus issues about confidence in 
information, management, and any process consultants used.  Ward argues that a 
proper OD is essential for effective culture change, facilitated by experienced 
professionals. 133 
 
Schermerhorn et al describe OD as an approach to planned change to improve 
organisational effectiveness. 134  This is much closer to what is implied here by culture 
management.  However, in applying “double loop learning” principles, described in 
Chapter 2, it may be impossible to know at the outset what an OD must change in 
order to achieve improved outcomes.  Thus the culture measurement models 
described in Section 6 are not seen as setting absolute standards against which an 
organisation measures itself.  Rather they are seen as frameworks of issues to measure 
performance and drive improvement.  These frameworks could define the initial 
agenda for an OD; the “diagnosis phase”.  Stewart similarly emphasises the 
requirement to define what needs to be changed and why.  The need to involve staff is 
also recognised, “A general guide is that people will support what they help to 
create”. 135  Schermerhorn et al go on to describe the “active intervention” and 
“reinforcement” phases of OD. 136  But, the reinforcement phase described includes a 
process of “refreezing”. 137  Such refreezing would inhibit further change.  Arguably 
there is the need for a “slushier” existence that enables the organisation, group and 
individual to change on a more frequent basis.  This suggests a continuum of culture 
management concepts, as shown in Figure 3.10.  The main proponents listed in the 
Figure are given in Johnson and Gill, 138 and Rollinson and Broadfield.139  However, 
Cartwright and Denison have been added by the researcher to represent a more 
enduring approach to culture management, based on their work reported earlier.  
 
3 - 48 
 
More Static More Fluid 
Organisation 
Development  


























Figure 3.10: Spectrum of organisational cultural dynamics. 
Source: Author. 
Proponents: 
Dyer; Martin, Sitkin 
and Boehm; Ogbonna; 
Ray. 
Proponents: 
Deal and Kennedy; Pascale and 
Athos; Peters and Waterman; 
Plant and Ryan; Tichy; Schien; 
McGregor; Sheppard; Blake and 







For example, Deal and Kennedy argue,  
 
“Cultures change only when they need and are … ready to 
change.  They change when their collective intelligence 
recognises that the world has changed and that the culture 
better adapt in order for the business to survive.  …  What role 
can a consultant play in easing the process?  Not much of one.  
A consultant can facilitate meetings to help members of the 
culture think through what is going on.” 140 
 
Deal and Kennedy go on to argue that it is the role of management to facilitate 
consideration of cultural issues, otherwise they will be pursuing a different agenda.  
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However, managers are not experts in everything, and whilst they should be involved 
in cultural management processes, it is argued that there must be a role for experts to 
contribute to the process, as in other business processes.  Thus Ward argues, “So, if 
you want people who really understand what change is about, search in the OD 
field.” 141 
 
A Brown, whilst recognising that many commentators tend towards regarding 
organisational culture as “… fundamentally static…”, is convinced that it is more 
dynamic.  He goes on to suggest that, to argue effectively that culture can be 
managed, it must be demonstrated that managers must have the capability to prevent 
change as well as to direct change. 142  This would imply mastery of all influences of 
culture, in order to be able to counter external pressures.  This extreme position is not 
accepted.  It is suggested that management need only to be able to control sufficient of 
the influences to be able to direct culture appropriately.  For example, no organisation 
would wish to counter Health and Safety and Environmental issues in opposition to 
legislation and public opinion simply to maintain 19th Century values.  Anthony 
argues, 
 
“Cultures change; indeed a persistent culture must demonstrate 
adaptive capabilities to significant changes in the environment 
and to newcomers who, although having to learn the cultural 
rules may also, particularly in the case of leaders, influence those 
rules.” 143 
 
Schein argues that leadership is uniquely associated with the creation and 
management of culture. 144  Anthony suggests that leaders are at the boundary of the 
organisation representing and negotiating the culture with the external environment. 
145  Whilst the “heroic” leader may achieve change through internal championing and 
external negotiated victories, most leaders probably win no lasting changes, partly 
because they do not have internal consensus support among the mishmash of internal 
subcultures, and thus have no strength for external battles.  This may be because some 
leaders concentrate too much on process and outcomes rather than strategy and 
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culture.  Schein states that he found “… leaders struggling with the concept of 























Figure 3.11: View of management action in relation to 
the organisation and the external environment. 
Source: Author. 
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This highlights the issue that if managers rely on mechanisms such as EFQM to 
manage the organisation, they do not penetrate deep enough into organisational 
culture for the managers to perform the task articulated by Schein.  Kotter also argues 
that too many managers rely on “Authoritarian Decree” and “Micromanagement” to 
try and change the status quo.  He argues that only “Vision” potentially breaks 
through the barriers to change. 147  Similarly, the Balanced Scorecard directs 
insufficient management attention to cultural issues by focussing on results and 
process.  This leaves insufficient resource for the deeply rooted issues of culture and 
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negotiation across the boundary at this level.  Kotter goes on to suggest that only 
about ½% of management communication is about the vision, 148 and Stewart 
emphasises the need for managements’ personal involvement, particularly when there 
is bad news. 149  She also sees a common failing in organisational change as a failure 
by management to recognise the need to change the deep rooted aspects of culture to 
fit more with the desired new organisation. 150  Kanter too states, 
 
“But the most powerful way to encourage people to embrace 
change is to develop a shared vision of an even more positive 
future, a vision created jointly by all of a corporation’s 
stakeholders – its customers, suppliers, employees – and its 
potential industry and government partners.” 151 
 
This emphasises an important point.  A vision developed and even well articulated by 
management does not necessarily engage staff at lower levels.  The various cultural 
mechanisms need to be harnessed to effect real commitment. 
 
When the organisational function hierarchy is mapped against NLP Logical Levels 
(Figure 3.11) it suggests that any failure to engage with the organisational vision 
means that insufficient attention is given to the higher functions of Belief and Identity 
that shape Capability and Behaviour.  Consequently organisations will not perform 
effectively if, “… to a CEO riveted on costs and short-term results, stories [a core 
feature of culture] don’t seem to make much sense”. 152  
 
The challenge is thus to identify the controllable or manageable factors that 
management can influence to negotiate and facilitate improvements.  Section 6 above 
illustrates a number of proposed mechanisms for measurement that highlight forms of 
deficiency, although Schein sees these as representing,  
 
“… a superficial and incorrect view of culture, … [with] a 
dangerous tendency to evaluate particular cultures in an absolute 
3 - 52 
way and to suggest that there are ‘right’ cultures for 
organisations”. 153   
 
Schein goes on to emphasise that the relationship between the culture and its 
environment is as important as the culture itself. 154  The researcher accepts this to 
some degree, recognising that there is not a single effective culture, but that cultural 
features can be improved by appropriate and sensitive management.  What is seen as 
particularly important is how to manage the peripheral issues in such a way as to 
affect the deep rooted aspects of culture; of peoples’ beliefs and values.  
 
“… vision and mission statements …statements of purpose … 
tend to hang on the wall rather than being lodged in the minds 
and hearts of employees.” 155 
 
Rituals and ceremonials, the identification of heroic figures, periodic celebrations and 
bonding events, reinforce what is important to the organisation.  These are the more 
tangible elements and are thus easier to change, but the linkages to deeper cultural 
features need to be understood or changes may encounter resistance.  If these more 
tangible cultural features are ignored, eg because of cost cutting measures, then key 
organisational messages will not be reinforced. 156  Deal and Kennedy suggest that an 
informal network of people when used to promote these myths and legends can be 
constructive.  In toxic cultures where these people work independently of the 
organisation they represent a barrier to change; presumably because they are creating 
and promoting myths and legends that do not conform to organisational objectives. 157  
Thus the management of informal networks and subcultures is important in the 
avoidance of cultural subversion.  This is not to say that everyone has to conform to a 
single culture, but merely that differences need to be recognised and managed 
coherently with the whole, which makes the task more wide-ranging and complex. 158  
Therefore, to manage the more peripheral issues it is necessary to have a deep 
understanding of the culture in which they exist. 159 
 
Kanter highlights,  
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“The traditional corporation is in such turmoil that it can no 
longer carry the weight of people’s hopes and dreams, or 
society’s expectation of permanence, to which a variety of 
welfare benefits and pensions are tied.” 160 
 
This recognises the pressures on people, within and external to the organisation, 
created by organisational change.  Whilst some people appear to do well out of 
change (“… joyously leap[ing] off the corporate ladder into post-entrepreneurial 
careers …”), 161 others do not survive the massive changes taking place (“… shoved 
off callously, without a safety net or help in getting back on their feet …”). 162  
Consequently change is likely to promote conflict between individuals, and between 
individuals and the organisation. 
 
“The first major problem that must be addressed in the post-
entrepreneurial world is the tension between corporate flexibility 
and individual security.” 163 
 
Kanter goes on to highlight “Workplace overload” as a second major factor. 164  So it 
is unsurprising that organisational change leads to the “What’s in it for me?” factor.  
Such lower-deck rumblings may seem antagonistic to senior management, whose 
perspectives are different.  But management must connect effectively with staff if they 
are to address their real concerns.  Kanter goes on to promote the “Business Athlete” 
as the new corporate hero, able to manage corporate and personal ambitions whilst 
building trust with stakeholders and cooperating with those externally; who might 
become corporate partners or future employers. 165  This then may be the new hero 
who addresses the cultural layer issues in Figure 3.11. 
 
Some authors seem to talk of culture very much in terms of the structure, eg Handy 
and to a large extent Burnes.  Whilst structure will have an important part to play, 
people’s feelings, identity and beliefs, may not simply and easily link to structural 
issues, such as organisational form and process.  Culture is not simply a mechanistic 
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framework, since if one adopts the NLP Logical Levels model to help understand 
culture; there is also a spiritual dimension.  Nevertheless, it may be necessary to 
reduce culture to a mechanistic view in order to seek to develop a model by which to 
manage it.   
 
“Schein seeks to understand the mechanisms used to propagate 
culture, and how new values and behaviours are learned.  Once 
this mechanism is uncovered, he argues, it can then form the 
basis of a strategy to change the organisation’s culture.” 166 
 
This essentially returns to the organisational metaphor conflicts highlighted in Table 
3.1.  Is it possible to combine mechanistic and non-mechanistic metaphors?  Even 
organisms might be seen as following a set of natural laws, but it is questionable 
whether this is ultimately true of cultures.  Thus the expectation is that a cultural 
model will have its limitations, but can (and perhaps should) be used to facilitate 
improved outcomes whilst recognising its limitations. 
 
The issue is not whether management can manage culture, but whether it can manage 
culture on an ongoing basis; whether it can be continually manoeuvred to best effect 
without breaking loyalty with subordinates.  This means: engaging staff in the 
development of an emerging and evolving vision; identification of cultural levers; and 
management of these in respect to internal and external pressures.  Like the 
supertanker, it may be hard to get the culture moving, and moving in the right 
direction, particularly as the winds and tides may exert deleterious influences.  
 
8. The importance of culture to the Balanced Scorecard process. 
 
As the Balanced Scorecard has developed, more emphasis had been placed on cultural 
issues.  However, even in the early days there were cultural issues that need to be 
considered, such as reward and the need to engage all staff in a corporate approach to 
the organisational objectives.  Nevertheless there are aspects to culture that have not 
been given considerable attention in the literature.  Chief among these is the issue of 
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national culture.  Arguments in favour of the Tableau de Bord, as opposed to the 
Balanced Scorecard may be based on national cultural style or simply on prejudices; 
although these too might be considered as having their roots in national culture.  It is 
unclear whether the Balanced Scorecard can or should be adapted to operate in other 
cultures.  To do so might undermine key principles.  Alternatively, if the power 
distance in the national culture suggests that people would be more comfortable with a 
more directive style of management, rather than a consultative style based on 
involvement, in such circumstances it might be possible to use the Balanced 
Scorecard at senior management levels.  Such managers would then be free to use a 
more directive style knowing how their actions interface with other parts of the 
organisation.  This might be seen as the way in which the Balanced Scorecard is used 
in MOD, but that is not to say that it is the most appropriate style. 
 
Organisational culture will also need to be considered.  For example, an organisation 
dominated by a strong entrepreneur who disdains management processes and systems 
is unlikely to be convinced of the need to invest considerable time and money in the 
Balanced Scorecard, particularly if he sees it as potentially weakening his/her central 
control.  It is therefore suggested that there are aspects of organisational culture which 
may help to determine the likely success of the Balanced Scorecard.   
 
Some organisations feel that culture is vitally important and this plays a strong role in 
matters such as recruitment or more generally in the specific management of culture 
within the organisation.  For example consider Southwest Airlines or some of the 
organisations studied by Kotter and Heskett such as Nissan, ICI or British Airways.  
Such organisations have developed their own perception of the culture that they wish 
to maintain.  In contrast some academic writers, such as Denison or Cartwright, whilst 
arguing that culture needs careful management, have provided specific models against 
which they believe culture can, or should be managed.  It is unlikely that, at the small 
business end of the organisational spectrum, “culture management” would feature 
very highly on a list of business objectives; although the issues that did feature would 
probably embody the relevant cultural issues to some extent.  Similarly, the “gut feel” 
of the small business man, when taking on new staff, probably has something to do 
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with values that he espouses but does not articulate.  Schein is seen as arguing that it 
is better to understand culture than to try to introduce, “more culture or stronger 
culture”. 167  Figure 3.12 sets out a model that may assist understanding in this area. 
 
Culture important, but 
difficult to maintain or 
project consistently.  
May affect the ability of 
the organisation to 
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Culture simple and 
relatively stable.  Readily 
discernable by all – local 
family run corner shop 
Culture complex, but 
stable and readily 
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This model suggests that culture will have a varying impact according to the degree to 
which there is a large customer/stakeholder interest and the degree to which there is a 
high staff turnover.  Thus the seaside promenade salesperson, working for a small 
company will have a large clientele that changes week-by-week, if not daily.  Staff 
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will turnover at a relatively high-rate: a summer holiday job, perhaps only for a few 
weeks.  For such organisations culture is of little importance and little training is 
required, consequently service is often casual or poor, as is employee commitment to 
the company.  But in the model, this sits surprising close to an organisation such as 
MOD.  In MOD there is considerable stakeholder interest, and the organisation suffers 
a relatively high staff turnover with a high proportion of service personnel (not even) 
completing short engagements of only a few years. 168  Whilst this has some 
organisational benefits, in that it helps to maintain a large core of fit, healthy young 
people for the very active lifestyle imposed, it does mean that there are problems.  
Building organisational understanding and commitment is harder, eg controlling the 
behaviour of “Jack” or “Squaddies” “on the town”, who might thus bring the 
organisation into disrepute. 169   Schein highlights that, 
 
“… any group with a stable membership and a history of shared 
learning will have developed some level of culture, but a group 
that has had either considerable turnover of members and 
leaders or a history lacking in any kind of challenging events 
may well lack any shared assumptions.” 170 
 
One dimension of this model also refers to the length of history of the organisation.  
Culture will be affected by this.  For example, the history of the organisation may be 
embedded into the assets of the organisation.  Alternatively it may be embedded in 
traditions, or secrets, handed down through the organisation.  The more enduring the 
traditions or the more dominant are physical or other structural features of the 
organisation, the harder it will be to implement change.   
 
Thus the model helps to identify the importance of cultural considerations relative to 
the overall activities.  The relationship is not simple, but the model suggests that not 
every organisation will need to spend the same amount of time thinking about the 
issues. 
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9. Summary. 
 
Whilst Kaplan and Norton, and their supporters, argue that the Balanced Scorecard is 
the means of transforming an organisation, there is another group of authors who 
argue that the way to transform organisations is through the management of culture 
and culture change.  These different groups rely on substantially different metaphors 
of the organisation.  By broadening the perspectives of the organisation through 
consideration of the cultural aspects it should be possible to increase the effectiveness 
of the tool. Typical of the sentiments of those who promote a more cultural metaphor 
as leading to organisational success are those expressed by Cameron and Quinn, 
 
“Simply stated, successful companies have developed something 
special that supersedes corporate strategy, market presence, or 
technological advantages.  Although strategy, market presence, 
and technology are clearly important, highly successful firms have 
capitalised on the power that resides in developing and managing 
a unique corporate culture.” 171 
 
It is difficult to see how organisational transformation would not affect organisational 
culture.  Indeed, the Balanced Scorecard, as a tangible and management process must 
be seen as part of the organisational culture.  Chapter 2 looked at arguments as to 
whether the Balanced Scorecard produced organisation success or whether it is just a 
management fad.  This Chapter has similarly shown that some people believe that 
management of culture produces above average performance, whilst others say that 
this remains to be proven. 
 
It is argued that organisational culture will help shape the implementation of the 
Balanced Scorecard.  Bititci, Mendibil, Nudurupati, Turner and Garengo, after 10 
years of work installing performance measurement systems in industrial 
organisations, observed: 
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• “… organisational culture and management styles have an 
impact on how performance measurement systems are 
implemented and used, thus affecting it success or failure; 
and 
• performance measurement systems can affect management 
styles and, to a certain extend (sic) organisational culture.” 
172 
 
 Nevertheless culture, organisational or national, may aid or detract from, or even 
prevent, the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard.  If culture is such an 
important factor in the implementation and shape of the Balanced Scorecard, and if 
culture management is so important to organisational success, then there needs to be a 
means of combining the two.  Various writers demonstrate means of measuring some 
aspect of culture, and there are also clear models of culture that can be used as a basis 
for managing culture. 
 
By combining management of the culture with implementation of strategy 
organisational outcomes should be improved.  Failure to integrate these issues could 
bring them into conflict due to incompatible objectives. 
 
However, it must also be acknowledged that there are difficulties in measuring and 
representing culture in a quantitative manner.  Referring to the large number of 
number of dimensions and aspects that make up culture, Cameron and Quinn state,  
 
“One reason so many dimensions have been proposed is the 
organisational culture is extremely broad and inclusive in scope.  
It comprises a complex, interrelated, comprehensive, and 
ambiguous set of factors.  Consequently, it is impossible to ever 
include every relevant factor in diagnosing and assessing 
organisational culture.” 173 
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Thus measurement will only look at a partial representation of culture.  For example, 
how does one measure symbols and artefacts?  Or are we measuring peoples’ attitudes 
to these things, and if so are we looking at climate or culture?  The issue of cultural 
measurement will therefore arise again in Chapter 4 where we will look at some of the 
ethical issues. 
 
As argued in Chapter 2 in the context of the Balanced Scorecard, whilst the number of 
articles reviewed in relation to this topic is small in relation to the total volume of 
literature, a small core of literature can provide a robust foundation of the topic.  In 
this context works such as A Brown’s “Organisational Culture” provides substantial 
value since it identifies and evaluates a wide range of competing concepts.  Again it is 
emphasised that the aim of this chapter has been to provide a sufficient grounding in 
the topic of culture rather than a comprehensive and rigorous exploration.  However, 
this topic is developed further in Chapter 5 where cultural issues are explored further 
in the context of the target organisation, and the adequacy of the literature survey is 
considered further in Chapter 4.  Chapter 3 is summarised in Figure 3.13. 
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Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Organisational culture is effectively a different way of looking at and 
managing the organisation.  There appears to be a relationship between 
the culture and the success of the organisation.  However, national 
characteristics also need to be borne in mind as these will affect the way 
individuals interact within the organisation.  NLP Logical Levels can also 
be used to help understand the relationship between the organisation, its 
strategy and the values and beliefs of the individuals in the organisation. 
Measurement of organisational culture is possible and a number of tools 
for measuring and managing culture were considered.  To manage 
culture successfully in an on-going manner will mean that the culture 
must not be frozen.  Consideration needs to be given to the linkages 
between cultural characteristics and organisational success. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard. 
Supporting case studies. 
Summary of conclusions. 
Figure 3.13 
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Chapter 4: Legitimate Research? 
 














Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
The Balanced Scorecard can be seen as lying at the Positivistic end of 
the research spectrum, whilst Culture is usually seen as lying at the 
Phenomenological end of that spectrum.  This Chapter therefore 
explores the issues of this research project in relation to that spectrum; 
how it developed; where it lies; the appropriateness of the tools used.  
Particular attention is paid to the literature surveys and to the survey tool 
developed for examining the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard.  
The Chapter also looks briefly at the appropriateness of measuring 
cultural issues. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard. 
Supporting case studies. 
Summary of conclusions. 
Figure 4.1 
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In Chapter 1 the choice of the research topic was noted to have been selected partly 
because of apparent contradictions in the development of the Balanced Scorecard 
within the researcher’s own organisation.  Choosing to study a topic within the 
researcher’s own organisation raises a number of issues.  These will be discussed 
here, as will the methods chosen to gather data.   
 
Chapter 2 provided details of the Balanced Scorecard strategic management tool.  
Chapter 3 similarly looks at the issues of organisational culture.  Management, using 
either of these concepts, is advocated as a means of improving corporate outcomes.  
Potentially the use of culture measurement tools within the Balanced Scorecard could 
be a way to combine the two concepts.  Therefore this Chapter looks at how these 
concepts might be examined to provide a case study in a common context.  This 
Chapter will therefore look at the role of the researcher.  This will prepare the way for 
Chapter 5 that looks at how these concepts were applied to one organisation and 
articulates their outcomes.  The organisation researched is highlighted in order to 
discuss methodological issues of significance, although the organisation and its issues 
are not discussed until Chapter 5. 
 
The aim of this chapter is therefore to validate the research methodology used in this 
study. 
 
2. Phenomenological or Positivistic research. 
 
The initial problem was to establish the perceived reasons for the apparent success of 
the Balanced Scorecard in the organisation.  This immediately highlights key aspects 
of the problem: words such as “perceived”, “reasons”, “apparent” and “success” 
represent evaluations or selections by the researcher.  This would tend to suggest that 
the research lies in the phenomenological paradigm.  Hussey and Hussey distinguish 
between the phenomenological paradigm and a positivistic paradigm as shown in 
Table 4.1: 1, 2 
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However, this might seem in some respects to be odd given that the Balanced 
Scorecard concepts are more firmly rooted in the positivistic paradigm, because they 
are about hard measurement of business outcomes.  Nevertheless it could be argued 
that even here there are very subjective judgements to be made: 
 
• Strategy is initially a subjective judgement, even if based on some forward 
prediction of likely outcomes such as a Delphi technique since the future is 
always unknown. 
• How much short-term profit should be traded off for long-term gain? 
• Cause-and-effect relationships are effectively hypotheses that must be tested 
and proved, and their selection is a subjective judgement. 
 
Conversely as we have seen the study of culture is more firmly rooted in the 
Humanistic, Interpretivist, Subjectivist paradigm, although as we have noted in 
Chapter 3 there is a debate about the place of hard measurement.  However, as Hussey 
and Hussey point out,  
 
“Although we have identified two main paradigms, it is best to 
regard them as the two extremes of a continuum.  As you move 
along the continuum, the features and assumptions of one 
paradigm are gradually relaxed and replaced by those of the 
other.” 3 
 
Thus whilst the two issues being studied may start near opposite ends of the spectrum 
there is probably some overlap and techniques from either end of the continuum 
should be appropriate. 
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Table 4.2: Evaluation of how the Phenomenological and 








The nature of 
reality: 
Reality is subjective and 
multiple as seen by 
participants in a study – 
Research covers two topics 
and is based in a specific 
organisation and involves 
attitudes and evaluations by 
organisational members. 
Reality is objective and 
singular; apart from the 
researcher – Does not apply. 
Epistemological 
– Relationship 
of researcher to 
the research 
subject: 
Researcher interacts with 
research topic – Research 
part of the organisation and 
involved in evaluating and 
interpreting input supplied 
through surveys. 
Researcher is independent of 
the research topic – Surveys 
provide input that is 
independent of the 
researcher. 
Axiological – 
The role of 
values: 
Value laden and biased – 
Research involves values and 
biases of individuals 
responding to the survey and 
of the researcher. 
Value free and unbiased – 
Does not apply. 
Rhetorical – 
The language of 
the research: 
Informal; evaluative and 
personal – Meanings open to 
interpretation and are highly 
personal. 
Formal; well defined 
meanings; impersonal – Does 
not apply. 
Methodological 
– The research 
process: 
Inductive process; mutual 
simultaneous shaping of 
factors; emerging design/ 
categories identified during 
process; context bound; 
patterns and theories 
developed for understanding; 
accurate and reliable through 
verification – Study of one 
prime context but with wider 
application; use of defined 
categories for research; 
research results not 
repeatable due to constantly 
changing factors. 
Deductive; cause and effect; 
predetermined categories; 
context free; generalisation 
leading to prediction, 
explanation, understanding; 
accurate and reliable – 
Surveys used to substantiate 
perceptions and to used but 
also a basis for explaining 
organisational issues; set, 
proven models used to 
evaluate organisation; 
comparison to outcomes 
reported from other 
organisations. 
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Table 4.2, based on Hussey and Hussey, and in turn adapted from the work of 
Creswell 4, suggests that the research is more at the Phenomenological end of the 
spectrum. 
 
3. Research process outlined. 
 
Figure 4.2 provides an outline of the research project as a whole: 
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This highlights the fact that two distinct topics are being brought together by this 
research.  Work on the Balanced Scorecard survey started early on in the study, before 
detailed work on cultural issues was initiated.  This is because initial work on the 
impact of the Balanced Scorecard highlighted cultural issues, but literature failed to 
highlight any substantial discussion on this topic. 
 
An early consideration also had to be where any detailed research would be 
undertaken.  Initial discussions with the research supervisor considered undertaking a 
number of comparative case studies in a range of organisations.  However, this 
research was being undertaken by part-time study and there were a number of work 
pressures that on occasions reduced or prevented study.  Consequently it became 
apparent that effort on study would not be consistent or predictable.  This was seen as 
a potential limiting factor on what might be achieved in terms of investigation into 
other organisations.  The precise objectives of the study were also unclear in the early 
stages.  This is not inconsistent with the approach to phenomenological research, 
 
“With a phenomenological approach, there may be no relevant 
existing theory or you may not to be restricted by existing theories.  
Therefore you may carry out your investigation in order to 
construct new theory to explain the phenomena or to describe 
different patterns which emerge in the data.  Alternatively, you 
may use the early part of the research study to develop hypotheses 
which are tested in subsequent stages of the research.” 5 
 
Blaxter, Hughes and Tight 6 refer to the research spiral, which, 
 
• Is cyclical, 
• Allows entry at any point, 
• Is a never-ending process, 
• Promotes reconsideration of practice, and 
• Returns the researcher to a different starting point. 
 














Figure 4.3: The research spiral, adapted from Blaxter, 
Hughes and Tight. 




This spiral diagram, at Figure 4.3, is useful since it helps to understand the way in 
which a project may develop.  Circling ever more tightly round the central core will 
throw the researcher out to one or other of the activities shown helps to increase 
definition and refine the central core, which is the topic itself.  The diagram helps 
identify the various activities required to complete the project.  However, two issues 
stand out as key: 
 
• Defining the scope – which may not ultimately happen until late on in the 
research. 
• Resources available – which will include “time”. 
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The ability to select candidate organisations and undertake detailed, comparative case 
studies was perceived by the researcher to be limited, because expanding the scope is 
related to the resources available, which ultimately impacts on the quality of the 
research. 
 
“One of the key skills involved in choosing a topic is to be able to 
pick one of the right size: not too big, not too small, but do-able 
within the time, space and resources available.” 7 
 
This was particularly so in view of the large amounts of time being absorbed in 
researching the issues related to the researcher’s own organisation.  The views of 
Phillips and Pugh are also relevant, 
 
“How then to undertake work towards a PhD on a part-time basis 
with no more than the necessary amount of stress? … If at all 
possible, choose a research problem that is related to your work.” 
8 
 
Thus, ultimately, it was decided to limit the research to presenting a single in-depth 
case study on the researcher’s parent organisation.  This was seen as likely to lead to 
continued support and access to the organisation, whereas delving into other 
organisations might lead to superficiality and/or increased cost: eg at one time 
contemplation was given to looking at USMC in the USA who were known to have a 
well developed Balanced Scorecard.  Similarly, delving into external organisations 
might lead to challenge as to the usefulness of the research to the parent organisation.  
Thus key considerations for the selection of the research topic were: 
 
• Organisation – knowledge of the organisation and ability to show relevance 
to the parent organisation. 
• Time – need to be flexible in terms of effort available to undertake the 
research project due to the need to respond to the peaks and troughs of full-
4 - 10 
time work requirements.  Thus for example, work crises might have lead to a 
delay or abandonment of case studies in external organisations, to the 
detriment of both the research and the parent organisation (or even the 
RMCS). 
• Cost – the cost of study was relatively high and to add to that substantial travel 
and other costs to investigate external organisations would not have been 
sustainable. 
 
Sekaran discusses the advantages and disadvantages of undertaking research within 
one’s own organisation 9; albeit in the more specific context of using an internal team 
to study and implement solutions to a particular problem, rather than looking at a 
more philosophical issue and contributing the benefit of any outcome derived.  The 
issues raised are discussed in Table 4.3 in relation to this research. 
 
Table 4.3: Advantages and disadvantages of conducting research 
within the parent organisation. 
Advantages: Disadvantages: 
Researcher more likely to be accepted 
by colleagues – Not always the case for 
academic study since it does not have 
the specific mandate from Senior 
Managers to ensure universal support, 
but generally most colleagues are 
cooperative. 
Internal consultants/researchers may 
have so absorbed the organisational 
mores and processes that they are 
unable to work outside of them within 
the organisational context – External 
supervisor/mentor, and the more 
challenging nature of academic study 
should help the researcher break the 
paradigm. 
Require much less time to understand 
organisation – Clear benefits here, but 
can be counterbalanced by 
researcher’s own preconceived ideas. 
Organisational coalitions may frustrate 
the purpose through concealment or 
misrepresentation of issues – True, but 
for academic study that will not 
necessarily challenge individuals or 
their power bases there is less likely to 
be deliberate deception, although any 
withholding of information, eg by non-
contribution to a survey, will distort 
results. 
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Available for implementation of results 
– True, but this is less likely to apply 
where the topic is selected by the 
researcher and studied as part of an 
academic course rather than under 
specific management mandate, and 
perhaps consequently viewed as 
interference or sniping at the work of 
others. 
Internal consultants not perceived as 
experts and thus recommendations may 
not be accepted – A clear problem if 
the aim is to implement a solution, but 
if the aim is merely to research and 
contribute to knowledge then internal 
perceptions will count for little, and 
indeed internally rejected 
recommendations might “come back to 
haunt” the organisation if they gain 
wider credibility externally. 
Internal consultancy costs are lower – 
True, but again if management does 
not specifically mandate the study then 
costs might be regarded as 
additional/avoidable. 
Researcher’s organisational biases may 
distort perceptions, findings or 
recommendations – True (see earlier 
comment on advantages), but the 
external challenge of 
supervisor/mentor should help to 
overcome such bias. 
 
However, Schein argues that, “The contextual meaning of cultural assumptions can 
only be fully understood by members of the culture …” 10  This emphasises the need 
for someone inside the organisation to be directly involved.  But, as suggested in the 
table above, the researcher, undertaking cultural research in their own organisation, 
may have distorted or biased views, particularly if he/she is a member of a particular 
subculture.  Nonetheless, with a sound recognition of the issues of researching in 
one’s own organisation it is reasonable to proceed.  For example, process or 
methodological issues will be more or less appropriate according to the individual 
undertaking the research and the organisation in which they are being used.   
 
Hussey and Hussey highlight the various methodologies that might be used for 
research across the Phenomenological/Positivistic continuum. 11  These are shown in 
Table 4.4 and evaluated in relation to this research. 
 
4 - 12 






Evaluation for this research 
project: 
Action research – 
Organisational study aimed at 
determining the effect of 
changing one variable in a 
constantly changing 
environment of which the 
researcher is a part with aim of 
solving a problem for the 
organisation and making a 
contribution to knowledge. 
This research fits into this 
category to a limited extent, 
because the researcher was not 
in a position to take the 
proposed solution beyond 
testing stage.  Thus the only 
problem addressed was that of 
measurement of culture, 
although this does allow a view 
of how culture management 
within the target organisation 
might be addressed. 
Case study – Extensive 
examination of a single instance 
of an issue. 
Research mainly fits into this 
category, providing elements of: 
Descriptive; Illustrative; 
Experimental and Explanatory 
case studies. 
Ethnography – Socially 
acquired and shared knowledge 
used to explain patterns of 
activity. 
Research relies heavily on this 
methodology as the researcher 
was studying and interpreting 
his own organisation. 
Feminist perspective – Study of 
changing role, impact, 
experiences of women in 
society, relative to their male 
counterparts. 
Not considered at all.  Too few 
females provided input to the 
study to draw worthwhile 
conclusions. 
Grounded theory – Systematic 
procedures used to induce a 
theory. 
Not used.  Theories developed 
initially from observation and 
substantiated from survey and 
supporting case studies. 
Hermeneutics – Consideration 
of the historical and social 
contexts of textual material. 
Not used.  Textual material 
used to support observation or 











Participative enquiry – 
Research relying on active 
contribution of participants in 
collecting and interpreting data. 
Not used.  Insufficient 
knowledge and experience of 
these issues and with high staff 
turnover this would not have 
been a practical proposition, 
particularly for part-time study. 
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Surveys – (Sample of) 
population studied to collect 
data about particular 
issues/variables. 
Appropriate and used to gain 
source data for research. 
Longitudinal studies – Study of 
a particular issue over a lengthy 
period with a view to 
determining the impact of 
different variables as they 
change independently of one 
another. 
Not used due to the limited time 
and resource available to study 
the different issues.  However, 
this methodology and/or cross-
sectional studies would be 
beneficial for any follow-up 
research undertaken. 
Experimental studies – Study 
of cause-and-effect relationships 
in laboratory or natural setting 
where variables can be 
controlled. 
Not appropriate – too many 
variables impacting 








Cross-sectional studies – Aims 
to obtain information on 
variables in different contexts. 
Used to the extent that 
published case study material 
provides data on the 
implementation of the Balanced 
Scorecard, and culture 
management in other 
organisations.  In this context 
application is limited since this 
is reliance on secondary or 
tertiary data, but in the context 
of the supporting case studies 
this applied much more. 
 
Again this emphasises the combination of Phenomenological and Positivistic 
approaches to this research.  However, these are not seen as necessarily distinct 
methodologies, because for example, action research aimed at producing a workable 
solution to a business problem can also be seen as a case study.  In this instance it also 
involved producing a survey.  Thus in this research there are a variety of techniques 
interwoven to pursue the objectives.  These techniques are identified in relation to the 
range of activities shown in Table 4.4 above. 
 
• Literature review – links particularly with Case study, and Cross-sectional 
studies methodologies. 
• Balanced Scorecard Survey – links particularly with Action research, Case 
study, Ethnography and Surveys methodologies. 
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• Cultural surveys – links particularly with Case study, Ethnography and 
Surveys methodologies. 
• Development of cultural assessment tool – links particularly with Action 
research, Case study, Ethnography and Surveys methodologies. 
• Supporting case studies – links particularly with Case study, Grounded 
theory and Cross-sectional studies. 12 
• Write-up – an integral part of all of these methodologies. 
 
In classifying this research within the Action Research category, it is recognised that 
this may be stretching the point somewhat, as highlighted in Table 4.4.  Kaplan argues 
that Action Research,  
 
“… engages the researcher in an explicit programme to develop 
new solutions that alter existing practice and then test the 
feasibility and properties of the innovation.” 13 
 
However, he goes on to provide a definition based on French and Bell that emphasises 
the collection and evaluation of data to assess the impact of change. 14  This would 
exclude this research from the category because it never progressed beyond the 
development and testing of the proposed measurement tool; the original, albeit 
limited, aim.  Nevertheless, Kaplan goes on to propose a new category of “Innovation 
Action Research”, which helps categorise this research more effectively.  This 
proposes four cycles of activity: 
 
• The Base Case, 
• Initial Implementation, 
• An Intermediate stage, and  
• Advanced Implementations. 
 
Each cycle goes through a number of stages: 
 
• Observation and documentation of new practices. 
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• Teaching and speaking about the innovation. 
• From the feedback, writing articles and books. 
• This will hopefully illicit invitations to implement the concepts in new 
organisations, enabling further development of the process and further data to 
be obtained concerning the new ideas. 
 
 Broadly, but with some limitations, this cycle has been completed up to the point of 
initial implementation; testing the new measurement tool.  The researcher has 
developed his ideas particularly from the work of Anslie 15; has made presentations to 
MDA students at RMCS and to members of the Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants; has written an article 16; and has implemented the tool in a test within 
his own organisation and evaluated the results.  Thus Kaplan’s concepts of Innovation 
Action research have been followed. 
 
Although this research is partly a case study Blaikie highlights three criticisms of case 
studies 17 that may apply in this instance: 
 
• Sloppy research and biased findings (based on prejudices of quantitative 
versus qualitative research methodologies and the potential for the researcher 
to influence the results) – the use of quantitative methodologies may help 
overcome this in part, but there is an acknowledged danger that the researcher 
may have interpreted issues based on personal perceptions.   
• Generalisation is not useful – the unique nature of every organisational 
culture is acknowledged, but articulation of that culture should assist in 
interpreting the results.  In particular, it is noted that the wealth of case studies 
in the Balanced Scorecard literature provide little directly relevant information 
because they relate to fundamentally different organisations or industries with 
little direct relevance to this case study. 
• They are more practical than methodological producing too much data, 
and take too long – the aim here is to solve a practical problem and the large 
amount of data presented should enable the reader to substantiate the findings 
for themselves thus overturning the first bullet above. 
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Caution is therefore urged on the reader.  By acknowledging these weaknesses it is 
hoped that the case study will provide greater value. 
 
4. Introduction to the organisation. 
 
In order to provide adequate explanations of the issues involved in the research 
methodology it is necessary to identify the organisation in which the research was 
undertaken.  This was primarily the Headquarters of Commander-in-Chief Fleet, the 
Navy’s operational Commander in the Royal Navy.  This is more fully explained in 
Chapter 5 and its Appendices.  However, Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show organisational 




















Figure 4.5: CINCFLEET at the start of the research project, 
showing Fleet Management Board members.  (Immediate 
CINCFLEET HQ elements shown in italics.  HQ ACOSs reported to DCINC.) 
DCINC 










5. Development of the research questions. 
 
Figure 4.6 below demonstrates how the research programme was developed.  This 
links to Chapter 1 and the development of the research questions used in Section 4 of 
Chapter 10.  This section explains further how these questions were developed.  
However, it must be recognised that these are only the key questions, or summary 
questions that arose during the early stages of the programme.  A fuller list of the 
questions developed during the early stages of the research, from which this shorter 
list is compiled, is shown at Appendix A to this Chapter.  Only the shorter list of 
questions is explicitly addressed in Chapter 10. 
 
The initial contact with the CINCFLEET Balanced Scorecard is described at Chapter 
1, Section 3.  This has been summarised in the question, 
 
• What is the local experience of implementing and using the Balanced 
Scorecard? 
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This begs two further basic questions, 
 
• What is a Balanced Scorecard? 
• How does one define a successful Balanced Scorecard? 
 
These arose out of the issue of whether what CINCFLEET was using was really a 
Balanced Scorecard, since the combination of PIs used did not seem to conform to 
basic practice, and perhaps what was being used was not a genuine Balanced 
Scorecard.  Was the form of the Balanced Scorecard closely prescribed or are there 
different forms?  This is explored in Chapter 2.  Similarly, if the implementation of 
the Balanced Scorecard in CINCFLEET was to be assessed then it would be necessary 
to define what was successful, or what constitutes failure.  Having established the 
basic concepts it was necessary to consider the process and results of the local 
implementation, such as: 
 
• How and why did the organisation commit to the Balanced Scorecard? 
• What are the perceived benefits? 
• How much knowledge of the process and tool did the organisation have? 
 
Such questions also led on to question, 
 
• Does the Balanced Scorecard constitute a valid management system, or is it 
just a passing management fad? 
 
These issues are explored in Chapter 6 through the questionnaire used.  Whilst a 
process or tool may be effective and provide benefits it is no guarantee that it will 
continue to be used.  This is because other cultural factors impact, such as the desire 
of any new management regime to be seen to being proactive by creating change.  
This issue also applied as the majority of the advocates covered in the literature 
survey during the early stages of this research seemed to have some sort of vested 
interest in the concepts.  The danger is therefore that organisations are talked into 
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taking on a management process by advocates who oversell the product and that when 
the implementation fails the tool is dumped.  This too starts to highlight cultural 
issues, which were also evident in early descriptions of changes resulting from 
CINCFLEET’s implementation, and in literature referring to French attitudes towards 
the Balanced Scorecard.  It was these issues that started to trigger questions about 
cultural issues, to which there seemed to be little or no reference in the literature.  At 
the time the researcher was also involved in separate work looking at measuring the 
four pillars of British military Operational Capability. 18  Involvement in this work 
highlighted the lack of hard measurement of morale in the armed forces 19 and the 
question of whether there was any relationship between morale and cultural issues.  
This issue is explored in Chapter 5, building on Chapter 3.  This area is summarised in 
the question,  
 
• Can the management of culture be integrated into the Balanced Scorecard 
process? 
 
This topic was also reversed to gain a fuller understanding of the issues, thus: 
 
• How are the Balanced Scorecard and culture inter-related? 
• Does implementing the Balanced Scorecard impact organisational culture? 
 
Figure 4.6 therefore highlights lower level block of work than Figure 4.2, and 
demonstrates outcomes from each stage. 
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Figure 4.6: Research Map 
Evolution Initiation Study of Research 
Methods 
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6. Literature Review. 
 
Of particular importance in this research is the Literature Review.  This has been 
noted in both Chapters 2 and 3, because the Balanced Scorecard and Organisational 
Culture both represent enormous topics and it has only been possible to give a flavour 
of these issues rather than an exhaustive analysis.  Sakaran describes the attributes of 
a good literature survey 20: 
 
• Identifies variables likely to be influential to the study. 
• Emergence of important variables for consideration and how they contribute to 
the investigation and resolution of the problem, through the development of a 
theoretical framework. 
• Facilitates testability and replicability of research findings. 
• Enables the problem statement to be defined with precision and clarity. 
• Helps to avoid re-invention of the “wheel”. 
• Enables the “scientific community” to see the problem as relevant and 
significant. 
 
These seem to be written for the more “scientific community” operating more at the 
Positivistic end of the research paradigm continuum.  Thus for example, repeating the 
surveys undertaken in this research is almost certain never to produce the same 
findings precisely because they involved perceptions, evaluations, made at a particular 
time and in particular circumstances that cannot be repeated.  Nevertheless, these aims 
are all believed to have been met, within the limits described here.  Blaxter et al list 
ten reasons for the literature survey that help support the above 21:  
 
• “Because it will give you ideas. 
• Because you need to understand what other researchers have 
done in your area. 
• To broaden your perspectives and set your work in context. 
• Because direct personal experience can never be enough. 
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• To legitimate your arguments. 
• Because it may cause you to change your mind. 
• Because writers (and you will be one) need readers. 
• So that you can effectively criticize what others have done. 
• To learn more about research methods and their application 
in practice. 
• In order to spot areas which have not been researched.” 
 
Stevens et al highlight four main functions for the literature review 22: 
 
• “To give reasons why the topic is of sufficient importance for 
it to be researched … 
• To provide the reader with a brief up-to-date account and 
discussion of the literature on the issues relevant to the topic 
… 
• To provide a conceptual and theoretical context in which the 
topic can be situated … 
• To discuss relevant research carried out on the same topic or 
similar topics.” 
 
It is believed that the literature surveys provided in Chapters 2 and 3 meet these four 
criteria.  In particular, 
 
• Both the Balanced Scorecard and culture management have been shown to be 
methods of improving organisational output. 
• The issues of importance for implementing and running the Balanced 
Scorecard have been highlighted, as have the means of managing culture 
through a culture model have been covered alongside means of measuring 
culture to aid achievement of desired aim. 
• In so doing the conceptual and theoretical framework for this research is 
provided. 
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• The crossover between these two topics has been highlighted from the work of 
M G Brown, however, no research in this area has been observed beyond 
Brown’s comments.  Nevertheless research in both areas has been highlighted 
that demonstrate that both these mechanisms can produce improved 
organisational performance. 
 
Blaxter et al, quoting the work of Bruce, also highlight the different purposes that a 
literature survey might seek to fulfil. 23  This is shown in Table 4.5 and evaluated in 
relation to this research. 
 
Table 4.5: Different typologies of literature surveys. 
A list of available literature. Not considered worthwhile because search 
engines provide more than adequate listings of 
available literature. 
A search – an intermediary 
source to create awareness 
of the available literature. 
This partly applies; particularly Ainslie’s work 
relating to military culture and ethos provided a 
strong lead on key issues and writers. 
A survey of literature where 
the literature is the focus of 
attention for understanding 
the discipline. 
This applies particularly.  Chapters 2 and 3, 
although not exhaustive, aim to form a platform 
on the topics of the Balanced Scorecard and 
Culture. 
A vehicle for learning and 
personal development. 
An important issue; literature has formed a key 
part of the process and personal learning, which 
was the underlying intention of research in the 
first instance. 
A research facilitator that 
impacts the development of 
the research. 
Another important issue; lack of comment on 
cultural development in Balanced Scorecard 
literature prompted a wider search on cultural 
material and directly contributed to the selection 
and use of cultural surveys. 
A report – not only a 
synthesis but also a “final 
representation of interaction 
with literature”. 
This also partly applies.  Although the literature 
survey forms a substantial part of the overall 
project the main focus of the research lies 
elsewhere in the surveys undertaken. 
 
Thus the literature serves three key roles: to create a foundation of understanding of 
the discipline, as a vehicle for personal learning, and as an aid to developing the 
research project.  Denscombe makes an additional point: that literature can be a 
source of data in its own right. 24  This highlights the point made previously that the 
case studies on the Balanced Scorecard and organisational culture presented in the 
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literature can be considered as “data”, bearing in mind that not all cultural 
assessments are made in a quantitative manner, and no-one is offering a means of 
measuring the quality of a Balanced Scorecard, other than by perceived overall 
organisational performance compared to other organisations. 
 
7. The Balanced Scorecard survey. 
 
The major component of this research was, in volume terms, the literature survey, and 
this is largely what initiated and directed the project.  However, a second and early 
component of great importance was the survey into the early development and use of 
the Balanced Scorecard within the researcher’s own organisation. 
 
Since the majority of those involved in the use of the Balanced Scorecard were senior 
managers it was felt that arranging interviews would be difficult because senior 
managers were known to be very busy and the process of interviewing might take 
substantial time.  Similarly, although this was substantially a phenomenological study 
a focus group was not used, albeit that this methodology is, “normally associated with 
a phenomenological methodology”. 25  This could be taken one of two ways: 
 
• Focus groups are associated with phenomenological studies rather than 
positivistic studies. 
• Focus groups are regarded as a fundamental part of phenomenological studies. 
 
This latter interpretation is perceived as the intention, because Zikmund comments 
that, “The focus group interview is so popular today that many research agencies 
consider it to be the “only” exploratory research tool.” 26  The researcher’s 
experience was that there were considerable difficulties in maintaining scheduled 
meetings for senior staff, eg the Management Board meetings, let alone arranging 
additional meetings.  It was therefore felt that using a questionnaire would be the most 
effective and acceptable means of gathering data, because it would allow participants 
to respond at their own convenience. 
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Being directly involved in the management of the organisation at a senior (but not 
Board) level, and being (at one time) involved in the development work on the 
Balanced Scorecard it was recognised that it would be impossible to take a detached 
view.  Similarly, the process of investigating the topic would draw even more 
attention to the issues and change people’s perspectives.  Because the Balanced 
Scorecard process involved relatively few staff it would not be possible to undertake a 
large-scale study.  Indeed because of the close knowledge and involvement of the 
researcher in the society being studied the research methodology might be considered 
to be “ethnography”.  Hussey and Hussey, referring to the work of Werner and 
Schoepfle (1987), suggest that ethnography is, “ …where the researcher becomes a 
full working member of the group being studied.” 27  Clearly this was the case as the 
researcher was part of the management team.  However, there are arguments that can 
be advanced to indicate that the researcher might be regarded as an “outsider”.  The 
researcher being a civil servant, and tackling this research from an academic 
perspective could be seen as distant from the Naval staff and the Fleet Management 
Board and its immediate support team.  This would apply to an even greater extent to 
those involved in running the Balanced Scorecards elsewhere, eg in the 2* Type 
Commands 28 and in the other Naval TLBs.  However, having worked for over 25 
years in the MOD, including many years in Naval functional areas, the researcher 
would have a detailed understanding of the social context of this study; a factor that 
would be recognised by many people providing input to the research.  But it is also 
recognised that this close involvement may introduce a bias on the perspectives 
represented and in the interpretation of information provided. 
 
At the stage that this survey was being formulated the final research question was still 
unclear.  This is consistent with what Hussey and Hussey describe as the process of 
developing the research question in a phenomenological study,  
 
“In a phenomenological study, you are more likely to determine 
the purpose of your research and construct only one or two 
questions which you will refine and modify, and set within a 
theoretical context during the course of the research itself.  The 
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final stages of your research design will be defining terms, 
establishing methodology and giving an indication of the expected 
outcome.” 29   
 
It was recognised that the Balanced Scorecard was perceived as being “successful”.  
However at this stage it was unclear what this meant precisely, or what might have 
contributed to this perception.  The questionnaire designed thus sought to capture 
views on the whole process of introducing the Balanced Scorecard, and on the 
perceived benefits.  Indeed at this early stage of the potential avenues for research 
was, “How to define and measure success”.  This would have led much more to a case 
study approach, comparing a number of different organisations.  Again it was felt that 
this would have involved considerable blocks of time, which were unavailable whilst 
undertaking part-time study.  Early reading also highlighted two other issues that 
would make this line of study difficult: 
 
• There were no recognised methods of determining success for the Balanced 
Scorecard, nor for isolating the impact of the Balanced Scorecard compared to 
other management processes being used concurrently.  For example, through 
anecdotal evidence it was understood that both BP and TNT were using both 
the Balanced Scorecard and the EFQM Business Excellence Model.  Both 
tools were recognised as contributing to organisational success.  However, it 
was unclear how the contribution of each could be isolated in order to 
determine the benefits of the Balanced Scorecard.  Chow, Haddad & 
Williamson argue that the Balanced Scorecard would be beneficial for small 
companies based on a study of what performance measures four small 
companies would put into a Balanced Scorecard if they used this tool. 30  
Whilst Lewy and Du Mee seem to regard the Balanced Scorecard as 
successful merely if the process continues in use. 31  Neither of these measures 
seemed worthwhile.  Kaplan and Norton describe successful companies in 
terms of a range of organisational achievement; for commercial enterprises 
generally in terms of market performance, eg on the stock exchange value, or 
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by general comparison with other businesses in the sector.  Neither of these 
methodologies would apply to CINCFLEET. 
• Details of Balanced Scorecards are rarely published by organisations due to 
the amount of detail that would be disclosed about strategic intentions. 32  And 
there was little if anything published in the UK on use of the Balanced 
Scorecard in the Public Sector, indeed Kaplan and Norton suggest that by 
1996 the use of the Balanced Scorecard in non-profit and government 
organisations was still only embryonic. 33  It was felt that it would be difficult 
to find organisations with which to conduct studies that would provide 
meaningful comparison of what contributed to success; Hussey and Hussey 
describe this as one of the key difficulties of the case study methodology. 34  It 
was also unclear as to how many other organisations would need to be studied 
in order to gain a clear picture on what constituted success and how the 
Balanced Scorecard had contributed to their success.  Thus the scope of the 
issue of meaningful comparative case studies and how to gain access to such 
organisations suggested that this would be a difficult course to pursue. 
 
This survey was undertaken between May and October, 2001.  The survey was 
conducted over such a relatively lengthy period due to the impact of the summer 
break and the low priority that was given to this task by many of the senior officers.  
A copy of the final survey used is at Appendix B to this Chapter, and was distributed 
with an accompanying letter seeking support (Appendix A), as recommended by 
Zikmund. 35 
 
Although at this stage thoughts on the area of examination for later work, ie 
organisational culture, were already beginning to emerge, the questionnaire was made 
fairly broad. This was done in order to gain a broad understanding of issues and 
perceptions and to help disguise the intended thrust of the research to prevent 
responses being tailored to a perceived need.  The questionnaire thus looked at the 
different implementation stages of the Balanced Scorecard and sought to record 
people’s perceptions and understanding of issues and outcomes. 
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This survey was inevitably a qualitative survey since the population available to 
survey was small and it was recognised that some would not respond.  Consequently, 
even though the questionnaire attempted to standardise many of the answers, the 
evaluation of the responses is evaluative rather than quantitative. 
 
A “postal” survey was used to overcome the perceived difficulty of arranging 
meetings with a large number of senior staff, particularly as many of these staff were 
dispersed and this would avoid the researcher wasting a lot of time travelling.  (As 
this research was undertaken on a part time basis this was an important constraint.)  
This would also give respondents greater flexibility to complete the survey at their 
own convenience, whilst also giving the opportunity to collect data in a more 
standardised format for ease of collation and evaluation. 
 
The questionnaire was designed to be capable both of eliciting core information in a 
short timescale, but also provide a framework for prompting wider views. 36  Thus for 
example questions provided some possible answers but invited free comment, eg: 
 
Section 2: Selection and introduction of the Balanced Scorecard.  This section 
aims to understand why the Balanced Scorecard was introduced, what knowledge 
there was in the organisation of the Balanced Scorecard process before it was 
introduced and what the aims of introduction were at this early stage. 
Focus attention on key issues facing the organisation:  
Replace or improve existing performance monitoring:  
Focus on strategic organisational objectives:  
Improve internal processes:  
1     What was 
the purpose of 
introducing 
the Balanced 




By including the “Other (please state):” option this gives the option of adding 
additional thoughts whilst the previous options provide the opportunity to respond to a 
few standard options for building Balanced Scorecards.  This methodology was felt 
likely to increase the rate of response by enabling at least a “tick the options” solution, 
as well as easing the classification of many responses.  The clear danger of this 
approach is that it prompts respondents to offer answers that were not valid or not 
recognised as underlying issues by the respondents.  However, it has to be recognised 
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that if an underlying assumption made at this time, that many of the respondents 
would not be totally clear about some of the issues, there would be considerable 
variability in the responses and the “Other” box would not result in additional 
comment.  It was also felt that face-to-face interviews would fare no better in terms of 
the quality of response and might lead to awkwardness and difficulty in the 
interviews, eg because Senior Officers might be embarrassed by an apparent lack of 
knowledge, whereas they could probably leave off replying to any questions of which 
they were uncertain if a postal survey was used. 
 
Questions were also designed to subtly test responses to other questions.  For 
example: 
 
Section 2: Selection and introduction of the Balanced Scorecard.  This section 
aims to understand why the Balanced Scorecard was introduced, what knowledge 
there was in the organisation of the Balanced Scorecard process before it was 
introduced and what the aims of introduction were at this early stage. 
Substantial (ie they were fully aware of the concept 
and the issues involved) 
 
Good (ie they had a broad understanding of the 
issues but required further training): 
 
Moderate (ie they were aware of the concept but 
needed substantial training): 
 
6     What level 
of knowledge 
did the Board 
have of the 
Balanced 
Scorecard at 
this time? Poor (ie they had little or no prior understanding of 
the concept when it was proposed): 
 
 
Section 3: The Implementation phase.  This section aims to gain an 
understanding of the implementation process for the Balanced Scorecard in this 
organisation and assess its initial impact. 
Using the standard Kaplan and Norton template:  
Using a modified Kaplan and Norton template:  
From first principles or existing management 
information processes to arrive at a bespoke system: 
 




in terms of its 
general 
framework? 
Other (Please state): 
 
 
4     Please state the number of 
dimensions and number of 
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Here Section 2, Question 6 seeks to establish the level of understanding people had of 
the Balanced Scorecard principles during the business tool selection phase.  But 
Section 2 Questions 3 and 4 also seek to understand the level of knowledge during the 
Implementation Phase by asking specific questions about the format of the model.  
And indeed there is the potential for a mismatch between the answers to these two 
questions.  For example, anyone suggesting that the Standard Kaplan and Norton 
template had been used, but then indicating that there were other than four scorecard 
dimensions would indicate a low level of understanding of the basic principles. 
 
The questionnaires were mainly sent out in soft copy on the internal MOD intranet.  
This provided the option for respondents to provide as much detail as they wished.  
They were also advised that trial respondents had indicated that it took approximately 
20 minutes to complete the questionnaire.  Respondents replied using a mix of hard 
and soft copy, and one or two had clearly taken considerably more than 20 minutes in 
replying (and in some cases said so).  This option to respond in hard or soft copy is 
therefore perceived as having had some benefit. 
 
Most, if not all the people invited to take part in the survey were known “casually” to 
the researcher through the conduct of the business.  Indeed, it was through business 
contact that the researcher was able to readily identify who could be invited to take 
part.  The population was comparatively small and thus there was no real possibility 
of selecting a sample since this would have seriously limited the breadth of response 
and thus missed potentially valuable insights into the issues.  The researcher did not 
know who would have the best understanding of the issues, or who would be most 
likely to respond. 
 
Results from the questionnaire were collated on a spreadsheet, since this provided a 
quick and easy way of viewing the combination of “tick” responses and narrative 
comment. 
 
The response rate was generally good but the pattern of responses did not reveal clear-
cut answers even to factual questions.  This had been anticipated because it was 
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perceived that senior managers’ understanding of the technical aspects of 
management process were limited.  Also attitudes to the Balanced Scorecard were 
expected to vary.  In general, it was expected that most of those who were not in 
favour of the Balanced Scorecard would fail to respond.  Anecdotal evidence from 
staff officers to such senior managers suggests that this was the case, even where 
reminders were sent.  This will clearly bias the survey results in terms of any 
perceived benefits.  However, the adoption of the Balanced Scorecard by the 
remainder of the MOD, and the subsequent award of a place in the Balanced 
Scorecard “Hall of Fame” 37 might, arguably, suggest that negative comments 
represent a slightly jaundiced view of reality.  Similarly others who saw no value in a 
study of the benefits of the Balanced Scorecard were expected to fail to respond.  
 
Full details of the response to the questionnaire are given in Chapter 5. 
 
8. Culture surveys. 
 
The outcome of the initial survey provided useful information and suggested that 
there had been considerable impact on organisational culture.  This survey confirmed 
that one major impact on the organisation of the Balanced Scorecard was the impact 
on the ways of working at Board level.  Managers perceived a change in 
management’s agenda and methods of dealing with issues.  In essence this was 
perceived as a “culture change”; a change in “the way we do things here”.   
 
Also, the issue about the use of the Balanced Scorecard in France had also been 
mentioned in a number of documents seen by the researcher.  The French preference 
seemed to be to reinvigorate a previously introduced process called Tableau de Bord.  
However, elsewhere, eg Scandinavia and Australia there seemed to be a much more 
ready acceptance of the Balanced Scorecard.  Could these differences of preference be 
attributed to cultural differences?  Examination of Hofstede’s work, discussed in 
Chapter 3, tends to indicate that there were sufficient cultural differences in France to 
make its acceptance less likely, although the issue of its use in multinationals might 
ultimately subvert any national tendency to reject a new foreign, indeed American, 
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management system.  Also there was a suggestion that Hofstede’s work might need to 
be revisited to see if there was any significant decline in national cultural identities 
that might enable new management systems to be more portable across national 
boundaries.  Thus there seemed to be a range of cultural issues from the macro, 
national cultural issues down to the purely parochial micro, organisational cultural 
issues.  This seemed too great a range to be covered.  There was perceived to be more 
benefit to the organisation in looking at the micro issues and consequently it was 
decided to concentrate more at this level. 
 
It was therefore decided to undertake a survey of organisational culture to test cultural 
survey instruments and to gain an understanding of cultural issues within the 
organisation.  However, it was recognised that standard cultural survey instruments 
were not totally ideal for this purpose because of the unusual nature of the 
organisation.  Conversely the use of standard cultural survey tools would enable 
comparison with standard organisational models.  Similarly, such tools could also be 
used for benchmarking against other organisations. 
 
Cost was clearly an issue in the choice of surveys.  Whilst a bespoke development 
would considerably reduce cost (because it would not require a “licence fee” to be 
paid on each questionnaire) it would provide no external reference to other 
organisations or a recognised model.  Consequently two surveys were selected: 
 
• The Handy/Harrison organisational style survey – since this could be 
reproduced locally at minimal cost whilst being backed by a clear model of 
organisational styles.  This survey attempts to determine the psychological 
contract between the individual and the organisation based on the four classic 
models of organisational type. 38  
• The Denison Culture Survey – whilst comparatively expensive it was backed 
by a clear cultural model for improving organisational performance, and 
allowed benchmarking against external organisations.  This survey compares 
employees’ perceptions of the cultural features of their organisation with those 
of successful organisations as determined independently by Denison. 
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The high level of response to the earlier more detailed questionnaire suggested that 
the response rate might be high.  Similarly, advice obtained from readings on 
conducting surveys indicated that response might be good if inducements or follow-up 
mailings are used. 39  Consequently, in order to keep costs down, it is common for the 
size of surveys to be limited to the minimum necessary for the desired level of 
accuracy. 40 
 
This survey was undertaken between September and November, 2002.  Again the 
speed of response to this survey was impacted by the low priority that was given to 
this task by many officers.  During November and December, 2002 responses were 
sent to staff who returned the Harrison/Handy survey.  Respondents were asked to 
encourage colleagues to complete the questionnaire, and it was hoped that the 
feedback provided might create a curiosity among those who had not had completed 
their own forms.  The survey was also advertised on the internal “intranet”, 
“Fleetweb”. 
 
Work was therefore undertaken to look at cultural issues of the military environment.  
These issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 5, including a look at the attitude to 
“business management” philosophy in MOD.  Considerable amounts of material were 
available that dealt with issues relating to military culture but there was no British 
material on the measurement of culture, indeed the researcher’s experience, including 
in relation to the BSC, was that the key component of culture in which the Services 
were interested, morale, was not measured but routinely subjectively assessed by 
Commanding Officers.  The researchers perception was that the pressures relating to 
the subjective assessment were such the results were always likely to be biased.  
However, the relationship of morale to culture was also unclear and appeared to be 
mixed with other features such as: 
 
• The moral component, 
• Ethos, and 
• Fighting spirit. 
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None of these seemed to address the breadth of issues dealt with by writers on culture 
in the business environment.  Nevertheless, these issues are so fundamental to the 
military culture that to ignore them would be to deny the true nature of the military 
culture.  It was thus perceived that there was a need to try and build these into any 
measurement and management of the culture within CINCFLEET. Ainslie’s work 
demonstrates the potential to measure the Moral Component, and various cultural 
measurement tools were known to exist. 
 
It was therefore perceived that if culture was to be measured and managed there 
needed to be an explicit model against which to measure and a clear measurement 
tool.  Whilst the researcher came across several cultural models and several 
measurement tools two models stood out as having clear measurement tools 
associated with them.  These were: 
 
• Handy’s work, based around the Harrison measurement tool for organisational 
style, which in addition to identifying organisational style, attempted to 
measure the psychological contract that individuals develop with the 
organisation based on that organisational style. 
• Denison’s organisational cultural measurement tool, which seeks to identify a 
relationship between organisational culture and organisational effectiveness. 
 
The Handy/Harrison model seemed particularly relevant at the time, late 2002, 
because the CINCFLEET HQ had recently undergone a reorganisation, part of the aim 
of which was to move from a role culture to a task or matrix culture.  This is discussed 
further in Chapter 5.  It was thought that the Denison survey might not only throw 
light on the organisational culture but on whether it was perceived to be effective.  
Thus it was perceived that these two surveys together might provide significant 
insight to the culture and also provide some guidance on the running of organisational 
cultural surveys in a military environment.   
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The use of these surveys constitutes a move more to the positivistic approach to 
research: using specific, proven research tools to determine qualitative information 
albeit in quantitative manner.  This also helps to strengthen the research by 
introducing a form of triangulation.  Hussey and Hussey comment that,  
 
“The use of different research approaches, methods and 
techniques in the same study is know as triangulation and can 
overcome the potential bias and sterility of a single-method 
approach.” 41 
 
They then go on to look at the work of Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe who 
proposed four methods of triangulation including Methodological triangulation, where 
quantitative and qualitative data is collected on the phenomenon. 42  In this context the 
initial survey coupled with personal knowledge, experience and anecdotal evidence 
form the qualitative side of the triangle.  The Handy/Harrison and Denison surveys 
form a quantitative dimension and the literature search forms the third dimension.  
 
In order to limit the cost of the surveys and to more easily manage the response it was 
recognised that the surveys would need to be limited in number.  This raises the 
question of an appropriate sample size and a sampling technique.  Hussey and Hussey 
highlight the following sampling techniques: 
 
• Systematic sampling divides the population by the sample size and selects 
every n'th subject. 
• Stratified sampling divides the population into predetermined groups and 
attempts to ensure that each group is representatively sampled according to the 
proportion that group is to the whole population. 
• Quota sampling ensures a particular count of particular categories of the 
population. 
• Cluster sampling involves selecting a group from a population divided into 
groups (because the groups are deemed to be representative of the whole 
population). 
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• Multistage sampling takes cluster sampling further and samples from a group 
within the whole population, because the groups themselves are still too large. 
• Snowballing or network sampling (derived from a phenomenological study), 
where respondents identify other sample members because they have 
experienced the phenomena. 
• Judgemental sampling is a further stage on from snowball sampling, where the 
researcher selects the sample based on their likely contribution to the study 
based on the value of their experience of the phenomena. 
• Natural sampling is where the researcher has no control over the sample 
selected, ie because there are other factors that determine its selection, eg 
those present on a particular day. 43  
 
It was felt that of these the most appropriate was a cross between stratified sampling 
and quota sampling.  It was recognised that there were distinct groups within the 
organisation, primarily Service and Civilian, which formed major groups with 
potentially very different perspectives, eg borne of different employment conditions 
and experiences.  Similarly within these groups it was felt likely that there would be 
different perspectives between junior and senior staff, that the Royal Marines and the 
Royal Fleet Auxiliary personnel represented distinct subcategories with Marines 
having different perspectives from Naval staff and RFA personnel having different 
perspectives from non-uniform civilians.  Consequently there were a large number of 
groups that might exist.  However, some sub-groups would form small numbers 
within the HQ, and these would either have to be amalgamated or discounted.  Fink, 
in her guidance on sampling, recommends a general “rule of thumb” that the sample 
size should be a minimum of 30. 44  Verbal advice from Dr T Ringrose, RMCS 
Shrivenham, was that for an organisation of the size of CINCFLEET HQ, about 1200 
personnel, a minimum sample of 50 was necessary.  The difficulty with such a sample 
would be the issue of subgroups within that location, based on specialism etc.  Dr 
Ringrose therefore supported the argument for a larger, properly stratified sample, but 
also highlighted the issue of non-response.  Bauer and Bauer suggest that the response 
rate for sponsored company surveys might be around 80%. 45  This was supported by 
verbal advice obtained from DASA on anticipated results to in house surveys, and on 
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the general rate of response to the earlier survey.  Fink suggests that over-sampling 
might be used to overcome potential non-response 46, but highlights the cost as a 
disadvantage of over-sampling. 47  Rounded up this suggests a sample size of 
approximately 40 for each of the groups because it was also recognised that response 
rates from some groups might be lower.  This is because over-sampling in a closed 
environment will create a wider awareness that other people have been sent the survey 
and there is consequent greater likelihood that, rather than replying themselves, 
people will rely on others’ attitudes and response to the questionnaire. 
 
Examination of CINCFLEET HQ staff directory indicated that the following groups 
might be appropriate: 
 
• Senior Naval Officers (Captain and above) – almost a 100% sample, but 
deemed necessary in order to gain a key perspective on the organisation as 
these staff play the most important part in the management of the HQ. 
• Two groups of middle ranking Naval Officers (Cdrs and Lt Cdrs) – 
representing the largest group within the HQ.  The sample was split on 
organisational lines with the aim of checking responses against each other on 
the basis that there should be no great dissimilarity. 
• Junior Naval staff (Lt, WO and CPO) – representing the opinions of junior 
naval staff, recognising that the experience of Lts would either be minimal if 
they were direct entry officers or substantial if they were promotees from 
ratings, in which case their opinions might also reflect their time as ratings.  
However, these staff form a significant group in terms of numbers in the HQ. 
• Senior Civilian staff (Grade C and above, but excluding RFA personnel) – 
representing mainstream, or “career” civil servants, who tend to work in 
personnel, finance or IT functions but does include some technical staff 
working in areas dominated by Service staff. 
• Junior Civilian staff (Grade E1 and Grade D) – junior civilian staff spread 
more widely through the organisation and who, due to function of lack of 
exposure are unlikely to have a broad perspective on management issues.  
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However, again, these staff form a significant group in terms of numbers in 
the HQ. 
• Others (RM, RFA and known Retired Officer grades) – who are likely to 
be more Service orientated having spent most of their time outside the HQ, but 
who might be expected to have a different perspective to Naval staff due to a 
different range of experiences.  For example, RMs undertake more military 
rather than naval activities; RFA contracts and operating regimes; Retired 
Officers are employed on Civil Service contracts and may therefore have a 
mix of Service and Civil Service perspectives.  However, none of these groups 
is large enough on its own to in the HQ to easily make a sample group.  Nor 
are they likely to be sufficiently influential to have a radical impact on the 
culture. 
 
Recognising that Junior staff might be less likely to respond to an academic survey 
the sample size for these groups was enlarged to 50 rather than the standard size of 40. 
 
It was deemed too difficult to try and identify staff by specialism rather than 
functional area.  And it was not clear that all specialisms would show any significant 
differentiation resulting from that specialism rather than from the groupings shown 
above.  That is, whilst the Warfare Branch is sometimes referred to as the “Master 
race” of the Navy, and might therefore have a different perspective from say 
engineering, it is unclear whether the perspectives of Naval marine engineers would 
differ from aviation engineers or RFA Engineers.  Similarly it is doubtful that the 
differences between Naval engineers and Naval Supply staff would be as great as 
between Naval Officers and RFA Officers.  In a larger survey these issues might be 
tested, although some of these groups might prove to be rather small with no clear 
view emerging from such small groups. 
 
The groups identified above were deemed to be a reasonable representation of the 
HQ.  Using printouts of the staff directory a semi-systematic system of selecting the 
n’th member of staff was employed.  Minor adjustments were made, eg to avoid some 
of smaller outstations where the relevance of belonging to the HQ and understanding 
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its culture might be unclear.  Similarly, in selecting the first 30 Junior Naval Staff 
only six Lts had been included.  This meant that this group was underrepresented, and 
so the group was rebalanced by the inclusion of additional officers. 
 
The Handy/Harrison survey was reproduced locally, with minor amendments to 
simplify some of the language.  As recommended by Bauer and Bauer, particularly for 
mailed surveys, the questionnaire was then tested on a couple of “Junior Civilian” 
staff (including one who was an ex-naval rating and thus potential also represented 
Junior Service staff) working for the researcher, in order to ensure that the instructions 
were clear. 48  It was felt that if junior staff had no difficulty with the questionnaire 
then more senior staff should not have any difficulty.  This trial was successful with 
both staff understanding the instructions.  The Denison survey was not tested due to 
the cost and the recognition that this was a professionally produced survey that was 
already widely, and commercially, used.  
 
The one change made to the Handy/Harrison survey as a result of the trial was to 
specify that Section 15 referred to MOD’s external environment.  This was a choice 
made by the researcher for two reasons: 
 
• Some staff might perceive the culture of the Fleet HQ as being synonymous 
with the Navy or part of MOD and thus to include such areas in the immediate 
external environment might lead to a conclusion that this section could not be 
applied. 
• Not all staff would have any real knowledge or understanding of the culture of 
other parts of MOD and would thus be unable to comment effectively if the 
boundary were purely set at Fleet HQ.  However, all staff could be expected to 
have some view of MOD’s external environment through their non-work 
experiences. 
 
Nevertheless this section was perceived to have caused some problems, as evidenced 
by phone or verbal queries and failure to complete this section in at least one 
response. 
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However, it was recognised that this would be an “unsolicited survey” and it may 
therefore be preferable to offer some inducement, even though it was hoped that staff 
might feel some form of moral obligation to respond to a colleague’s plea for help in 
his academic studies.  A direct personal response was therefore offered, plus the 
promise that published aggregate results would be anonymised, and the promise of a 
prize draw (three copies of a Scott Adam’s book).  Nevertheless the response rate to 
the survey was disappointing and the reasons for this are discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
The low response rate led to amalgamation of groups.  The poor quality of the 
responses to the Harrison/Handy survey meant that special measures had to be 
adopted to improve the viability of the results.  The results of the survey are covered 
in Chapter 5.  Appendix C to this chapter outlines the process used in an attempt to 
improve the quality of responses to the Harrison/Handy survey. 
 
9. Validity of cultural measurement. 
 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, Kaplan and Norton’s argument is that in order to change 
the business effectively there needs to be clear targets and measurement of the aspects 
of the business that are required to be changed.  M G Brown suggests that culture 
might be managed through the Balanced Scorecard, but there were no clear 
recommendations of how to do this.  Indeed whilst recommending the use of the 
Balanced Scorecard to monitor culture and values, particularly during a period of 
organisational change, Brown actually states,  
 
“When it comes to measuring culture change or the extent to 
which values are communicated and followed, it is difficult to 
come up with meaningful measures.”  49   
 
Chapter 3 covered some of the issues concerning the measurement of culture.  This 
chapter looks further at that topic and touches on the ethical issues. 
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As Chapter 3 demonstrated, culture is a multifaceted concept.  It cannot be easily 
defined for a single organisation because the perceptions of the individual observers, 
both internal and external, will vary.  A culture will be made up of subcultures, and 
thus whilst there may be a cultural core on which there is wide spread agreement, its 
meaning and importance will vary from individual to individual.  Thus any attempt to 
describe or measure the culture will, at best be a constructed consensus, based on a 
sample view.  Since culture is also largely a set of unconscious values and attitudes, 
albeit with tangible products and by-products, to articulate the culture could impact 
the culture, eg through hardening support or opposition to the manifestations of 
culture. 
 
Clearly therefore the measurement and articulation of culture has implications for an 
organisation.  Whilst Harrison/Handy’s model articulates four competing cultural 
styles, each of which will be present to a lesser or greater extent, Denison’s model can 
be construed as effectively suggesting that there is “one way” to become effective.  
Nevertheless, both these models would permit a multitude of cultures since there is a 
vast range of cultural features that are not assessed.  Hence it must be recognised that 
the usage of any cultural assessment tool will only partially explore and measure the 
culture, and thus could arguably be “mis-representing” the culture because it is 
incomplete.  Thus Oppenhiem suggests that in order to measure an individual’s 
attitude towards an issue it is necessary to use sets of questions to examine the same 
issue. 50  Harrison/Handy effectively uses 15 different tests for their four cultural 
types.  Each of these is effectively divided into four, but it could be argued that, since 
these four statements represent four different cultures, each of the 15 cultural features 
of an organisation is only represented by one statement.  This may suggest a low 
validity, and indeed the complexity of some of the wording (noted earlier) may 
contribute to a poor understanding of issues being examined. 
 
In contrast, Denison’s survey is testing 12 different characteristics of an 
organisation’s culture, each of which is tested by five questions.  Nevertheless, these 
12 concepts are quite broad, eg Vision, Coordination and integration, Creating 
change, Team orientation.  It could therefore be questioned how well five statements 
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adequately cover these issues, and how well 60 questions adequately cover the key 
aspects of effective organisational culture. 
 
Even where adequate questions exist, and they are well worded, the individual’s 
attitude to the organisational culture is not entirely determined by the organisation but 
can be impacted by external features.  Thus for example, high exit barriers, including 
those erected externally, by circumstances such as poor economic conditions, may 
prevent individuals leaving an organisation or appreciating the organisation’s values.  
Thus such views, where included, would help to distort the perceptions of the 
organisation.  This is an important issue in the context of Chapter 5.  As Oppenhiem 
points out,  
 
“We cannot necessarily predict behaviour from attitudes … The 
links between attitudes and behaviour are complex, and group 
membership may or may not be a valid criterion of a particular 
attitude.” 51 
 
Ward develops a hierarchy of: 
 
• Expectation – develops over hours and days as a result of behaviour and its 
results.  People are highly aware of expectations. 
• Attitude – which again develop from behaviour and results, but over months 
and years.  People are only dimly aware of attitudes. 
• Culture – is the result of behaviour and its results, expectations and attitudes.  
People are unaware of culture, which develops over many years. 52 
 
The issue here is also about the difference between “culture” and “climate”.  Attitude 
may reflect “climate” more than “culture”.  Shared attitudes may reflect a consensus 
on the climate rather than reflecting the outcome of culture, but conversely 
disagreement over specific cultural features does not imply that these are 
interpretations of the climate.  Rousseau  therefore argues that measures of culture 
must be normative rather than descriptive. 53  The relationship between the culture and 
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climate and the shared consensus on these issues is thus somewhat complex, because 
ultimately the aim is to describe the culture, which is a set of norms to which 
individuals subscribe to a lesser or greater extent, and perceptions of the culture will 
differ based on the expressed description as well as their attitude towards that feature. 
 
Schein also suggests that the results of cultural surveys are merely articulating the 
climate of the organisation.  He concludes,  
 
“… questionnaires can be a very useful tool for getting at norms of 
behaviour and at organisational climate, but as such data should 
not be confused with cultural assumptions … At best the survey 
results are an artefact of the culture, subject to the same 
interpretation problems as other artefacts.” 54 
 
Thus even if culture surveys are not truly cultural, but climatic, instruments, it is 
argued that sensible interpretation of the results by someone with knowledge of the 
culture can help to render them as cultural data. 
 
In order to understand the relationship between organisational climate and 
organisational culture the following comparison is proposed (Figure 4.7). 
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Figure 4.7 can be seen as building on the work of a number of authors: 
 
• Moran and Volkwein – “… since climate operates at a more accessible level 
than culture …” 55 
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• Mullins – “Organisational climate … can be likened to our description of the 
weather …” 56 
• Salancik and Pfeffer – who “… define climate in terms of the shared 
perceptions of what attitudes and needs are appropriate, the shared 
definitions of jobs and work environments, and the definitions of how people 
should relate to the environment.” 57 
• Field and Abelson – suggest climate can exist at three interdependent levels 
of individual, group and organisation, and reflects perceptions of 
“…autonomy, structure, rewards and warmth”. 58 
• Reichers and Schneider – “… we stop short of asserting that climate and 
culture are identical or almost identical.  We agree with Schein (1985) that 
climate can most accurately be understood as a manifestation of culture.”  59 
 
The difficulty in describing the culture is thus that of whether what is described is 
really the culture of the organisation at all.  
 
“Finally, and perhaps most controversially, is the assertion by 
Schein (1984) that accessibility of information on culture raises 
certain ethical concerns.  Researchers employing a survey or 
questionnaire to study organisations behave unethically, Schein 
argues, by purporting to speak for respondents through 
aggregated survey data rather than using the informants’ own 
words.  He argues that summary categories and aggregations of 
information misrepresent the respondents’ view.  Externally 
derived categories need not conform to the organisation members’ 
worldview …” 60 
 
It is accepted that any view of the organisation based on a defined model must be 
limited in its articulation of the culture, because by definition it will focus on 
particular aspects to the exclusion of others.  Equally, a description of the culture of 
an organisation based on direct quotation is similarly limited to the features 
highlighted by the individual and individuals interviewed by the researcher.  Thus no 
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representation of an organisation’s culture is complete.  The very act of encouraging 
an individual to think about cultural phenomena will harden their attitudes and 
perceptions causing the culture to change.  Thus the researcher becomes an agent for 
change in the organisation, even if the outcome of the research is never read within 
the organisation.  Clearly the less publicity the outcomes of the research gets the less 
impact the researcher will have.  Consequently, taking Schein’s argument to its 
logical conclusion, it could be argued that any cultural research is unethical in that it 
will influence the organisation rather than letting it develop in its own way. 
 
Nevertheless, it is argued that cultural research is legitimate since organisations and 
societies are accountable.  Recognition of the limitations of the description are 
essential, but this is where broad models such as Johnson’s culture web are important 
since they encourage the articulation of a broad range of issues. 61  However, in that 
this is only a framework, a researcher could still distort the readers’ perceptions by 
failing to present a balanced or comprehensive view of the key issues. 
 
It is therefore concluded that no cultural description can be complete and unbiased, 
particularly one based on a defined model.  The representation by internal members, 
or the researcher, will be tainted by the climate experienced or perceived. 
 
10. Mini Case-Studies 
 
As the work on this research was concluding a number of brief case-studies were 
undertaken to look as the Balanced Scorecard implementation in other organisations.  
The aim was to validate the tools and models developed during this research and to 
see what, if anything, other organisations had done about measurement and 
management of culture.  These essentially took the form of interviews with a key 
member of staff involved with the Balanced Scorecard coupled with background 
research on the organisation.  Clearly there was not the potential to undertake the 
detailed research into organisational cultural issues that had been undertaken in the 
context of the studies on CINCFLEET.  This was because there was neither the time 
(interviewer and interviewee) nor the available literature.  Nevertheless, it is believed 
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that there is good, but not complete, coverage of the issues suggested by Deal and 
Kennedy: 
 
• Analysis of the physical setting of the organisation. 
• Examination of what the organisation writes. 
• Scrutiny of how the organisation greets outsiders. 
• Discover how employees feel about the organisation. 
• Identification of what people do in the organisation in order to identify 
organisational priorities. 62 
 
Organisations were identified by a variety of means and contacts with the purpose 
being explained in outline before they agreed to cooperate.  All the interviewees were 
thus keen to show their organisation in a reasonably good light.  The case studies were 
constructed using face-to-face interviews, based loosely around the original survey 
instrument developed and used within the Royal Navy, and the models subsequently 
developed.  Supporting data was also obtained from the internet.  Following the 
interview the case study was written up and presented to the interviewee for checking 
of factual data, and, in some cases to avoid presenting anything that might be of 
sensitive nature to the individual or organisation.  The aim was not to present a biased 





This chapter has attempted to show that the research was undertaken from a broad 
perspective using a range of phenomenological and positivistic methodologies.  Using 
a broad range of methodologies aims to improve the robustness of the results, 
although the impact of the research being undertaken by someone who is part of the 
organisation must be recognised.  Robust results are important because of the 
transitory nature of culture, which means that repeating the processes can never 
duplicate the results. 
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The processes are described in detail in order to enable readers to determine their 
benefits and any limitations.  This will enable them to be repeated, where appropriate, 
and therefore enable any follow-on work to be more robust.  Finally, the ethical issues 
of culture measurement are discussed because of the risk that narrow use of 
methodologies may misrepresent the organisational culture.  It also recognises that 
any articulation of organisational culture will impact on the organisation, thereby 
recognising that this research is “not done in a vacuum”. 
 
With this understanding of the process and issues of undertaking cultural research, it 
is now possible to move on to examine the organisation and the research results in 
depth. 
 













Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
This Chapter demonstrates how the researcher has attempted to 
balance the positivistic and phenomenological elements of the research.  
Thus, for example, quantifying cultural issues enables them to be 
measured, but constrains them to the terms and issues presented.  Thus 
the presentation of the culture can be distorted.  Similarly, the 
researcher’s role in the organisation, whilst having the benefit of helping 
to understand and articulate the issues, presents a problem in that it is 
his interpretation that is presented not a true representation.  But culture 
is a transitory phenomenon and will always therefore be difficult to 
capture and represent.  Such problems do not make attempts invalid. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard. 
Supporting case studies. 
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Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
This Chapter and its appendices set out the organisational and 
environmental context of the research undertaken.  They describe the 
organisational structure and highlight the major change programme that 
existed at the time of the research using a number of models of 
organisational change.  They thus contextualise Chapter 4, building on 
the work undertaken in the literature review at Chapter 3.  The aim is to 
prepare the way for subsequent Chapters by building a specific picture 
of the organisation.  This will enable the reader to develop a view of the 
cultural phenomena, in order to help overcome any subsequent 
problems of the transitory nature of the organisational culture, and the 
problems of representing culture through quantitative methods. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard.
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard.
Supporting case studies. 
Summary of conclusions. 
Figure 5.1 
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1. Introduction. 
 
Commander-in-Chief Fleet (CINCFLEET) was introduced briefly in Chapter 4 in 
order to “contextualise” some of the issues about how this research was undertaken.  
The aim of this Chapter and its accompanying appendices is to provide further details 
of the organisation and the issues it faced during the period of change that are 
analysed in later Chapters.  Some of the broader or more detailed issues are contained 
in appendices to keep this Chapter focussed on the central theme of the specific 
organisational culture issues of the military.  The appendices will be of interest to 
future researchers looking at the changes during the period covered by this research.  
Consequently Sections 2 and 3 are merely summaries.   
 
Section 4 looks in more detail at the distance between the military culture and the 
culture of society.  But Section 5 looks more at some of the current internal tensions 
in military culture.  In the analysis and conclusion a model is developed to provide 
understanding of the meaning of the “Gap”, which should therefore facilitate its 
management.  The tensions between civil and military culture have real impacts and 
these are acknowledged through the contrast of extreme examples from the Iraq 
conflict in 2002. 
 
In addition to describing the culture and cultural events, this Chapter is important in 
three ways: 
 
• It demonstrates why the culture of military organisations is an important topic 
for study. 
• It highlights the tensions that exist over changes that bring perceived 
“business” approaches to the military environment. 
• Presents the environmental background for the case study work in Chapters 6 
to 8. 
 
In the context of the latter point, Yin states,  
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“…you would use the case study method because you deliberately 
wanted to cover contextual conditions – believing that they might 




CINCFLEET is the Front Line Command of the Royal Navy.  The Fleet First 
reorganisation, which took place in the early 21st Century, aimed at restructuring the 
Headquarters to improve management and reduce the management overheads.  The 
prime changes were: 3 
 
• Creation of a strategic level of management. 
• Separation of the “Tribal Commander” responsibilities from their structural 
responsibilities. 
• Improved focus for the generation of operational capability. 
• Creation of Deployable 2* Operational Commanders. 
• Single point of focus for the delivery of training. 
• Reduction in the overall size of the Headquarters. 
• Location of the majority of the Headquarters at the waterfront. 
 
The Fleet First Change Programme is described in greater detail in Appendix A to this 
Chapter.  The researcher, as Assistant Director Business Development, and a member 
of the Change Programme Steering Group, was familiar with these changes.   
 
This radical change programme proved to be highly effective and regarded, 
generating considerable savings through manpower cuts.  The Researcher’s 
observation and perception was that the hierarchical power, coupled with the 
budgetary pressures and the levels of “secrecy” surrounding the original development 
of Fleet First proposals enabled the achieved success.  This was because those losing 
power were somewhat isolated and had no alternative proposals.  This smacks 
somewhat of the Power culture defined by Harrison/Handy. 
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These Fleet First changes also directly affect the culture of the organisation: 
 
• The built infrastructure: a move away from the Cold War nuclear bunker at 
Northwood: linked to a change in perception of the military threat. 
• Changes in power relationships: eg the reorganisation of the management 
boards. 
• Change in the messages of what is important in the organisation, eg changes in 
financial responsibilities. 
• Change in who was employed in the organisation: relocation meant many 
civilian staff transferred to other organisations and new staff were brought in, 
and the opportunity was also taken to reschedule the routine roulement of 
many service staff working in the HQ. 
• Changes felt at all levels: CINC now had to split time between his two HQs; 
junior civilians had to move out of the Command; induction programme meant 
that Junior Seamen attended the same course as 2* Officers. 
 
This reorganisation was thus very significant for CINCFLEET, but has also become a 
“model” for change elsewhere.  The researcher’s recollection is also that there was a 
“hidden agenda” that was spoken of at the time of Fleet First, which was the 
expectation of an eventual merger with 2SL’s TLB.  2SL had been based in 
Portsmouth since the mid 1990s, and work on merger was well underway by late 
2004.  Fleet First may thus be seen as a stepping stone to further organisational 
change; arguably an essential stepping stone to these further changes. 
 
3. Why change? 
 
Appendix B to this Chapter sets out some of the environmental pressures that 
contributed to the Fleet First reorganisation.  The changes, together with the pressures 
detailed later, can be summarised as follows: 
 
• Political – The end of the Cold War mentality and the pressures for 
government to adopt more business-like approaches to management issues; the 
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expectation of greater dependence on international alliances to tackle 
operational situations. 
• Economic – Adoption of commercial accounting and the strict budgetary 
limits imposed resulting from different Government economic priorities and 
perceptions. 
• Social – Changes in make-up of the population and their expectations; greater 
ethnic, religious and cultural diversity, wider use of women in military roles, 
improvements in educational standards and the emphasis on “life-long 
learning”, greater emphasis on individual rights and expectations. 
• Technical – Increasing cost of technology and the increased pace of 
technological advance in an organisation relying on technical leadership for 
supremacy over potential adversaries. 
• Legal – Greater international accountability through wider scrutiny and 
challenge and (as will be seen later) legal action against those perceived to be 
breaking national and international law even during military operations. 
• Military – Changing nature of military activities from set piece confrontations 
against well defined military opponents to peacekeeping, humanitarian and 
anti-terrorist operations. 
• Industry – Increasing global perspectives with organisations competing more 
widely for a diminishing military market, which was more widely distributed 
and across the boundaries of formerly adversarial blocs; failure to achieve 
radical benefits of organisational success and cost reduction through quality 
programmes. 
 
This brief list highlights what amounts to a revolution on all fronts and creates 
enormous pressures for organisations.  Key to being able to respond effectively is to 
become more flexible.  As a large established organisation, the Royal Navy can be 
expected to exhibit inertia and a bureaucratic (role culture) style.  The attempt to 
introduce matrix management (task culture) into CINCFLEET highlights that one of 
the responses to the pressure for change was recognition of the need for a different 
organisational culture. 
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4. The Gap. 
 
This section builds on the change theme by looking in more detail at what has been 
described as the “Gap”; the different social structures of the military and civilian 
communities and the resulting tensions between the two groups.  In particular, these 
issues are even more cultural than the more environmental issues described in the 
previous section; although the issues described previously can be seen to have cultural 
dimensions, and the issues described below have their roots in political, economic, 
technological, social and other changes.  The distinction between these two sections 
may thus seem arbitrary.   
 
Key to this concept of the Gap is the work of Feaver and Kohn, highlighted in The 
Journal of Strategic Studies. 4  This is backed up by a useful article that attempts to 
look at aspects of the phenomenon in Britain. 5  However, this latter article seems to 
represent something of a personalised view and might not fully accord with views 
held elsewhere in either the civilian or military communities.  Nevertheless Strachan’s 
article highlights many of the key issues affecting the Gap in Britain, not all of which 
are covered here.  A similar, more factual, presentation of the issues is provided by 
Dandeker. 6  Looking back even further, the issues are described in a matrix.  This is 
shown here in Table 5.1, developed from Huntingdon, which was in turn based on 
Segal et al. 7  This table should be useful in the consideration of the “Gap”, which is 
seen as an issue lying more along the low-low/high-high axis. 
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Table: 5.1: Matrix of relationships describing degree of coherence 
between civil and military communities. 
 Level of congruence – extent of similarities 
between the characteristics of the different 
groups. 
Level of interaction – 
extent of multiplicity 
of contacts between 
the different groups. 
Low High 
Low Isolation – highly 
specialised military forces 
that are divorced from the 
society that hosts them, eg 
forces of occupation or 
research/military 
establishments that are 
opposed/(barely) tolerated 
by host communities. 
Self-sufficient – armed 
forces that undertake both 
the military tasks and 
provide the social 
infrastructure to remain 
independent of the social 
infrastructure, eg British 
Forces in Germany. 
High Professionalism – highly 
specialised military forces 
enjoying strong support 
from society, eg consider 
the SAS relationship with 
Hereford. 
Identification – citizens 
closely involved in the 
delivery of military 
capability, eg citizen 
armies of Israel or 
Switzerland. 
 
Wills, in reporting on changes to the structure of Army Medical Services (AMS) in 
the early 1990s, highlights that among the problems perceived early on were concerns 
about “ethos and culture”.  In the process of integration with public NHS services it 
was,  
 
“ … apparent that the old equilibrium has been unsettled by the 
process of the move … Conclusions indicate a large change to the 
cultural practice of the AMS, which will have to filter through to 
the ethos of the organisation for a new equilibrium to be reached.  
Whether a successful ethos and culture can be nurtured will only 
be apparent in a time of operational activity.  In the meantime, a 
delicate balance between accepting and promoting beneficial 
change where possible, while safeguarding traditional values of 
importance, has to be negotiated.”  8   
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Arguably, merging any two organisations will present cultural problems, but the 
difference in nature between the Service and Civilian communities will represent an 
extreme example.  Ainslie’s work hints at problems in this area when he seeks to 
build a model of the “ethos” of the British Army’s Royal Engineers. 9, 10  Among his 
concerns are those highlighted by Rose of the relationship between the culture of the 
armed forces and national culture. 11  Essentially the argument is that the culture of the 
armed forces must be different from the culture of society in general.  This implies 
that the gap needs to be managed, and people crossing the gap will need assistance. 12  
An interview with a relatively senior naval officer highlighted the issues,  
 
“The problems are exacerbated by the regime in 2SL training, eg 
at RALEIGH, where cost savings measures result in the school 
being run to commercial working hour standards.  Thus recruits 
face a culture shock when they join ships that run 24hrs/day.  
Similarly, the work onboard ship can include very mundane 
activities, eg cleaning, that recruits have neither been properly 
exposed to previously, nor feel at all comfortable about 
undertaking.  The culture gap between civilian and service life is 
now quite significant.” 13   
 
Subsequently the Navy introduced a three-day acclimatisation course for people 
thinking of joining the Service. 14  Wills also states,  
 
“…the Armed Forces are accommodating changes in society 
which effect its global ethos.  A typical example being a new 
generation of recruits who are better educated, physically weaker, 
with higher expectations and a greater propensity to legal 
redress.” 15   
 
For example, the researcher was, while undertaking this research, required to 
undertake an investigation into the accounting arrangements for clothing stocks held 
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by CGRM.  Whilst visiting CTC Lympstone, the researcher was told of the difficulty 
that many recruits experienced in dressing themselves and in maintaining and wearing 
uniforms (particularly the boots, since they were accustomed to only wearing light 
trainer style footwear).  But in contrast, whilst Wills’ comments may reflect the pool 
from which recruits are drawn, by early in the 21st Century there was considerable 
concern about the educational standards of British Army recruits.  Whilst the number 
of people entering tertiary education was growing, it is reported that something like 
48% of recruits at best have the literacy and numeracy skills expected for 11 year 
olds. 16 
 
Cartwright’s evaluation of the moral and ethical darkness of our modern society, 
equating its counter-cultures with those of late 20th Century Balkan society, 
highlights the gap that recruits must cross when joining the armed forces to restore 
some form of law and order to such socially and culturally bankrupt societies. 17  
Critically in modern warfare it is junior ranks whose decisions often come under close 
scrutiny.  One Commandant of the USMC refers to the “strategic corporal” making 
potentially life and death decisions at the vehicle checkpoint. 18, 19  This highlights the 
extreme pressure junior staff experience and the need for substantial development to 
re-orientate individuals to perform such roles.  A recent legal case where ex-service 
personnel were seeking compensation for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, following 
operations in Northern Ireland, Bosnia and the Falklands, 20 highlights the need for 
sympathetic treatment for problems that were once ignored or dealt with 
unsympathetically and even harshly; consider the executions during World War I of 
servicemen who were sometimes apparently suffering from “shell shock”. 21  
Beaumont goes even further arguing that the Services need the committed 
understanding of its servicemen and women, 
 
“We no longer adhere to a regime where unquestioning obedience 
is the rule: ‘Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do or die…’  
We want our soldiers to be aware of the raison d’etre of the Armed 
Forces, and publish pamphlets such as The British Military 
Doctrine to facilitate this.” 22 
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Tangredi accepts the idea of a gap but believes that it does not represent a real 
problem. 23  He quotes Huntingdon, arguing that there are such differences in the 
civilian culture that it is not possible to talk of a general gap, but only of a gap 
between a particular civilian subculture and the military culture. 24  In contrast 
Henderson, writing in 1985 has to set out to refute the suggestion that unit cohesion is 
not important.  He reports the perception, held in the US, that modern technology 
produces weapons of such lethality that large armies are no longer necessary and 
unacceptable to the civilian community.  His purpose in writing is partly to refute the 
suggestions that: 
 
• Small unit cohesion is unimportant in modern armed forces. 
• Organisational cohesion can only be maintained in large force structures. 
• The advent of modern technology in weaponry makes the issue of cohesion 
irrelevant. 25  
 
Cartwright argues that the individual is highly important to group cohesion in small 
groups, whilst leadership is of greater significance to group cohesion in a larger 
group. 26  Note that whilst these other writers are writing from a military background, 
Cartwright is looking much more at a general business environment.  
 
Whilst disagreement among the military, or between them and academics, is nothing 
new, it does suggest that this is an issue of concern and thus worthy of study.  
However, Henderson does go on to illustrate the importance of the “human element” 
in relation to the Falklands War.  He concludes that the British superiority, enabling 
them to win, was “…that the Argentineans lacked the will to prevail” 27.  It is thus 
perhaps somewhat surprising that this issue is not examined further in his book 
despite it having been a recent war involving a major world power and apparently 
supporting his key contentions.  Part of this answer may be found in the immediate 
subsequent contention that,  
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“The failure to consider the human elements in war adequately 
and an overemphasis on weapon capabilities, number of troops, 
and other concrete factors are caused by the difficulty in 
quantifying the human element, whereas the more tangible factors 
are easily counted, totalled, and compared.” 28   
 
It may thus be that further detailed examination of the human factors in the Falklands 
war is inhibited by a lack of any detailed work on the organisational culture by either 
side.  This would clearly impact the potential to study the issue of any culture gap 
between the military and the society from which they were drawn.   
 
However, Rose goes further than addressing the general need to look at the cultural 
gap by suggesting that within the armed forces the rights of the individual must be 
subordinated to the organisation’s needs. 29  Henderson, drawing on the work of 
Moskos, describes how the American military have made service life “just another 
job”, and consequently people are not prepared to risk their lives for their job. 30  This 
is an example of an organisation attempting to close the gap with society to its own 
detriment.  This is supported by Hillen who states,  
 
“The real danger is that the gulf between civilian and military 
society has narrowed …The real danger is not that America and 
its military will grow too far apart – it is that they will grow too 
close together.” 31   
 
Coker also highlights:  
 
• There has been a decline in the perception of the armed forces as a vocation, 
particularly through the adoption of commercial ethos and practices.  
Consequently there is less acceptance of the heroism and sacrifice required 
and an expectation of immediate reward. 
• There is a loss of perception of war as a moral activity, consequently troops 
fail to deal with ethically with indigenous populations in combat areas. 
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• “Civilianising the armed forces destroys its allure”.  He highlights the way 
that African-Americans exceed their national proportion in the US Army, and 
are also disproportionately represented in the non-combat specialisms. 32   
 
It is therefore important to look at the relationship between the individual and the 
organisation.  The reason for this is that the culture and ethos of the armed forces is 
peculiar and yet vital to organisational success.  Whilst the armed forces of a country 
may represent an extreme example, the same is probably true to a more limited extent 
for any organisation and its relationship with the social culture, or cultures, in which it 
operates, ie the culture of the organisation needs to be different from that of society.  
This difference will create the organisational loyalty that will enable it to succeed in a 
competitive environment.  Henderson goes on to suggest that to build cohesive units, 
the individual soldier must rely on the unit to satisfy physical, security and social 
needs.  This is a clear example of where the military may come into conflict with 
normal social trends, since these basic needs are usually supplied through the family.  
Although Henderson suggests that the bond to the unit is recognised by individuals as 
not being permanent, it is suggested that there are aspects to the relationship and 
experience that ensure that this is a permanent bond that transcends other 
relationships. 33  
 
Interestingly, however, Byron 34 takes an opposite position to Tangredi by arguing 
that the American military have become so divorced from its parent society that it is 
in danger of becoming completely self-serving, to the detriment of itself and America.  
Consequently he argues that the American military needs to break down the cultural 
barriers and re-connect with American society.  An example of this problem is 
highlighted by Cartwright who sees “Equality” and “Equity” as being key drivers in 
organisational success.  He argues that employees will wish to see that differences in 
status and reward for different groups of employees are justified.  Whilst there may be 
no direct, overt challenge on these issues, in a more open society that is able to openly 
deliver greater equality and equity, the continuation of the “Officer” and “Other 
Rank” division may seem to be arcane. 35  Thus Cartwright comments, “Personal 
contacts and relationships that differentiate between social groups serve to perpetuate 
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stereotypes and prejudice.” 36  He goes on to refer to organisations as being akin to an 
extended family where everyone feels they belong.  These sentiments are reflected 
elsewhere, for example Henderson. 37  But it may seem to many that “families” where 
the managers live and eat separately from the rest represent the socially elite of a 
bygone age.  Strachan points to the rise of the middle class, with its natural aspiration 
to officer leadership status, and the shrinking working class from which the rank and 
file are traditionally drawn. 38  This social shift means that aspirations are not matched 
to organisational requirements and results in recruitment difficulties. 
 
Another view of the changes taking place is provided by Moskos, Williams and Segal, 
who refer to the emergence of the “Postmodern Military”.  They identify five key 
changes: 
 
• Increased structural and cultural interpenetration of the civil and military 
spheres. 
• Reduced distinctions between military ranks, services and the fighting and 
support arms. 
• Increased use of the military in non-warfighting roles. 
• Increased use of the military in international missions; often authorised from 
beyond the parent state. 
• Increasingly international nature of force structures. 
 
Essentially, this view is just an alternative view of many of the problems being 
experienced by the military community and its host culture.  It results from moving 
from the “modern military organisation” which was typified by the professional 
officer class, supported by conscripted masses, pursuing war-orientated missions on 
behalf of the nation-state.  These modern military structures differed substantially 
from the culture and structure of their parent society. 39 
 
One of the most significant examples of cultural tensions arising from social 
developments in the British Army is that of the Gurkha Regiments.  Whilst their 
integration has in many respects been successful, with the regiments being highly 
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respected and effective units, the cultural differences represented in different pay and 
social arrangements embodied in the Tripartite Agreement have increasingly caused 
tensions, even resulting in legal action. 40  However, in this context the cultural 
divides may be within a single society or national culture.  Henderson quotes 
examples from the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) of strong social bonds between 
troops sharing personal resources across rank boundaries. 41  He even quotes an NVA 
soldier who describes the way that troops regarded their political officer as a mother 
figure. 42  In the Soviet army small unit cohesion is achieved through imposed 
isolation from other influences. 43  He contrasts this with the US Army, which he sees 
as having failed to build cohesive small units that compete successfully with the wider 
circles of friends and family. 44  Similarly, Cartwright’s suggestion that the 
organisation’s social activities provide an opportunity for developing relationships has 
to been seen in a very different context in the Services. 45  Often segregation is 
according to rank, and, even where the different ranks do meet, events are informally 
or formally regulated according to strict service protocols.  Consequently the 
relationships established may provide a degree of “family bonding”, but only in a 
particular “Service” form.  This is not to say that there are not good, sound reasons for 
separation and maintaining a distance between the various ranks, although that too 
might be challenged.  The question is whether, and how, the services openly justify 
such behaviour so that it is accepted by all, rather than being an unspoken issue that 
creates division.  And whether, in modern society it is appropriate or helpful in 
developing the bonds between comrades that are so essential to the ethos of the armed 
forces.  
 
The issue of family bonding is enormously important.  Not only are the internal 
bonding processes important, such as of resocialisation, discussed below, but the entry 
and exit barriers are also important.  Henderson again contrasts the strong exit barriers 
of the NVA, Soviet and Israeli Armies, albeit they take different forms, with the ease 
of exit from the US Army. 46  However, in order to bring the services closer to society 
and thus bring down the entry barriers, it is arguable that the US Army has not only 
lowered the entry barriers but the exit barriers also.   Henderson highlights the limited 
amount of enforced contact time with the unit and its leaders, and the reduced 
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financial dependence on military service resulting from “moon-lighting”. 47  Other 
factors that might be considered here are the financial independence of wives, brought 
about by increased employment opportunities, and/or, in the UK social security 
payments for less well off troops. 
 
Similar sentiments to those of Byron are expressed by “WMD”,  
 
“Furthermore, the prominence of service, nationhood, selflessness 
and faith and respect in nationals institutions is being rapidly 
replaced by individual rights, scepticism of public services and the 
acceptance of ever[more]-liberal attitudes; “me” rather than 
“we” predominates.  These trends are in many ways in conflict 
with what can be regarded as traditional military ethos and 
culture.” 48   
 
Yet WMD goes on to assert that the members of the armed forces are part of society 
and are affected by these trends.  It is therefore unclear as to what WMD sees as the 
relationship between the military “society” and society in general, although (s)he does 
go on to talk about the “…fallacy…” that the armed forces should reflect modern 
society.  Giles puts it somewhat more crudely, but perhaps slightly amusingly,  
 
“It is a constant of civilised society that it requires an uncivilised 
armed force to protect it.  It is the old adage that good men sleep 
whilst rough men stand and guard the door.” 49   
 
Thus this would seem not to be purely a US problem, although WMD actually 
perceives the US to be better off in this context. 50  Interestingly, in the same way that 
Byron and Tangredi disagreed over whether the gap was important, Le Pecheur in 
responding to WMD disagrees by suggesting that the Royal Navy should sort itself 
out without worrying about any gap between society and the Navy.  Where he does 
concur is that there are too many “me” orientated officers who take a wider view of 
morale than that focussed on “…the selection and maintenance of the aim…” in the 
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principles of war. 51  Beaumont recognises the increased emphasis of the personal 
agenda, but believes that the Services should reflect its society, but believes that an 
“…ethos of community and service…” is just as essential for the community as a 
whole. 52  This highlights potential tensions in society, and thus also in the Services. 
 
Chapter 3, Section 3 highlights the difference between the organisation as it exists and 
the way that the organisation is perceived internally and externally.  Conceivably this 
may be part of the explanation for the “gap” perceived to exist between society and 
the military, particularly when the general reference to military culture is to that 
which existed in a previous age.  There may be a degree to which such views may 
have been, for many years, the dominant view in society of the military, based on 
their first and second hand experiences during the years of conscription and National 
Service.  These tend to be reflected, or parodied in historical films, drama and 
comedies in books, films and TV.  Coker also highlights that the Thatcher government 
was the last one to include cabinet members “…who had actually heard a gunshot in 
anger …”. 53 
 
Byron also challenges the perceived wisdom of the Military in continually proposing 
solutions that persistently build on the past.  “What we call naval strategy reflects the 
entrenched power of the Navy's three dominant communities.” 54  This leads to a 
failure to invest in new types of equipment that might better meet the changing needs 
of military scenarios and the external environment.  However, there is a degree to 
which these equipments are important symbols of the military culture and the success 
they have delivered in the past.  Organisational conservatism, coupled with an 
inability to challenge the paradigm that utilises these assets, will thus tend to reinforce 
continued reliance on such equipments.  Only explicit failure will thus lead to a 
rejection of such cultural symbols in favour of new symbols, and thus a new culture.  
Consider for example: the “wooden walls” of the 19th Century Navy; the “damned 
Un-English” submarine that was so successful in World War I; the demise of the 
battleship in favour of the aircraft carrier.  Thus the culture is embedded not only in 
the assets of the organisation but also in the associated intangible asset of knowledge 
of how to operate and use the assets.  Consequently, if, as promoted by Balanced 
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Scorecard concepts, the organisational knowledge is to be given greater prominence, 
it is questioned whether this reinforces corporate culture and thus resistance to 
change.  There is also a relationship between the paradigm and the power base in the 
organisation.  Since power will derive to some extent from the ownership of the key 
cultural assets and process they will tend to be reinforcing of the culture. 55  
Henderson also argues that the design and construction key facilities will have an 
impact on culture.  He counterbalances the “…cost-effectiveness…” culture with need 
to reinforce socialisation processes through the design of barrack facilities that 
improve unit cohesion. 56  In the UK the SLAM project has similarly given emphasis 
to the “single” in Single Living Accommodation Modernisation, rather than cohesion. 
57  The fact that the cost-effectiveness culture wins says something about the 
organisation, ie perhaps it has failed to understand the cost and the benefits of 
cohesion in its investment appraisal of new facilities. The Soviet Army facilities are 
assessed as supporting cohesion. 58  
 
A Brown highlights the problem that national cultures that emphasise individualism as 
opposed to collectivism will tend to result in the creation of multiple organisational 
subcultures. 59  The earlier notes on Hofstede’s work highlight that Great Britain’s 
national culture would tend to promote organisational subcultures.  This raises the 
issue of whether subcultures are detrimental or supportive to the overall organisational 
culture, and whether attempting to promote a single culture is therefore beneficial or 
detrimental to the achievement of overall organisational goals.  The British Army’s 
regimental system might be seen as organisationally promoted subcultures, but since 
they are officially sponsored and therefore structurally orientated to overall 
organisational aims this may be less of a problem.  However, the relationship between 
the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, whilst falling into the same category, may present 
significantly different issues and thus cause greater problems in terms of trying to 
promote organisational cohesion and corporate culture.  Interestingly, Cartwright 
implies that if the organisational culture is too powerful then it will mask the 
individual subcultures making it difficult to identify and manage issues at the lower 
level.  However, this seems to deny the way he advocates that his Nine Factors 
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measurement instrument should be used.  Nevertheless, he does go on to make the 
point that,  
 
“ … by the identification and measurement of individual sectors or 
departmental cultures, it will be possible to link business 
performance indicators directly to the motivating factors in each 
individual culture.” 60   
 
This tends to suggest that whilst it is important to consider and manage culture, the 
impact and relationship with subcultures could be extremely important.  Thus 
Cartwright goes on to emphasise the need to measure cultural issues at a sub-
organisational level in order to distinguish the different issues in different parts of the 
organisation. 
 
One of the key issues is the degree to which organisations can or should teach the 
organisational culture rather than allow it to be absorbed.  Ainslie’s work was directed 
at measuring the moral component in the Field Army, based on earlier work directed 
at ensuring sufficient aspects of the military culture were absorbed during training 
following extensive civilianisation/contractorisation of the Royal Engineers Training 
School.  Failure to teach the culture will mean that people absorb the culture.  Since 
part of the culture is based on “myths and legends”, 61 which may not be reality, there 
must be some concern as to whether people are absorbing the right beliefs.  This may 
affect their behaviour; consider the practice of bullying recruits that appears to have 
been rife in the past.  Ainslie would clearly therefore support a proactive approach.  
This line is supported by Cartwright, who states,  
 
“Whereas behaviour can be externally controlled, cultural beliefs 
and values need to be taught and then internalised before they 
become effective motivators.”  62   
 
Indeed Cartwright goes on to suggest that management control the culture and thus 
determine the behaviour of employees. 63  This contention is not fully accepted.  
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Individuals will respond to management’s attempts to impact culture in either a 
positive of negative manner.  If management action is to be positive then changes 
must be accepted and internalised by employees, otherwise the espoused culture and 
the perceived culture will be different.  Bowen, et al, argue that part of the 
enculturation process is the selection procedure.  An extended and rigorous process 
becomes part of the “rites of passage” that help the prospective employee understand 
the organisation as well as showing the potential employer whether the individual is 
suitable. 64  Indeed their model for recruitment recommends that not only should the 
prospective employee be required to they demonstrate that they have the required 
“Knowledge, Skill and Ability” (KSA), but also to show that they have a personality 
that will fit with the organisational climate or culture. 65  They add,  
 
“Researchers have long proposed that a fit between individual 
needs and organisational climates and cultures would result in 
greater job satisfaction and organisational commitment.” 66   
 
This of course demands that the organisation understand its own culture first.  For the 
Services, recruitment processes can be extensive, eg Officer Selection procedures are 
rigorous and demanding, and take place over a couple of days in special facilities.  
The danger here, and in the subsequent training processes, is that the organisation 
ends up “cloning” employees leading to a less than effective culture. 67  Thus for 
example Magerison and McCann’s Team Management System work and research 
reveal that 56% of respondents to their questionnaire, from the “Military/Defence” 
category, fall into just two of their eight major job role preference types. 68  A similar 
analysis of students at the RMCS, using the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), 
suggests that the military do not reflect the make-up of wider society, and may not 
have the most appropriate personality types for senior management roles.  Indeed, 
there is a suggestion that the training and promotion system at the lower levels may be 
counter productive in developing senior officers. 69  This leaves a substantial debate 
about the benefits of recruiting suitable employees who are predisposed towards the 
organisational culture, or training those who might fit and have the necessary “KSA”. 
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However, teaching the organisational culture will make it much more overt, and could 
thereby even change its nature.  But in making these aspects of culture more overt 
there may be a better chance that they will be internalised and thus affect the 
behaviour of the individual.  In a similar context, Henderson argues that small group 
cohesion is best created by,  
 
“…an intensive resocialisation process.  The determinants of the 
new recruit's day-to-day behaviour must be replaced by a new set 
of rules based on his perceptions of what his new fellow soldiers 
and his leaders expect.  This type of resocialisation is best created 
through a rites-of-passage process that totally consumes the 
soldier's attention and efforts for an extended period and from 
which he emerges with a new or adapted set of operating rule for 
his daily life.” 70   
 
He goes on to argue that this resocialisation is as important as teaching a soldier new 
skills, but tends to be at the mercy of “cost effectiveness managers” who fail to 
appreciate its importance.  Henderson further comments,  
 
“…unit history, ceremonies, distinctive insignia, and other items 
representative of unit and national history should be taught to 
members and should be periodically reinforced for older 
members.” 71  
 
This highlights the value of such ceremonies as Trooping the Colour, and of 
Remembrance Parades with the potential for contact with past organisational 
members.  These are not peculiar to the British Army.  Henderson describes the 
Soviet Army practice whereby recruits “attested” before their units, where possible at 
a “historical site of combat glory”, 72 and Shaw highlights the significance of the US 
flag to their military, although many of his comments would equally apply to other 
nations and their flag. 73  Henderson argues that basic training in the US Army 
achieves the required resocialisation, but its effects are overturned by the rapid break-
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up of small units due to personnel reassignment. 74  Arguably putting the cultural 
issues in the Balanced Scorecard will result in positive action planning, eg training, as 
advocated by Ainslie.  And WMD support this approach too,  
 
“As a minimum, this subject should become part of our training 
and education at all levels; it is an area that few in the service ever 
consider, let alone discuss”. 75   
 
In contrast A Brown highlights that some see culture as perhaps having a rather 
insidious “third order” control over individuals, 76 and elsewhere he also refers to 
perception that such teaching might be seen as indoctrination. 77  Teaching the culture 
may counter such objections by making the culture more overt.  
 
Chapter 3 referred to Cartwright’s model of “enculturation”. 
 
• Identification – with the cultural influences. 
• Motivation – resulting from expected outcomes arising from adherence to the 
culture. 
• Internalisation – the individual adopts the values and beliefs for himself. 78  
 
Henderson uses the same term, internalisation of norms and values, to describe the 
way NVA soldiers were bound to the organisation and its objectives.  He contrasts 
these with “tangible rewards and ‘economic man’ assumptions” that are typically 
thought of as motivators producing organisational commitment.  Henderson goes on 
to point out that this internalisation bound soldiers to their objectives despite severe 
hardships, 79 and to emphasise the necessity for internalisation brought by the style of 
modern warfare. 80  Tweedie reports on the changing culture in the services that leads 
to a requirement for internalisation of values rather than having them imposed,  
 
‘Air Chief Marshal Sir Anthony Bagnall, Vice-Chief of the Defence 
Staff, said he and his colleagues had no intention of presiding over 
deterioration in military discipline and operational effectiveness, 
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but times had moved on. … Sir Anthony acknowledged discipline 
was essential in military life, but added: “In my view ‘punishment’ 
is not a word that is appropriate in today's Armed Forces.” ’ 81   
 
The production of the report, examining the issue of a “contract” between the Services 
and recruits, which resulted in Sir Anthony’s statement, prompted a number of letters 
to The Times.  Inevitably a balanced selection of letters was presented including some 
that recognise the need and benefits of a form of rigorous discipline. 82  
 
The internalisation of beliefs comes not purely from a social culture but from religious 
ethics too.  Thus Henderson writes, “The population that supplies soldiers to an army 
also provides at the same time their beliefs and values.” 83  And he highlights this as 
one of the characteristics of nationalism. 84  As an example he quotes the Israeli army, 
which is strongly nationalistic, but where tensions are more related to difference 
between Jewish sects than they are between different religions. 85  However, for some 
their particular religious beliefs would tend to dominate and seemingly transcend 
national allegiances,  
 
“For many Muslims, it seems there is an obligation to try to 
change Dar ul-Harb [the House of War] into Dar ul-Islam [the 
House of Islam], and they may use many methods to achieve this.  
Mohammed’s way appears to have been by military conquest, 
Jihad, hence there is theological justification for the use of 
violence against the non-Muslim world.” 86   
 
It is thus easy to see why some argue that an attack on one Muslim country is an 
attack on all Muslims, whilst others, highlighted in this same article, seek to distance 
themselves from terrorist activities.  However, the following article, “Thou shall not 
kill?” 87 seeks to establish the Christian basis for the use of lethal force.  This article 
was written by Major General (Retired) The Reverend Ian Durie, a British military 
commander during the 1991 Gulf War who subsequently became a Church of 
England minister.  Even though many see the influence of religion as waning in 
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western society, the symbols and influences remain, eg White Ensign, built from a 
series of “religious” emblems, and the services of thanksgiving, involving military 
personnel, to commemorate major national events. 88  Thus the influence of religion 
can be unifying or sectionalising, particularly in the increasingly multi-ethnic western 
societies.  For an organisation that is specifically trying to diversify its ethnic mix, 
there may be deep-seated religious differences that need to be addressed.  For 
example, the MOD has now appointed Khushid Drabu, a barrister and founding 
member of the Muslim Council of Great Britain as a Muslim spiritual adviser to the 
Armed Forces.  In an interview with the MOD’s in-house magazine “Focus” he 
highlights some of the religious cultural issues that affect recruitment to the services.  
One of the issues highlighted is the perception that future operational activity will be 
against Muslims, thus pitting religious brothers against each other. 89  In a following 
article Khushid Drabu suggests that the British are ignorant of Islam and that it is 
misrepresented by the press. 90  Strachan highlights MOD’s tensions in its “ethnic 
minority” recruitment, on the one hand reducing the number of Gurkha regiments 
whilst on the other hand filling up the ranks with Fijians and Irish. 91 
 
In Appendix B reference is made to the increasing use of “business” methods to 
manage within Government.  When applied to the military, this closing of the gap is 
not seen with universal favour.  Strachan highlights Admiral Essenhigh’s defence of 
his budgetary management tactics as being part of a “politicisation” of the military 
hierarchy and its necessity to operate alongside the “Whitehall Warriors”.  Strachan 
states that Admiral Essenhigh, in writing a letter to The Times,  
 
“… was evidence of a determination by senior officers to close the 
civil-military gap both by saying for ministers what they might 
have been expected to say for themselves and by directly 
‘informing’ the greater public.” 92 
 
Strachan suggests that this is not in the best interests of the military because: 
 
• It will alienate senior officers from middle-ranking officers, and 
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• It will be seen as definitive and will thus stifle public debate.  
 
His argument is that in implying he was running a “big business”, 
 
“… Essenhigh’s analogy was wrong: he is not a businessman and 
his fleet was not a corporation.  The fact that he could claim he 
was and that it was suggested a profound cultural shift within the 
higher command of the British armed forces.” 93 
 
This same debate is covered by Beaumont who reports some as seeing the business 
culture as undermining traditional values.  He goes on,  
 
“The conclusions of some of those who take this line is that the 
Army needs to be different from society at large and should not be 
afraid to say so.”  94 
 
Thus not all in MOD agree with Essenhigh anyway.  Specifically, in the MOD, the 
“We are not running a business” syndrome is highlighted as a reason for changing the 
content, focus and titles of the scorecard dimensions;  
 
“In developing the defence balanced scorecard, we faced some 
interesting issues.  Defence is not a business, and we do not have 
customers or shareholders in the traditional sense.  Making a 
profit is not our reason for existing.  As a result, the traditional 
reasons for introducing a balanced scorecard do not apply to 
defence.” 95 
 
But this “paranoia” against “business” management philosophy and tools is also often 
backed by a lack of understanding, which also seems to be illustrated here: although 
elsewhere the article does seem to articulate the more widely recognised origins and 
purposes of the Balanced Scorecard.  The dislike of business management is echoed 
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by Boyes in his paper on the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard into 
Commandant General Royal Marines (CGRM),  
 
“The scale, rapidity and complexity of change initiatives has been 
met with a range of reactions.  The lexicon of the changes is 
couched in "business speak" not "military speak" and the drive to 
introduce practices that make the MOD more "business like" are 
interpreted by some as making the MOD more "like a business" - 
which is a clash of ethos and has creased some hostility and 
scepticism.” 96 
 
Kaplan and Norton do themselves no favours with the public sector community with 
such statements as, “Creating shareholder value is the outcome that every strategy 
seeks to accomplish.” 97  Clearly, MOD does not have “shareholders” in the generally 
accepted sense, and the substitution of “stakeholder” would go a long way to rectify 
the position for the public sector but undermine the issue in terms of the private 
sector.  The clear distinctions between public and private sectors therefore need to be 
recognised, particularly in terms of the way that balanced scorecards are ultimately 
shaped.  Nevertheless, MOD was inducted into the Balanced Scorecard 
Collaborative’s “Hall of Fame” in 2002,  
 
"As an exemplar of making strategy a continual process, the 
Ministry has used the scorecard to help make transparent the 
internal linkages that drive performance, giving increased 
confidence to the Defence Management Board that its decisions 
are based on a truly comprehensive view of performance.  The 
results have been clear and visible: simplified strategic objectives, 
better communication of strategic intent, improved resource 
allocation, greater accountability, better decision making and 
improved overall results." 98   
 
And this despite the relative immaturity of the process. 
5 - 26 
 
Thus there is tension between the civil and military communities, and attempts to 
bridge the gap are not always appreciated.  Nevertheless, Strachan does not seem to 
see the British civil-military gap as a problem, suggesting that it is historic, and 
Kummel 99 and Vennesson 100, respectively looking at the situations in Germany and 
France, see the gap between civil and military communities as currently being smaller 
than for many years.  The suggestion is that it is in the USA that the problem is 
greatest.  Even if recruitment to the British Armed Forces has been traditionally 
difficult, and the gap between civil and military communities is no greater than has 
historically been so, this still highlights an issue that requires effective management 
for those crossing the boundary in either direction. 
 
5. The study of Service culture. 
 
“It is only comparatively recently that the RAF has begun to seriously examine and 
seek a better understanding of its own particular ethos and culture.” 101  So states 
Seabright in the opening paragraph of an article examining the future issues for the 
RAF culture.  This suggests that consideration of cultural issues is only just beginning 
to be seen as relevant for senior management, it previously having being regarded as, 
“… an area of academic study, particularly for historians and sociologists.” 102  
Similarly, in relation to the US military, Hillen states, “…there are precious few 
tasked to care for the institutional soul – the culture, the values, the ethos.  In times 
past this was the task of the military academics.” 103  Seabright’s article might thus be 
seen as an important “think piece” from someone in the Joint Services Command and 
Staff College, particularly when published in Air Power Review (a more learned 
journal than The Naval Review and The British Army Review, which are more 
informal publications with a mix of articles including informal anecdotes or 
unattributable challenges to official policy).  Seabright goes on to explore some 
important issues for the development of the RAF culture, but also recognises the 
separate history and traditions of each of the Service, and thus presents a useful article 
to prompt further consideration of some of the current cultural issues for MOD. 
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Whilst Seabright highlights that, 
 
“The RAF, like its sister Services, has always accepted that its 
ethos and culture needs to be different from the society its 
personnel are drawn from if it is to sustain the moral component of 
air power, because of the “unlimited liability” that its personnel 
accept.” 104 
 
he goes on to highlight, 
 
“… the RAF has long recognised that its ethos and culture is 
different in many respects from those of its sister Services.” 105 
 
The key issues he highlights in this context are: 
 
• It is only a small proportion of the Service, and that now mainly taken from 
the officer corps, that engages in combat. 
• The RAF is dominated by well educated technical specialists. 
• It is the Officer Aircrew ethos and culture that dominates the Service because 
this is where the Senior Management is drawn from. 
• Continuing profound technological change throughout the history of the 
Service. 106 
 
The tension between society and the Services is well covered, 
 
“Military ethos and culture is based, in part, on the wider social 
ethos and culture of the society from which soldiers are drawn.  
However, this is then developed by military organisations through 
the process of both formal and informal socialisation in which 
recruits are dispossessed of large parts of their previous civilian, 
(sic) ethos and culture and assimilate a distinctive military ethos 
and culture. … Physically separated from the rest of society the 
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distinctive ethos and culture of this profession flourished, as 
Howard states: “They were a self contained universe, with their 
own routine, their own ceremonies, their own music and dress and 
habits; that whole tedious but obsessive way of life known as 
‘soldiering” (sic)  The armed forces have thus evolved into 
separate and distinctive institutions within British society.  [They 
have created structures that support both their function and their 
ethos and culture.]  These structures reinforce the subjective 
‘psychological contract’ that is often said to exist between the 
Services and each individual Serviceman and which commits the 
individual to risk his life in return for suitable rewards and 
support. 107 
 
Drawing on a warning from CDS (Chief of Defence Staff) in 2000, Seabright 
highlights three issues that could potentially undermine this traditional service ethos 
and culture: 108 
 
• Significant changes in the underlying social culture that are affecting the 
composition of the Armed Forces, particularly the roles females, acceptance of 
homosexuals 109 and impact of human rights legislation. 
• Civilianisation, privatisation and contractorisation of functions previously 
undertaken by service personnel, primarily because of economic pressures. 110 
• Changes in the nature of the tasks being undertaken, particularly the non-war 
fighting roles.  
 
Seabright highlights that changes, such as accepting homosexuals, have been 
“…forced onto a reluctant military…”. 111  Frost also highlights these issues, 
 
“ …with a few notable exceptions senior officers have effectively 
exchanged the identity of their service in return for short-term 
accommodation with anti-military elites.  Having ceded the terms 
of the debate to their enemies they are now prepared to sacrifice 
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its ethics and culture, and if necessary to conceal the 
consequences.  In short, they have failed to resist the imposition of 
a modern liberal vision upon a culture which is necessarily 
illiberal, and which is now disintegrating under the impact.” 112 
 
Although these comments were made partly in the context of the US, Frost goes on to 
suggest that there is resentment against the senior British military staff for their failure 
to oppose such issues.  He also suggests that Adm Jock Slater probably disqualified 
himself from appointment to CDS by publicly opposing government policy in such 
areas, 113 and in so doing isolated himself from others who may be seen as having 
profited by their silence.  
 
Whatever ones’ view of these changes, the issue is that they are “changes”, and as 
such will have consequences.  Complin, in his article on the career management of 
Royal Signals Young Officers, drawing on the work of Senge and Bell, argues that 
change of policy will have second and third order changes that: 
 
• Are difficult to predict. 
• Can interact in unforeseen ways. 
• May have a slowly accumulating affect. 
• Are in danger, when detected, of misinterpretation or dismissal. 114 
 
Nevertheless, almost in contrast, Seabright highlights the work of Dandeker and 
Massey and says both argue, “… the Services have often resisted change in the past, 
but once forced to accept it have found that their operational effectiveness has not yet 
been compromised.” 115  However, it could equally be argued that this merely proves 
Bell was right and the impact has not been recognised. 
 
Another issue highlighted by Seabright is the sectional sub-cultures.  This is a broader 
issue than simply that related to the dominant officer aircrew culture.  It is also 
suggested that whilst occupational sub-cultures exist in the other services the divisions 
are sharper in air forces.  Consequently air forces are less cohesive.  However, during 
5 - 30 
the Cold War era a culture based on Main Operating Bases developed, but this has 
been broken somewhat by the style of operations in recent years.  Instead the RAF has 
had to operate from Deployed Operating Bases with an ad hoc mixture of air and 
ground crews, including reservists.  Changes in management structure, particularly the 
creation of “purple organisations” may also have started to weaken individual service 
cultures.  This is particularly important in relation to the training process. 
 
A major thrust of the article is the impact of the UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles).  
These are already having a significant impact on operations: in the British Armed 
Forces UAVs are only operated by the Army.  Erosion of the use of manned combat 
aircraft, and erosion of the RAF’s predominance in piloting (even remotely) would 
have a significant impact on the culture of the Service.  Remote operation could also 
lead to a change in the nature of warfare and it is not too far a conceptual move to see 
tasks being contractorised.  Consider for example the provision of Army heavy 
transport provided by contractors whose personnel are Reservists who would continue 
to operate the equipment in operational areas, albeit under different management. 116, 
117  Seabright also says, 
 
“… the precedent has already been set, as the CIA has already 
used air power, in the guise of a Predator UAV, armed with 
Hellfire missiles to kill terrorists in Yemen during November, 
2002.” 118 
 
Similarly, whilst the Royal Navy regularly operates ROVs (Remotely Operated 
Vehicles) for underwater mine disposal, 119 there are also many commercial firms 
with considerable expertise in using underwater ROVs, eg for exploration and 
archaeology recovery work.  Indeed, other navies use remotely piloted boats for 
minesweeping tasks, and consideration is being given to using similar vessels to 
provide close escort for larger vessels against terrorist attacks. 120  There are also 
commercial and charity organisations operating in land-mine clearance in various 
parts of the world. 121  Thus there is good reason to treat Seabright’s concerns 
seriously. 
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Thus Seabright’s work is timely, not only in highlighting the increasing interest in the 
cultural dimensions of the Armed Forces, but in highlighting some of the emerging 
trends that will seriously impact the Services, that is: 
 
• Service culture is under considerable pressure for change from external 
factors. 
• Senior management in the Services are becoming increasingly aware of the 
cultural issues and of the need for them to manage these issues. 
 
In February, 2004 a conference was held at the QEII Conference Centre in London to 
look at the moral component of military capability.  Cdre Mike Potter, formerly of 
DP&A, and a highly respected advocate of MOD’s Balanced Scorecard having been 
involved with it during its substantive development, spoke at the Conference where it 
was argued that, 
 
“Understanding what constitutes the moral component and how it 
applies to modern military doctrine is of major importance.  
However, it is an issue that has been under-represented in much of 
the discussion of reshaping the armed forces.  Emphasis has been 
placed on the technological development of the armed forces and 
on physical reorganisation of the armed forces to produce the 
desired military effect.  However, this is having a huge impact on 
the moral component of the equation and only recently has this 
issue begun to be addressed in a consistent form.  This was 
highlighted by Commodore M Potter who pointed out that 
understanding of what made-up the moral component and how it 
can be measured was limited, and that only now were the three 
services coming to grips with developing the right kind of metrics 
to understand the issue.” 122 
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The concept of “measure what matters” underpins the scorecard. Adm Sir Jonathon 
Band, now CINCFLEET, but who as ACNS was so instrumental in introducing the 
Balanced Scorecard into MOD, addressed a Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) 
conference in October, 2003.  He continues to be a strong advocate of the Balanced 
Scorecard, which supplemented by Customer Supplier Agreements, Cascaded 
Objectives and Risk Management, is known in CINCFLEET as the “Performance 
Management” system. 
 
“Although I have set out a positive story about how my command 
measures and forecasts performance, one should not be under any 
illusion that the process is young, but maturing.  The key 
ingredients in making this work are acceptance of the culture and 
senior management engagement and leadership. … I have good 
reason to be confident about my Performance Management 
System.  It has helped me when my command was tested in anger 
during Operation Telic, which involved warfighting in Iraq and in 
Operation Fresco, which related to provision of firefighters.  Both 
operations were conducted successfully and recuperation is now 
underway.  In summary, effective and modern planning, 
performance management and financial management tools are 
fundamental to me as the Commander-in-Chief.” 123 
 
Thus there is continued support for both the development of metrics related to cultural 
issues and the development and use of Balanced Scorecard.  Therefore the aims of this 
research continue to be valid for the foreseeable future. 
 
Another important issue is whether individuals can be expected to absorb the culture 
or whether they need to be taught the culture, in order for it to be maintained.  Clearly 
the Services are very traditional.  Daily routines acknowledge this, eg through 
morning and evening “Colours” ceremony, albeit that these are often much more 
muted than in the past.  Some aspects of tradition are thus maintained and indeed are 
taught.  However, there are some aspects that are merely absorbed, eg the traditions of 
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individual messes in the Army.  Similarly, a core part of culture is the process of 
passing on myths and legends.  By definition, almost, this implies some informality 
rather than documented evidence.  Whilst, there may be no great harm in some of 
these myths and stories there is always the potential that they may be misused or that, 
because they are part of the informal process of socialisation, that they can be or are 
used to embed the wrong attitudes or actions.  Consequently, mess traditions, aimed at 
“bonding”, or establishing status, may, in a more culturally diverse society, and in an 
organisation where women have a more equal status, be seen as offensive or 
demeaning.  Some initiation ceremonies, or more informal “rites of passage”, might 
thus be considered to be “bullying”, although less so by those imposing the process 
who would probably consider it “character building”.   
 
If culture is to be managed effectively, in order to create change, greater efforts are 
probably needed to ensure that what is taught is soundly based and supports the 
organisational need.  For example, it is often said that, “…who controls the past 
controls the future, [and] who controls the present controls the past…”. 124  Control of 
the past enables the motivational and inspirational stories of the past to be used to 
engender appropriate future activity.  However, unless the stories used are soundly 
based there is always the potential that they might subsequently be undermined, 
thereby creating organisational confusion.  The emphasis in the British Military of 
maintaining, and researching, their history is thus sound from a cultural perspective, 
but also from a learning perspective since it can lead to reappraisal and learning from 
past mistakes, or the ability to extract the positive lessons.  Thus history and traditions 
need to be researched and taught formally in order to ensure that stories appropriate to 
organisational need are soundly based and utilised effectively.  Informal use of 
cultural tools can lead to actions and events that run counter to the organisational 
needs or aims. 
 
Kaplan and Norton have argued that you only get what you measure.  But 
measurement alone will be pointless if there is no understanding of why something is 
being measured.  The basis of the Balanced Scorecard is thus to build a strategic 
model of the business that guides activity through the construction of plans that lead 
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to target setting.  This links back to the basic “feedback” model.  McCunn similarly 
argued that, when developing and implementing the Balanced Scorecard, one of the 
key criteria for success was, “knowing what you want”.  It is argued that the same is 
true of culture.  Whether one employs a generic model like Denison’s culture model 
or Ainslie’s “Military Ethos Measurement Tool”, both are based on an articulation of 
clear goals or acceptable performance levels.  Denison does this in two ways, first by 
articulating the individual features of a high performing culture, and secondly by 
measuring reported performance against the standards of other organisations.  
Ainslie’s merely does the first. 
 
It is therefore argued that, if culture is to be measured, there is a need for the 
organisation to define and own the cultural model that will be used.  It is recognised 
that when organisations set out on such a path they are unlikely to have a clear view 
of their culture, let alone how they might want culture to develop in order to improve 
its contribution to organisational outcomes.  Existing models, such as those offered by 
Cartwright or Denison may thus be effective.  Without such models it will be unclear 
what the organisation hopes to achieve by setting any cultural targets and how they 
contribute towards strategic aims, or alternatively whether individual aims are 
culturally coherent.  Whilst Kotter, Senge, and many others, suggest there is a need to 
be clear about managing cultural features they are not seen as advocating 
measurement in order to determine progress.  Whilst cultural measurement is difficult, 
particularly if you cannot define precisely what it is that you want, this should not be 
an excuse for ignoring the issue.  This is similar to Kaplan and Norton’s argument that 
you should measure what is important rather than what is easily measurable. 
 
An alternative argument is that the strategic objectives in the scorecard articulate the 
required culture.  This would seem to be true to a large extent.  Consequently, 
mapping the strategic objectives against the existing culture to identify the change 
required, and use of a cultural change model, to guide management as to some of the 
issues and pressures that will be faced can only be of assistance to the process.   
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The issue here is that whilst most organisations have hard measures, eg financial 
measures that articulate current performance, cultural issues are argued to be implicit 
rather than explicit.  The inter-relationship between cultural features may therefore 
not be readily understood, and attempting to change one aspect of the organisation 
may thus result in unexpected resistance or undesirable change elsewhere. 125  Thus 
the advantage of models such as those proposed by Ainslie, Cartwright and Denison is 
that they provide an audit tool, or at least a basis for the discussion of cultural issues. 
126  Therefore in the same way that Kaplan and Norton argue for “double loop” 
learning about the strategic aims, leading to change of both the strategy and the 
methods of achieving strategic aims, the initial cultural model used might be expected 
to develop to meet the specific cultural aims and objectives of the organisation.  
Similarly, where the Balanced Scorecard is to be used to allocate resources to the 
strategic objectives, development of the culture will require funding and must be 
included in the Balanced Scorecard in order to attract funding.  The cultural model 
will therefore represent the plan for achievement, with the potential to set clear targets 
against the individual aspects, and the overall cultural measure, reported by that 
particular cultural model. 
 
6. Analysis and Summary. 
 
The Services have their own particular culture.  However, if Services are to be truly 
effective they must enjoy the support of the society from which they are drawn.  
However, not all aspects of society are appropriate for a service organisation.  The 
Services thus represent a sub-culture within society.  Trompennaars and Hampden-
Turner propose that culture can be seen as a normal distribution of values. 127  Where 
the values are present in different cultures there will be some degree of acceptance.  
Where the values of one culture are not present in the other cultures these values will 
be seen as the defining characteristics of that culture.  Adapting this concept to this 
situation could help to explain the perceived gap between the military and civilian 
population.  Also any attempt to move the core values of the military to be closer to 
norm of society could account for the resistance encountered, if one argues that 
cultures are fairly static. 
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Thus, adapting the concepts of Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, in Figure 5.2 
below, Sub-culture A, within the overall National culture, has little in common with 
either Sub-cultures Y or Z.  However, Sub-cultures Y and Z have a substantial degree 
of commonality.  Any movement of sub-culture Y would be likely to cause a reaction 
in either sub-culture A or Z. 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Cultural norms.  Distribution of cultural 
values for sub-cultures within an overall culture. 
Adapted from the concepts of Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner. 
National culture 
Norm 
Sub culture A Sub culture Y
Sub culture Z 
 
 
Rose, Henderson, Strachan, Ainslie and others identify a “gap” between the civilian 
and military cultures.  What is disputed is the degree to which this gap matters and 
whether it is truly a gap.  Yet few would disagree that training is required to turn 
individuals into a disciplined fighting force that clearly understands the bounds of its 
power and legitimacy.  Therefore they must be different from the society they 
represent.  Similarly few would argue against the concept that a nation’s military 
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forces should reflect the society they represent, otherwise they have no moral or social 
base in the community which they represent and which provides the resources needed.  
Therefore there is an issue about whether the military are merely a group of 
individuals with common beliefs drawn from the milieu of attitudes represented in the 
amorphous mass of subcultures in modern pluralistic and multicultural societies.  Or, 
do the military represent a legitimate subculture of their own.  Certainly everything 
about the military way of life tends to suggest that they have their own deeply rooted 
culture either directly or indirectly taught, even in the recruitment process.   
 
The issue might thus be the degree to which there is a real gap between the military 
and society, or whether it merely represents one extreme on a multidimensional 
matrix.  Seen in this way then the gap only exists if the balance of power and thought 
moves substantially against the military on the militaristic/pacifistic dimension, and 
similarly against the other groups that support and surround the military, eg 
government institutions that deal regularly with the military; Veterans’ groups; 
suppliers of materiel and other goods and services consumed by the military; other 
institutions that have similar value structures such as the police.  If this shift away 
from the military were to occur, to such an extent that they became isolated, then their 
position would become untenable, particularly as resources would almost certainly 
decline.  A military isolated from the wider community is difficult to envisage, unless 
one considers some form of totalitarian state where the military are deliberately 
positioned in opposition to the core of society.   
 
Developing these issues from the concepts of Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (see 
Figure 5.2), the existence of a gap would have to be based on cultural values of a 
“sub-culture” lying outside those of the core culture, as illustrated in Figure 5.3 
below.  This is the definition of a “gap” that will be considered here; otherwise the 
definition of a gap would have to be where the norm of the sub-group is different 
from the norm of the culture.  The likelihood of the norms being the same is remote, 
thus there would always be a gap. 
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Figure 5.3: Existence of a cultural gap between society 
and the military. 
Adapted from the concepts of Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner. 
National 
culture Norm 




This would have to be an extreme situation where none of the characteristics of one 
group are readily accepted in the other.  If the groups overlapped then there would just 
be perceived differences between the groups.  This is the same as the way 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner described the perceived characteristics of a nation 
as being the national characteristics that are not common characteristics of the two 
nations. 
 
Whilst Hofstede argues that national cultures are stable in the long-term, this does not 
recognise that the membership of nations is changing due to large-scale migrations, 
such as have occurred in recent decades.  The migrants bring with them characteristics 
that are not necessarily lost as the individuals become part of a new society, without 
being fully absorbed.  The addition of such foreign sub-cultures into a more 
amorphous national culture will tend to move it, perhaps away from the military if 
these new sections of society are inadequately represented in the military.  This is 
shown in Figure 5.4 below. 
 




Figure 5.4: Impact of merging cultures.















What is postulated here is that the absorption of people from cultures A, B and C into 
the national culture, will have the effect of broadening the culture, but also of moving 
it slightly away from that of the military.  In this diagram Culture B is more easily 
absorbed into the national culture, perhaps because ethnic origins are similar, there is 
a common language, common religion, close historic ties.  Also in this diagram an 
overlap with the military culture is shown to represent the fact that the military are 
drawn from the members of the national culture (ie no true “gap”).  Of the new 
national members, entry into the military, and adoption by them, is more likely from 
Culture C, than from Cultures A or B.  This could increase the tensions between A 
and B on the one hand and C on the other.  Thus the culture of the military might shift 
even further away from the national culture, because particular groups are under-
represented. 
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A significant issue here, which perhaps highlights Hofstede’s thinking, is the degree 
to which these other groups really are absorbed into the national culture, and the 
degree to which national culture changes.  Difficulties during 2004 in France, where 
religious symbols and clothing have been banned from schools in order to maintain 
the French culture, are an example of issues and pressures of this nature.  This 
contrasts strongly with the example in the United Kingdom where great efforts are 
made to promote tolerance, which enables immigrants, and often subsequent 
generations, to maintain separate cultures within a wider society.  In these instances, 
attempts by members of these communities to change and adopt the ways and 
practices of the host nation have, in the very extreme, led to “honour killings” to 
prevent transfers into the host culture.  
 
“Police are to review more than 100 murders in an attempt to 
understand and prevent “honour killings”, it was announced 
yesterday. … Scotland Yard announced the initiative amid growing 
evidence that women in the Asian community are being subjected 
to violence and sometimes murdered for defying cultural 
traditions.  Their perceived crimes can include wanting to go to 
university, refusing an arranged marriage, having a boyfriend or 
dressing in Western-style clothing.” 128   
 
Whilst these issues may not seem to specifically affect the military, the existence of 
“cultural ghettos” will affect any state sponsored group.  This is because they are on 
the one hand trying to attract people into their membership in order to maintain 
contact with the whole cross-section of society, and on the other hand rejecting such 
people because they cannot, or will not, change their values to exclude those aspects 
that are unacceptable to the military culture, or even to the national culture. 
 
The “distance”, perhaps the “psychological distance”, between the military and the 
people it seeks to recruit can probably widen, eg consider the prevalence of the use of 
recreational drugs in modern society and their necessary rejection by the military.  
Such factors reduce the capacity of the military to attract otherwise suitable recruits.  
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The alternative is to conduct programmes to rehabilitate recruits.  In one sense this 
already happens in the context of personal fitness, but is not a legitimate role or use of 
resources by the military in the context of criminal or anti-social activities or attitudes 
that might otherwise prevent individuals from becoming suitable recruits.   
 
Nevertheless, in terms of the military being a legitimate tool and resource of 
government, the military could be, indeed are being, used in such a manner to a 
limited extent, eg consider the Skill Force Development initiative.  This organisation, 
which seeks to re-establish a learning culture among (potentially) disaffected school 
children through a programme of personal development activities led mainly by ex-
Service personnel, is sponsored and partly funded by MOD.  Although this, and other 
types of youth activity, may enhance recruitment to the military, that is not its primary 
aim.  Nor does it meet needs in terms of providing sufficient recruits of the right 
calibre for modern technologically based military forces.   
 
Thus there is a need to recognise a tension between core values that maintain and 
sustain the military capability, and the need to draw from a sufficiently large range of 
the population so as to allow sustainable recruitment to meet requirements.  If the 
military are to represent society they must be drawn from as wide a range as possible, 
bearing in mind that some sections of the society cannot or should not be represented, 
eg the handicapped or the criminal subculture.  Nevertheless even these sections of 
the community should have sufficient positive contact with the military in order gain a 
positive image. 
 
This highlights the issue of creating an image of the military that is both generally 
supportive, and sufficiently appealing, so as to attract, in adequate numbers, the right 
type of employees to meet the range of staffing needs.  Not everyone can be a fighter 
pilot; not everyone can be an infantry soldier.  However, these and many other tasks 
within the military have few or no counterparts in civilian life.  Other tasks, such as 
administration or catering, do have civilian counterparts, but may sometimes be 
conducted in such a manner or context as to reduce or eliminate comparability.  
Consequently recruits have to be trained to be able to conduct tasks in a different 
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context to that which they will normally have experienced.  Since these contexts, eg 
military operations against an enemy, are generally difficult, or unpalatable, training 
is essential to ensure success and to ensure that employees do not leave when faced 
with these difficulties.  High levels of staff turnover are likely to destroy the 
effectiveness of any organisation.  Therefore the demanding realism of some training 
can itself be expected to alienate recruits.   
 
Consequently, it is essential that the right culture is established early in training in 
order to build strong commitment through difficult training later in the acclimatisation 
process.  If it is too weak the wrong people may be retained whose mental and 
physical capabilities are not sufficiently robust to withstand later difficulties.  This 
would involve a waste of resources, and possible risk such bad publicity that other 
potentially worthwhile recruits are alienated.  It is therefore argued that the 
development of the individual’s psychological contract with the organisation needs to 
be handled carefully.  In circumstances where conscription pertained this was much 
less of an issue, and consequently the regime was less benign. 
 
The argument of this section so far has been that culture is a significant issue for the 
military.  Also, there is a perceived significant “gap”, perhaps better described as a 
“distance”, between the cultural norms of the military and the cultural norms of the 
society to which the military need to appeal for recruitment purposes.  But perhaps 
this distance affects the delivery of wider support needed by the military, particularly 
during periods when there are no tensions or military operations.  For those recruited 
the training they undertake will potentially assist in the cultural shift.  Building 
support in the general population is more difficult to achieve.  Relatively limited, but 
none the less vital, resources will need to be applied to the management of public 
perception.  Failure to do so will result in the distance between military and civilian 
culture being maintained or growing.  If resources are to be used effectively there 
needs to be a clear understanding of what the organisation is trying to achieve and 
whether the measures employed are being effective.  This goes back to one of Kaplan 
and Norton’s basic arguments that you get what you measure and thus also the 
corollary that you don’t get what you don’t measure.  Thus the proposition here is that 
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the military must set clear targets for what they wish to achieve in terms of cultural 
acceptance both externally and internally.  Without clear targets and plans, backed by 
a system of measurement and appropriate resources, it is unlikely that the desired 
results will be achieved.   
 
As alluded to earlier in this Chapter, Kaplan and Norton also argue that achievement 
of strategic aims will normally only be driven through effectively by linking reward to 
aims.  Conceptually this is difficult to argue against if one accepts a “self-satisfaction 
model”, where personal aims can be achieved through financial exchange.  However, 
many of the writers engaged in the argument both for and against acceptance of the 
cultural distance between the military and society recognise that the self-seeking 
philosophy present in society is damaging to the interests of the military.  This would 
seem to argue against the use of financial reward in the military because it is not 
linked to “team spirit”.  Kaplan and Norton would probably argue that provided the 
reward is linked to the strategic objectives of the organisation then individual reward 
should not be divisive.  Similarly, rewards might be team based.  There are some who 
would argue for an intrinsic motivational model, where organisational success and the 
construction of strong internal relationships can itself be sufficient reward to make 
explicit financial reward unnecessary.  Thus, consider McGregor’s “Theory Y”, which 
assumes amongst other things that,  
 
“The most significant reward that can be offered in order to obtain 
commitment is the satisfaction of the individual’s ‘self-actualising 
needs’ … This can be a direct product of effort directed towards 
organisational objectives.” 129 
 
This opens up a different topic, but it is the researcher’s contention that financial 
reward, even linked to the achievement of Balanced Scorecard objectives and targets, 
may not be in the interests of the military.  The aim must surely be to achieve some 
higher, inspirational form of motivation, rather than financial gain, which would 
direct interest outside of the organisation for its realisation.  Managing the differences 
between the military and civilian sectors within the defence community also needs to 
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be considered.  Efforts should be made to increase unity rather than promote 
differences. 
 
In this chapter it has been proposed that the National culture is changing, as is the 
culture of the Military.  Only if the relative movements are the same will there be no 
change in the Gap between the civilian and military culture.  Strachan argues that 
whilst the military are changing the gap is not opening within the British culture.  
Kummell and Vennesson argue that in Germany and France the gap has closed in 
recent years.  But Strachan and Beaumont, and others, highlight the reaction against 
the movement of the British military culture towards a more business management 
culture.  Rose sees the need for the British military to maintain its standing in order to 
be effective in operational situations in the future, while Wills highlights the problems 
of people moving between the civilian sub culture and the military sub culture.  Thus 
there is a clear need to help people with the transition, in either direction.   
 
This chapter has therefore looked at some of the pressures on the military to change 
and adapt to the modern world.  It has also looked at a specific, major, change in 
CINCFLEET in order to explain more of the culture of that organisation and to set the 
context for some of the work in Chapters 6 to 8.  Clearly a complete picture of the 
culture of the organisation would be impossible to paint.  One issue is the degree to 
which the culture is changing, or the change is being resisted.  It will be remembered 
from Chapter 3 that Hofstede argued that culture is fairly static.  Nevertheless, whilst 
the military, particularly in Britain, maintain strong links with the past, there have 
undoubtedly been substantial changes compared to the culture of a century or more 
ago.  These changes will be in part due to changes in national culture.  But this may 
be more evident in the more superficial and visible elements of culture than in the 
more deep-seated ideas such as “Queen and Country”. 
 













Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
This Chapter has highlighted the environmental pressures for change 
that MOD and CINCFLEET have faced.  It has also examined the 
tensions between social and the military cultural issues.  In particular the 
Chapter touches on disagreements over the adoption of “business 
management” techniques for an organisation that is not a “business” in 
the traditional sense.  The need for training to help individuals cross over 
between the two cultures has been highlighted.  A final model was 
presented for helping to understand the relationship between sub-groups 
within a culture, and the impact of movements of one sub-group relative 
to another. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard. 
Supporting case studies. 
Summary of conclusions. 
Figure 5.5 
 
To conclude this Chapter we examine high profile issues that arose in Spring 2004 
that relate to these pressures as an illustration of how this issues interact internally and 
externally to the military, and thus as to their relevance for debate.   
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During the early part of 2004, both the British and American people were disturbed by 
the allegations and revelations of brutality against Iraqi prisoners, following the 
conflict of 2003. 130  Phrases that have been used to condemn the actions include, “… 
do not reflect the true nature of the American people …” 131 and, “If proven, the 
perpetrators are not fit to wear the Queen’s uniform.  They have besmirched the good 
name of the Army and its honour.” 132  Whatever the facts of the case, there is little 
doubt that the issues have created enormous problems for the British Army and the 
Army of the United States of America.  Even though neither of these organisations 
would ever wish to condone what has happened, the incidents, which give rise to the 
allegations and revelations, result from the culture that exists in the organisation. 133  
This is an unpalatable fact, even though it may represent the culture of elements at the 
extremities of the organisations. 
 
“Frederick claims … that the chain of military command above 
was aware of what was going on.  He was, in the time-honoured 
phrase, just acting under orders.  There is evidence to support his 
claim: Major General Antonio Taguba, the American officer 
responsible for investigating the Abu Ghraib abuses, has 
recommended that more senior military figures, including a former 
director of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Centre … 
should also be held accountable. … In reality, the military 
policemen and women of the 372nd Military Police Company who 
did the torturing took their cue from the rest of the US military 
command structure.” 134 
 
This highlights the tensions between the ideas, on the one hand, that senior 
management set the culture and the strategic agenda and the mass just follow, and on 
the other hand, that individuals within the organisation at all levels will have an 
influence on the culture and activities of the organisation.  Thus whilst the official 
processes and programmes of the organisation may seek to establish the desired 
culture, unofficial subcultures will exist and promote their own agendas and values.  
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The organisation, being driven from the senior levels, must therefore redouble their 
efforts to establish the desired culture through organisational process. 
 
This means that: 
 
• Organisational culture must be clearly defined.   
• Activities must be defined that build and maintain the required culture.   
• Attempts must be made to measure this consistently to ensure that the 
activities undertaken are delivering the required culture.   
• Failure to achieve the desired results must initiate changes in the activities 
until methods are found that deliver the required results. 
• Deviant subcultures must be rooted out. 
 
These are effectively the core concepts that echo the principles of the Balanced 
Scorecard.  It is therefore argued that it is entirely valid to include culture as a topic 
within the Balanced Scorecard.  Indeed, “Reputation” is one of the issues highlighted 
in the MOD Balanced Scorecard. 135  The reputation of the British Army will 
undoubtedly be affected by the allegations of abuse of Iraqis.  Yet this damage to its 
reputation will take many years to overcome.  Thus the risks are not simply ones of 
“likelihood” but also of “impact”. 
 
Failure of the MOD to adequately communicate behaviour requirements, and to 
reinforce these so that they become part of the culture throughout the entire 
organisation, lies at the heart of the Iraqi abuse problem.  Yet this is exactly the same 
lesson that will be shown to have emerged from the implementation of the Balanced 
Scorecard.  There has been too little communication of the aims and objectives of the 
organisation, and too little reporting of achievement against objectives, because the 
Balanced Scorecard has become a tool only for senior management. 
 
Motivational issues are crucial to this debate.  What motivates an individual to behave 
in a particular way?  This is rooted deeply in the values and beliefs of the individual.  
The degree to which an individual’s values and beliefs match those espoused by the 
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organisation will show up in the degree to which there is a strong psychological 
contract between the individual and the organisation. 136  Training is an essential part 
of helping the individual to gain the right values and beliefs, particularly if the 
individual is joining the organisation from a broader culture that places a different 
emphasis on such issues.  
 
Thus one of the interesting features of the Iraqi abuse revelations is that: 
 
• America has roundly condemned the actions. 
• The media have also presented reports of the “home town” support for one of 
the individuals at the centre of the revelations. 
 
These contradictions are exactly the sort of dilemma that the armed forces face.  On 
the one hand they go to war to protect their nation against a covert terrorist threat; on 
the other hand they are expected to win hearts and minds by open friendly activity.  
These tensions that place service personnel on the frontline in imminent danger of 
death; with sometimes the necessity to kill the enemy (whoever (s)he is), which is not 
something that the general population understand since they have never shared these 
experiences.   
 
“The same qualities of aggression, submission to authority and 
group solidarity that make good military material also make 
soldiers easy to manipulate into fighting a “dirty war”.  A good 
intelligence officer and a good torturer can wear the same 
uniform.  Or, as we have just shockingly learned from Abu Ghraib, 
our governments can, in the new era of privatisation, just hire in 
the torturing talent from the vast array of private defence firms 
that offer to service every need of the Pentagon.” 137  
 
This issue highlights the need to educate the public and thus help create the right 
values there that are needed to support the military culture among the military.  This is 
particularly true at a time when the proportion of the community, and leadership of 
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the country, have any experience of serving with the military, albeit that the military 
itself has change radically over the last half-century as a result of technological 
change.  Failure to address the culture and attitudes of the host national culture could 
mean that the military find themselves fighting an uphill battle to recruit suitable 
personnel with the right attitudes.  Failure to achieve the desired recruitment levels 
could well result in yet more of the core military task being devolved into the Private 
Sector.  Thus, the MOD, and the government, must learn to address the changing 
national culture, as well as the dynamic of other environmental changes. 
 
The conviction and imprisonment of three junior NCOs in early 2005 138 has 
subsequently proved to be the tip of an unpleasant iceberg, with perhaps some 50 
British service personnel being investigated, or charged with crimes as serious as 
murder. 139  Indeed, there is also one instance of a US Marine apparently shooting a 
prisoner, whilst being filmed by a TV camera crew.  Such instances have a 
detrimental affect on everyone.  There are reports that the charging of an SAS trooper 
with the murder of a civilian in Iraq has led to a crisis in the regiment with many 
threatening to return to their parent units if the charges are not withdrawn. 140  The 
crisis caused by this situation led to a revolt by their “Nobel and Gallant Lordships” in 
July, 2005, in the House of Lords.  Lord Boyce spoke of the armed forces being, “… 
under legal siege and … being pushed in the direction in which an order could be 
seen as improper or legally unsound …”. 141  His predecessor as CDS, Lord Guthrie, 
said, 
 
“We are asking a very great deal of young soldiers who are put 
under huge pressure of a kind which very few people outside the 
services have experienced, and which has rarely been experienced 
by those who craft our laws and are responsible for our legal 
system.  Undeniable damage to the army’s trust in the chain of 
command has occurred, and it could have been minimised.  The 
risk of morale suffering further is real.  Many people, rightly or 
wrongly, think the system is unjust.” 142 
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Despite this robust plea, further soldiers were subsequently charged, including a 
decorated officer who ordered an inquiry into the actions of his own men. 143  Swabey 
points out that these legal actions could be seen as a Government smokescreen to 
avoid any challenge to its own actions. 144 
 
In contrast to the actions of members of the Lancashire Regiment, the Iraq war also 
produced a rare George Cross.  Yet it is the same Army and the same training, 
broadly, that has produced these contrasting events.  It is also interesting to reflect on 
the relative media exposure of the actions of Trooper Finney and the alleged torture 
by the Lancashire Regiment. 
 
“Trooper Finney, a young armoured vehicle driver with less than 
a year’s service, was driving the leading Scimitar vehicle 145 of his 
troop … Without warning they were then engaged by a pair of A10 
ground attack aircraft.  Both vehicles were hit and caught fire and 
ammunition began exploding inside the turrets.  Finney managed 
to get out of his driving position and was on the way towards cover 
when he noticed that this vehicle’s gunner was trapped in the 
turret.  He then climbed on to the fiercely burning vehicle, at the 
same time placing himself at risk from enemy fire, as well as fire 
from the A10 aircraft, should they return. … he managed to haul 
out the injured gunner, get him off the vehicle, and move him to a 
safer position not far away, where he bandaged his wounds.  The 
troop officer, in the other Scimitar, had been wounded and there 
were no senior ranks to take control.  Despite his relative 
inexperience, the shock of the attack and the all-too-obvious risk to 
himself, Finney recognised the need to inform his headquarters of 
the situation.  He therefore broke cover, returned to his vehicle, 
which was still burning, and calmly and concisely sent a lucid 
situation report by radio. … At this point Finney noticed that both 
the A10 aircraft were lining up for a second attack.  
Notwithstanding the impending danger he continued to help his 
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injured comrade … Both aircraft fired their cannon and Finney 
was wounded in the lower back and legs … Despite his wounds, 
Finney succeeded in getting the gunner to the waiting Spartan.  
Then, seeing that the driver of the second Scimitar was still in the 
burning vehicle, Finney determined to rescue him as well.  Despite 
his wounds and the continuing danger from exploding ammunition 
he valiantly attempted to climb up on the vehicle but was driven 
back by the combination of heat, smoke and exploding 
ammunition.  He collapsed exhausted a short distance from the 
vehicle … During these attacks and their horrifying aftermath, 
Finney displayed clear-headed courage and devotion to his 
comrades which was out of all proportion to his age and 
experience.  Acting with complete disregard for his own safety 
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Chapter 6: The study of the implementation of the Balanced 




The introduction of the Balanced Scorecard was seen by the researcher to be having a 
distinct impact on CINCFLEET in 1998 and early 1999.  It was this impact that 
substantially led to the choice of the Balanced Scorecard as the research topic.  In an 
attempt to capture the issues, before corporate memory faded too much, a survey was 
planned in late 2000 and conducted around mid 2001.  Initial contact with 
CINCFLEET’s Balanced Scorecard suggested to the researcher that comparison with 
scorecards elsewhere would not be particularly profitable: the issues covered were 
narrow and specific to CINCFLEET, concentrating mainly on Readiness of Force 
Elements (vessels, aircraft and Royal Marine Units).  The aim was thus to identify the 
issues arising from the process of implementation and the impact of the Balanced 
Scorecard.  This Chapter therefore fits with the description of the Balanced Scorecard 
in Chapter 2.  Indeed, the information gained from this survey will be used at the end 
of this Chapter to analyse the Royal Navy’s development and implementation of the 
Balanced Scorecard against the issues highlighted in Chapter 2.  Chapter 1 highlights 
some of the key questions underpinning the research topic.  Essentially, one of the 
issues being tested here is, “Does following a set of implementation guidance rules 
produce an effective Balanced Scorecard?”  Another key issue being tested is the 
impact the Balanced Scorecard has on culture.  This Chapter will add further to the 
understanding of the culture and issues of the organisation that were highlighted in 
Chapters 3 and 5. 
 













Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard.   
This Chapter will seek to examine the introduction of the Balanced 
Scorecard in the Royal Navy.  It will present in detail the results of the 
survey outlined in Chapter 4.  The aim is to assess the impact that 
introducing the Balanced Scorecard had on the organisation. 
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard. 
Supporting case studies. 
Summary of conclusions. 
Figure 6.1 
 
 To enable readers to gain an overview of the responses to the survey, Appendix A to 
Chapter 6 summarises all the results obtained from the questionnaires.  Because it 
provides only a summary it may not be totally reflect the true situation in any area, eg 
because some issues are about perceptions or answers were provided by individuals 
with incomplete knowledge.  Appendix B provides a full listing of the narrative 
comments provided in responses.  This will enable readers to gain a fuller picture of 
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the perceptions of respondents.  Only a selection of the key comments provided is 
included in the main body of the text here.   
 
In this Chapter, and the associated Appendices, acronyms are not always explained.  
Reference should be made to the Glossary in such cases.  In some cases, when quoting 
from individuals’ responses, non-standard acronyms have been standardised or 
replaced for the ease of the reader.  Readers will by now be familiar with most of the 
key ones used, and many of the remainder can be glossed over without losing the 
meaning.  The extensive use of acronyms is often regarded by people external to 
MOD as a distinct cultural feature of MOD, and even moving between organisational 
areas may require staff to learn a new “language”.  Amendments or explanations to 
comments provided by questionnaire respondents are provided in normal type and 
enclosed in square brackets.  In general the aim has been to use the words provided by 
organisational members, because this is their interpretation of the culture.  Trice and 
Beyer state, 
 
“Language structures experience and gives [organisational 
culture] meaning by providing systems of categories for things.  
The representations provided by language come to represent 
people’s worlds to them.  All organisations have characteristic 
languages that are used to express meanings specific to their 
cultures.  They include jargon, slang, gestures, signals, signs, 
songs, humour, jokes, gossip, rumours, metaphors, proverbs, and 
slogans.  Narratives are used to convey relatively subtle and 
intricate sets of cultural meanings.” 1 
 
To change the language too much could “sterilise” the culture being represented. 
 
It will be remembered from Chapter 4 that originally consideration was given to 
undertaking comparative case studies on the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard.  
The questionnaire, on which this chapter was based, was originally developed with 
that in mind.  Consequently the wording of some questions, and the inclusion of some 
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questions, may seem to be slightly curious in relation to the organisation culture or its 
processes. 
 
2. The Balanced Scorecard survey in the Royal Navy. 
 
This section outlines and analyses the results of the initial survey undertaken early on 
in this research.  Its main aim is to demonstrate how this early work influenced the 
later work and thinking.  An initial summary of these results was made and published 
as a short article. 2  This survey represents a more detailed examination of the 
responses received.  Chapter 4 gives details of the compilation of the questionnaire 
and the rationale for the questions.  The next section will therefore concentrate on the 
replies received and their interpretation. 
 
2.1.  Organisations covered by the survey. 
 
In the preliminary questions, eg name, appointment, address, respondents were 
invited to state which organisation their responses relate to.  The organisations 
covered were: 
 
• CNS/ACNS (Chief of Naval Staff/Assistant Chief of Naval Staff) 
• CINCFLEET 
• FOSF (Flag Officer Surface Flotilla) 
• 2SL (Second Sea Lord) 
• CNS (Chief of Naval Support) 
 
Most of the responses (13 out of 23) relate to CINCFLEET and FOSF 
(sometimes amalgamated with the CINCFLEET data for ease).  This survey 
was conducted between May and October, 2001.  In addition there are also the 
results from the work undertaken by Boyes to consider, which covers CGRM. 
3  This is covered separately later in the Chapter. 
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2.2. Organisational climate before the Balanced Scorecard was 
introduced. 
 
In response to the first question about the climate within CINCFLEET prior to 
the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard, the following comments were 
received: 
 
• Lacking corporate focus.  Reactive.  Stovepiped. 
• The TLB Management Plan consisted of a "traditional" collection of 
PIs, primarily measuring output in terms of ship ready days at 
Readiness. 
• Hierarchical in Fleet at FMB. 
• It was input rather than output based. 
• Operated on a day-to-day basis tackling problems as they arose.  Little 
business/finance linkage, and limited consideration of strategic issues. 
 
The comments provided are not seen as particularly incisive in terms of 
analysing the climate.  But can perhaps be summarised as follows: 
 
• Stovepiped – ie functional isolationism or insularity. 
• Traditional hierarchy. 
• Narrow, short-term focus on local input and output issues. 
 
This rather shallow perception may suggest two things: 
 
• A lack of understanding of the concept of organisational climate and 
how to describe it, ie if this had been an issue for management there 
would have been a clearer understanding of what was meant, leading 
to better definition. 
• A lack of understanding or attention to the local climate, eg the 
comments on the Management Planning issues miss the mark 
completely. 
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These two issues are clearly linked.  But note too the highlighting of the short-
term focus, which was typical of the problems that Kaplan and Norton 
encountered that led to the development of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
The comments received from elsewhere in the Naval Sector were: 
 
• The management board tended to focus on issues closest to their hearts 
or that were politically sensitive.  There was only token attention paid 
to finances. 
• Recently formed from separate organisations (CINCNAVHOME, CED, 
CFS) adversarial. 
• Management desperate to establish overall health of Navy.  RAB about 
to be introduced.  Focus on outputs growing. 
• Conservative - action avoidant - continually searching more 
information - producing reports on past activity, and amending reports 
on past activity.  Long Hours culture to justify importance of the 
directorate - brief compiling. 
• Well intentioned but lacking objective measurable data on which to 
make management decisions. 
• Good.  The management board had identified key performance 
indicators and monitored them through an MIS. 
• Hierarchy of budgets with limited output focus, management reports 
provided periodically against objectives in Annual Management Plan. 
 
These comments are slightly more incisive and suggest: 
 
• Conservatism. 
• Parochialism leading to adversarial attitudes. 
• Reporting culture. 
• Non-strategic in outlook. 
• Becoming aware of the need for a more strategic approach. 
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This mainly supports the conclusions drawn from the responses within 
CINCFLEET, and might be seen as typical of the culture of a large 
bureaucratic hierarchy.  However, there is the emerging flavour that external 
threats, in the form of organisational pressures and process changes were 
beginning to demand better performance. 
 
This suggests that the Navy was a traditional hierarchy, very conservative and 
functionally based and focused, with only a growing awareness of the business 
environmental pressures that threatened the organisational stability. 
 
2.3. Management processes being used before the Balanced Scorecard 
was introduced. 
 
The aim of the next question was to help build up a picture of managements’ 
understanding of the management processes.  The purpose was to present a 
picture of managements’ theoretical background in management, ie can they 
effectively describe the processes they use to manage.  This would help 
validate the quality of managements’ response to other questions. 
 
The phrasing used for this question was, “What were the key management 
processes/concepts/tools used in the management and running of the 
organisation?  (For example, Management by Objectives, Total Quality 
Management, Investors in People.)”  There are two issues in the phrasing of 
this question: 
 
• The terms “management processes”, “concepts” and “tools” are all 
used to give respondents a broad enough scope or understanding of the 
requirements of the question.  That is, to avoid limiting people to set 
MOD terminology, and to encourage them to look widely.  Hence also 
the use of the examples that are essentially very different in nature. 
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• It was recognised that giving specific examples might result in these 
examples being fed back as answers.  Therefore for clarification: 
o Investors in People was a mandated process at the time, and 
therefore should be included; 
o Total Quality Management was in use in some small measure 
in areas of MOD, but it certainly was not a key management 
tool, and certainly not in MOD Headquarters and was not 
expected to be included; 
o Management by Objectives is loosely the model for the key 
management philosophy used in MOD, but this term was dated, 
and not used in MOD.  Management by Objectives was by this 
time seen as a flawed system in management philosophy, and 
therefore to include this answer might suggest some naivety or 
ignorance. 4 
 
The IiP bait has been clearly taken.   
 
• IiP present.  Standardisation of skills, norms and work processes.  
Financial control based on historical information.  Direct supervision 
through the hierarchy. 
• At FMB.  Series of briefs, and reviews by CINCFLEET, followed by 
verbal direction.  IiP introduced. 
 
But there is also the suggestion that the Management by Objectives (MBO) 
bait has provided certain appeal.   
 
• Management by objectives drawn from the Fleet Plan, which cascades 
to the FOSF Plan.  Focus was on issues raised at the Sub FMB, EG or 
Morning Briefs - usually initiated from sea. 
• Management by Objectives.  Regular reporting on Fleet activities, unit 
availability, performance against in year cash management control 
totals. 
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However, the issues that do start to emerge are: 
 
• Management by exception. 
• Reporting and briefing regime. 
• Key influence of cash limits. 
• Backward looking regime dwelling on past performance against 
objectives. 
 
Since management, particularly Naval Officers will tend to move around the 
Navy Sector quite a lot, the expectation is that similar views would be 
expressed from the other Naval areas.  The replies received include: 
 
• Key Performance Indicators relating to an output based management 
plan reviewed on a Personnel Management Information System 
(PERMIS) and IiP. 
• Management by objectives and priorities.  Non-strategic planning.  
Focus on financial inputs. 
• Supposedly MBO and IiP, but tended towards a very traditional 
military approach. 
 
Again note that MBO and IiP reoccur.  Similarly supported is the backward 
looking perspectives and the pervasive influence of financial input.  However, 
the additional key fact that emerges from these answers is that of the use of 
rudimentary and subjective performance indicators. 
 
If, as has already been suggested, the Navy was run largely on a MBO basis, 
this would suggest a largely stagnant or moribund management process.  It 
would also help explain the historic perspective and the reporting culture.  
However, the comments on subjective and rudimentary PIs do also suggest 
that management of tasks was not particularly taut, and therefore 
accountability was loose.  In contrast, the management of finances is typically 
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to the last penny, but at this stage there is still no emphasis on forward 
planning or the linkage of finance to outputs.  Thus the Navy Sector appears to 
be open to the criticisms of the Thatcher era that management processes were 
not effective and in need of modernisation. 
 
2.4. Purpose of introducing the Balanced Scorecard was introduced. 
 
In order to speed the completion of the questionnaire, and in order to improve 
the analysis, this question contained some set options as well as the 
opportunity to add additional reasons. 
 
Focus attention on key issues facing the organisation:  
Replace or improve existing performance monitoring:  
Focus on strategic organisational objectives:  
Improve internal processes:  








The four options were based on findings from research reading giving typical 
reasons for introducing the Balanced Scorecard, eg as in McCunn 5 and 
Kaplan and Norton. 6  The expectation was that among many managers there 
would be no clear reason given for introducing the Balanced Scorecard, 
particularly since the author’s perception was that the TLBs were largely 
following the ACNS lead.  
 
The table below represent the number of responses received against the four 
main options offered. 
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Table 6.1: Purpose of introducing the Balanced Scorecard.  
 ACNS CINCFLEET 2SL NSC 
Focus attention on key issues facing 
the organisation: 
3 of 4 10 of 13 2 of 2 4 of 4 
Replace or improve existing 
performance monitoring: 
2 of 4 8 of 13 2 of 2 4 of 4 
Focus on strategic organisational 
objectives: 
2 of 4 7 of 13 1 of 2 2 of 4 
Improve internal processes: 2 of 4 6 of 13 1 of 2 2 of 4 
 
With 19 responses out of 23 (82%), the most popular answer was “Focus 
attention on key issues facing the organisation”.  However, only the “Improve 
internal processes” scored marginally less than a 50% response rate.  And thus 
with such a blanket response to these options it is by no means certain that 
people were clear on the reasons for introducing the Balanced Scorecard.  
However, some of the additional comments supplied are a little more revealing 
and probably of more value. 
 
• Pressure/direction from TLB to use the BSC. 
• To turn strategy into action - and improve the availability of 
management information to the Board. 
• Understand causal relationships within the organisation and identify 
real cost drivers. 
• Dock with NAVB processes. 
• Improve identification and achievement of actions. 
• Link outputs to finance. 
• Single page top level report to Navy Board. 
• Identify levers to improve performance. 
• Encourage corporate as opposed to divisionalised behaviour. 
• Introduce cohesion among the previously separate parties. 
• Apply coherent reporting throughout TLB and HLBs. 
 
The key issues that emerge from this are: 
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• Provide common process. 
• Improve and provide common understanding of key issues. 
• Improve management control of key issues. 
 
Thus there is a degree to which these answers repeat the first option provided, 
but the answers expand that option by highlighting the fact that previously 
there was no common understanding of key issues or of requisite actions.  This 
thus reinforces the Stovepipe mentality that was highlighted earlier. 
 
2.5. Consideration of alternatives to the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
The next question posed was: “What other management processes/ 
concepts/tools were considered as supplements or alternatives to the Balanced 
Scorecard?”  The purpose of this question was to determine whether the 
Balanced Scorecard had been selected as a result of a survey of tools to meet a 
specifically identified need, or, at the other extreme, whether it was merely 
introduced on the basis of, “This is what I know about, let’s have one, now 
why would we need it?”  Apart from the odd suggestions that IiP and 
Corporate Governance might meet the requirements, the choice largely 
appears to have been (with supporting examples of answers received): 
 
• EFQM. 
o Initially EFQM was assumed to offer an additional 
organisational tune up tool in order to assess the validity of 
current strategic direction.  Balanced Scorecard viewed as the 
dials on the organisation, rather than the road map. 
o There was substantial debate about EFQM, which at the time 
was seen as a rival to the balanced scorecard rather than as a 
complement to it. 
• TQM. 
o TQM. 
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o EFQM and TQS [ie TQM ?] considered as complementary in 
that they offered measurement tools over time and 
benchmarking. 
• Nothing. 
o None at the time (although the relationship with EFQM was 
documented). 
o None in particular.  However, the methodology of Performance 
Management (PM) at the time was recognised as inadequate 
and the BSC forced "ownership" of the objectives in the plan. 
 
The TQM option is interesting in that this is a radically different approach to 
the issues.  EFQM was known by the author to be favoured as a new 
management approach, due to its promotion by the Cabinet Office. 7  Indeed 
efforts were made to dissuade the author from studying the Balanced 
Scorecard as it was supposedly overtaken by EFQM; but this was before MOD 
Centre committed to the Balanced Scorecard.  Of these options, including IiP, 
none directly drives the organisation to identify and manage the Key Issues for 
the business in quite the way that the Balanced Scorecard does.  EFQM is an 
organisational assessment tool and does not itself identify and drive the 
strategic agenda.  TQM may help address, particularly at the lower levels, an 
improvement in processes and outcomes, but again it does not help develop 
the strategic agenda.  However, there is a degree to which there was a 
“Balanced Scorecard or nothing” perception, built largely from the perceived 
need to follow a corporate initiative.  
 
2.6. Originator of the idea of introducing the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
The purpose of this question was to determine who originated the idea in order 
to give perspectives on the answers supplied by the different respondents.  The 
author believed at this stage that overall the originator was Commander Simon 
Lister, who is believed to have undertaken an MBA and might therefore be 
expected to have been aware of the concept, although the implementation 
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within the ACNS area did not appear to have followed the concepts closely.  
An important issue, both here and in relation to the issue of Champions (see 
below) is about the ability of individuals to have a key influence.  The answers 
given include: 
 
• Cdr [now Cdre] Simon Lister.  [Reply from Adm Dunt, COS 2SL.] 
• CINCFLEET Adm Essenhigh. 
• Me [Admiral Band] and the then Cdr Simon Lister. 
• No one person - it was a Board decision but work was led by the then 
ACNS.  [Reply from Admiral Essenhigh.] 
• Brian Brader, Deputy Command Secretary. 
• Not known. 
• D Gould - AUS(FS), A Cumming - NED (BA Engineering).  [Reply 
from David Gould.] 
• Price Waterhouse consultants.  [Reply from Brian Brader.] 
• CINCFLEET personally - first under Adm Boyce, then continued more 
forcefully under Adm Essenhigh. 
 
Exceptionally here the origins of some comments have been highlighted 
because the origin is almost as important as the comment itself.  The answers 
here, however, were slightly unexpected.  It is unfortunate that Cdr (now Cdre) 
Lister, did not respond to the questionnaire.  However, it appears that the 
following were major influences: 
 
• Cdr Simon Lister as DNRP/BS. 
• Admiral Jonathon Band as ACNS. 
• Admiral Essenhigh as CINCFLEET, but see below regarding role as 
champion. 
• Admiral Boyce, both as CINCFLEET and CNS, but again this may be 
more as a champion. 
• Brian Brader as DCS(RF), but only in the context of CINCFLEET. 
• David Gould as AUS(NS), but only in the context of the NSC. 
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• PriceWaterhouseCoopers consultants, who were providing 
assistance in the implementation of the RAB accounting systems. 
 
Within this list there is again reference to the local implementation and the 
hierarchical drive, or following.  Thus David Gould and Brian Brader, along 
with others, many have been influential in their own TLBs, in driving the 
“followers” before they were pushed.  What is unclear are the precise roles 
played by Cdr Lister and Rear Admiral Band (as they were).  Again this might 
be “originator” and “Champion”, although it is probable that Admiral Band 
played a much greater role.  What is apparent is that the genesis of this major 
initiative is by no means clear to those who were involved, even a short time 
after the work was started.  This may, in part, be due to a keenness to “jump 
on the band-wagon” and claim some credit for what was emerging as a 
successful programme.  This may seem a somewhat cynical view, but it 
reflects the culture of the organisation.  However, the process of 
implementation was substantial and therefore there is plenty of scope for 
individuals to claim some credit for involvement.  The only real issue is the 
degree of involvement as opposed to the degree to which people can 
justifiably claim credit as the “originator” of the idea. 
 
2.7. The Champions. 
 
Nadler 8 articulates the concept of “… champions of change…” referring to 
the leaders who: 
 
• Leaders who were outstanding leaders in periods of change, and/or 
• Leaders who foster, guide, support and resource change programmes. 
 
These are not necessarily the leaders of the changes themselves, what others 
might refer to as the “change agents”, but key senior level advocates.  Turner 
defines the Champion as “… a senior user representative, who convinces the 
sponsor that this project should have priority for their support ahead of 
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others.” 9  A change agent will be the Champion’s actor within the 
organisation to articulate the requirements, demonstrate managements’ 
commitment and implement the change, identifying and overcoming any 
resistance. 10  Change agents can be external to the organisation, but the 
Champion must be internal and at a senior level.  They are the leading 
advocate of a particular change, and if not the CEO, they must be able to 
convince the CEO and demonstrate that they have the CEO’s support. 
 
The next question attempts to identify the senior individual within each 
organisation who promoted the concept of the Balanced Scorecard, and who 
had the structural position to drive the process into the organisation.  Those 
who were nominated were: 
 
• Cdre David Smith RN, Director Naval Personnel Corporate Planning. 
• Rear Adm Jonathan Band – ACNS. 
• Within FOSF - Plans division. 
• Initially at Board level ACNS - Adm Jonathon Band prompted by 
Simon Lister, then SO1. 
• DCF Adm Malbon (for CINCFLEET). 
•  [Brian Brader] plus successive Commanders-in-Chief and Command 
Secretaries. 
• Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh. 
• CINCFLEET personally - first under Adm Boyce, then continued more 
forcefully under Adm Essenhigh. 
• David Gould, Command Secretary for the NSC. 
• CFS - Vice Admiral John Dunt. 
 
This highlights that Adm Band was the initial Champion Navy Board level; 
Cdr Lister would have been too low a level to act effectively as a Champion.  
What is less clear is who acted as the Champion in CINCFLEET.  Although 
Adm Essenhigh was almost certainly the principal Champion, but there is the 
suggestion that prior to Adm Essenhigh, Adm Boyce was the initial 
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Champion.  Brian Brader is highlighted as having a key role, probably as a 
lower level champion or project sponsor.  It is unlikely that someone at this 
level (Deputy Command Secretary) would be able to really act as a sponsor on 
their own without strong support from above.  As already indicated, lower 
level organisations such as FOSF were following the TLB lead, but Cdre 
Smith and David Gould clearly paid key roles in 2SL and NSC respectively.  
What is not clear from this is whether all respondents truly understand the 
concept of a “Champion” in view of the fact that people like Cdr Lister were 
nominated. 
 
2.8. Senior management expectations from introducing the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
 
McCunn in articulating the 11th Commandment for implementing the 
Balanced Scorecard is clear,  
 
“The key thing to remember is this: when you are wondering 
about whether a balanced scorecard is what you need, think 
about the Eleventh Commandment: do not start unless you 
know what you are hoping to achieve.”  11   
 
The next question in the survey therefore seeks to establish whether 
management had a clear view of what they wanted to achieve by 
implementing the scorecard, in order match this in subsequent questions 
against the actual outcome.  The question is also aimed at finding supporting 
evidence for the earlier question of, “What was the purpose of introducing the 
Balanced Scorecard?” 
 
The wording of the question seems to have elicited information about attitude 
or emotion rather than the more tangible or practical outcomes.  Thus the 
summary demonstrates these two categories of response, which are illustrated 
with examples: 




? Keen to utilise. 
o Cautious. 
? Cautious: uncertainty about its applicability and 
relevance to an operational naval command. 
o Sceptical. 
? Mixed, with much scepticism, apart from Adm 
Essenhigh and ACNS. 
o Reticence. 
? Not too clear.  Certainly some reticence to embrace yet 
another initiative.  Some concern over additional work-
load. 
o Concern. 
? Some considered it another management fad, others 
recognised it gave them the opportunity to manage their 
business differently. 
o Optimism. 
? "Wait and see" but generally optimistic. 
• Practical: 
o Improvement in corporate performance. 
? Better performance management; more cooperative 
behaviour. 
o Move towards output management and focus on output. 
? Move towards output based management.  Set 
achievement of Operational Capability (OC) as prime 
mover. 
o Improved cooperation and more cohesive management. 
? Engagement by Board members collectively in key 
performance issues. 
o Improved management and reporting focus. 
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? More focussed board meetings considering 
performance and management priorities for now and 
future. 
o Improved management process. 
? Rationalised material covered at SFMB.  Focus on key 
issues and thorough review of PIs.  Highlight areas that 
SFMB should work on, chart progress and target 
management action. Improve trend analysis. 
 
Thus there is a demonstration of sceptical attitude towards changes in 
management process, but nevertheless there was an expectation (or hope!) that 
there would be an improvement in management process leading to 
improvement in output.  This tends to confirm, the earlier comments on the 
purpose of the changes. 
 
2.9. Level of understanding when the Balanced Scorecard was selected 
for introduction. 
 
The question, “What level of knowledge did the Board have of the Balanced 
Scorecard at this time?” was simply aimed at trying to determine whether 
those involved in accepting and agreeing to the introduction of the Balanced 
Scorecard understood what they were agreeing to.  It is accepted that this is 
entirely a subjective perception, and in many cases will involve self-
perception.  There was thus a suspicion that this would be over marked.  
However, in that this questionnaire was being run some time after the event, 
the hope was that people might be prepared to be reasonably honest and admit 
that, with further knowledge and experience, their initial understanding was 
somewhat lacking. 
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(Responses split according to 
whether they were a member of the 
Member of Management Board 
(Yes), or not No):
YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO
Substantial (ie they were fully 
aware of the concept and the 
issues involved):
Good (ie they had a broad 
understanding of the issues but 
required further training): 1
Moderate (ie they were aware 
of the concept but needed 
substantial training): 1 3 1 1 1
Poor (ie they had little or no 
prior understanding of the 
concept when it was 
proposed):
2 2 6 2 1 1




Table 6.2: Level of Board knowledge of the Balanced Scorecard at time of 
selection and introduction.
ACNS CINCFLEET 2SL NSC
 
One CINCFLEET respondent was unable to answer this question and the 
CINCFLEET Board Member who scored the level of knowledge as 
“Moderate” also ticked “Poor”, on the basis that levels of understanding 
varied.  Therefore on the whole there appears to have been a remarkable 
degree of honesty.  So much so that one might question why the management 
board were signing up to a system they did not understand.  When 
counterbalanced by the optimistic expectations highlighted in the previous 
question, this may suggest an almost desperate “we’ll try anything to get us 
out of this mess”.  Conversely, what may be reflected is a positive drive 
provided by the Champion and the sceptical view that “it has worked for 
others, perhaps it will work here”. 
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2.10. Building commitment during the implementation phase. 
 
The next question looks at how the level of commitment was built at 
Management Board level to gain their support for the proposal and also to 
ensure that implementation action was undertaken at the lower level.  It also 
aims at starting to identify where the expertise came from to develop the 
concept, particularly given that the Management Boards did not contain the 
required expertise.  Thus the best sources are likely to be from training 
providers and management consultants. 
 
Number of relpies indicating 
sources of knowledge.
ACNS CINCFLEET 2SL NSC
Management already understood 
concept well and needed no 
further training:
Training for the Board was 
provided by internal staff: 3 4 2 3
Training for the Board was 




consultants were used to provide 
training:
11
The Board did its own research:
1 1
Other (please state): * One individual 
did research and 
provided advice 
* Training 
provided to the 
Board to increase 
* Joint work 
with external 
consultants.
Table 6.3: Source of Board knowledge to increase understanding of, and 
commitment to, the Balanced Scorecard.
 
In Table 6.3 the number of replies represents strength of perception of how 
training was provided not the amount.  This data suggests that CINCFLEET 
were probably the most thorough in their learning process, relying heavily on 
consultants who knew about the concepts but also using a variety of methods.  
However, 2SL and NSC who implemented slightly later than CINCFLEET did 
have the benefit of CINCFLEET experience.  And, indeed, CINCFLEET had 
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the benefit of Navy Board experience to draw upon.  Those implementing later 
thus potentially had better experience and knowledge within the organisation 
to draw upon, but only if the quality of that experience was good.  Thus 2SL’s 
Balanced Scorecard should have been the best, but as will be seen, this was far 
from the case. 
 
2.11. Organisational level of the initial Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Balanced Scorecards can be built initially at any level of the organisation, 
although, generally it is suggested that they will be best constructed in a 
downward cascade.  The exception to this is in a conglomerate, which does not 
apply to the Royal Navy.  The aim of the next question was thus to confirm 
that this cascade process had been applied.  The danger of not operating in this 
pattern is that business units may set objectives that are not consistent with 
those of the higher level. 
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Number of relpies 
indicating 
organisational level for 
initial scorecards.
ACNS CINCFLEET 2SL NSC
Corporate level: 4 11 1 3
Major strategic entity 
or divisional level: 1 4 2
Lower business unit, 
profit or cost centre 
level:
2 1 - Staff officer level.
At a mix of levels 
according to local 
management initiative:




Other (please state): The first BSC 
took the FOSF 
Management plan, 
which operated 
across the entire 
HLB.
Table 6.4: Development level for initial Balanced Scorecard within 
the organisation.
 
Here there is some indication that simultaneous development may have 
occurred.  The reply from the 2SL organisation in Table 6.3 suggests that they 
were built at Staff Officer level is taken as meaning that this is the level of the 
organisation at which the work was done rather that it being the level of the 
organisation to which the scorecard related.  (The other response was from the 
named staff officer who supposedly constructed the scorecard.  The researcher 
knows of no scorecards at SO1 level.)  The researcher’s recollection is that 
whilst the Navy Balanced Scorecard was initiated first, work on 
CINCFLEET’s scorecard followed on quite closely behind.  Work on the 2* 
HLB level scorecards within CINCFLEET was only started once the initial 
work on the TLB level scorecard was complete, although it underwent very 
early redevelopment, perhaps thereby creating the impression that 
developments were simultaneous.  Thus, there is some evidence to suggest 
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good practice in cascade development, or at least simultaneous development to 
ensure consistency. 
 
2.12. Format of the Balanced Scorecard at introduction. 
 
There was no financial dimension to the original “balanced scorecards” used 
by the Navy Board and CINCFLEET.  This was added subsequently as a fifth 
dimension or perspective.  The question of what format was used was thus 
designed to check whether respondents really understood whether Balanced 
Scorecard concepts had been closely followed or not.  Results are set out in 
Table 6.5.  The question was supplemented by direct questions on the number 
of perspectives/dimensions and the number of performance measures used.   
 
Number of responses 
indicating the perception of 
how the scorecard was 
constructed.
ACNS CINCFLEET 2SL NSC
Using the standard 
Kaplan and Norton 
template:
Using a modified Kaplan 
and Norton template: 3 8 2 3
From first principles or 
existing management 
information processes to 
arrive at a bespoke system:













This tends to suggest that Kaplan and Norton’s model was not closely 
followed.  But it is unclear the degree to which it was understood that the 
model was not being followed, and the degree to which this might impact the 
outcomes.  Whilst the indications are that the 2SL and NSC scorecards were 
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both built to 4 dimensions/perspectives and around high teens or low twenties 
in terms of the number of performance measures, the picture is less clear for 
the Navy Board and CINCFLEET scorecards.  The changes in number of 
perspectives in these scorecards are widely, but not universally acknowledged.  
However, there is no strong consensus on the number of performance 
measures used.  Some indicate low figures, mainly falling in the region of 
around 16 to 30.  However, some indicate that there were, “Many” and one 
suggestion that there were “Hundreds!”   This is supported by the view from 
FOSF, within CINCFLEET, where they used between 200 and 250.  Kaplan 
and Norton’s arguments are for around 20, as these would be memorable if 
properly constructed, because each would have a clearly understood rationale.  
Thus there is some indication that basic balanced scorecard concepts were not 
being followed.  Thus perhaps for some people there was no clear picture of 
what the organisation was trying to achieve with the balanced scorecard.  The 
early changes in structure and content may not have helped.  The next question 
was aimed at digging deeper into whether people understood what was being 
done, and what the scorecard meant. 
 
2.13. Rationale for the structure of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Not everyone answered the question asking about the rationale adopted for the 
format of balanced scorecard.  The answers given are also quite revealing: 
 
• ACNS area. 
o It met our needs.  
o 4 subordinate users and one summarising their performance 
measures  
• NSC 
o It was a fairly purist approach to the K&N theory. 
o Measuring performance, and the enablers influencing 
performance. 
• 2SL 
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o Common approach to other TLBs in Naval Sector and NAVB. 
• CINCFLEET 
o I believe it was aimed at providing a non-profit making/output 
focused organisation and that 4 enabling axes were seen to 
culminate in the output of capable/ready forces. 
o Adapted to fit the already existing reporting formats. 
o Reflected key output measures and monitored input. 
o Followed standard format and identified major areas of 
business.   
o Combination of simplicity and useful information. 
o Coherent with the higher level BSC used by FMB. 
 
Thus these answers reflect a high degree of “follow the leader”.  But other 
than in NSC there is no indication that basic Balanced Scorecard concepts had 
been followed.  Indeed, the suggestion that the organisation was simply 
measuring and monitoring inputs and outputs, or that it followed 
organisational structure, whilst perhaps fairly near the truth denies the basic 
concepts of the Balanced Scorecard.  This aligns with the earlier indications 
that people were perhaps merely arranging existing performance measures into 
four or five groups. 
 
2.14. Involvement in the construction of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
The researcher’s perception of working practices in MOD at this time, and 
these were seen to apply in the case of the construction of the CINCFLEET 
Balanced Scorecard were, work was largely conducted at SO1 level or below, 
with each successive layer being involved in developing the final “paper”.  
Rarely were tasks completely initiated at higher levels, nor were management 
layers consistently ignored.  Yet Kaplan and Norton are keen that the whole 
board should be directly involved in the development of the scorecard, 
because of the crucial links, and the need for agreement and commitment, to 
the strategy that underpins the scorecard.  The next question was therefore 
6 - 27 
designed to see who was most involved in the development of the Balanced 
Scorecard and whether it followed Kaplan and Norton’s advice or the usual 
desk-level work with senior management endorsement. 
 
Very High: High: Moderate: Low: None:























A sub-set of the 
Board:






























































CINCFLEET - 1 ACNS - 2
Others (please 
state):
CINCFLEET - 1 FOSF - 1 ACNS - 1
Table 6.6: Who was involved in building the Balanced Scorecard and 
how significant was their involvement in the initial scorecard?
 
 
There are a number of issues that need to be considered here in assessing the 
replies set out in Table 6.6: 
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• The low number of replies overall means that the results are not very 
robust. 
• The low response rate can be taken as meaning that individuals had 
insufficient knowledge to answer each sub-item. 
• Effectively five different implementations are covered that were almost 
certainly handled in different ways. 
• Although a five-point Likert scale has been used, the interpretation of 
individual scale-points will vary between individuals. 
• The knowledge of what went on will vary between individuals; indeed 
some individuals were not involved in the implementation process 
throughout the period. 
• In virtually every case there was no attempt to name any individual 
involved in the process, eg where respondents were asked if, “A 
particular Board Member” was involved.  This response may 
duplicate other answers to other questions. 
 
Nevertheless, some general conclusions may be possible: 
 
• The level of involvement in the process is seen as quite high within 
CINCFLEET. 
• This involvement seems to have been more an involvement of 
“individuals” rather than a collective Board involvement. 
• The relatively high involvement of consultants in the Fleet and 
NSC implementations, as opposed to no perceived consultancy 
involvement in the original ACNS implementation. 
 
When this latter point is combined with the perceived low levels of knowledge 
of Board members, and their low collective involvement, the results must be 
of questionable quality.  It might be assumed that the consultants had a 
reasonable level of knowledge, (“In the country of the blind the one-eyed man 
is king” 12) but this would not be entirely supported by the researcher’s own 
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experience.  (Consultants working on the software for the balanced scorecard 
gave a presentation on their work at one of the monthly N8 branch staff 
meetings.  At the conclusion of the presentation on member of staff had the 
temerity to ask, “… but what is a Balanced Scorecard?”  The reply given was 
along the lines of, “I don’t know.  It’s something to do with Kaplan and 
Norton.  You will have to read the book.”) 
 
2.15. Building commitment and involvement to the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Having established who was involved it is necessary to look at the stages at 
which the various people became involved.  A four point scale is used. 
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Again in Table 6.7 the issue is that whilst there is some difference between the 
various implementations, there also appears a divergence of views on 
individual implementations.  A slight difference might easily be expected, but 
in other instances the views provided are not reconcilable.  For example, and 
depending on interpretation of the categories designated, the involvement of 
the workforce does not seem consistent with their level of publicity that the 
concept received subsequently.  Similarly, the suggestion that no consultants 
were involved in developing CINCFLEET’s Balanced Scorecard is not 
realistic, in view of its contradiction of the other respondents, and the 
researcher’s own knowledge.  In general the key people involved at the early 
stages are: 
 
• The CEO, 
• The Planning Department, and 
• Consultants, in CINCFLEET, FOSF and NSC. 
 
Subsequently Board Members and Senior Managers became involved before 
Middle Managers became involved.  Junior Managers and the Workforce had 
little or no involvement. 
 
2.16. When was the Balanced Scorecard introduced? 
 
The next short section aimed to determine when the work on the Balanced 
Scorecard was started and how long it took to introduce the initial scorecards.  
A short time would suggest a superficial approach, or a lack of involvement or 
awareness.  A longer period might be interpreted either as it took a long time 
to get the work done, either because a thorough job was done or because 
mistakes were made and had to be corrected.  Alternatively it might again 
reflect a lack of interest and thus a perception that the task was dragging on 
and preventing people from getting on with other issues.  Only if responses are 
consistent can there be real confidence that people were fully aware. 
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Table 6.8: Summary of responses on implementation dates of the 



















Again the small number of replies and the inconsistent form of reply makes 
detailed analysis impossible.  However, the lack of consistency shown in 
Table 6.8 does suggest that the level of involvement was probably low and 
results in a lack of awareness.  In particular the start of development work in 
CINCFLEET is described variously as starting between early 1998 and late 
1999; a period of almost two years.  Similarly, implementation is described as 
taking place between “late 1998” and “2000”.  Bizarrely, one respondent 
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thought that implementation took place at the same time as the development 
started, whilst another respondent thought that the implementation was well 
over a year after development started.  Bearing in mind that this survey took 
place between May and October 2001, this may be sufficient time to lead to 
some differences, but the error rate does seem high. 
 
2.17. Structural levels at which the Balanced Scorecard was introduced. 
 
Kaplan and Norton argue that Balanced Scorecards should be introduced in a 
cascade from the corporate level.  The next question therefore aimed to see if 
this process was followed.  Similarly the structural level to which Balanced 
Scorecards are cascaded can be important.  Scorecards can be cascaded down 
to individual or work group level.  Failure to push the cascade down to lower 
levels limits the impact that the Balanced Scorecard has because the further 
the cascade reaches the more relevant the scorecard becomes to the 
individuals.  In the following table the columns are effectively independent, 
although comparison between columns will demonstrate the degree of 
consistency of approach.  Results are displayed in Table 6.9, below. 
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(Data in brakets and 
italics represents 




ACNS CINCFLEET FOSF 2SL NSC
Corporate level: 1st - 7 to 8 
months




2nd - 18 to 24 
months









unit, profit or 
cost centre level:
(3rd - Ongoing) (3rd - 6 months) (3rd - 
concurrently with 
other levels in 
some areas)
Personal level:
Introduced at a 
mix of levels:
1st
Not rolled out 
further:
(3rd) (2nd)
Table 6.9: Summary of responses on roll-out of Balanced Scorecards to different 
structural levels and the time taken.
 
The oddity here is the data from FOSF that suggests that the Balanced 
Scorecard was introduced at the corporate level after it was introduced at other 
levels.  However, if the MOD perspective is taken then the FOSF data may be 
regarded as the most accurate, because the Navy Sector introduced the 
Balanced Scorecards, with developments taking place at a number of levels 
simultaneously in various organisations, followed by development of the 
MOD’s Balanced Scorecard.   Elsewhere in the data “Corporate level” is seen 
as identifying the level at which the replies are given, ie ACNS would describe 
the TLBs as “Major strategic entity or divisional level”, in other instances this 
would be regarded as the “Corporate level”. 
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Clearly there is a difference of opinion in the ACNS area as to the extent of 
rollout.  One respondent saw the Balanced Scorecard being rolled out to lower 
levels (HLB level or below) whilst another thought that rollout stopped at TLB 
level.  Similarly, one respondent in 2SL only saw the Balanced Scorecard 
being rolled out at TLB level and no lower.  The evidence of one respondent 
in CINCFLEET also suggests that work at HLB level ceased due to resource 
restrictions.  The researcher’s recollection is that there was some truth in this.  
Limited consultancy support delayed the work in some areas.  The drive to 
complete the rollout and maintenance of the process at HLB level was 
eventually overturned by the Fleet First reorganisation that proposed the 
abolition of the HLBs as organisational entities. 
 
Responses on the time taken at the various levels are so diffuse that there is 
nothing useful that can reasonably be concluded from this data. 
 
Thus in summary, the Navy appears to have been successful in cascading the 
process down to an intermediate organisational level, although not all 
respondents recognised this.  This suggests that there was only limited 
awareness of the overall process and what was happening in other areas. 
 
(During the Fleet First process attempts were made in CINCFLEET HQ to 
develop SO1 level objectives that related to an objective cascade derived from 
2* level Balanced Scorecards.  This was the only attempt to specifically link 
objectives at a team and individual level, and was not expected to be in 
Balanced Scorecard format.  As a formal process this was abandoned after 
about a year on the basis that it duplicated the normal objective setting 
regimes, particularly for civilian staff who are required to agree objectives 
annually as part of their performance reporting and “bonus” arrangements.) 
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2.18. Impact of introducing the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Section 1 of the questionnaire sought to establish what the organisation was 
like before the Balanced Scorecard was implemented.  The next question 
therefore asks the respondents to compare what the organisation is like after 
the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard, and to identify any specific 
benefits during this period.  The aim is to see whether the process of 
implementation has affected the organisation.  The question is asked again in 
relation to the post implementation phase to see which is seen as having the 
greatest impact.  The underlying issue here is whether the process of 
developing a Balanced Scorecard, with its potential for conflict resolution, 
increased clarity of objectives and improved working relations between 
managers, will have a positive impact on the organisation.  Mayo discovered 
that positive and negative interventions with production workers improved 
output due to improved social cohesion between the workers. 13  Potentially 
this could happen with the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard, since 
although it was a new “management tool” it would aid clarity of objectives 
and cohesion between previously competitive resource managers. 
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What impact did 













FOSF - 1 CINCFLEET - 1





















Culture: FOSF - 2 ACNS - 1
CINCFLEET - 5









Climate: CINCFLEET - 1
FOSF - 2
CINCFLEET - 7










CINCFLEET - 1 Sense of significant 
change.
Focus.
Table 6.10: Level of impact from the implementation phase for the 
Balanced Scorecard.
 
Thus the impression of the respondents, shown in Table 6.10, is that there was 
a positive improvement in the management process and in the strategic 
learning.  There is little overall agreement on any improvement in the culture 
or the climate.  But then it will be recalled that respondents had some 
difficulty articulating these issues in Section 1, referring mainly to 
organisational structure.  Note that the ACNS Balanced Scorecard is also seen 
as having had a positive impact on Culture and Climate.  In contrast the impact 
on the FOSF HLB seems to have been generally detrimental.  Although there 
is very little data, this may suggest that the impact of implementing the 
Balanced Scorecard was more positive at the higher levels than at the lower 
levels.  Certainly at this stage there was no change in organisational structure.  
Other issues (eg reporting culture) might be seen as being reinforced, whilst 
the other issues about strategic perspectives are those that have been identified 
here as being overturned. 
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With regard to specific benefits attributable to the Balanced Scorecard, the key 
issues are (with examples of responses): 
 
• Improvement in management process (recognised in, or prompted 
by, the previous question) and recognition of the need for better 
management tools.   
o A more holistic approach to management of the NSC.  But a 
need to manage by exception. 
o In terms of the FMB scorecard the benefits were that they were 
presented with information that really counted and which they 
could control, thus reducing the amount of information they 
were presented with and so leading to better decision-making.  
However, the tool is still being used to report progress rather 
than manage the business so further work is required before 
the full benefits of the scorecard will be derived. 
o Began to change attitudes (for the better) about the need for 
useful management tools. 
• Shorter more focussed management board meetings. 
o Yes, board meetings more focussed and became shorter. 
• A more strategic or holistic view. 
o Concentrated on what was important and what they could 
control or have significant influence over. 
o Corporate behaviour. 
• Better focus or targeting of the issues requiring management. 
o It brought a welcome focus to discussion at Board Level and 
forced agreement on actions required. 
o Promoted greater understanding between customer and 
supplier. 
• Improvements in PIs. 
o Performance metrics established. 
o Clear focus on PM (Both PIs, their targets and scores). 
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Thus there are three specific things that emerge here that were not covered by 
the table above: 
 
• Recognition of the need for better management tools. 
• Shorter more focused management board meetings. 
• Improvements in PIs. 
 
These changes might be seen as operating at three different conceptual levels.  
Thus, the recognition of the need for better management tools is a strategic 
perspective since it applies much wider than the use of the Balanced Scorecard 
and the Management Board operation.  Improved Management Board 
meetings represent an operational level improvement, which is supported by 
the collection of improved data at the tactical level in order to create the 
operational picture.  It is therefore questionable why there was a stronger 
perception of an improvement in culture and climate within the organisation.  
This could be explained by: 
 
• If the perception was that the impact was mainly at Management Board 
level, and its immediate supporting staff and processes, it might be that 
this was not seen as impacting the much wider organisation. 
• The highlighting of significant issues, and a developed perspective of 
past poor performance in addressing these issues, might have a 
negative impact on perceptions. 
 
2.19. Lessons learned from the Balanced Scorecard introduction phase. 
 
A key issue highlighted by the Balanced Scorecard and other management 
tools and philosophies is the need to learn from experience.  The next question 
thus sought to identify whether respondents had learnt from their experience in 
introducing the Balanced Scorecard, and if so, what. 
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Some of the issues highlighted here simply reinforce, or articulate, the lessons 
articulated in Balanced Scorecard literature.  For example: 
 
• The importance of top-level commitment and the need to 
demonstrate commitment. 
o It is difficult to do but the commitment of the top man is vital. 
• The need to restrict the number of measures used on the Balanced 
Scorecard.   
o Needed to think through axis.  Initial PIs too numerous, too 
input focussed. 
o Too many performance measures cloud the issue? 
 
Thus the issue here is, whether, had the consultancy support been better and 
used more widely, and had there been a better (self-)education programme, 
some of these lessons would have been embedded in the process rather than 
emerging as learning points.  However, important themes that emerge are: 
 
• Produce something relatively quickly and develop it rather than 
expect to get it right first time. 
o Start quickly and allow the scorecard to improve with use. 
o Using existing management plans/information is a good place 
to start building a scorecard in order to start the process and 
get the board used to using a scorecard, rather than embarking 
on detailed business analysis. 
o Don't expect to get it right first time.  Ensure format dovetails 
with other BSC within organisation. 
• Establishing the relationships between scorecards at different 
levels. 
o Need for consistency with level above. 
• The need for predictive measures. 
o Relationship between top-level BSC and underlying data is 
crucial but difficult.  Predicting future is difficult but valuable. 
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• Need for education, which will also help build commitment, and 
• It takes time and effort to effect the cultural change needed. 
o Keep the top pages visually engaging, always be ready for drill 
down for more detail, keep it to bulleted text, graphics and 
coloured boxes.  Must always show past and forecast trend.  
Must keep visibility of absolute requirement, in year target and 
current performance always, never separate.  Only 50% senior 
managers confident to use Chots displayed information.  Need 
to push then to explore this medium by CEO.  1SL example. 
o Buy-in to the process takes time – systems-thinking is a difficult 
concept for some people. 
o It's a slow process to enable/facilitate a profound culture 
change in a large organisation.  More investment in people 
aspects is needed. 
• Balanced Scorecard will change as the organisation develops. 
o That the balanced scorecard is dynamic - and must change with 
the business as it develops. 
 
Nevertheless some of the themes that emerge might be disputed: 
 
• Starting with existing measures – This can lead to a waste of 
resources since existing measures may not be related to strategic 
direction.  Certainly it was the researcher’s perception that the early 
emphasis in CINCFLEET on the measurement of Force Element 
Readiness, which predominated in their initial Balanced Scorecard, did 
not pass the “So what?” test and merely precipitated the re-engineering 
of the Balanced Scorecard.  This re-engineering took place within 
about a year of the initial Balanced Scorecard being developed, and 
consumed considerable resource, particularly consultancy support.  
Culturally perhaps this was an essential stage to go through in 
organisational evolution, but this predomination of existing measures 
rather than “measuring what is important” could have lead to the 
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Balanced Scorecard process being abandoned because it added nothing 
new. 
• Keep the development team small – The failure to fully involve staff 
at all levels in the process may account in part for the Balanced 
Scorecard not becoming as key a management process as Kaplan and 
Norton believe it should do.  In particular, the failure to deeply engage 
all the Board Members in the process, and to surface and resolve 
internal conflict, might be seen as another reason for not having got it 
“right first time”.  Taking more time and involving more people may 
mean you do get it “right first time”, but the implicit distaste for such a 
methodology may reflect organisational culture and the “Let’s crack-
on” that is typical of the “Thruster-organiser” of Magerison and 
McCann’s Team Management System, which is so prevalent in the 
management levels of the Defence Sector. 14 
 
Thus in summary, there have been many learning points that emerge from the 
implementation process.  Some reinforce, or are merely consistent, with 
previous learning.  Other issues highlight these specific implementations, and 
may thus be derived from cultural or process, and might not thus be consistent 
with other implementations. 
 
2.20. Development of the Balanced Scorecard since it was introduced. 
 
The next question moves into the post-implementation period and seeks to 
establish perceptions of how much the scorecard has changed.  Kaplan and 
Norton’s concepts would expect to see some change over time as strategy is 
implemented or as the strategy itself changes.  This goes back to the double-
loop learning issues covered in Chapter 2.  However, with good management 
commitment, a poorly implemented Balanced Scorecard, or one that is 
developed in a fast changing environment might also be expected to change; 
respectively to improve its drive of management process, or to better reflect 
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the emerging environmental forces.  Therefore the question is posed as to what 
is perceived to have driven those changes that have taken place. 
 
There has been 
significant 
change:
There has been 
moderate 
change:
There has been 
little change:
There has been 
no change:























Table 6.11: Perceived level of change to the Balanced Scorecard 
since its initial introduction.
 
Although only a four-point scale has been used in this instance, there is quite a 
strong overall perception that Balanced Scorecards changed significantly after 
initial implementation.  The greatest change appears to have been in the 
content of the scorecards, although a number of respondents, as will be seen 
below, highlight the move from 5 to 4 perspectives.  (And the researcher’s 
recollection is that the original ACNS Balanced Scorecard was four 
perspectives, with a fifth being added before being re-brigaded back down to 
four.)  This change might be seen as significant rather than moderate.  Whilst 
all the respondents recognise that change had occurred, perceptions of the 
degree of change might be tempered by the degree of involvement and thus 
creating the perception that the first attempts were not very good.  Thus under 
assessment of the degree of change is probably more likely in this instance. 
 
Reasons given for the changes shown at Table 6.11 included: 
 
• Mainly changes at Fleet or above, and the transition to an Access 
based BSC. 
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• Axis change driven by TLB/Centre and content (PIs) changed as 
organisation learnt about BSC. 
• Changes in the strategic plan - fresh issues requiring Board visibility - 
new hierarchical structure enabled less crucial information, in more 
detail to still be available but [without] clutter[ing] senior managers 
view of overall business performance. 
• Refinement of what we wanted and aligned with the Departmental 
BSC. 
• Organisational change; better understanding of performance etc 
issues. 
• Refinements to performance measures are better [management 
information]. 
• Organisational restructuring.  New objectives, programmes, drivers 
etc. 
• Implementation of a 4-axis scorecard based on the results of Fleet 
Business Modelling, in order to capture business critical success 
factors - those parameters important to Fleet and over which Fleet has 
a high degree of influence. 
• Continued development - primarily by consultants. 
• Detailed business analysis conducted and alignment of structure with 
Kaplan and Norton. 
• The need to better measure output. 
• Redesign of the BSC iaw competing requirements to match card to the 
business or conform to that of higher organisation. 
• MOD used different format. 
• Need to be more relevant to Fleet's activities and management 
requirements. 
 
Two issues emerge here: 
 
• Changes in the structure and content were driven by the need for 
greater consistency across the organisation.  It is unclear from these 
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responses, precisely who drove the structural change back to four 
perspectives.  Different candidates emerge and it may have been a 
combination of these since developments were going on across a broad 
front. 
o MOD HQ. 
o CINCFLEET/FMB. 
o Consultants. 
o The influence of Kaplan and Norton’s concepts. 
• Changes to PIs resulted from a number of different issues: 
o Better understanding of the business and management 
requirements to manage performance. 
o Changes in strategy. 
o Improvement in the structuring of information. 
 
Thus changes seem to have emerged largely from a “back to basics” move in 
order to improve and extend the process.  This highlights the problems of 
lower level organisations developing their own ideas in isolation from a 
strategic initiative driven from the very top of the organisation. 
 
2.21. Impact and benefits of the Balanced Scorecard following 
introduction. 
 
This section seeks to establish the perceived benefits of using the Balanced 
Scorecard.  The questions change here because the use of the scorecard should 
address different issues to the development and introduction.  Here the 
emphasis will be much more on the on-going management than developing 
greater understanding of the process, issues and consensus within the 
organisation.  The issues, concerning attitude towards these questions, will 
continue to be relevant.  Thus the advocates of the process are likely to 
continue to identify the positive aspects of the system, and the sceptics will be 
less enthusiastic or more critical.  However, it is recognised that the poorest 
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opinions may not correspond to sceptics and the best opinions to supporters.  
The results are shown at Table 6.12. 
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What impact did this 






































































Other (please state): NSC - The NSC 
was soon after 
subsumed within the 
DLO, which also 
took on the BSC.
 ACNS - It has 
rebutted the mess deck 
criticism that the board 
have no idea what is 
going on, or going 
wrong.  It is a highly 
effective problem 
delivery system, that 
causes the board to 
have to manage, be 
aware of problems and 
try to react or 
anticipate problems.
Table 6.12: Level of impact during the post-implementation phase for 
the Balanced Scorecard.
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The following comment was also added: 
 
• These changes were as much about learning how to use the BS as they 
were about changing the format. 
 
Attitudes here, with the exception of those related to Financial Performance, 
seem to represent a much closer consensus on the Balanced Scorecard 
providing a “Positive” impact.  However, there is one respondent from 
CINCFLEET who has generally little or positive disbenefit from the process. 
 
The perceived specific benefits attributable to the Balanced Scorecard during 
this phase fall into two main categories: 
 
• Process benefits, such as: 
o Better management board functioning. 
? Senior management more focused; improved strategic 
outlook; improved management boards. 
o Better output focus. 
? Focus on underlying causes of performance shortfalls; 
better resource allocation. 
? Infinitely better management of the Navy both as a 
customer and as a supplier. 
o Better decision-making. 
? More informed decision making from increasingly 
timely and relevant information.  Reduction in the 
exhaustive staffing process that delivered carefully 
crafted words to the board(s) that were then just noted. 
? Better approach to STP review of enhancements/ 
savings.  Promotes/facilitates output focused 
management perspective.  Better decisions. 
o Better focus on key issues. 
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? Identification of potential issues and ability to better 
prioritise. 
• Outcome benefits, such as: 
o Sea Harrier problems, 
o Lynx problems, and 
o Medical issues. 
? Isolation of problem output areas, eg Lynx rotor head, 
SHAR recovery programme; and kept at Board level on 
a monthly basis. 
? Ability to show non-performing suppliers, both public 
and private sector eg DLO, Surgeon General, 
Westlands, that their performance is being monitored, 
and its clear, auditable relationship with RN outputs.  
Raised performance has followed all briefs (except Surg 
Gen as yet - although we now have ministerial interest 
in the issue again through the balanced scorecard 
briefing at Admiralty Boards.) 
o Fleet First. 
? The Fleet First management process has developed 
directly from the lessons learnt from BSC. 
 
Most of these issues had started to emerge in the implementation phase, so 
there is “nothing new”, particularly, here.  The issues are thus the degree to 
which these emerged, or continued to emerge, during the overall process. 
 
2.22. Changes to the management process following the introduction of 
the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Since it could not be certain what respondents would reply in terms of the 
specific benefits obtained from introducing the Balanced Scorecard, the next 
question seeks to establish what changes have taken place to the management 
process.  Potentially some respondents might see changes to the management 
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process as being beneficial.  Specifically, respondents are asked to consider 
additions or deletions to the business process, although it is recognised that 
these might not derive directly from the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
• Greater focus on strategic leadership and change management at 
higher levels.  BSC evolving. 
• BSC takes some management action to prepare.  This has undoubtedly 
increased workload on a quarterly cycle.  New database system 
administrator will, however, spread this load. 
• A monthly/quarterly process has been put into place to deliver the BSC 
for each Management Board.  For some staff this has been redirection 
of their efforts, but for other has meant new (extra) work. 
• None that I would attribute to the BSC, since most changes have been 
dictated by the personal management style of the TLB Holder. 
• Planning process modified to reflect scorecard focus. 
• It stimulated new performance management processes, but had less 
influence over other business processes. 
• Enormous and profound - ie break-up of NSC and formation of WSA. 
• Business processes radically restructured with the advent of the DLO. 
• There should have been a smarter information collection process - 
enter once use many times. 
• Complete restructuring. 
• Financial process markedly improved.  BSC has significantly improved 
ability to brief facts to CINC. 
 
Again there is a broad spectrum of responses; some arguing that no change has 
taken place whilst others argue substantial change is taking place.  Few, if any 
of the issues are totally new.  However, the substantial organisational change 
must be acknowledged.  The role of the Balanced Scorecard in initiating some 
of that change, in providing continuity through it, or emerging as a key 
management tool beyond change must be acknowledged.  This later point was 
highlighted previously in respect of the establishment of the DLO.  Certainly 
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the NSC took the Balanced Scorecard into the organisational change and its 
relationship to the Navy Balanced Scorecard, its championing by key members 
of the new DLO Management Board, and the gradual adoption by MOD meant 
that it remained a key management tool. 
 
Thus if there is any conclusion to be drawn from these answers it is that, some 
managers show a propensity to be led down a narrow path, whilst others are 
still able to think more broadly and recognised the importance of issues. 
 
2.23. Extent to which the aims of introducing the Balanced Scorecard 
were met. 
 
In Section 1 of the questionnaire respondents were asked what the purpose 
was of introducing the Balanced Scorecard.  It will be recalled that the 
answers were summarised as: 
 
• Focus attention on key issues facing the organisation. 
• Improve and provide common understanding of key issues. 
• Improve management control of key issues. 
• Provide common process. 
 
The next questions seek to understand how well these objectives have been 
achieved, and what are the key features that contribute to that success or 
failure.  A four point scale is provided, together with the potential to dismiss 
the original objectives. 
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ACNS CINCFLEET FOSF 2SL NSC
Original aims fully 
met and exceeded: 3 4 1
Original aims fully 
met:
1 3 2
1 (although this 
respondent also 
felt that they 
were no longer 
relevant)
Original aims only 




Original aims no 
longer considered 
relevant:
Table 6.13: Degree of achievement of original aims of introducing the 
Balanced Scorecard into the organisation.
 
The results at Table 6.13 suggest that there is some degree of conflict over the 
level of success that the Balanced Scorecard has achieved.  Although the 
highest proportion sees the Balanced Scorecard as having exceeded 
expectations, there was a significant proportion that saw it as not having met 
those objectives.  This may be related to expectations rather than extent to 
which the Balanced Scorecard has been successful. 
 
A number of key themes emerge, illustrated by examples of responses: 
 
• Lack of initial understanding of the tool and its benefits. 
o Limited expectations of BSC. Its potential has surprised many 
managers. 
o Because we initially didn't realise what a useful tool it was. 
• The benefit of having a strong champion or a Corporate drive to 
introduce the tool. 
o Strong leadership, availability of management trained desk 
officers, and timing. 
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o Commitment of the Board supported by good staff work in the 
HQ to develop options between Board Meetings. 
• The strength of the tool itself. 
o Dedication of individuals and the flexibility of the BSC. 
o The strength of the tool.  The enthusiasm of the champion and 
the project team. 
o It is easy to understand. 
• The problems and cost of introducing the tool. 
o High-level commitment and quality (ie expensive) consultants. 
o The failure is due to insufficient knowledge of the CEO who 
was unable to fully understand the implications of the 
information being presented on the BSC. 
o Inability to measure or agree input PIs. 
o Not as successful as could be due to inadequate supporting MIS 
and management resistance to a paradigm shift. 
 
The most worrying comment, and hence the anonymity used in providing 
answers, is the inability of one CEO to understand the implications of the data 
provided.  However, this may also highlight a failure in process, because, had 
the CEO been directly involved in developing the Balanced Scorecard and an 
underpinning cause-and-effect model, he would have immediately appreciated 
the implications of what was being presented.  Thus this, and others of these 
comments, do suggest that there was limited understanding of the Balanced 
Scorecard process.  Again this reinforces the findings at Table 6.1, which 
shows limited understanding of the tool. 
 
These issues follow into the next question. 
 
2.24. Understanding of the Balanced Scorecard now that it has been 
introduced. 
 
As indicated immediately above, there is some suspicion still that the 
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Balanced Scorecard is not fully understood, even after it has been 
implemented.  Respondents might be expected to show that there was greater 
understanding of the concepts, although some might realised the full potential 
of the tool now that it is beginning to be implemented and thus admit to a 
lower level of understanding.  Indeed, Kaplan and Norton argue that they only 
began to appreciate the full potential of the system as they saw it being 
developed and used in the years following the initial development.  
Nevertheless, as has been shown in Chapter 2, if the organisation is to develop 
the use of the Balanced Scorecard as a key management tool or process, staff 
at all levels should be aware of the concept and should be briefed on the basis 
of performance against Balanced Scorecard objectives.  Consequently, once 
the tool is in use, staff at all levels would show at least some awareness, even 
if the process has not be fully cascaded down via the use of personal or team 
Balanced Scorecards.  The next question thus seeks to see the levels of 
understanding after implementation.  A four point scale is used, as shown in 
Table 6.14. 
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Table 6.14: Level of understanding of the Balanced Scorecard post 
implementation.
 
Table 6.14 suggests that the perception is that understanding is good at board 
level, degrading to a limited or no understanding at working level.  Since as 
has already been argued, the Balanced Scorecard must be understood at 
working level if action is to be orientated towards the desired goals, failure to 
educate staff at the lower levels might be seen as reflection of poor 
understanding at the higher levels.  This is because it is essentially a departure 
from key Balanced Scorecard concepts.  Alternatively, it could be argued that 
this is a cultural issue where staff are simply expected to obey orders, without 
knowledge of the wider strategy and the processes by which management is 
conducted. 
 
2.25. Commitment to the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
This question was originally designed to determine whether different 
organisations had a continuing commitment to the Balanced Scorecard once 
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implemented.  It will already be evident that the mandating of the process in 
MOD renders this question superfluous.  Consequently it will be no surprise to 
find that all who answered this question answered positively.  However, some 
supplemented their answer giving a hint of an underlying motivation: 
 
• External policy driven requirement: 
o Yes (MOD Policy). 
o Organisation no longer exists - amalgamated into a larger 
organisation where BSC was mandated from more senior 
levels. 
• A personal interest in the process: 
o I believe they are, but there is much work to be done to (a) 
educate all staff, and (b) derive the full benefits from the 
scorecard. 
 
2.26. Linking objectives to the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Earlier the need to drive staff in the required direction, through the articulation 
of the Balanced Scorecard objectives, was highlighted.  The next question 
builds on that by seeking to determine the level to which organisational 
objectives are articulated and thus whether staff might be expected to 
understand how they contribute to the strategic aims of the organisation.  The 
achievement of organisational aims may also be derived from motivational 
factors such as reward.  The subsequent question that will also be covered in 
this section thus seeks to determine the extent to which reward is also linked to 
the Balanced Scorecard. 
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Not linked at all: Partially linked: Fully linked:
















































Table 6.15: Degree to which individual's personal objectives are 
linked to the Balanced Scorecard objectives.
 
 
The data in Table 6.15 suggests that there is more likely to be a linkage 
between Balanced Scorecard objectives and individual objectives at the higher 
levels of the organisation.  The question asks for an “explicit” linkage.  Thus 
the inconsistency of answers and the fact that previously it has been 
determined that staff at the lower levels almost certainly have not been made 
aware of the Balanced Scorecard process, it is difficult to see how an explicit 
linkage could have been made.  Some of these answers must therefore be 
viewed as being optimistic in respect of the lower levels of the organisation. 
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Not linked at all: Partially linked: Fully linked:











































With such substantial agreement, demonstrated in Table 6.16, that there is no 
linkage between the reward structure and Balanced Scorecard objectives, the 
suggestions, mainly from NSC, that there is a linkage seems odd.  Some of the 
additional comments may help explain this: 
 
• Partially linked (civilians only). 
• Not linked at all, although for civilians the reward system does have a 
performance link. 
• Not linked at all (although the board have agreed to specific objectives 
that will be linked to performance related pay). 
 
Essentially what is being referred to here is the increasing tendency to have a 
performance element of pay for civilians and senior military officers.  
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However, the researcher is not aware of any explicit linkage.  There are two 
aspects to this: 
 
• The Balanced Scorecard has not been cascaded down the organisation 
and therefore the ability to link performance, measured on a Balanced 
Scorecard, to civilian staff’s individual objectives and achievement is a 
remote possibility.  Indeed, since individuals are measured against 
personal objectives, any attempt to link performance to a corporate 
Balanced Scorecard, over which the individual has no say, and little 
ability to influence individual measure performance, would almost 
certainly be very strongly resisted.  In that sense there is no concept of 
team or corporate performance.  However, a “Minor Awards Scheme” 
has been introduced in recent years, whereby individual or team 
achievement can be recognised by line managers with the award of a 
gift of up to £50.  Provision exists for such awards to include a 
minority of service or consultancy personnel within such teams. 
• For the more senior staff who have a performance related element to 
their pay, demonstrable achievements highlighted by the Balanced 
Scorecard might be one way of seeking evidence in support of pay 
awards.  However, the integrated nature of responsibilities within 
MOD means that scorecards often include critical issues over which 
the relevant senior manager has only partial influence.  Thus for 
example, CINCFLEET’s Balanced Scorecard has always included 
measurement of the availability of operationally capable forces.  This 
is measured in terms of the four (METS) pillars of capability: 
 
o M – Manpower (is the vessel fully manned to the required 
standard), 
o E – Equipment availability (is all the required equipment 
ready and is everything work to the required standard), 
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o T – Training (has the vessel undertaken the required training 
routines and performed satisfactorily within the laid down 
timescales), 
o S – Sustainability (is all the equipment and support required to 
sustain operational activity available and, where required, 
deployed). 
  
 Of these four pillars only “T” is under the direct control or 
management of CINCFLEET: M is primarily the responsibility of 2SL, 
E and S falls to NSC/DLO.  Even then, Training can only be 
completed satisfactorily if the required manpower is available and the 
material condition (E) allows the training to be undertaken.  Thus 
readiness failures, even in training standards, may not be under the 
direct influence of CINCFLEET, although he will be responsible for 
putting appropriate pressure on suppliers and assisting them in juggling 
priorities.  It could therefore be reasonably argued that it would be 
unrealistic or unfair to directly link performance pay to Balanced 
Scorecards even for such senior officers. 
 
It is therefore concluded that Balanced Scorecards do not directly influence 
reward, although they may be a contributing factor considered at the highest 
levels. 
 
2.27. Future developments to extend implementation of the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
 
This next section of the questions seeks to determine what further plans exist 
to extend the use and the functionality of the Balanced Scorecard.  The 
expectation would be that this would indicate whether the development 
programme is considered to have matured and thus little further develop will 
take place, or whether lessons learned about the process will facilitate further 
development.  The first question relates to the degree to which plans exist to 
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roll-out the Balanced Scorecard further within the organisation, and over what 
timescales.  Input received included: 
 
• Some new scorecards will be developed for the new HQ.  It is likely 
that FMB and FMG will use the same (current) scorecard (although 
we have recommended that each have their own to reflect the nature of 
the business).  FOST and COS(Support) will have their own 
scorecards.  Fleet has yet to decide whether other functional groups 
will have their own scorecards.  FOST and COS(Support) scorecards 
will be developed by 1/4/02. 
• Continuous development and improvement. 
• Yes - 1 to 2 years. 
• Intention is for BSC to be implemented only at senior levels of 
management. 
• It will change with Fleet First, although Type Commanders already 
have their own and these will essentially just be "cut" in a different 
way post Fleet First. 
• Linkage to individual objectives is planned. 
• New DBSA will involve most of the organisation.  This is being 
implemented now. 
• 2 to 3 years. 
• No - not needed as such at the lowest levels. 
• Yes mandated at HLB level, being implemented at BLB level and 
below.  Full implementation within 2 years. 
 
These answers reflect a number of issues: 
 
• A degree of uncertainty that may arise from: 
o Staff moving on to other jobs and therefore being unaware 
of the specific plans in the area in which they were 
previously involved. 
o The impact of organisational changes. 
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o Uncertainty arising from the influence MOD Centre taking 
over the sponsorship of the Balanced Scorecard. 
• The impact of organisational changes that require existing 
Balanced Scorecards to be scrapped in favour of new ones, 
reflecting changed responsibilities of senior managers. 
• A perspective that the Balanced Scorecard is only required at the 
more senior levels; although there is at least some suggestion that 
in some areas the concept may be rolled out to lower levels. 
 
This suggests that there is only limited commitment to the Balanced Scorecard 
process.  A stronger commitment might have resulted in clearer ownership and 
drive to implement the process, and a commitment to seeing the process 
implemented at lower levels. 
 
2.28. Planned changes to the Balanced Scorecard and the Balanced 
Scorecard processes. 
 
The aim of the next two questions was to determine, not whether the process 
was to be extended, but whether the Scorecards themselves, or the processes 
that support them, were going to be developed further.  Here again this would 
demonstrate commitment to the process if further investment is to be 
undertaken.  Firstly, the development of the Balanced Scorecard itself: 
 
• Alignment (vertical). 
• Vision for horizontal alignment. 
• Ongoing refinement in the light of experience. 
• More strategy focused, linked to objectives and target setting to 
measure success of strategy and instil correct corporate behaviour.  
Databased version to reduce staff workload.  Ownership of KPIs/PIs 
and more explicit description of algorithmic aggregation for top level 
colours. 
• Continued developmental changes. 
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• Changes to reflect major reorganisation and ongoing internal and 
external business change. 
• Only changes to reflect organisational changes. 
• Incremental improvement of PIs. 
• Web browser, underpinned by an access database, to dock completely 
into MOD centre and D P+A requirements. 
• None at present. 
• Presently introducing the Access based BSC, that will involve even 
more staff. 
• Moving to the DBSA to keep in step with Fleet, and others. 
 
Again the issue of uncertainty emerges.  However, some of the replies have 
clearly confused the Balanced Scorecard with the process, and thus process 
changes will be taken with replies to the next question.  But essentially, it 
seems that only incremental improvements to the PIs are planned.  This 
suggests that people are now generally content with the overall structure and 
content of the Balanced Scorecard, or that interest is declining. 
 
Looking at the process issues in the last two questions, whilst there is a degree 
of uncertainty, there is also a degree of commitment shown to developing and 
improving the process.  Planned process improvements highlighted, in 
addition to the “Don’t knows”: 
 
• Improvements to the IS support of the process, and 
• Risk management. 
o Now delivered electronically.  Development of PIs, including 
risk. 
• Improved alignment of Balanced Scorecards, both vertically and 
horizontally. 
o All new scorecards will be developed using the systems 
thinking approach to ensure consistency and coherency with 
the FEB scorecard. 
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• Wider involvement in the process. 
o More staff will be involved in the performance assessment as 
the access based BSC is rolled out. 
o Involve more staff at a junior level.  A requirement of the DBSA 
and to spread the workload.  Also supports the new HQ 
organisation. 
• Better trend analysis and forecasting leading to more proactive 
management. 
o Greater use for forward looking and risk management; less use 
as a reporting tool. 
• Improved decision management. 
o Greater emphasis on trend analysis to encourage proactive 
rather than reactive management. 
• Need to learn from experience. 
o Recognition of need to learn and develop. 
 
Thus there are some mixed messages emerging from these answers.  Some 
people seem very unclear about how the Balanced Scorecard and its processes 
will develop, whilst other have a clear vision of how processes can be taken 
forward to extract even greater value from the Balanced Scorecard.  This 
would suggest that there is still a degree of commitment to, and enthusiasm 
for, the process. 
 
2.29. Future expectations of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
The next question thus tests the commitment directly by asking about 
organisational expectations of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Again the number of people responding with uncertainty is perhaps surprising 
and stands in contrast to some very positive responses.  Indeed the responses 
almost seem at the extremes.  In addition to the almost inevitable “Don’t 
knows” the responses can be summarised as: 
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• Strong commitment to embedding the concept at the heart of the 
management process. 
o It is the principal XB agenda item and is the preferred 
management medium. 
o Develops into major day to day management tool. 
o That it will continue to be at the heart of business. 
• It will provide a strategic management tool. 
o To enable the Board to give and monitor implementation of 
strategic directions. 
o It will continue to provide a strategic overview of business 
processes and performance. 
• It will drive organisational learning and improvement. 
o Improved output management. 
o Continued improvement. 
• It will drive communication and objective cascade. 
o All down to middle management to have personal objectives 
tied to scorecard.  Fundamental part of performance 
management. 
o A fully populated, database driven version that permits transfer 
of data up to NAVB/DMB and even across to DLO etc.  A 
Balanced Scorecard that may be examined and provide the 
examiner with a clear view of what Fleet strategy is.  A way of 
measuring the success or otherwise of in year achievement or 
corporate objectives, as distilled down to SO1 level throughout 
the new HQ. 
 
Despite a strong, “Don’t know” lobby, most people see the tool as having an 
important role in the management and development of the Royal Navy. 
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2.30. Future developments to extend implementation of the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
 
Another test of commitment to the Balanced Scorecard is to look at any plans 
to introduce other management tools or processes that might conflict or 
detract.  Of course some may complement the Balanced Scorecard, or may 
even have be planned as a result of problems highlighted through using the 
Balanced Scorecard.  There are three main answers in the responses provided: 
 
• Don’t know: 
o Not known. 
o Continuing readiness to introduce useful tools and techniques. 
o Very much dictated by the TLB/Centre. 
These comments, in the main, reflect people who have left the 
organisation and are therefore unaware of current plans.  But this group 
can also include those who see the introduction of new business tools 
and processes as something that is imposed on them. 
• Many: 
o Too many! 
o Performance Management in its totality. 
o Many! Eg EFQM. 
o Many - ISO 9000/2000, IiP, ROSPA, etc etc. 
These may represent the “We must have a new initiative” brigade of 
those who see change as a mark of achievement.  This community is 
viewed with derision by others who believe that there are too many 
initiatives and these initiatives never produce anything worthwhile.  
However, there may also be an undertone here of people who now 
recognised that business tools can aid management and see the 
potential to increase the use of such tools.  Alternatively, such 
responses may be a reflection of a “performance measurement” 
culture.  (The Performance Management mentioned here was a work 
stream within the Fleet First programme aimed at completing the 
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development of the Balanced Scorecard process for the new structure, 
and to facilitate the connection with SO1 level objectives.) 
• EFQM: 
o Business development process instituted - EFQM next - greater 
focus on learning in the workplace - new organisational 
structure under Fleet First at Fleet. 
o EFQM may be introduced in the next five years. 
o Potential for benchmarking and EFQM. 
o EFQM considered, but all initiatives on hold due to HQ 
reorganisation. 
Originally seen as a competitor, EFQM became increasing represented 
as a complementary process. 
 
Thus there is nothing here to suggest that there was any real threat to the 
Balanced Scorecard as a key management process. 
 
2.31. Other comments. 
 
Finally participants were invited to make any additional comments about 
issues that they thought had not addressed, or to add additional specific 
evidence that contributed or supported their views.  (Because some of the 
comments are quite extensive, they have been interspersed with summary to 
aid the identification of lessons.) 
 
• The Balanced Scorecard concept has now been developed with the 
Defence environment and has become a mandated system for 
reporting.  This development was not due to work undertaken in …, but 
… has been well positioned to meet emergent requirements from the 
wider implementation. 
• I left … over a year ago, so my recollection of events has been clouded 
by a busy past year at … - where I have incidentally influenced a BSC 
for our newly formed Management Board! 
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These comments highlight the issue raised above that, having been 
instrumental in introducing the Balanced Scorecard in one organisation; 
individuals have moved on and thus become unaware of the development in 
the organisation which they left.  However, two issues emerge: 
 
• The Balanced Scorecard became mandated as a corporate 
management system. 
• Those people who did move on to other organisations were well 
placed to help in develop of the concept in new areas. 
 
• Within …, the BSC has been introduced, primarily, due to direction 
from Fleet.  Though there was some resistance at the outset, the BSC 
has focused Management Board business, resulting in streamlined 
meetings.  Board Members are aware of their responsibilities and 
know where to focus their attention. 
• But the BSC is only as good as the effort put into its construction and 
subsequent updating.  Areas or issues not identified (and given PIs) 
are not included and can then risk exclusion from SFMB business.  … 
operates an annual review and the new DBSA can accept updates at 
any time. 
• Though the BSC has simplified some of senior management's work, 
there is a considerable chain of work below and this has been an area 
of some growth.  (The DBSA may reduce and spread this work.) 
• As is common with IT systems, rubbish in at the lower levels will 
deliver rubbish to the SFMB.  Extra effort is expended to check most 
inputs; future developments must rely on a central pool of data that is 
collected once, checked once and used many times.  Finally, in using 
the tool, it is absolutely crucial that a constant review of management 
actions is in place.  Capturing and presenting so much fine grained 
information can easily seduce Board Members into thinking effective 
action is in hand, when it is plainly not. 
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• The BSC has proved to be a very good learning tool that has focused 
attention on the more important aspects of the HLB's business.  It has 
also improved consideration of strategic issues and helped to link 
finance to all other business. 
• The downsides are two-fold.  Firstly the BSC relies on a significant 
input from many members of staff.  Counter to this is the (probable) 
reduced workload for senior management.  Secondly the BSC uses the 
PIs in the Management Plan and is therefore only as good as the PIs 
(rubbish in, rubbish out).  However, over time this, both these 
problems, should become less of a problem. 
 
Key issues added here are: 
 
• Improvement of management process. 
• Improvement in management focus. 
• Improvement in the understanding of important and strategic 
issues. 
• Danger of not including all the important issues in the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
• Increased work at the lower levels to support the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
• Proper use of IS to support Balanced Scorecard. 
• Need for accurate information. 
• Measurement is not management. 
 
• But has scorecard approach been of any practical value?  A few 
examples: 
o £48M additional for SHAR from DMB. 
o SHAR pilot FRI.  [Programme to improve retention.] 
o Transfers within DLO to improve Lynx availability. 
o DLO internal funding of submarine repair programme. 
o Enhancements to [HMS] Ocean - no cost to naval TLBs. 
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o Speeding up strategic manpower review (Topmast). 
o Pressure to explore short-term palliatives to front line manning 
problems such as understanding of extent of medical 
downgrading and allied DCSA under performance. 
o This is NAVB taking a strategic view of business performance - 
analogy is to shining a torchlight rather than using a 
screwdriver. 
• Other benefits: 
o Empowerment of board through information. 
o Navy at a glance. 
o Dealing with matters outside direct control (DLO, DPA) ie 
enabling the intelligent customer function and ... 
o Dealing with other suppliers eg … - Westland 
• One of my specific objectives (self set) when I became … was to 
modernise the Navy Board's management tools.  I therefore instituted a 
programme to develop: 
o Output based performance plan. 
o Balanced scorecard. 
o Strategic plan. 
 All in place within 2 years.  Original versions held in DNRP. 
• We do need to align the DLO BSC with other TLBs - eg Fleet, DPA 
etc. 
 
Here the new issues are: 
 
• A number of specific improvements resulted directly from the use 
of the Balanced Scorecard. 
• Improved management of the relationship with other MOD and 
external bodies. 
• Important role of Champion. 
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• …As far as I know, the Naval Support Command was the first part of 
the MOD to use the balanced scorecard, at least at TLB level.  There 
were a number of stimuli, but two I think were particularly significant. 
 When I arrived in 1994, the NSC had only just been set up, with the 
constituents coming from previously independent baronies including 
CINCNAVHOME, Chief Executive Dockyards, DGST(N), and CFS 
himself.  Most of these had not taken kindly to coming under a single 
command.  I felt strongly that there was both a need to find a 
consistent method of measuring and then managing performance 
across these different areas, and that focussing on collective 
performance would be a good way of stimulating corporate as opposed 
to adversarial behaviour.  It was originally at the suggestion of Mr 
Alistair Cumming, then Managing Director of British Airways 
Engineering and our non-Executive Director, that we started trying to 
develop a balanced scorecard - which he had introduced into BA 
Engineering. 
 The second stimulus was the Capital/RAB programme.  You will recall 
the original capital vision of "a department managing by outputs at all 
levels".  This required us to develop metrics for measuring output 
performance in CSAs with our main customers.  It also required us to 
understand the lower level outputs (for example in the NBSA, DGA(N), 
and Ship Support Agency) which contributed to the intermediate ones 
in our CSAs with Fleet.  These then needed to be brigaded together to 
the level of the TLB in order to monitor our performance internally, 
and adjust effort and resource allocations to areas requiring 
remediation. 
 Although we had a rudimentary scorecard up and running within six 
months, it really took about two years before the scorecard was 
making a real difference to behaviour at Board Level, and the 
performance of the Command.  About that time we started forming up 
the Defence Logistics Organisation, and we were able therefore to take 
the Naval Support Command Model and adapt it to the new 
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circumstances.  In this respect the scorecard proved particularly 
powerful in providing a corporate overview of what had previously 
been three entirely separate TLBs.     
 Just before I left the DLO I recall a particularly strong example of the 
power of the scorecard in focussing in Board level attention to analyse 
particularly persistent problems, which was poor availability of the 
Lynx helicopter, in both its Army and Navy versions.  Usually poor 
performance is summarily attributed to lack of resource, and poor 
performance in the supply chain.  It is certainly true that the supply 
chain was put under great strain by the failure of the mono-block rotor 
head, but on further analysis it was discovered that there was also 
poor practice in not dis-engaging the auto stabilisation system when 
the helicopter was firmly tied to the deck with engines running: this 
meant that the aircraft was effectively trying to stabilise the ship, 
which was putting appalling strain on the rotor-heads!   
 Similarly, poor availability of the Army Lynx was often attributable to 
lack of second line maintenance manpower as to lack of the correct 
spares supplier.  What this shows is that the scorecard is not only a 
powerful way of providing strategic management, but it is also a good 
way of forcing managers to look underneath the obvious when 
persistent problems arise. 
 
Issues highlighted include: 
 
• Management’s adversarial behaviour prior to the implementation 
of the Balanced Scorecard, due to individuals promoting their own 
organisational issues and agenda. 
• Benefit of having an external manager as a Non-Executive 
Director to provide high level advice on management issues. 
• Influence NSC brought to the development of management 
processes in DLO. 
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• Balanced Scorecard drives managers to examine underlying 
problems.  
 
• The [BSC] is a fine tool and a very poor master.  Its main use is to act 
as template for describing the business, reporting and, most of all, for 
looking ahead at what must be done to move forward. 
• I would feel that the introduction of a BSC approach in any area where 
I was involved in the future would be a very high priority. 
• The IT systems are inadequate for everyone to embrace the culture.  
Therefore the process is time consuming. 
• A crucial stage in developing a scorecard is to undertake a thorough 
business analysis, this does not have to be an early stage as use of the 
scorecard as a process and tool ought to be embedded early on. 
• As I remember, the BSC was originally proposed by the ASI who were 
implementing Project Capital within Fleet TLB at the time.  CINC 
became engaged with this as a modern management method which he 
could use effectively.  I believe this was one of the first BSCs to be 
delivered in Defence, and was produced with the heavy backing of the 
N8 leadership and costly consultants.  The Fleet BSC preceded the 
founding of the Directorate of Performance and Analysis (DP&A) in 
Main Building which was responsible for the FPMG (now DMB) BSC, 
thus starting a "BSC fever" across the defence organisation. 
 
Additional issues highlighted are: 
 
• The requirement for effective management is not overturned by 
the use of the Balanced Scorecard. 
• The Balanced Scorecard is more than an IS reporting tool. 
• Seen as possible to implement early version of the Balanced 
Scorecard before fully understanding the business processes and 
issues. 
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• Benefits of having consultants (business process experts) albeit that 
they are extremely costly. 
• Introduction of the Balanced Scorecard may have started in 
different places at about the same time.  However, the Royal 
Navy’s use of the Balanced Scorecard was influential in driving its 
use across the remainder of MOD. 
 
2.32. Overall analysis and summary on the questionnaire on the 
introduction of the Balanced Scorecard into the Royal Navy. 
 
Although the questionnaire was tested and comment was invited, the 
experience of using the questionnaire with the target audience has highlighted 
some problems and the need to improve the wording in some areas.  For 
example, having ultimately used the questionnaire in the MOD it is clear that 
wording could have been made more specific to the culture.  Nevertheless 
there do not appear to be any major problems arising from the wording, and a 
substantial quantity of good quality data was provided.  Probably more effort 
should have been made to track down and utilise information from sources 
close to the implementation, although the problems of rapid memory fade 
seem to present some problems for some who did respond to the 
questionnaire.  Similarly, the early development work appears to have been 
conducted by a comparatively small group in many areas, consequently some 
replies from those on the fringes seem to views at odds with those more 
closely involved. 
 
The quality of the responses provided varied somewhat.  Some were clearly 
sceptical.  Others seemed to have a shallow appreciation of the issues 
providing very brief input that did not always conform to the consensus views.  
The researcher has deliberately avoided identifying such views separately 
since such views nevertheless represent views held within the organisation.  In 
contrast other views were rich in detail and may thus dominate views obtained 
6 - 75 
from the survey.  Every effort has been made to be inclusive in terms of the 
input provided. 
 
Considerable changes in attitudes have been articulated by some respondents, 
and there is evidence of concern about management process in order to 
achieve improvements in outputs.  Thus before the Balanced Scorecard was 






• A traditional hierarchy. 
• Having a narrow, short-term focus on local input and output 
issues. 
• Having a reporting culture. 
• Non-strategic in outlook. 
• Becoming aware of the need for a more strategic approach. 
 
Following implementation the following had occurred: 
 
• The Navy had provided the impetus for the introduction of the 
Balanced Scorecard across the whole of MOD. 
• Managers from the Navy Sector were influential in Balanced 
Scorecard developments elsewhere within MOD. 
• There was a more strategic outlook. 
• Management was more focussed on key issues. 
• Management processes were more effective. 
• Strategic changes had been implemented as a result of the 
introduction and use of the Balanced Scorecard. 
• Business process failures had been identified and corrected 
through the use of the Balanced Scorecard. 
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• Internal and external relationships were being managed in a more 
effective manner due to better focus and less adversarial approach 
on key issues. 
• Benefits of modern management processes were recognised 
thereby making it easier to improve processes, eg by the 
introduction of new management tools. 
 
Ultimately the work done in MOD was recognised by Kaplan and Norton 
themselves, 15 and MOD was also being held up in Whitehall as an example of 
a Department using modern management tools. 16  But despite this, there were 
those for whom the experience was by no means memorable.  Some people 
were unable to fully articulate the issues within about a year of moving away 
from an organisation in which they were heavily involved in developing the 
process. 
 
This suggests that for some senior managers there has been a significant shift 
in the business management issues, processes and outcomes.  However, the 
rotation of staff away from such posts does mean that the changes will not 
necessarily be evident to all new comers; it will depend on how closely they 
were involved in previous tours of duty in related posts.  Similarly, some of 
those directly affected by the changes will have reached the end of their 
careers and will therefore not be in a position to sustain the developments, eg 
by promoting the “myths and legends” to other staff.  For others it would 
appear that this was probably just another “initiative”, or management fad, in 
which they were involved and it will not have a lasting impact on them. 
 
3. Balanced Scorecard implementation in CGRM. 
 
In the introduction to this Chapter, and as noted previously, Lt Cdr N Boyes has 
undertaken an analysis of the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard in CGRM’s 
area. 17  Extracts from that work are provided here in order to add an additional 
dimension to the work undertaken in CINCFLEET.  Again the quotations are 
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substantial to give the reader an opportunity to evaluate, for themselves, the cultural 
issues. 
 
In relation to why the work was undertaken, and the attitude of CGRM 18, Boyes 
comments about the driving forces behind implementation, 
 
“Within the Royal Navy [CINCFLEET] was personally seized by the 
need to improve decisions, particularly resource allocations and the 
need to align with the DMB’s process. … The [CGRM] also wanted 
to be involved early with the development of the BSC for similar 
reasons and acted as the lead [HLB] within CINCFLEET, for the 
development of the HLB scorecards.” 19 
 
This supports the issues about the attempts to align with the hierarchy of Balanced 
Scorecards, but may seem to suggest that work at the DMB started much earlier.  
Responses to a questionnaire sent to the DP+A area, but not included so far in this 
Chapter, suggest that initial work on the DMB Balanced Scorecard started in 
September, 1999, and the initial scorecard was introduced in April, 2000.  This is 
about 18 months to two years before Boyes undertook his study and may help explain 
why the issues are presented in this manner. 
 
Another reason for early adoption of the Balanced Scorecard by CGRM was the 
perceived differences in issues and culture that are highlighted by Boyes. 
 
“One aspect of the cultural and organisational difference between 
the Royal Marine Command (RMC), commanded by CGRM, 20 and 
CINCFLEET is worth exploring at this point.  In the main, the other 
Type Commands, and to a large extent the CINCFLEET HQ, are 
‘platform focussed’, whereas the RMC is essentially focussed on the 
trained Marine.  This platform focus goes together with an 
equipment centric view and managing resources for the procurement 
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and support.  Essentially the ‘Navy man the equipment – the Marines 
equip the man’. 21, 22, 23 
  
Boyes goes on to explain that, whereas Naval recruitment and training is undertaken 
by 2SL, RM recruitment and training is undertaken entirely by the RMC.  Thus the 
business issues in CGRM’s area are different to those of CINCFLEET. 
 
“Performance Measurement is not new to the Armed Forces, it has 
been a feature of Defence Management for many years, not least to 
inform the report made to Parliament annually by the MOD.  
However, the scale and pervasiveness of performance measurement 
has increased over time, with the MOD seeming to have an 
inexhaustible appetite for data.” 24 
 
This supports the “measurement culture” referred to by earlier questionnaire 
respondents.  Boyes also highlights CGRM’s hope that the development of the DMB 
scorecard would rationalise measurement requirements and thus reduce the 
administrative burden. 25 
 
The development of CGRM Balanced Scorecard was led by the CGRM COS, at the 
direction of CGRM.  Thus there was both senior management commitment and a 
senior level “Champion”.  An implementation team of the Management Planning 
department was created to develop and implement the Balanced Scorecard.  Both of 
the Management Planners had undertaken MDA training, but were also in contact 
with CINCFLEET, DP+A staff and CINCFLEET’s supporting consultants.  This 
provided the implementation team with the training in support of the process. 26 
 
Reference is made to the selection of an “off the shelf” software solution provided by 
the consultants.  It was the researcher’s recollection that this “off the shelf” solution 
was actually the continued development of the Access development initiated by 
CINCFLEET following the failure of the PowerPoint development.  CGRM were 
influential in helping to develop the further development of Access database. 27 
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Development of the CGRM Balanced Scorecard used the frameworks that by that 
stage were common to both DP+A and CINCFLEET.  However, an iterative process 
was used to define the KPIs, which involved staff from 1* COS down to and 
including SO1s. 28 
 
Boyes explains that the early development of PIs was passed to the consultants for 
incorporation into the database for demonstration purposes. 
 
“During this initial design phase the author observed a fairly mixed 
reaction from the CSOs’ and SO1s’ (sic).  These reactions ranged 
from, ‘I hope this will go away –I’m too busy’, ‘This is really Blue 
Peter Management’, ‘What is the minimum I need to do to met the 
requirement?’, to ‘My area of business is not correctly represented 
here – I should have more KPIs’.  It was clear that despite the strong 
and clear leadership given by both CGRM and COS that the ‘buy-in’ 
by the senior management team was rather less than 100 per cent 
…” 29 
 
The early lessons learned in this development and implementation phase were: 
 
• An underestimation of the work required. 
• Insufficient work on educating people on the concept. 
• Insufficient involvement of wider work community leading to a 
perception that the Balanced Scorecard was simply a planning tool. 30 
 
The implementation team therefore sought to address the issue of gaining wider 
ownership, but were not entirely successful. 
 
“Sufficient progress had been made in the initial design phase to 
enable an outline performance plan for the forthcoming plan year 
[2001/02] to be produced and CGRM was in a position to articulate 
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his strategy in a document called ‘The Commandant Generals (sic) 
Intent’ for inclusion in the plan.  This document provided the 
strategy steer for the remaining development.  It is considered to be 
a good example of translating the vision into tangible terms, the lack 
of commercial business language should be noted and the style is 
well suited to the intended audience.  In general the reverse was true 
of the process and with the term BSC in particular which was 
distasteful to many.  One SO1 had even set an auto filter on his e-
mail application to delete messages on receipt that contained the 
term or its abbreviation.” 31 
 
The next stage of the process was quite rigorous and involved the COS, as Champion, 
holding one or more two to three hour discussions with the CSOs.  This agreed the PIs 
in principle and was followed by detailed development between the individual CSOs 
and the project team leader.  This effectively engaged the top management team more 
fully and thus increased the degree of organisational commitment; although Boyes 
suggests that pockets of scepticism remained, with SO1s tending to reflect the views 
of CSOs.  The total KPIs at this stage was 18, but there were over 600 supporting PIs. 
32 
 
At that stage, full implementation, a series of briefings was programmed to highlight 
the finalised Balanced Scorecard and how it would be used.  A representative of 
DP+A was invited to speak to CGRM’s Management Board. 
 
“As an illustrative example he recounted a recent DMB decision to 
allocate additional resources to rectify a deficiency with ammunition 
for the Royal Marines.  This was in response to a regular periodic 
report that had been submitted by HQRM which had quantified the 
problem and the operational impact.  The punch line to this example 
was that the resources were transferred from the Army because they 
were unable at that time to report their readiness objectively so 
could not articulate the impact of the resource given up.  The 
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audience was suitably impressed, but the author was left wondering 
about the subliminal message being transmitted and where the 
internecine behaviour would impact next.” 33 
 
This comment, together with the one that followed immediately does suggest that 
Boyes may have shared the scepticism of the Balanced Scorecard that others in the 
HQRM held.   
 
“However inspiring and educational the messages and briefings 
were, that this was a fundamentally new management concept for 
changing the way business was to be conducted; it was not easy to 
reconcile with the activity it had generated thus far – which was 
devising a performance measurement system.” 34 
 
The development process, although not fully complete (only about 40% of PIs were 
completely finalised) had taken about 18 weeks.  Also at this stage work was being 
disrupted by Fleet First activity. 35 
 
Boyes goes on to describe the process and issues post implementation.  Despite strong 
support at senior levels, middle management continued to show a pockets of 
scepticism although there were “… islands of enlightenment where staff were quietly 
enthusiastic …”. 36  Review of supporting PIs led to a reduction to about 450. 37 
 
The record of events presented by Boyes supports the conclusions gained from the 
earlier questionnaires.  Boyes does refer extensively to the use of CMG as the 
consultants in this work.  CMG were indeed involved, particularly in the development 
and implementation of the software.  However, PriceWaterhouseCoopers were also 
known to be involved for a major part of the redevelopment in CINCFLEET and in 
the subsequent deployment to HLB level. 
 
The issue highlighted by Boyes, which was not evident from the survey undertaken, is 
the ability and willingness of middle management to frustrate the intentions of senior 
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management.  This should not overstated in terms of as a willingness to disobey direct 
orders, but is important in the context of the results of the cultural survey of 
CINCFLEET HQ that are described in Chapter 7. 
 
4. How successful was the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard in the 
Navy Sector. 
 
Section 2 of this chapter has sought to answer this question from the responses 
provided by those involved in the process against criteria set by the researcher.  This 
section seeks to re-present the material against a different set of measures.  It will be 
recalled that in Chapter 2, the lessons learned by various authors in their 
implementation of the Balanced Scorecard were aggregated into a set of 20 
guidelines.  This framework will therefore be applied to assess the implementation in 
the Navy Sector.  (See Table 2.1.) 
 
Table 6.17: Factors likely to impact Balanced Scorecard 
implementation. 
 Guideline for 
implementation: 




1. Top Level 
Commitment. 
Strong top level commitment, except 
in 2SL.  This is different from Top 
Level involvement.  Much of the 
development work done at SO1 level. 
Yes 
2. Involving more than 
Top Management. 
Other than work done by project 
officers, other levels of management 
not generally involved. 
No 
3. Ensuring a broad 
spectrum represented 
in development. 
Development restricted to senior 
managers and planning organisations. 
No 
4. Agreeing strategy 
before developing the 
scorecard. 
Initial developments were based on 
existing performance measures. 
No 
5. Focusing the scorecard 
on strategic objectives. 
Increasing understanding and focus on 




6. Avoid focussing on 
worthless measures. 
Initial developments were based on 
existing performance measures, but 
increasing sifting of existing measures 
and development of new measures. 
Yes – 
partly. 
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7. Adapt the scorecard to 
meet local 
requirements. 
All scorecards developed locally to 
meet local issues.  Some constraints 
about need to consistent use of PIs at 
all levels.  
Yes 
8. Executives use the 
Balanced Scorecard 
strategically. 
Increasing focus on strategic issues. Yes 
9. Using terms 
consistently. 
Clear articulation of PIs. Yes 
10. Utilise pilot projects. Development of scorecards staged as 
understanding developed. 
Yes 
11. Use experienced 
consultants to support 
implementation 
process. 
Initially no, but the major 
developments in CINCFLEET and 
CFS used consultants. 
Yes – 
partly. 
12. Avoid misusing the 
Balanced Scorecard. 
Scorecards used strategically with no 
interference from higher levels. 
Yes 
13. Construct and 
understand the cause-
and-effect map. 
Extensive and complex cause-and-
effect map developed in CINCFLEET, 
but not known to exist elsewhere. 
Yes – 
partly. 
14. Use the Balanced 
Scorecard to drive the 
compensation process. 
No direct linkages to the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
No 
15. Use the Balanced 
Scorecard to support 
organisational 
learning. 
Initial scorecards in ACNS, 
CINCFLEET and CFS developed as a 
result of increased understanding of 
issues.  2SL’s implementation more 
cosmetic and thus less influential. 
Yes – 
partly. 
16. Balanced Scorecard 
must be properly 
resourced. 
CINCFLEET and CFS developments 
were thoroughly resourced, but ACNS 
and 2SL developments were 
developed locally.  CINCFLEET 
software development eventually used 
throughout MOD. 
Yes 
17. Properly balance the 
IT issues. 
Although creation of new database 
within CINCFLEET developed into a 
major issue, it did not dominate the 
development of the Balanced 
Scorecard itself.  IS developments 
elsewhere were minimal. 
Yes 
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Full explanation of Balanced 
Scorecard provided within 
CINCFLEET and CFS areas at most 
levels in the HQ.  Not explained to all 
staff, and 2SL undertook little 
education beyond those directly 
involved.  Other areas relied mainly on 
self-help, although the Navy Board is 
known to have received presentation 
from major UK company. 
Yes – 
partly. 
19. Avoid over-complex 
and lengthy 
development. 
Again, in the CINCFLEET area the 
development did eventually become 
complex and lengthy, due to the 
creation of an extensive cause-and-
effect map and IS development.  
Elsewhere implementations were 
much less complex and lengthy. 
Yes 
20. Clear objectives for 
Balanced Scorecard 
programme. 
Although purposes were not 
universally recognised, originators and 




At a superficial level these developments score 16 out of 20 items fully or partly 
adopted: perhaps somewhat generously since the four implementations did vary 
significantly.  Nevertheless, this would seem to suggest a very well executed 
programme.  However, it must be recognised that this activity has largely been 
constrained to Headquarters and Shore Establishments, and the Balanced Scorecard 
has not been rolled out across the full extent of the organisation.  Staff at the lower 
levels have no routine visibility of what are still generally regarded as “strategic” 
tools, and little effort is made to use the Balanced Scorecard as a basis for 
communication, and certainly not on a regular basis.  (In the context of the Defence 
Balanced Scorecard, the researcher was present at a Central TLB Finance Conference 
in September, 2003.  Consecutive presentations by 2nd PUS, DGFM and ACDS(RP), 
on the issues affecting the finance community, failed to make any reference to the 
Balanced Scorecard.)  Thus, whilst the Balanced Scorecard may drive the agenda at 
the higher levels, the majority of staff are unaware of the issues being addressed, of 
the strategic intent and the progress being made.  It could thus be argued that the full 
resources of the Department are imperfectly harnessed. 
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Boyes conducts a similar analysis based on 16 criteria developed from the Critical 
Success Factors listed by Kaplan and Norton and Olve, et al. 38  Of the 16 criteria, one 
was dismissed as irrelevant (use of a pilot implementation – on the basis that the 
CGRM implementation could be considered a pilot HLB implementation).  Five were 
assessed as have been fully applied in the CGRM implementation, six had been 
partially applied and four had not been applied.  He assesses, 
 
“Therefore there are ten factors that indicate a weakness in this 
programme and warrant special and particular attention in future 
BSC development within the Royal Navy.  That is not to say that the 
other factors are irrelevant, but only that this programme has 
satisfied them.  An underlying cause for some of those graded 
‘Partial’ or ‘No’ … is the relative immaturity of the programme …” 
39 
 
The failures highlighted by Boyes 40 were: 
 
• Failure to gain consensus that this is a fundamentally new management 
system rather than improvement to the measurement system. 
• Failure to conduct fundamental reviews of Balanced Scorecard measures 
from tactical and strategic perspectives. 
• Failure to review the project against Kaplan and Norton’s five principles 
of a strategy focussed organisation. 41 
• Failure to set achievable but stretch goals. 
 
Boyes assessment of the impact the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard in 
CGRM is that it is difficult to isolate the specific impact that it had. 
 
“As far as the [CGRM Management Board] is concerned, then 
objectively the BSC had very little effect, primarily because their 
behaviour did not change fundamental way and because board 
decisions were not based on BSC information.  … A process of 
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change had commenced with the involvement of key personnel that 
was observable.  The process of constructing the measures to 
support CGRM’s strategy created a focus on process analysis, 
improvement and linkage that was new to many.  The opportunity to 
consider how functional silos contributed to the overall strategy of 
the organisation, in a facilitated manner with the [implementation] 
team and the ensuing dialogue, even with the sceptics, at least 
provided those people with the potential of developing new 
perspectives.”  42 
 
Overall the conclusion is that the rules developed are an effective measure and guide 
for implementation.  Boyes also developed rules and used these effectively for an 
assessment; although his assessment only took place some nine months or so into the 
implementation process.  However, some five to six years after work started it is clear 
that the Balanced Scorecard is well embedded in MOD, with no sign of early 
abandonment.  Consequently, against Holtham’s Management Fad Model 43 described 
in Chapter 1, the Balanced Scorecard would now be starting its decline as a 
management tool.  Even accepting that change in large organisations tends to be slow, 
the Balanced Scorecard may thus have escaped being seen as just another 
management fad, as there are no competitive management tools currently on the 
horizon. 
 
The evaluation of the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard suffered from a number 
of issues: 
 
• Post event evaluation.  It was purely a post-event evaluation with no pre-
analysis of the organisation and the issues it faced.  Consequently the 
assessment of the organisation at a preceding date is tainted by subsequent 
events, including the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard. 
• Low level of interest in management process among many staff.  Few staff 
at senior management levels have any substantial training in management, and 
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their focus thus tends to be on issues that are addressed upwards or outside of 
the organisation rather than on detailed internal process change. 
• Short term perspectives of management.  The short-termism produced by 
relatively “short tour” lengths, for both military and senior civilian staff, 
means that there is little emphasis on long-term gains.  Emphasis tends to be 
on achieving short-term change rather than on sustained improvement.  
Consequently, the interest is in introducing the Balanced Scorecard process 
rather than ensuring that it is introduced properly with a thorough analysis and 
the setting of long-term plans and objectives.  This was most evident in 2SL 
where both written input and more informal verbal input suggested that the 
process and level of involvement were both strictly limited. 
• Limited numbers of people contributing to the survey.  Some of those 
involved in the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard were at a senior level 
and left the organisation shortly afterwards, leading to (perceived) difficulties 
in tracking them down and gaining information from as wide a spectrum as 
possible.  Similarly, not all those invited to participate in the survey 
responded, for example due to a lack of interest in the Balanced Scorecard 
process, or in the analysis of its introduction.  Time pressures for senior 
managers was also a consideration, both in the selection of those invited to 
contribute and the responses received (or not received) from some 
contributors. 
• Potential domination of the views of a few advocates.  The most substantial 
views were provided by a few real advocates of the system.  These views may 
tend to distort the picture overall, although they may also be the most reliable.  
It is not necessarily clear which is the case.  
• Domination of hard issues.  Even in the responses of the advocates the 
emphasis tends to be on the “hard issues”, things that can easily be measured.  
These also tend to be the things that dominate in the measures used in the 
Balanced Scorecard.  Thus in the early scorecards the measures were 
dominated by units of output produced. 
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Although these issues may limit the value of the survey, it is believed that there is still 
sufficient data to make the evaluation worthwhile.  However this evaluation is backed 
up by cross reference to external factors: 
 
• The achievements recognised by Kaplan and Norton, both in terms of the 
award given to the MOD by the Balanced Scorecard Collaborative, and by the 
inclusion of the MOD as a case study in their recent book. 
 
“The ministry’s use of its strategy map and Scorecard has improved 
communication and teamwork within the organisation, enhancing 
decision making.  Equally vital, communication with other 
government offices has also improved.  For instance, the MoD now 
uses its map and Scorecard during funding negotiations with the 
Treasury …” 44 
 
It is acknowledged that these comments relate more to the implementation at 
Departmental level rather than that in the Royal Navy.  Nevertheless the Royal Navy 
was the driving force behind the wider MOD adoption of the process. 
 
• The evaluation of the implementation against the consolidated rules for 
implementation developed in Chapter 2. 
 
Consequently it is concluded that whilst there has been considerable success with the 
Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy, there are indications that there is scope for 
improvement.  In no way is this meant as a derogatory comment; since many believe 
that implementation is a long-term development process.  This research can 
effectively therefore provide a vital link in terms of developing an understanding, in 
terms of “double loop learning”, about how well the organisation is progressing with 
implementation and development.  In particular, whilst the organisation, and the 
individuals involved, can justifiably be proud of achievements, there are key issues 
that need to be addressed to improve the overall process. 
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In particular, the key failure of the Royal Navy process, and subsequently the MOD 
process, seems to be the lack of involvement of the lower levels.  Lower levels were 
never engaged in the development of the Balanced Scorecard, and particularly not 
across a broad spectrum of the organisation.  Consequently the Balanced Scorecard 
has become a Senior Management tool.  In these circumstances the MOD Balanced 
Scorecards can hardly be considered tools that orientate activity at all levels.  
Therefore, if anything were to be added to the 20 rules of implementation as a result 
of this study, it would have to be: 
 
“Managers, at all levels, must use the Balanced Scorecard 
frequently to communicate and reinforce organisational 
direction and achievement.” 
 
Only when used in this way will the Balanced Scorecard genuinely start to become a 
means by which feedback is created, with the potential for the organisation to learn. 
 
However, one other major learning point emerges.  There is evidence to suggest that 
no significant efforts were made by senior managers to corporately develop and agree 
a strategy before the Balanced Scorecard was implemented.  This is particularly 
evident from the substantial rework of the Balanced Scorecard in CINCFLEET and 
the apparent superficial way the Balanced Scorecard was constructed in 2SL.  
Nevertheless, and in support of the successful development of the Balanced Scorecard 
concept for the development of a strategic agenda, the early development of the 
Balanced Scorecard does seem to have helped inspire the FLEET First and 
TOPMAST programmes.  This may suggest that, provided double-loop learning is a 
key part of the Balanced Scorecard process, strategy may be emergent rather than a 
prerequisite for a Balanced Scorecard.  In the case of the Royal Navy this may either 
be because of the influence of strong leaders or because early use of a deficient 
embryonic scorecard highlighted issues and helped build the consensus for a strategy, 
which Kaplan and Norton argue is essential for an effective Balanced Scorecard 
process. 
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5. Impact on Culture. 
 
A key question that this research, and specifically this survey, sought to address is 
whether the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard has changed the culture.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, Schein’s definition of culture was: 
 
• Assumptions – these represent the invisible core elements, such as a shared 
vision or established social attitudes. 
• Values – that represent the preferences that guide behaviour, such as attitudes 
within an organisation or ethics within a society. 
• Artefacts – that represent the tangible material elements of culture, such as the 
language used to articulate the policies and procedures of the organisation, the 
use of acronyms, and the spoken word and dialects of the society. 45 
 
In Chapter 5 it was shown that there was disagreement about the “business 
management” influence within the Royal Navy, and the wider MOD.  Clearly 
therefore the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard has not impacted the culture at 
the deeper levels of “Assumptions”.   
 
Nonetheless the use of the Balanced Scorecard is embedded, at least in the present, in 
the Artefacts of the organisation, as it represents the process by which senior 
managers operate and guide the organisation.  It is fairly clear that it will remain for 
the foreseeable future, having been mandated by the DMB as the main planning tool 
for the Department.  This is not to say that it is enduring, and can be treated in the 
same way as other artefacts, eg the White Ensign, Regimental Colours.  Such artefacts 
are more firmly embedded, and through characteristics such as loyalty have associated 
elements in the Values and Assumptions of the organisation.  However, the Balanced 
Scorecard is one of the key issues explained as part of the development for senior 
managers, and thus forms part of their “socialisation” process at that level.  Arguably 
therefore it becomes a key artefact for senior managers, who form a sub-culture 
within the overall Service community.   
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In Chapters 2 and 3 it was shown that various writers argue that senior management 
are key to setting policy, direction and the organisational culture.  It is therefore 
suggested that one of the key tools that such an influential group use to manage the 
organisation must, consequently, be a key artefact, in its broadest sense.  This means 
that the Balanced Scorecard has affected the culture of the organisation.  However, the 
size and history of the organisation suggest that there is a need for a sense of 
proportion in such a statement.  Artefacts come and go, and the increasing pace of 
change means that durability needs to be viewed in terms of the level of change taking 
place at the time.  Thus the “cat-o-nine-tails” which was used to govern the Navy for 
many years has little relevance in the 21st Century, but is still a key feature of naval 
history.  Indeed again it is an artefact that is linked to deeper values and assumptions, 
eg discipline.  Hopefully the Balanced Scorecard will be remembered as a more 
benevolent means of managing, even if it proves to be a little less enduring.  Arguably 
the Balanced Scorecard links into efficiency and effectiveness, which have a now 
enduring place in organisational values. 
 













Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard.   
This Chapter demonstrates that the Royal Navy implemented the 
Balanced Scorecard effectively, and that there was a consequent 
change of organisational culture precipitating changes in working 
practices across the MOD.  Specifically, the introduction of the Balanced 
Scorecard is credited with precipitating major changes within the Royal 
Navy; Fleet First and TOPMAST. 
Extensive use of questionnaire respondent input was used to overcome 
any researcher bias in articulating the culture.  However, it was notable 
that there was disagreement among respondents on a whole range of 
issues, suggesting that involvement and perceptions varied significantly.
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Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard. 
Supporting case studies. 
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Chapter 6 provided a view of the process and impact of the introduction of the 
Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.  It demonstrated that it had an impact on the 
culture of the organisation, in terms of the processes, activities and attitudes of 
management.  It would be wrong to overstate these issues.  The culture of the 
organisation is much more substantial, in terms of the Values, Assumptions and 
Artefacts.  Yet as the work of Strachan and Buckingham showed in Chapter 5, the 
adoption of business management tools and business language raises passions among 
the military.  Boyes’ comments were also noted in Chapter 5, together with more 
specific evidence in Chapter 6.  This could be regarded as a form of cultural pressure 
for stability.  Yet a change has taken place.  It could be argued that such changes are 
merely climatic issues, rather than cultural.  However, even global warming will 
eventually affect national cultures, eg through changes in agriculture.  Thus any 
enduring climate change within an organisation eventually becomes a cultural change.  
It is sometimes postulated that within Church communities a tradition is created in 
two weeks, and it is a brave man who attempts to change things. 
 
In Chapter 3 it was argued that expanding the role of the Balanced Scorecard, to 
measure and manage cultural issues, enhances the role of the Balanced Scorecard by 
developing it from a mechanistic tool into a softer organic management process.  This 
is consistent with the concepts outlined in Chapter 2, where Kaplan and Norton are 
shown to argue that any issue of importance to the organisation should be included in 
the measurement and management processes.  In particular, the inclusion of cultural 
management model and measurement is seen as enhancing the often weak Learning 
and Innovation perspective of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Nevertheless, as was shown in Chapter 6, the Royal Navy failed to rollout the 
Balanced Scorecard fully to all levels.  Essentially it remained at senior management 
levels.  Organisational change – the creation of the DLO – meant that the concept of 
the “Royal Navy” within MOD was changing.  A significant part, both in size, role 
and importance, was suddenly absorbed into a “purple”, ie Tri-service organisation, 
where influences and management were no longer mainly naval.  Therefore, in 
deciding to take the work forward and examine organisational culture, the researcher 
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recognised that there was benefit in limiting the coverage of any survey.  The 
researcher’s experience gained from conducting the initial survey also indicated that a 
more tightly bounded survey would be easier to conduct and thus probably lead to 
greater success.  Similarly, the cultural influences in a wider organisation would be 
difficult to ascertain and highlight.  It was therefore concluded that the cultural 
surveys would be conducted within the Fleet HQ.   
 
Chapter 4 describes the process and the selection of the surveys to be used.  This 
Chapter will describe the results of the survey.  Chapter 8 will describe how the 
results of this cultural survey were developed further.  Chapter 9 provides supporting 
cost studies before the final overall evaluation and summary in Chapter 10. 
 
In reading this Chapter caution should be exercised.  Where data is interpreted in 
relation to the culture of the organisation it must be recognised that this is the 
researcher’s own interpretation or suggestions of the cause and effect.  Other 
individuals might provide alternative or additional interpretations. 
 
2. The results of the Harrison/Handy survey. 
 
This section outlines the results obtained from the Handy/Harrison Survey run in 
CINCFLEET HQ in September to December, 2002.  (A copy of the survey used is at 
Appendix A to Chapter 3.)  This was six to nine months after the main Fleet First 
reorganisation referred to in Chapter 5.  The process used in this survey is described 
in Chapter 4, and builds on exploration of cultural issues in Chapter 3.  Excluding one 
totally invalid response (only the personal preference was provided) the number of 
responses was as follows: 
 
Number %
Service - correctly marked 44 35.2
Service - containing errors or omissions and requiring remarking 30 24.0
Civilian - correctly marked 26 20.8
Civilian - containing errors or omissions and requiring remarking 25 20.0
Total: 125
Table 7.1: Handy/Harrison survey response rate.
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This represents a total response rate of 41.6%.  Table 7.1 highlights that 44% of 
usable responses contained errors.  The 44 correctly marked Service responses 
represent a small but useable sample.  Using the 26 correctly marked civilian staff 
responses represents something of a risk, because it falls below the desirable 30 
responses, as discussed in Chapter 4.  Care will need to be taken when interpreting 
these results in isolation, but careful cross-referencing with other groups will indicate 
the usefulness of the incorrectly marked results. 
 
Table 7.2 below sets out the personal preference for the four types of organisational 
style highlighted by Handy.  Where the scores indicated that two organisational 
cultures were equally ranked first this is indicated. 
 





Service - correct 4 7 30 0 2 1 44
Service - incorrect 9 4 12 5 0 0 30
Civilian - correct 1 2 19 4 0 0 26
Civilian - incorrect 5 4 14 1 1 0 25
Totals: 19 17 75 10 3 1 125
Table 7.2: Personal preferences for organisational style.
 
 
Expressed as percentages this gives: 
 
Totals:
a b a b a b a b a b a b
Service - correct 9.1 3.2 15.9 5.6 68.2 24.0 0.0 0.0 4.5 1.6 2.3 0.8 35.2
Service - incorrect 30.0 7.2 13.3 3.2 40.0 9.6 16.7 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.0
Civilian - correct 3.8 0.8 7.7 1.6 73.1 15.2 15.4 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.8
Civilian - incorrect 20.0 4.0 16.0 3.2 56.0 11.2 4.0 0.8 4.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 20.0
Totals: 15.2 13.6 60.0 8.0 2.4 0.8 100.0
Table 7.3: Percentage preferences for organisational style.
Power'a' = % of line total
'b' = % of overall total
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This demonstrates the strong preference for a Task culture.  Note too that Table 7.3 
demonstrates a lack of personal preference for a Person centred culture among the 
Service Personnel who marked the survey correctly.  Service organisations might be 
expected to run as a power structure, because of the clear authority structures.  
Civilian staff might be expected to prefer a rules-based role culture, or bureaucracy.  
Surprisingly, among those marking the questionnaire correctly, service personnel are 
much more strongly in favour of the role culture than a power culture.  Civilian staff, 
who marked the questionnaire correctly, are much more likely to prefer a person 
centred culture than a role culture, although the small sample makes a definite 
conclusion here somewhat suspect. 
 
However, the differences between the questionnaires marked correctly and those 
marked incorrectly is highlighted here.  Whilst in both cases the Task culture still 
remains the strongest preference, the overall profile is different, with a pronounced 
shift towards favouring a Power culture among those where the questionnaire had to 
be remarked.  It is unclear from this evidence alone whether this is a genuine bias on 
the part of these individuals or whether this bias was introduced by the remarking 
process.  In favour of arguing that the remarking has not introduced bias is the fact 
that all respondents who provided their name and address received feedback, and only 
two people challenged this feedback.  However, whilst one challenged the 
interpretation of the results the other indicated that the score did not represent their 
true feelings.  This individual provided a new survey that moved their personal 
preference from “Power” to “Task”.  Comparison of the two profiles suggests that 
they were not merely the reverse of each other.  It is unclear whether only one 
individual was brave or interested enough to challenge the result and provide a new 
response.  If this were true then there is an argument that the incorrectly scored 
questionnaires should be excluded.  But to exclude all of these on the basis of one 
instance would be wrong, particularly since a large proportion of the questionnaires 
containing minor errors or omissions, which only required limited amendment that 
would not have substantially affected the results.  Similarly, it has been conjectured 
that those who marked the questionnaire incorrectly may have reversed the marking 
scheme indicating the reverse of their real preference.  Again there was no one who 
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indicated that the response provided did not reflect their true feelings about the 
organisation, although again this may have been due to apathy or work overload. 
 
Table 7.4 below, structured in the same way as above, illustrates the numbers of 
respondents seeing the organisation as being of a particular type. 
 





Service - correct 11 13 15 4 0 1 44
Service - incorrect 4 6 7 12 0 1 30
Civilian - correct 5 10 9 0 1 1 26
Civilian - incorrect 7 9 8 1 0 0 25
Totals: 27 38 39 17 1 3 125
Table 7.4: Perception of organisational style.
 
 
Here the situation is much more even.  Although most see the organisation as having 
either a Role or Task culture (with the numbers more or less evenly split), there are 
also significant numbers seeing the organisation as a Power culture and a significant 
minority of service personnel seeing it as having a Person culture.  The percentage 
figures are as follows: 
 
Totals:
a b a b a b a b a b a b
Service - correct 25.0 8.8 29.5 10.4 34.1 12.0 9.1 3.2 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.8 35.2
Service - incorrect 13.3 3.2 20.0 4.8 23.3 5.6 40.0 9.6 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.8 24.0
Civilian - correct 19.2 4.0 38.5 8.0 34.6 7.2 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.8 3.8 0.8 20.8
Civilian - incorrect 28.0 5.6 36.0 7.2 32.0 6.4 4.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0
Totals: 21.6 30.4 31.2 13.6 0.8 2.4 100.0
Table 7.5: Percentage perception of organisational style.




'a' = % of line total
'b' = % of overall total
 
 
It will again be noted from Table 7.5 that there are differences between the 
perceptions of Civilian and Service personnel and between the responses that were 
marked correctly and incorrectly.  Here, among those marking the questionnaire 
correctly, Service personnel are much more likely to see the organisation as a power 
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culture or a person culture.  Civilians are most likely to see the organisation as a role 
culture, whilst none of them see it as a person culture. 
 
It will already be evident that there is a considerable mismatch between an 
individual’s desire for and organisational style and their perception of the 
organisational style in CINCFLEET HQ.  Table 7.6 below sets out the degree to 
which the organisational style is perceived as meeting the individual’s needs, ie the 
extent of the psychological contract.  Partial matches represent situations where either 
the personal preference or the perceived organisational style was split and this was 




Partial Match Unmatched Totals:
Service - correct 14 3 27 44
Service - incorrect 14 0 16 30
Civilian - correct 6 1 19 26
Civilian - incorrect 12 1 12 25
Totals: 46 5 74 125
Table 7.6: Extent of psychological contract.
 
 
This immediately highlights the fact that the remarked questionnaires show a greater 
tendency to indicate a strong psychological contract, see Table 7.7 below. 
 
'a' = % of line total
'b' = % of overall total
Totals:
a b a b a b
Service - correct 31.8 11.2 6.8 2.4 61.4 21.6 35.2
Service - incorrect 46.7 11.2 0.0 0.0 53.3 12.8 24.0
Civilian - correct 23.1 4.8 3.8 0.8 73.1 15.2 20.8
Civilian - incorrect 48.0 9.6 4.0 0.8 48.0 9.6 20.0
Totals: 36.8 4.0 59.2 100.0









Thus the percentages of unmatched perceptions show a greater difference where the 
questionnaire was marked correctly by the respondent: approximate ratios of 1:2 and 
1:3 compared to 1:1 and 1:1.  This again highlights problems with the remarked 
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questionnaires.  Nevertheless, even taking this data at face value, it does tend to 
indicate a relatively low level of concurrence with perceived organisational style.  
Thus in the best cases only about 50% of staff have a strong bond with the 
organisation, and in the worst case only about 25% have that strong bond.  For an 
organisation that demands a high commitment this is not very impressive. 
 
Although the personal preference may match the organisational perception this does 
not indicate the strength of the contract.  By looking at the strength of the 
psychological contract it is possible that some errors in the marking procedures might 
be eliminated.  That is, if any respondent used “4” as their strongest preference rather 
than “1”, netting off one score against the other merely presents the difference not a 
priority.  However, if the remarking process did create a tendency to overemphasise 
the scores at the extremes of preference, this may not be a valid assumption for the 
remarked questionnaires; although again the degree of remarking is an issue.  The 
table below therefore sets out the strength of the relationship by taking the average 
values for the differences between the scores allocated to personal preference and 
organisational perception.  These are then compared with the average scores for the 
strength of relationship for a role culture and a task culture.  Effectively the difference 
here for an individual score will lie between 0 and 45.  However, scores at the top end 
of the scale will be extreme and are therefore likely to be rare: the exit barriers would 
have to be extremely high to keep anyone in the organisation that was so alienated 
from it.  Extreme alienation would produce an average of 30 for the four scores, 
consequently anything over half of that might be considered quite high. 1  On this 
basis average scores of 10+ would suggest that there is some psychological distance 
and that the organisation ought to be looking to build a score of around 5. 
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Average score - 
Personal 
preference
Average score - 
Organisational 
perception
Average score - 
Role culture
Average score - 
Task culture
Service - correct 10.0 11.6 6.4 10.2
Service - incorrect 10.8 10.8 8.5 9.0
Civilian - correct 11.6 11.7 9.8 9.4
Civilian - incorrect 8.5 9.6 7.0 7.5
Average: 10.2 11.0 7.7 9.2
Table 7.8: Strength of psychological contract for personal 
preference cultural style, organisational perception, role 
culture and task cultural types.
 
 
Here in Table 7.8 it can be seen that the strongest average psychological contract is 
generally with a Role culture, the exception is for the civilian group who correctly 
marked their surveys who marginally prefer a task culture.  It is surprising that in all 
cases this contract is even stronger than that for the personal preference.  But note too 
that the average scores for a Task culture are also generally lower than for the 
personal preference.  The worst score in terms of strength of psychological contract 
(ie the highest score) is generally in relation to how the organisation is perceived. 
 
This shows that because the majority of the staff do not see the organisation as 
meeting their psychological needs, the average score for the psychological contract is 
higher than if they perceived the organisation to be a role culture.  This is perhaps 
surprising in view of the fact that more people would prefer a task culture and more 
perceive the organisation to be a task culture.  Therefore to determine the overall 
strength of the psychological contract, Table 7.9 below sets out the average scores for 
each of the culture types and the overall average. 
 



















Service - correct 14.1 6.4 10.2 10.6 10.3
Service - incorrect 12.3 8.5 9.0 10.1 10.0
Civilian - correct 13.9 9.8 9.4 13.7 11.7
Civilian - incorrect 12.5 7.0 7.5 10.8 9.4
Average: 13.3 7.7 9.2 11.2 10.4
Table 7.9: Strength of psychological contract for 




This demonstrates that the relative preference for the role culture is quite strong, as is 
the reaction against the power culture and that despite it featuring quite highly as a 
preferred style.  But this does show that the average score for the psychological 
contract (ie the score for the personal preference, as shown in Table 7.8) is only at 
about same the average level of the scores for all types of organisation. 
 
Thus, generally, there would be significant improvement in people’s psychological 
contracts if the organisation consistently behaved like a Role culture.  A clear 
intention of the Fleet First HQ Reorganisation was to create a matrix organisation, ie 
to become a more of a “Task” culture.  However, although this was management’s 
intention and considerable effort was expended to sell this to the staff through the 
“Breakthrough” programme, and Handy suggests that this is the type of culture in 
which middle and junior managers prefer to work 2, staff do not appear to have 
“bought-in” to this culture.  This may simply be an issue about the time it takes to 
reorient staff.  There is therefore a degree to which a “Coercive Psychological 
Contract” is operating rather than a “Cooperative Psychological Contract”. 3  If such 
scores continued, management would need to consider whether they wish to revert to 
a Role Culture or whether they need to do further work on cultural issues to improve 
the strength of the psychological contract.  
 
The poor standard of marking, and the necessity to remark questionnaires to gain 
reasonable value from the exercise, does limit the value obtained from this 
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questionnaire.  It is unclear precisely to what extent the remarking has impacted the 
results.  However, the correctly marked questionnaires do demonstrate a poor level of 
psychological contract in the organization, and the remarked questionnaires tend to 
support that conclusion.  There is also a perceived difference between civilian and 
service personnel in their cultural preferences.  This will add to organizational 
tensions. 
 
3. The results of the Denison survey. 
 
As highlighted in Chapter 4, the other survey used was the Denison Survey, which 
provides a completely different type of organisational audit based on culture 
producing organisational excellence.  The expectation at this stage was that data 
would provide further confirmation and understanding of the poor culture.  Data 
provided by the Harrison/Handy survey could be analysed immediately on receipt, 
whilst data on the Denison survey was required to be sent to the USA for processing.  
Consequently the Denison results were received several months after the 
Harrison/Handy survey results, a delay caused in part by a change in the bureau 
processing the data, and the need to collect all the results before the data could be 
compiled.  Fortunately, as described in Chapter 4 the Denison survey was marked 
more effectively by respondents than was the Harrison/Handy survey. 
 
This section outlines the results obtained from the Denison Survey run in 
CINCFLEET HQ in September to December, 2002.  The process used is outlined in 
Chapter 4 and the questions used in the questionnaire are listed in Appendix A to this 
Chapter.  Full details of the survey, including an electronic version of the survey can 
be seen on the internet. 4  124 surveys were received and processed by the scoring 
centre.  Because of the low response rate for this survey it was necessary to 
amalgamate groupings compared to the original intention.  Two logical groups were 
immediately evident: 
 
• Civilian staff. 
• Middle ranking service officers. 
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However, this left three groups that whilst not ideally suited for combination, were 
even less suited to being amalgamated with the other groups above; unless they were 
to be combined with the second one listed to make a very large “Uniformed” group.  
It was therefore decided to create a third group: 
 
• Senior and Junior Naval staff, RM and RFA. 
 
It is difficult to know precisely what impact amalgamating these disparate groups had 
on the results, eg did the Senior Officer scores dominate the overall results. 
 
Standard reports were produced by the Aviat Scoring Centre for each of the three 
groups, plus an overall report for the organisation as a whole.  Each report contained: 
 
• An introduction. 
• A summary of the Denison culture survey concept. 
• A graphic summary of survey results. 
• A detailed question-by-question analysis of results. 
• Suggestions of actions required to improve organisational culture and 
performance.  (Some of which have less specific relevance to CINCFLEET as 
the wording of the questionnaire and the report are more geared to commercial 
organisations.) 
 
The results are presented relative to other organisations responding to the survey.  
Consequently, the scores reported represent the percentage performance relative to 
other organisations.  The scores were graphically represented by the quartile in which 
the percentage score occurs, eg 51 means that score is one percent above the average 
score and is graphically represented in the third quartile.  The Summary section that 
introduces the survey highlights that the database against which measurement occurs 
is 1,000 organisations and 40,000 individual responses.  The survey consists of 60 
statements divided into 12 sections, which are themselves divided into four groupings. 
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The researcher had no clear expectations of where the results would lie overall, or for 
the individual groups.  However, it was nevertheless surprising to find some 
remarkably low scores.  Overall the scores were quite low, with only the score for 
“Strategic Direction and Intent” just scraping into the third quartile, and four scores 
being in the bottom quartile.  It was quickly evident that there was considerable 
disparity between the scores of the different groups with the “Senior and Junior Naval 
Staff, RM and RFA” group at the top, followed by the “Civilian Staff” and with 
“Middle ranking Naval Officers” lagging some considerable way behind.  Whilst not 
an entirely legitimate measure, the following table (Table 7.10), which turns 
percentage scores into points, gives a broad indication of the performance. 5  
However, there was no other method of providing a quick overall comparison 
between the three different groups, because otherwise the scores are only provided at 












12 Section percentages 
expressed as points.
359 515 201 356
12 Section percentages 
converted to points and 
expressed as 
percentage of 1200.
29.92% 42.92% 16.75% 29.67%
60 Question 
percentages expressed 
as points. 1975 2599 1388 2050
60 Question 
percentages converted 
to points and expressed 
as percentage of 6000.
32.92% 43.32% 23.13% 34.17%




The difference in percentages here highlights the problem of this crude (illegitimate) 
method of converting and amalgamating percentages of different issues.  
Nevertheless, it makes the point adequately about the disparity between the different 
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groups.  This does also show that overall the organisational culture is not very good, 
but further analysis at the level of individual questions reveals even greater disparities. 
 
The results of this survey are presented graphically and in tabular form at Appendix B 
to this Chapter. They are also presented graphically in Appendices C to F.  Using 
“traffic light” colours to represent the four quartiles of score level, this highlights the 
overall poor level of the scores.  Looking at the extent to which performance is 
balanced across the different axis, this suggests that there may be some problem on 
the stability/flexibility dimension.  The indications are that the organisation is not 
flexible, primarily because of low adaptability scores. 
 
Against only three statements were Middle Ranking Naval Officers showing a strong 
lead over one or more of the other two groups.  These are shown in Table 7.11 below. 
 










There is a strong culture. 55 71 24
There is an ethical code that 
guides our behaviour and 
tells us right from wrong.
59 85 65
Most employees are highly 
involved in their work.
42 51 19




In two instances the lead is strongest against the civilian staff.  This is perhaps 
unsurprising in the context of a strong culture since Naval Staff are Uniformed and go 
through a training and socialisation process that creates strong bonds to other 
members of the Naval Service, and to the organisation.  Senior civilian officers are 
unlikely to develop a career structure in a single Command, and thus there will be 
much less of a bond between the senior civilian staff and those that they lead at the 
lower levels.  This might help to explain also the stronger perception of involvement, 
ie employment in the services has a long-term impact on external family and social 
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arrangements.  However, in the case of the ethical code, the score for the civilian staff 
is not particularly weak.  This may be because many staff work in areas such as 
finance and personnel, both of which also have strong ethical codes.  RM and RFA 
staff may perceive themselves much more as “outsiders” in the HQ, because of they 
are few in number and more isolated from each other. 
 
In Table 7.12 below the Civilian staff show a strong lead (or joint lead) over one or 
more of the other two groups against 12 questions. 
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Leaders have a long-term 
viewpoint. 63 11 70
We are able to meet short-
term demands without 
compromising our long-term 
vision. 28 1 31
Our approach to doing 
business is very consistent 
and predictable. 58 13 64
There is a clear agreement 
about the right way and the 
wrong way to do things.
70 14 60
There is continuous 
investment in the skills of 
employees. 36 4 68
Teams are our primary 
building blocks. 52 30 64
Work is organised so that 
each person can see the 
relationship between  his or 
her job and the goals of the 
organisation. 48 6 45
Decisions are usually made 
at the level where the best 
information is available.
49 19 45
New and improved ways to 
do work are continually 
adopted. 25 11 47
The interests of our 
customers seldom get 
ignored in our decisions. 41 3 44
Learning is an important 
objective in our day-to-day 
work. 23 6 62
We make certain that the 
"right hand knows what the 
left hand is doing". 66 18 65
Table 7.12: Civilian staff lead over other groups.
 
 
In those cases where the lead is jointly shared, ie the scores are within a few points, (8 
of the above 12) with the Senior and Junior Naval staff, RM and RFA, comment will 
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be made here rather than in the following section that looks at the issues where that 
group leads.   
 
One cultural factor that might affect a number of these issues is that many middle 
ranking naval officers may be on their first or only tour in an HQ.  They may 
therefore be much less clear about the long-term perspectives that operate in the HQ, 
and may be much less clear about the structure, processes and culture, which is 
substantially different from life afloat.  For example, Service staff are expected to 
undertake any required training prior to taking up appointment, whereas there is no 
effective manning and training margin 6 for civilian staff who are expected to make 
time during their day or take time away from their regular work in order to undertake 
training.   
 
Similarly, change will be more evident to civilians who may spend their careers in the 
organisation rather than to those who merely spend a couple of years in the 
Headquarters.  But there may also be an issue about the degree to which change is 
perceived as important.  Again Senior Naval staff will be much more involved in 
authorising change, and they will have spent much more of their time in HQ 
appointments (although not just CINCFLEET HQ).  It is also true that many middle 
ranking service officers do not seem to adjust well to working in HQ roles.  The 
researcher has frequently been told, “This isn’t what I joined the Navy for”, by staff 
working in Headquarters roles.  Consequently such people may feel less empowered 
and less useful than where they had a much clearer and distinct role to fulfil, eg in 
charge of a department on board ship.  Often too Lt Cdrs will be the main working 
level within a headquarters with little in the way of junior staff to support them, and 
then when there are support staff they are often civilian.  Consequently there is likely 
to be a different perception of leadership and team working compared to working 
elsewhere in the Navy.  Similarly, where such staff move from being the Command 
structure aboard ship to being support structure in a large Headquarters, they may not 
easily gain the wider perspective or feel that they have the same degree influence that 
they had previously in their immediate working environment.  The researcher recalls 
that during the Fleet First “Breakthrough” assessments, and during the concurrent 
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EFQM assessment, there was a strong feeling among SO1s and SO2s that ACOSs and 
DACOSs were not effectively communicating the wider picture of events. 7  This 
similarly supports the failure of the Command to use the Balanced Scorecard 
effectively at all levels to articulate the strategic intent and the progress being made.   
 
Civilian staff work predominately in the Finance, Personnel, IS areas, and in general 
administrative support.  It will be recalled that Fleet First produced a massive change 
in the financial structure of the Command.  Similarly too Civilian Personnel 
management was centralised and combined with 2SL’s Civilian Personnel team.  IS 
was also a major facilitator of the new working arrangements.  Thus many civilian 
staff will have perceived that improvements in the ways of working were impacting 
the HQ at the time this survey was undertaken.  In contrast, in order to improve the 
transition to the new HQ structure, there were considerable staff changes among the 
Service personnel during the three to six months either side of the change, but mainly 
post implementation.  Thus the service middle management would probably have 
experienced less change and they would have had less understanding of what went on 
previously.   
 
Another aim of Fleet First, which would have been emphasised to all staff as they 
joined the new HQ, was a desire to better meet the customer need, ie the needs of the 
Front Line units.  Again from work on the EFQM survey undertaken in mid to late 
2002, the researcher was aware that Service middle managers did not feel that there 
was a strong focus on meeting customer demands.  This is understandable, and could 
even be partly attributed to the Balanced Scorecard.  Customer needs are often short-
term issues, whereas the Balanced Scorecard was creating much more of a long-term 
perspective at senior management levels.  Thus there may have been a perception that 
Senior Management was not giving adequate attention to short-term issues. 
 
Senior and Junior Naval staff, RM and RFA showed a strong lead (or joint lead) over 
one or more of the other two groups against 27 questions.  Eight of these instances are 
noted above where the lead was jointly shared.  Those listed here in Table 7.13 are 
where this group showed a distinct lead over both other groups. 
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There is a long-term purpose and 
direction. 72 22 41
There is a clear mission that gives 
meaning and direction to our work. 75 57 43
Leaders set goals that are ambitious, but 
realistic. 52 18 17
We continuously track our progress 
against our stated goals. 66 29 50
People understand what needs to be 
done for us to succeed in the long run.
56 13 36
We have a shared vision of what the 
organisation will be like in the future.
48 22 31
There is good alignment of goals across 
levels. 45 15 20
It is easy to reach consensus, even on 
difficult issues. 45 14 17
We seldom have trouble reaching 
agreement on key issues. 56 23 32
Leaders and managers "practice what 
they preach." 41 5 15
Authority is delegated so that people can 
act on their own. 81 17 15
Cooperation across different parts of the 
organisation is actively encouraged.
78 68 48
Teamwork is used to get work done, 
rather than hierarchy. 62 26 46
Everyone believes that he or she can 
have a positive impact. 40 15 5
Business planning is ongoing and 
involves everyone in the process to some 
degree. 57 15 45
The way things are done is very flexible 
and easy to change. 39 5 10
Different parts of the organisation often 
cooperate to create change. 41 14 23
We encourage direct contact with 
customers by our people. 57 31 36
We view failure as an opportunity for 
learning and improvement. 44 4 22
Table 7.13: Senior and Junior Naval staff, RM and RFA lead 
over other groups.
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If the earlier assumption that the results for the Senior and Junior Naval Staff, RM and 
RFA are skewed by the views of Senior Naval Staff, then this may help to explain 
why so many of these statements are related to the more strategic and higher 
management functions.  For example, eight of the statements (including one covered 
in the previous section) relate to the Mission quadrant, and clearly this is an area 
where senior management will be most involved.  But note also the disparity of views 
on whether leaders and managers practice what they preach.  Similarly if one asks the 
questions: 
 
• Who delegates authority so that people can act on their own? 
• Who encourages direct contact with customers by our people? 
 
Then the answers are likely to be “Senior Managers”.  Thus the significant disparities 
between the rankings on these statements would seem to confirm that the marks for 
this group are distorted by senior management and do not reflect this community as a 
single entity.  In some instances this potential “Senior Managers” distortion can be 
seen to have some bias, but with its impact limited by the remained of the group, eg in 
respect of “The way things are done is very flexible and easy to change”.  In other 
circumstances it seems to not be the full explanation for the high score, eg as in the 
case of, “Authority is delegated so that people can act on their own”.  One reason for 
this is that although the lower service ranks may have comparatively little authority 
and responsibility in overall terms, because they will tend to be “senior” in terms of 
their overall length of service and experience within the Navy, they are likely to be 
given much more responsibility and authority in relation to their specific job.  Thus 
these will often be considered “high status” jobs.  Similarly, Junior Naval Officers 
may either be relatively junior, and thus recognise the importance of the role given to 
them in an HQ, or they will be Senior Ratings promoted to Officer status, and thus 
enjoying similarly high levels of “autonomy” based on extensive service. 
 
The statement, “We continuously track our progress against our stated goals” might 
be construed in two ways: 
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• For senior managers it could recognise the monitoring of effective goal 
achievement, as through the Balanced Scorecard. 
• For civilian staff it may relate to the way that specific objectives are used in 
the annual staff appraisal process, and these are monitored regularly. 
 
In both these instances the score is likely to be higher than for middle ranking service 
officers, for whom neither of these issues is likely to be particularly important.  The 
same may also be true in relationship to the statement, “People understand what 
needs to be done for us to succeed in the long run”, although the lower agreement to 
“long-term” perspectives may help explain the lower scores. 
 
In relation to the statement, “Cooperation across different parts of the organisation is 
actively encouraged”, there is closer agreement between the uniformed groups than 
there is with the civilian group and the uniformed groups.  This may be partly 
explained by the stronger social connections in the service community leading to a 
greater ease in working across organisational boundaries.  In contrast, civilians see 
team-working as more important than hierarchy for achieving outcomes, when 
compared to middle ranking service officers.  Again the group containing senior 
officers may be reflecting desire rather than the true situation. 
 
The existence of a “fear culture” was often referred to during this period of change.  
This could be an interpretation of the results against the statement, “We view failure 
as an opportunity for learning and improvement”.  Middle ranking officers will be 
more likely to see themselves as being “in the goldfish bowl”.  In an HQ they will be 
in more regular contact with senior naval officers more than at any other time in their 
career.  Failure in an HQ will be more obvious for such staff.  For civilians the issue is 
that this is a constant feature, and for senior officers and ratings there is likely to be 
less concern about future promotion prospects, because career aspirations have 
already been more fully met.  (When the “Launch events” for the Fleet First HQ were 
run, one senior officer made a comment in his presentation to the effect that, “If an 
SO1 ‘cock’s up’ they will not be an SO1 for long”.  When it was tactfully pointed out 
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that this was not the sort of culture that we were aiming to create for the new HQ, he 
rephrased it for the second presentation.  He started, “Last time I said … but I’ve been 
told I can’t say that any more.  We have to be ‘pink and fluffy…’”, thereby giving the 
same message whilst playing lip service to the new culture.) 
 
This simple analysis does suggest that the original groups defined for this survey were 
probably reasonable.  Clearly there is a difference between the civilian and military in 
their perception of the organisational culture.  And if the results of the Senior and 
Junior Naval Staff, RM and RFA are skewed by the views of Senior Naval Staff, then 
this means that this creates another distinct group.  What is unclear, as a result of the 
amalgamations is the degree to which senior and junior staff disagree.  But if the 
Middle Naval management group is anything to go by, not only will Senior and Junior 
Naval staff disagree, but it is probable that senior and junior civilian staff will 
disagree.  Thus an important issue is the degree to which there is disagreement.  That 
is not suggesting that one group is right and the other is wrong, just that there is a lack 
of shared culture.  What is a serious issue is the poor scores form the Middle Ranking 
Naval Officers, who form the core of the Headquarters. 
 
The following statements produced a high score: 
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There is a clear mission that gives 
meaning and direction to our work.
59 75 57 43
There is a clear strategy for the 
future. 57 60 55 55
Our strategic direction is clear to 
me. 53 59 49 48
The leadership has "gone on 
record" about the objectives we are 
trying to meet. 59 65 55 56
Leaders have a long-term 
viewpoint. 51 63 11 70
Ther is a clear agreement about the 
right way and the wrong way to do 
things. 51 70 14 60
There is an ethical code that guides 
our behaviour and tells us right 
from wrong. 67 59 85 65
Cooperation across different parts 
of the organisation is actively 
encouraged. 67 78 68 48
People work like they are part of a 
team. 51 56 39 58
We make certain that the "right 
hand knows what the left is doing."
53 66 18 65
Table 7.14: Areas of high score overall.
 
 
In only three cases shown in Table 7.14 is the high score not reasonably uniform.  In 
each case it is the middle ranking naval officers who score lowest.  However, in a 
number of instances one score, although not particularly poor, is significantly lower 
than the top score, eg the first statement shows this pattern.  Thus against only 10 
statements (10.67%) is there a good overall score, with the highest score being 67 (in 
two instances).  This tends to confirm a rather poor culture with a low level of 
agreement even in the positive areas.  The common theme that emerges from these is 
to do with the long-term perspectives of objectives and culture.  The common themes 
here are: 
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• Strategic direction. 
• Agreement about working practices and cooperation. 
 
The following statements, Table 7.15, produced a poor score: 
 

















Our vision excites and motivates our 
staff. 12 29 5 10
We are able to meet short-term 
demands without compromising our 
long-term vision. 16 28 1 31
It is easy to coordinate projects 
across different parts of the 
organisation. 14 23 6 15
The leaders and managers "practice 
what they preach." 18 41 5 15
Ignoring core values will get you into 
trouble. 16 9 15 25
The "bench strength" (capability of 
people) is constantly improving.
19 26 7 25
Problems seldom arise because we 
have the skills necessary to do the 
job. 9 15 7 6
Everyone believes that he or she can 
have a positive impact. 17 40 15 5
The way things are done is very 
flexible and easy to change. 15 39 5 10
We respond well to competitors and 
other changes in the business 
environment. 9 13 3 16
Customer comments and 
recommendations often lead to 
changes. 8 14 3 8
Customer input directly influences 
our decisions. 10 13 5 13
Innovation and risk taking are 
encouraged and rewarded. 15 20 6 19
Table 7.15: Areas of poor score overall.
 
 
These 13 statements all score below 20 percentile points against the overall 
CINCFLEET perspective.  Yet even here there are a number of statements that were 
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included in those where one group had a significantly higher score than another 
group.  Thus again the disparity between the groups is emphasised.  Here the common 
themes seem to be about short-term abilities and activities, although there are strongly 
negative cultural issues emerging too, eg skill development, adoption of core values, 
customer focus, flexibility, trust in the leadership, adaptability, blame-culture.  Of 
particular interest is the conflict between the high scoring statements on strategic 
direction and the lack of motivation by the vision and conflict with short-term issues.  
This might be taken as suggesting that there is a mismatch between strategic aims and 
people’s belief and commitment to them. 
 
The generally low scores achieved in this survey support the suggestion from the 
Harrison/Handy survey that CINCFLEET HQ has a poor culture.  There are 
indications too that senior management has a different view from that lower down.  
There would thus be an expectation that this conclusion would be refuted by 
management, or at least they would attempt to provide explanations why “things are 
different now”.  But the exceptionally low scores against some of the statements, 
particularly by the Middle Ranking Naval Officers cannot be easily explained away.  
Indeed, one of the most worrying features of the culture is probably the disparity of 
view. 
 
The following table lists the statements where there was a substantial disagreement 
between different groups.  Table 7.16 below highlights statements where there is a 
difference of 30% or more between scores for different adjacent sub-groups, when the 
individual scores are ranked in order, ie between highest and middle score or middle 
and lowest score, but not between highest and lowest scores. 
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There is a long-term purpose and 
direction. 72 22 41
Leaders set goals that are 
ambitious, but realistic. 52 18 17
Leaders have a long-term 
viewpoint. 63 11 70
Our approach to doing business is 
very consistent and predictable.
58 13 64
There is a strong culture. 55 71 24
There is a clear agreement about 
the right way and the wrong way to 
do things. 70 14 60
Authority is delegated so that 
people can act on their own. 81 17 15
There is continuous investment in 
the skills of employees. 36 4 68
Work is organised so that each 
person can see the relationship 
between  his or her job and the 
goals of the organisation. 48 6 45
Business planning is ongoing and 
involves everyone in the process to 
some degree. 57 15 45
Learning is an important objective 
in our day-to-day work.
23 6 62
We make certain that the "right 
hand knows what the left hand is 
doing". 66 18 65
Table 7.16: Areas of substantial difference of view.
 
 
Table 7.16 lists twelve statements.  This is 20% of the statements in the questionnaire.  
Here issues that emerge are: 
 
• Leadership. 
• Management and planning of work. 
• Staff development. 
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However, it will be recalled that the Denison model purports to use culture as a 
predictor of organisational effectiveness.  Against this criterion the CINCFLEET HQ 
organisation might therefore be expected to be particularly ineffective.  There is no 
way of independently verifying this, particularly for the period under consideration.  
Had this been a commercial company the financial results might have provided some 
a measure of comparison.  Although an EFQM assessment of the HQ was carried out 
shortly before this survey was undertaken it was not externally validated, and being 
the first such assessment the scoring, although facilitated by an experienced EFQM 
assessor, cannot be considered “robust”, nor was the score widely disclosed.  
Nevertheless, it is a matter of record that the Royal Navy was, at this time, 
undoubtedly, one of the best Navies in the world, however defined.  In that sense 
therefore, the HQ running the Royal Navy must play a significant role.  It is therefore 
questioned whether, 
 
• The low level response, 
• The questionnaire or the model it is built on, or 
• The timing of the survey, 
 
produced a distortion in the results that unfairly reflects the organisational culture. 
 
Although the level of response to this survey was low, resulting in an amalgamation 
of the anticipated groups, the overall sample size was good enough to reflect the 
culture of the HQ.  At the time the size of the HQ was around 800.  The sample thus 
represents about 17%.  The distribution was also such that there was representation 
from all key segments of the population.  Indeed the main population, the SO1 and 
SO2 Naval Officers, were preserved as a discrete group.  Thus it is felt that the low 
response rate is unlikely to have produced a significant distortion in the results.  The 
other work that the researcher was involved in at this time, the EFQM and 
Breakthrough assessments, also support the evidence provided by this survey. 
 
Following on from Chapters 3 and 5, and as highlighted in the introduction to this 
Chapter, there is a strong reaction against business tools and methodologies among 
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the military.  The culture of the military is somewhat removed from that of business 
and thus it is fair to conclude that the Denison model does not fully represent the 
military culture.  Nevertheless, many of the statements being marked in the Denison 
survey can be see as equally applicable in a military culture.  Thus, as highlighted 
previously, it is not simply the fact that some dimensions of the model achieved very 
low scores, but that there were disturbing contrasts between different groups.  For 
example the group that contained the organisations leaders scored publicisation of the 
vision highly, whilst the middle ranking naval offices gave this statement a low score.  
It is therefore believed that although the Denison model does not fully reflect the 
military culture it is not sufficiently flawed in this context to invalidate suggestions 
that the culture of the CINCFLEET HQ was poor. 
 
The timing of the survey was possibly not ideal.  But then what time for an initial 
survey is good; there will always be issues that make a particular time 
unrepresentative.  Arguably with an influx of new staff, who were properly inducted 
into the new Headquarters, or who had chosen to work there, should mean that staff 
would be highly committed.  Nevertheless, there were a lot of teething problems in 
the new HQ, and the split of staff across many interim sites throughout the 
Portsmouth Naval Base, did complicate matters.  This was also a period impacted by 
Op Fresco; support to the Civilian authorities during a Firefighters’ strike.  Had the 
survey been run previously it would have taken place against a background of turmoil 
and uncertainty as reorganisation would have been in the planning, development or 
implementation stages.  Had the survey been delayed it would have been conducted 
during the run up to Op Telic, and would probably have attracted much less of a 
response due to other priorities.  Thus whilst the timing of this survey may have 
detracted from the results by producing a somewhat false picture, it is argued that any 
alternative timing would probably also be argued by some constituency or other to be 
an inappropriate time that led to false results. 
 
On balance therefore it is argued that the results probably represent a poor 
organisational culture as measured at that point in time.  That is, it represents a poor 
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business culture in a Headquarters that is also dominated by a military culture that 
embodies other issues that are not measured. 
 
4. From Measurement to Management. 
 
4.1. Outline of the basis for management. 
 
The scope of this research does not allow for full consideration of culture 
management for two fundamental reasons: 
 
• The management process is yet a third large topic that would take an 
enormous amount of time to do complete justice and, since the culture 
of organisations is so diverse, the issues that would need to be covered 
are numerous and would necessitate substantial generalisation. 
• Culture is a relatively enduring phenomenon and therefore most 
appropriate to a longitudinal study, because any action taken would 
take some time to mature and show tangible and measurable results.  
This would not fit within the timeframe for an already lengthy research 
project.  Neither does the researcher have the sponsorship to undertake 
such a lengthy management intervention. 
 
However, culture measurement cannot realistically be seen as an end goal in 
itself; it does not pass the “so what” test.  Neither does the researcher 
subscribe to the notion that simply by measuring something like culture that 
management would achieve the desired goal.  Culture would undoubtedly have 
to be the subject of a complex PI, but not one that would simply demonstrate a 
“more” or “better” goal.  For example, using one of the standard models 
highlighted in Chapter 3, improvements in the overall score might still ignore 
an aspect of culture that was fundamentally and dangerously flawed if it were 
not contextualised for a particular culture. 
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Therefore, to demonstrate the importance of turning culture measurement into 
culture management, it is proposed to build on the results of the surveys in this 
Chapter by examining the type of action that management might have taken to 
improve the culture of CINCFLEET HQ.  This is done using the contextual 
information provided in Chapter 5.  This section is thus tailored to one specific 
organisation.  General advice on cultural management related to a particular 
model seems to often be offered by those providing models. 
 
4.2. Issues for cultural management arising from the Harrison/Handy 
survey. 
 
It will be recalled that only limited, sound information was obtained from the 
results of the Harrison/Handy survey.  This can be summarised and addressed 
as follows: 
 
• Substantial support for Role Culture – This was in an organisation 
that was converting from a Role Culture to a Task Culture and this may 
reflect an allegiance to the past which should not be ignored. 
• Strong preference for Task culture – The fact that there is a 
preference for a Task culture is encouraging.  The fact that there is a 
strong perception of the organisation as a Role Culture is 
understandable but worrying.  Management need to build on the desire 
of staff for a Task Culture by advertising the results of the survey and 
articulating the benefits of a Task Culture. 
• Strong perceptions of the organisation as either Role or Task 
cultures, and strongest psychological contract for Role Culture – 
The leanings towards a Role Culture need to be countered by 
reinforcing the mechanisms of a Task Culture, for example, by expert 
facilitation, ensure that the change takes place at a working level, and 
that successes are highlighted.  This is probably the most significant 
aspect to be addressed.  The penalties of the Role Culture also need to 
be highlighted.   
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• Elements of support for Power and Person cultures – The presence 
of a potential significant minority who prefer Power or Person Cultures 
needs to be managed carefully.  The “Command” culture of the 
military environment must not be ignored, since this may rightly push 
people, particularly in certain circumstances, toward a Power Culture.  
However, management should monitor behaviour carefully to ensure 
that individuals do not overuse or abuse power.  There should be an 
emphasis on delegation, empowerment and knowledge sharing.  
Emphasis should be on placed on Teams and Team working.  Reward 
should be orientated towards teams rather than individuals.  Training 
should emphasise flexibility and broad perspectives not simply narrow 
disciplines and role focus.   
 
4.3. The Denison Survey. 
 
The Denison survey provided more information than the Harrison/Handy 
survey, and it was more specific about key cultural issues.  The full details of 
the results can be found above, and reference can also be made to the Denison 
Organisational Culture website. 8  A summary of some of the key issues is: 
 
• Overall the scoring was low, suggesting a poor (or weak) culture. 
• Different groups within the HQ had significantly different opinions. 
• The Middle Ranking Naval Officers in particular seem to have a poor 
opinion of the culture. 
• The highest scoring section was the Senior Officers and Junior Naval 
Staff, RMs and RFA.  (There may be some distortion here reflecting a 
rosy view of life from Senior Naval Officers and the more Senior 
Ratings.) 
• Overall the strongest issue, common to all groups, was the Strategic 
Vision and Intent. 
• The next strongest was Team Orientation, but opinions on this differed 
much more. 
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• Capability Development, Creating Change and Customer Focus were 
the weakest areas.  The scores were dragged down particularly by the 
Middle Ranking Naval Officers. 
• The Senior Officers and Junior Naval Staff, RMs and RFA also rated 
the Goals and Objectives and Agreement segments highly.  
• Middle Ranking Naval Officers rated the Vision and Organisational 
Learning sectors very low. 
 
Management must take the poor culture seriously and invest time and effort, 
and perhaps additional financial resources, into addressing this generally and 
the key weaknesses specifically.  Note that even the “strong” elements of the 
culture are only strong relative to the other scores, not in relation to high 
performing organisations.  Thus there is no scope for any real confidence.  It is 
recommended that a long-term programme of culture management should be 
established to address problems.  This will start with period of further 
assessment of the culture to identify the specific impacts and penalties of the 
poor culture, and a programme of education of cultural leaders, particularly 
senior managers.  The future role of these cultural leaders in improving culture 
needs to be identified to ensure that there are individuals with specific 
responsibility for targets and improvement programmes. 
 
Differentiation of groups represents problem.  Increased effort needs to be 
made to build relationships across boundaries; not simply organisational 
boundaries, but social and status boundaries.  The “big team” needs to be 
emphasised.  The HQ represents a different environment for Naval Staff to the 
environment of operational units or training establishments.  Real efforts need 
to be made to identify and reinforce benefits that can make working in the HQ 
a worthwhile experience for service and civilian staff.  Failure to address this 
issue could result in a decline in perceptions as staff move to other posts and 
articulate poor views of their experience. 
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The Middle Ranking Naval Officers have a generally poor perception of the 
HQ and their role.  Their contribution needs to be explained and their 
importance emphasised.  External facilitation would probably be beneficial in 
order to gain greater clarity of the issues of this key group.  This would enable 
staff to express issues without fear of retribution.  The importance of their jobs 
in the HQ, in relation to their career development, also needs to be emphasised 
to enable staff to understand the potential personal benefits. 
 
The comparatively more positive views of the Senior and Junior Naval Staff, 
RMs and RFA personnel needs to be understood.  This could be the basis of 
spreading a more positive story through the wider organisation; spreading the 
“myths and legends” of those who have had a positive experience.  Care will 
need to be taken that messages are not simply refuted on the basis that the 
experiences are not widely shared. 
 
The comparatively strong opinion of the Strategic Direction and Intent is only 
strong compared to the other scores indicated.  Overall these factors still only 
score about 50%.  The disparity of the scores between the different groups (20 
point spread) does suggest that the Strategic Direction and Intent is not 
consistently understood or shared.  The aim must be to share this on a more 
regular basis and ensure that it is relevant to the organisational members.  
There are two issues that are relevant here:  
 
• The failure, demonstrated in Chapter 6, to use the Balanced Scorecard 
effectively to communicate strategic issues to all staff.  The Balanced 
Scorecard should therefore be used more proactively. 
• A long-term vision (15 years) may have little relevance to many staff 
(particularly naval staff) in the HQ who will already likely be in their 
mid to late career.  Inevitably the Strategic Direction for an 
organisation like the Navy must be set for such timescales, because of 
the long gestation period for equipment programmes that may also be 
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seen as a threat to the structure and shape of the Navy and its culture, 
see Chapter 5. 
 
In respect of Team Orientation there is a 27 point gap between the top and 
bottom groups.  Again it is the Middle Ranking Naval Officers who share least 
in this perspective.  This may be because they see themselves has having less 
of a stake in the orientation and running of HQ than they would like; perhaps 
because they had a stronger team development role in their previous roles 
outside the HQ.  Efforts might therefore be made to use such staff more 
proactively in team and group activity, both in work and social contexts.  This 
is not simply creating a role but working to build across the whole of the 
“Involvement” Sector (See Figure 3.9) in order to engage staff in the 
organisation and its culture.  (Remember that for service personnel the Service 
culture can be a 24 hour a day experience for long periods.) 
 
With a comparatively high score on Strategic Direction and Intent, and during 
a period of change, the low scores for Capability Development, Creating 
Change and Customer Focus might seem surprising, particularly as the Fleet 
First changes were aimed at improving the focus on the Fleet.  However, all 
three groups show a low score, albeit that the Middle Ranking Naval Officers 
are again over 20 points lower than the top group.  This may reflect: 
 
• A generally negative attitude towards change. 
• A failure of senior management to motivate and engage staff in the 
change process or to articulate the benefits effectively. 
• A general distaste among Middle Ranking Naval Officers for working 
in the HQ. 
• A failure to demonstrate how the HQ adds real value to the overall 
process of preparing the Fleet for Operations. 
• A failure to address what Operational units see as the real needs. 
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Further research into the issues underlying the poor scores is essential if 
management is to tackle these issues.  In particular there is a need to address 
the perceived poor focus on customers.  If Middle Ranking Naval Officers are 
arriving in the HQ with this perception, and the HQ is not dispelling this fear, 
or is perhaps reinforcing it, then when they return to other duties they are 
likely to communicate this to others thereby perpetuating the perception.  This 
is an instance where the sub-culture is not following the lead of Senior 
Management. 
 
Senior Officers and Junior Naval Staff, RMs and RFA rated the Goals and 
Objectives and Agreement segments highly compared to other issues.  This 
may be because the senior officers where particularly involved in the 
development, and agreement, of the objectives, whilst junior staff have no 
expectation of involvement in these activities in a “Command” structure.  This 
may therefore be a function of how the measure was taken.  Thus the 
difference with the Middle Ranking Naval Officers is important (over 30 
points in both cases) since it may suggest an unfulfilled expectation of 
involvement on the part of the latter group. 
 
Whilst they understand the Strategic Direction and Intent, the fact that the 
Middle Ranking Naval Officers do not share the Vision is particularly 
worrying.  This group potential are the future owners of that Vision.  This may 
reflect an organisation in constant retrenchment whilst struggling to meets its 
apparently expanding commitments.  This may come from the narrower 
perspectives of middle management compared to senior management.  
Similarly, the poor perception of Organisational Learning among this group 
may reflect a perception that the realities of need are not being met.  This may 
link not only to their perception that the organisation is failing to meet 
customer need but also that it is not developing the individuals within the 
organisation. 
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4.4. Developing a Culture Management Plan. 
 
The actions outlined in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 represent a significant body of 
work.  Developing a plan that addressed all these issues would potentially 
create confusion, although the concept of following a clear cultural model may 
assist in gaining acceptance of a wider action plan than simply articulating a 
list of actions.  The following are therefore offered as the initial core actions to 
embark on a programme of culture improvement: 
 
• Embark on a facilitated programme of education for the leadership to 
improve their understanding of the culture and their role in managing 
it. 
• Senior management must be more proactive in communication across 
all levels of the HQ, particularly in terms of the vision and strategic 
objectives, but also in terms of identifying, rewarding and highlighting 
good practice and outcomes. 
• Engage Middle Ranking Naval Officers more effectively in the 
decision making and in creating effective team building. 
• Ensure the vision, goals and objectives are more effectively linked to 





Chapter 6 concluded that the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard in 
CINCFLEET had been reasonably successful and had had a positive impact, but 
limited in the respect that it impacted the business processes, particularly at the more 
strategic levels.  This Chapter concludes that the organisational culture of the 
CINCFLEET HQ was quite poor, with relatively low levels of psychological 
commitment, and a poor business culture that might therefore be having a negative 
impact on organisational effectiveness.  The results of the two surveys thus seem to 
support each other.  The Denison survey result suggests a major problem existed with 
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middle management, and this is supported by a very limited amount of evidence from 
Boyes that was presented in Chapter 6 that related to the pre-Fleet First organisation.  
The failure to fully implement the Balanced Scorecard concepts may be seen as an 
impediment to overturning organisational problems in respect of the contribution that 
culture management makes to successful management and outcomes.  Nevertheless, 
despite the problems articulated below, the outcomes of the surveys can be shown to 
produce an action plan to address identified problems.  This underpins the concept 
that measurement is a key to effective management.  However, measurement on its 
own is not seen as worthwhile.  Proactive management of the culture is essential. 
 
It is argued therefore that two issues need to be addressed: 
 
• Proper and fuller implementation of the Balanced Scorecard in terms of the 
lessons identified from other implementations, as highlighted in Chapter 2. 
• More effective management of the cultural issues, by: 
o Better recognition and management of the benefits to be obtained from 
improved management processes. 
o Effective and on-going management of the organisational culture, 
particularly through a period of substantial, indeed on-going change. 
 
This second point has been highlighted previously in Chapter 3, and is supported by 
the Balanced Scorecard concepts of management through effective planning, 
management, measurement and adjustment of plans: the Double Loop Learning cycle 
highlighted in Chapter 2.  Chapter 3 also highlighted the need for a model to underpin 
such management, in the same way that the cause-and-effect model underpins and 
defines the Balanced Scorecard processes.  This Chapter, coupled with some of the 
issues raised in Chapter 4, suggests that neither the Harrison/Handy nor Denison 
surveys are ideal for this role: Harrison/Handy is too complex and merely audits the 
organisational style and individual commitment to it; Denison provides a much more 
detailed examination of cultural issues, but is not tailored to the military culture, and 
is quite expensive.  It is therefore concluded that a new cultural model is required to 
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facilitate effective management of the organisational culture in CINCFLEET HQ.  














Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard.   
Cultural survey results. 
Serious weaknesses in the methodology used to quantify the 
organisational culture of CINCFLEET HQ limited the value of the survey 
undertaken.  However, there was sufficient evidence to suggest that not 
only was the overall culture poor but that there was considerable 
disagreement in the organisation.  This suggests that the organisational 
effectiveness might be low, yet at the time this research was being 
undertaken, CINCFLEET was effectively managing and preparing for 
Operations.  Culture measurement is a precursor to effective 
management, because it facilitates the development of a targeted 
management action plan. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard. 
Supporting case studies. 
Summary of conclusions. 
Figure 7.2 
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End notes: 
                                                 
1 The average score across all four organisation types is arrived at by taking the worst match 
represented by scores of: 60, 45, 30, 15, matched against: 15, 30, 45 and 60.  This produces the 
psychological contract profile of 45, 15, 15 and 45.  This totals 120, which when divided by 4 gives an 
average score of 30.  The strongest psychological contract would be a complete match that would total, 
and average 0.  It is therefore suggested that anything over the difference between these two scores 
probably represents quite a strong psychological distance between the individual and the organisation.  
(The order of organisational preference is irrelevant here.) 
2 Handy, C.  (1985).  Understanding Organisations (3rd Edition).  Penguin.  Pages 194 and 195. 
3 Ibid.  Pages 43 and 44. 
4 See http://www.denisonculture.com/culture and 
http://www.denisonculture.com/samplesurveys/culture accessed on 16th January, 2002 and 11th 
January, 2002 respectively. 
5 Percentage scores are relative scores to the whole database, whilst converting these into 
straightforward scores might suggest a more direct measurement system. 
6 Manning and training margin is a mechanism used particularly in the Services to ensure that front-line 
units can have a full complement, whilst still allowing for rotation etc through career courses, or to 
cope with injuries that put staff into “non-effective” categories. 
7 The eight key principles articulated by the “Fleet First” programme had sought to address this issue.  
These were termed “Ways of working” and were: 
• Consider the “big picture”. 
• Focus on service and outcomes for Fleet. 
• Think and operate as a Fleet HQ team player. 
• Take ownership and responsibility. 
• Build relationships and communicate effectively. 
• Develop people and their capability. 
• Challenge and improve Fleet HQ working practices. 
• Share your knowledge and make use of corporate knowledge. 
These were published in many ways, including on credit card sized plastic cards issued to all staff. 
8 Denison, D. R.  (2000).  The Denison organisational culture survey.  
http://www.denisonculture.com/culture accessed January, 2002 
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Chapter 8: Developing a cultural measurement and management tool 














Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard.   
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard. 
Chapter 7 appeared to show that the culture of CINCFLEET HQ was 
poor.  However, deficiencies in the surveys used and in the methodology 
used to collect the data meant that more research was required.  
Certainly neither of the cultural surveys used had been seen as being 
suitable for regular use for measuring cultural development; a simple 
and cheap tool was required. 
The aim of this Chapter is therefore to develop and test a cultural 
measurement tool specifically for the CINCFLEET HQ. 
Supporting case studies. 
Summary of conclusions. 
Figure 8.1 
 
8 - 2 
 
1. The Balanced Scorecard. 
 
In Chapter 2 the Balanced Scorecard was examined.  The need to have PIs that helped 
management to deliver strategic objectives was noted.  Such PIs, and the underlying 
cause-and-effect model, should enable the corporate objectives to be articulated and 
understood at all levels of the organisation.  Yet to contain the necessary issues within 
about 20 PIs, as recommended by Kaplan and Norton, is demanding.  Consequently 
complex PIs have been advocated, eg by M G Brown, Becker et al, as a means of 
consolidating issues into something understandable but significant and relevant. 
 
The use of the Balanced Scorecard is aimed at delivering significant performance 
improvement.  Such improvements both necessitate and demand changes in attitude 
and action from people at both an individual and collective level.  This can be 
articulated as a change in climate and culture for the organisation.  Such change needs 
to be positively managed but should contribute to the success of the organisation.  
Failure to embed changes into the organisation will lead to behaviours and attitudes 
reverting to those prevailing before the changes were attempted.  This is because the 
prevailing culture of the organisation will normally resist change.  These issues were 
discussed in Chapter 3, which also examined ways of measuring culture.  Chapter 4 
looked briefly at the issues of the legitimacy of measuring culture, and also 
considered briefly the issues of the difference between culture and climate. 
 
Chapter 5 introduced CINCFLEET as the organisation that would be used in this 
research.  It described some of the issues driving organisational change, the changes, 
and impact of those changes.  This followed through into Chapter 6, which examined 
the process and impact of implementing the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.  It 
concluded that there was some impact on organisational culture, albeit probably at the 
more superficial levels of “artefacts”, and even then mainly within the “senior 
management” sub-culture.  It was also concluded that whilst the implementation of 
the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy was largely successful it had failed to 
penetrate deeply into the organisation. 
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This failure to penetrate the lower levels of the organisation will limit the contribution 
that all individuals are able to make, because activities will not be linked and 
orientated towards commonly held goals.  Chapter 7 looked at the degree to which 
there is a shared culture within CINCFLEET HQ.  It was clearly shown that there 
were substantial differences of culture within different sub-groups.  In particular, the 
middle ranking Naval Officers seemed to have a poor culture, which was not shared 
by other members of the organisation.  However, it was recognised that the cultural 
instruments used to measure the culture were not wholly appropriate for the task of 
regular measurement: the Handy/Harrison survey was complex and really only 
suitable for a managed intervention; the Denison survey was expensive and not 
entirely geared to the military environment. 
 
However, it is has been argued that if management are to manage an issue then a 
measurement process is required that consistently measures that issue and enables 
management to take appropriate action.  The impact of that action should be 
determinable.  In other words, there needs to be an underpinning model, similar in 
concept to the cause-and-effect model, which enables a complex issue to be managed.  
In Chapter 2 one of the identified criteria for the success of the Balanced Scorecard 
was taut definition and consistent use of terminology in the use of PIs.  This Chapter 
will therefore show how an appropriate model was developed to measure culture 
within CINCFLEET HQ. 
 
2. Criteria for the development of a cultural measurement tool. 
 
Balanced Scorecard data will have an associated periodicity for measurement.  Data 
might, for some PIs, be measured daily, but strategic management is unlikely to 
involve frequent use of such data.  Only if there were a very significant change in the 
trend of such data would senior management collectively be involved.  By definition 
“strategic issues” are unlikely to need corporate review of decision at a frequency of 
less than a month, unless the business as whole was highly volatile.  Thus, for 
example, Balanced Scorecards in MOD are mainly quarterly.  That is not to suggest 
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that decisions are required on a quarterly basis on all measures merely that these are 
the strategic issues that need to be considered in concert. 
 
• Therefore the first criterion that needs to be applied is that data can be 
collected quarterly.  This will enable trends to be established, rather than 
necessarily resulting in specific actions. 
 
Chapter 4 highlighted the issues about sample size required for a valid sample, whilst 
Chapter 7 highlighted the poor response rate.  The researcher’s own experience 
managing the annual internal “Staff Attitude Survey” within CINCFLEET HQ was 
that a 40% response rate would be a good outcome.  Thus the survey must cover 
sufficient staff to ensure adequate response, but repeatedly surveying the same staff is 
likely to lead to “survey fatigue” with a consequent reduction in the response rate.  
Therefore there is a need to recognise that a survey of this nature will need to be based 
on a sample rather than the total population. 
 
• There is a need to ensure that the number of responses received is sufficient 
for good statistical analysis. 
 
However, there is also a need to consider whether the group surveyed would be 
treated as a whole or whether it would be stratified in any way.  Trice and Beyer 
highlight the differences of opinion as to whether organisations are an amalgam of 
sub-cultures or whether there is a single or overarching organisational culture. 1  This 
supports the concepts outlined in Chapter 5 (see Figure 5.5) of an overall culture 
containing or built up from subcultures.  Experience with the Denison survey reported 
in Chapter 7 suggests that there might be significant differences between different 
groups within the CINCFLEET HQ.   
 
• Although the survey responses in total may represent the overall 
organisational culture, there may be a need to recognise different subcultures 
within that in order to address particular constituencies or sectional interests. 
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Consequently there is a tension between keeping the survey small and recognising the 
overall culture, and expanding the size of the survey to recognise different 
constituencies.  Expansion of the measurement beyond the boundaries of the 
CINCFLEET HQ might add to the complexity.  This is because the issues of 
importance may vary according to where the boundary is drawn.  For example, whilst 
attempting to measure the culture of the Royal Navy could be entirely legitimate, the 
activities undertaken in such a widespread organisation would raise different issues.  
Attempting to address this diversity adequately would increase the number of issues 
that would need to be covered by the survey. 
 
• There is a need to establish a manageable organisational size and boundary in 
order to limit the range of issues to be considered. 
 
The survey will need to be based on a clear model in order to be able to effectively 
interpret the results and to facilitate management action.  Results that are not linked to 
clear concepts could result in management taking suboptimal action that addresses 
sectional interest rather than dealing with overall organisational aims and objectives. 
 
• There is a need for a clear model that facilitates overall understanding of 
cultural issues but which also facilitates measurement of cultural elements. 
• A model should be linked to organisational objectives and achievements and 
not simply be an isolated measurement of culture. 
 
Chapters 5 and 7, in particular, highlighted that the military have specific cultural 
features that are not necessarily common elsewhere.  Chapter 3 highlighted the issues 
of national culture in the context of acceptance of management tools and models.  
This too suggests that culture must be taken into account when implementing a 
management tool, such as a cultural measurement tool.  
 
• Any model should be appropriate to the organisation in which it is to be used. 
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In order to encourage staff to respond, in addition to all the management issues (eg 
management support, and perceived management action on the results), the survey 
will itself need to encourage completion by being quick and easy to complete. 
 
• The survey will need to be well designed and presented. 
• The survey should be relative short and simple to complete. 
 
Chapter 7 highlight issues of poor culture within CINCFLEET HQ.  If this diagnosis 
is accepted then it is likely to mean that a “fear culture” exists.  This will militate 
against an adequate response level and against accurate response to the questionnaire. 
 
• The survey will need to be anonymous in order to overcome any fear of 
retribution. 
 
Working in a Service environment there are constant pressures to reduce 
administrative cost in order to ensure resources are directed to Front Line activity.  
Repeating the survey on a quarterly basis will add to cost, and thus is likely to attract 
criticism. 
 
• The cash and economic cost of the survey needs to be minimised.  That is, not 
only must the use of external resources be kept to a minimum, internal costs 
must also be minimised. 
 
In summary, the survey will need to be: 
 
• Conducted quarterly, 
• Based on a sample size that addresses the level of response required, 
• Based on a sample size that addresses major sub-cultures within the 
organisation, 
• Addressed to a clearly bounded organisation, 
• Based on a model that addresses clearly articulates cultural features, 
• Based on a model that addresses specific management objectives, 
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• Based on a model that addresses the specific cultural features of the target 
organisation, 





Some of these features are in direct conflict and thus the construction of the survey 
presents a distinct challenge, eg recognising subcultures and having a sufficient 
quarterly sample to adequately represent these groups.  To this challenge is added the 
desire of developing a repeatable process to enable other organisations to meet similar 
requirements.  If this objective can be met within an organisation in the Royal Navy, 
and is successful, then other Service organisations may wish to follow suite. 
 
3. Development of the tool. 
 
The process of developing the final version of the measurement tool, described here, 
was inevitably somewhat convoluted, iterative, evolutionary, elusive, and in part even 
ethereal, as might be expected in phenomenological research.  The description of the 
development here is therefore an attempt to describe the development in a more 
coherent and understandable manner. 
 
Firstly, a table was compiled of various models that might be relevant to the 
measurement of the organisational culture in a military environment.  These were: 
 
• Denison’s Organisational effectiveness tool. 2 
• Ainslie’s six measures of Military Ethos. 3 
• Stouffer’s Cohesion and combat effectiveness. 4 
• Shils and Janowitz’s Cohesion in the Wehrmacht. 5 
• Moskos’ Cohesion and battle-survival. 6 
• Shamir’s Leadership influence on cohesion. 7 
• Gal’s Unit morale or climate. 8 
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• Henderson’s Human element in combat. 9 
• Price’s Factors influencing psychiatric casualties. 10 
• Grossman’s Learning to kill in war. 11 
• CSIS Report Measuring US Military culture. 12 
• Johnson’s culture web. 13 
• Cartwright's Nine Factors. 14 
• EFQM. 15 
• Hofstede’s key elements of culture. 16  
• Schein’s key elements of culture. 17  
• A Brown’s Sources of organisational culture. 18 
• Drennan’s Additional sources of organisational culture. 19  
• Cameron & Quinn's Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument. 20 
 
These items were selected for inclusion because they represented a wide range of 
military, cultural and management models.  There was no particular reason to select 
these other than that they were readily available from existing reading, and represent 
distinctly different types of relevant model.  The table is shown at Appendix A to this 
Chapter.  Some of the individual elements from the different models, particularly the 
military ones, were recognised as being highly specific in the way they were specified 
and would need to be interpreted in a much broader manner. 
 
These individual elements were then iteratively grouped into categories until a few 
key themes emerged.  The aim was to see if a new model could be developed.  The 
categories, as shown in Appendix B and Appendix C to this Chapter, were: 
 
• Teams and Groups, 
• Leaders, 
• Training, learning and development, 
• Individual, 
• Beliefs, 
• Task, and 




It was recognised that different aspects of the same element would be appropriate 
under different headings.  Thus, whilst “Policy and Strategy” are the responsibility of 
“Leaders”, they are the basis of “Beliefs”, if shared within a “Team”, but should also 
be “Task” related and are owned by the “Organisation”.  It was also recognised that 
there were relationships between these various elements, for example “individuals” 
are formed into “teams”, that are bound together by “beliefs” and have “leaders”, 
which implies some level of “organisation”.  However, the researcher was unable to 
identify a clear structure or relationships that linked these separate elements in a 
logical manner around a core element or in some progression or hierarchy.   
 
Failure to readily identify a clear model encouraged the researcher to reconsider this 
strategy.  The idea of simply using a heptagon, in the same mode as Cartwright’s 9F 
model and the Innovation Climate Questionnaire (see Figures 3.4 and 3.5), seemed 
crude.  It was therefore decided to experiment with the adaptation of an existing 
model.  This raises the issue of whether the result could be said to be original, and the 
degree to which the researcher might infringe copyright or intellectual property rights.  
However, it is argued that development of an existing model constitutes new work, 
and provided the development is sufficiently different and the underlying source is 
acknowledged, then the work should not be discounted as a result of either of these 
two issues.  This issue was discussed with Carl Edwards of Cranfield University, who 
is an expert in intellectual property and related issues.  He considered that the 
adaptation of the basic model, and the more substantial changes arising from 
redevelopment of the questionnaire, should not cause infringement of intellectual 
property or copyright.  Phillips and Pugh highlight 15 criteria that can be applied to 
determine whether work constitutes a new contribution to knowledge.  The list 
includes, “New interpretation of established work”. 21  It is argued that development 
of an existing model falls under this heading.  Thus none of the military models listed 
above incorporates the wider business management issues, and the business models 
are not generic and not tailored to the military context.   
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The researcher was immediately attracted to the Denison Model.  This model 
addresses 12 dimensions that are linked to two cross-cutting axes, and is linked to 
organisational effectiveness.  A Brown highlights that Denison’s model is one of the 
few models that links culture and performance. 22  He goes on to describe the model 
as having “great intuitive appeal”, but warns that it should not be accepted 
“uncritically” due to the wide range of factors affecting culture and organisational 
performance. 23 
 
Any adaptation of the Denison questionnaire would immediately break the linkage 
with Denison’s database that assesses organisational effectiveness against other 
organisations, as described in Section 3 of Chapter 7.  This would immediately reduce 
the value of the process.  The process of marking the Denison survey is commercially 
contracted and it was not anticipated therefore that there would be any potential to 
develop linkages to the database, or to establish where scores from a future 
questionnaire might align to the performance of other organisations.  However, whilst 
the link to other organisations would be broken it was thought that it should 
nevertheless be possible to develop a measurement of organisational effectiveness 
based on the underlying model. 
 
As a first step the 12 elements of the Denison cultural assessment instrument were 
used as a basis for mapping the other military, cultural and business models.  This is 
set out in Appendix D.  For ease these were then consolidated against the 60 
statements used in the questionnaire: Appendix E. 
 
The next stage was to design the statements for the assessment process.  There were 
two immediate considerations: 
 
• How many statements should be used? 
• How to maximise the issues covered. 
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Denison’s cultural measurement tool uses 60 statements; five for each of the twelve 
dimensions.  This was perceived as too many for a quarterly survey, which was 
perceived to need to be brief, and might include other questions.   
 
“Since attitudinal questions are more sensitive than factual 
questions to changes in wording, context, emphasis and so on, it 
becomes impossible to assess reliability by ‘asking the same 
question in another form’.  It will no longer be the same question.  
For this reason, we should not rely on single questions when we 
come to measure those attitudes that are most important to our 
study …” 24   
 
Therefore 12 questions are insufficient.  24 questions were perceived to be too few to 
adequately assess 12 elements.  The choice was therefore between 36 and 48 
questions.  However, it was thought that by combining two issues in each statement, 
72 issues could be covered in 36 statements.  This immediately raises the issue of 
double-barrelled questions.  Zikmund states, “A question covering several issues at 
once is referred to as double-barrelled and should always be avoided.” 25  This is 
because it becomes complex, causing confusion, and increases the number of possible 
answers.  Many authors subscribe to this view, eg Buckingham and Saunders 26, Czaja 
and Blair 27, de Vaus 28, and Dillman 29, but these comments are always made in the 
context of obtaining specific information from individual questions.  This survey is 
not seeking to do this.  Instead it is seeking to gain an impression about a multi-
facetted issue.  Consequently this needs broader coverage to arrive at a view than 
would be obtained from a single question.  Thus Henerson, Morris and Fitz-Gibbon 30, 
and Moser and Kalton 31 suggest that multiple questions should be used to gain a 
clearer impression of attitudes to such complex issues.  This is what Denison does.  
He uses five statements to measure each aspect by asking respondents the degree to 
which they agree with the statements.  If this methodology were employed then issues 
could be combined in statements.  Therefore it is not necessarily the response to one 
particular statement that was important, but the aggregate response to each group of 
statements that provides the perception of attitude on the twelve elements of the 
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model.  Denison does provide markings for individual statements in the feedback to 
his questionnaire.  This approach may be considered slightly inappropriate and would 
not be recommended where statements combined different topics.  Thus whilst 
combining aspects of a common theme in a statement is somewhat dubious practice, 
even if an individual feels differently about the two issues combined in the statement, 
it is the overall opinion that is important not, in this instance, their feelings about a 
specific issue.  In such circumstances the statements would need to be carefully 
worded, combining related issues, whilst keeping the statements relatively short and 
simple.  The aim was therefore decided to try to keep statements below 20 words in 
length, although it is also argued,  
 
“Paradoxically, however, it does not always pay to make the 
statements too clear and unambiguous, not to ask the respondent 
to think very hard.  Often, a statement that is, strictly speaking, 
almost meaningless, works very well because pilot work has shown 
that respondents invest it, in their own way, with the meaning that 
our context requires.” 32   
 
Further work would need to be done to determine the overall acceptability of this 
approach, eg by conducting comparative studies into the double-barrelled statements 
or larger numbers of statements addressing individual themes.  However, as 
highlighted below, the methodology seems to have been generally accepted, with only 
one respondent out of 50 actually marking one of the questions twice to differentiate 
the different aspects, although questionably this may also have been a factor in some 
of the other questionnaires that were rejected because some statements were 
unmarked.  It may also have been a feature of this one statement, ie that the double-
barrelled nature was more obvious than in some of the other statements. 
 
It was also decided at this stage that the assessment tool would be developed in 
relation to the CINCFLEET HQ.  There were two reasons for this: 
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• There was an immediate requirement for a measurement tool to assess the 
morale of staff in the HQ for the new CINCFLEET HQ Balanced Scorecard. 
• Discussions with Lt Col Ainslie revealed that he had experienced resistance to 
the adoption of his Military Ethos Measurement Tool.  Military commanders 
were perceived as nervous about adopting a new tool that might be seen as 
exposing their weakness in managing the ethos within their units.  It was 
therefore unlikely that measurement tool that measured culture in a wider, 
more front-line, situation would be readily accepted. 
 
This would mean that statements would need to reflect the military, government, 
environment, without needing to reflect the more “extreme” elements of military 
culture.  Thus, “Willingness to risk death for others”, “Ability to cope with battle 
conditions” and “Realistic training for combat” generally, fortunately, have little 
relevance in CINCFLEET HQ work.  Clearly not all the issues listed would be 
incorporated in the statements, and the main intention was to ensure statements 
remained related to the core 12 dimensions of the Denison model.  The statements are 
shown in Appendix F. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated the relevance of the NLP Logical Levels.  It was 
emphasised that the Balanced Scorecard needs to motivate staff by addressing issues 
at all levels in order to ensure corporate coherence.  In particular there was a need to 
ensure that the higher levels were addressed, because these would impact on people’s 
attitudes to issues at the lower levels.  It was therefore decided that the statements 
would be tested against the different logical levels. 
 
• Identity – “Who?  Identity is to do with sense of self.” 
• Beliefs – “Why?  Our beliefs and values shape our understanding of why 
things are possible or impossible for us.” 
• Capability – “How?  Capability is about the how-tos of life – the knowledge, 
skills and processes that make it possible or impossible for one person who 
has them to find doing something easy ...”  
• Behaviour – “What?  Behaviour is what you actually do – or don’t do.” 
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• Environment – “Where? and When?  This level involves issues or details of 
context.”  33  
 
Because each statement contained two elements it was recognised that statements 
might relate to more than one logical level.  The assessment of the statements is at 
Appendix G. 
 
This demonstrates that the statements provide substantial cover across all the base 
levels of the NLP Logical Levels.  (No attempt was made to link to the “Spiritual” 
level as this was seen as inappropriate.) 
 
It was also recognised in order to encourage respondents to avoid consistently 
marking the questionnaire in the same way that it was necessary to encourage careful 
reading.  This can be done by the use of negative statements.  Sekaran states,  
 
“Instead of phrasing all questions positively, it is advisable to 
include some negatively worded questions as well, so the tendency 
of respondents to mechanically circle the points towards one end 
of the scale is minimised.” 34 
 
This was discovered to be difficult because the statements contained two issues.  Few 
statements could be turned round without becoming lengthy or even more complex.  
Ultimately six statements were selected for reversal, which represents about 16%.  
This was perceived to be adequate.  The reversal of statements is shown in Appendix 
H to this chapter. 
 
The next issue that had to be tackled was the measurement scale.  Both Denison and 
Ainslie used 5-point Likert scales.  Zikmund states,  
 
“Business researchers’ adaptation of the summated ratings 
method, developed by Rensis Likert, is extremely popular for 
measuring attitudes because the method is simple to administer.  
8 - 15 
 
With the Likert scale, respondents indicate their attitudes by 
checking how strongly they agree or disagree with carefully 
constructed statements that range from very positive to very 
negative toward the attitudinal object.  Individuals generally 
choose from five alternatives …but the alternatives may number 
from 3 to 9.” 35 
 
Related to the size of the scale is the issue of whether to use a balanced or unbalanced 
scale.  A balanced scale has a neutral or indifference point at the centre. 36  Lack of a 
neutral or indifference point forces respondents to make a decision.  A neutral or 
indifference point could mean respondents either have no preference or insufficient 
knowledge to make their decision.  Since the aim of the questionnaire was to identify 
people’s attitudes or opinions, it was believed that a respondent would, in other 
circumstances, make a decision on these issues even if they felt they had insufficient 
information.  Oppenheim argues,  
 
“Most of an individual’s attitudes are usually dormant and are 
expressed in speech or behaviour only when the object of the 
attitude is perceived.” 37  
 
Consequently, indifference was perceived as invalid.  Sekaran, quoting from Elmore 
and Beggs, states,  
 
“Research indicates that a 5-point scale is just as good as any, and 
that an increase from 5 to 7 or 9 points on a rating scale does not 
improve the reliability of the ratings.” 38 
 
It was therefore decided to use a six-point itemised scale, not to increase the reliability 
but simply give greater differentiation than a four-point scale.  A six-point scale was 
thought to be easier for people to use rather than an eight-point scale, which seemed 
excessive.  The statements were then smartened for presentation; shown at Appendix 
I. 





Two stages of testing were carried out.  The first, with a couple of the researcher’s 
own staff, will not be considered further as it identified nothing of significance.  This 
section will therefore only consider the substantial benchmarking exercise conducted 
within CINCFLEET HQ in March, 2003. 
 
For the purposes of this trial the ACOSs in the HQ were asked to nominate staff who 
from the top 25% of their staff for morale and achievement.  Although this attracted 
some question and comment, there were clear reasons for this course of action: 
 
• Testing was essential in order to benchmark the model for actual use, that is, 
in order to interpret results, the results from a defined sample were necessary. 
• A random sample would not adequately define the limits of scoring likely to 
be derived in regular use unless a large sample was used. 
• The previous use of cultural surveys in the HQ indicated that there was a poor 
culture and that the results of a random sample would probably be skewed to 
the lower end of the scale. 
• Use of a sample from the lower end of the scale would automatically tend 
towards a low score, but it was not known where the higher scores were likely 
to be. 
• A group of staff with high morale and achievement were thought more likely 
to respond to respond to the request for completion of the survey. 
• Results from this initial test could be validated against a real sample when 
used. 
 
The initial test would also enable a reasonable attempt to be made at setting the 
traffic-lights for the Balanced Scorecard.  MOD generally uses a four traffic-light 
system.  This enables data to be readily understood. The four categories used within 
MOD are: 
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• Green – Satisfactory. 
• Yellow – Minor weakness. 
• Orange – Serious weakness. 
• Red – Very serious weakness. 39 
 
The following schematic was proposed to meet this. 
 
• Green – Very High – 100% of measured components rated 75% or higher. 
• Green – High – More than 50%, but less than 100%, of measured components 
rated 75% or higher. 
• Yellow – Good – 50% or more of measured components rated between 50% 
and 75%. 
• Orange – Satisfactory – 50% or more of measured components rated between 
25% and 50%. 
• Red – Poor – More than 50%, but less than 100%, of measured components 
rated 25% or lower. 
• Red – Very poor – 100% of measured components rated 25% or lower. 
 
This provides a slightly greater granularity than the four traffic light system, but 
scoring in both the top and bottom categories is likely to be rare.  The additional 
categories have been created because it is common practice in CINCFLEET to tag the 
overall traffic light colour with a quadrant indicating the lowest score of subsidiary 
elements within a complex PI.  This mechanism defines the “Green with green tag”.  
(In this context the “components” refer to the twelve elements of the model, not to 
individual questions.  Thus each of the twelve components is rated simply on the four 
“traffic light” colours with red being equal to the bottom quartile scores, and so on to 
green equalling top quartile scores.) 
 
Using this system it would be necessary to adjust the scores from each quarterly 
assessment, based initially on the test sample.  Therefore the test sample score would 
demonstrate what adjustment was necessary to bring their score into the top 25%.  
This necessitated consideration of what adjustment would be applied to the results.  
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Before the test sample was taken it was not clear whether there be a propensity to 
avoid marking at the extremes.  This would have distorted the overall picture.  
Theoretically, taking a sample of the top 25% of staff the average score would be 
87.5%, that is, halfway through the top quartile.  However, the sample might also be 
biased towards the top performing staff, and thus be positively skewed.  It was also 
recognised that, with the earlier cultural surveys having demonstrated that the HQ had 
a poor culture, the results might be lower than 87.5%.  Thus although the idea of the 
benchmarking or calibration exercise was to standardise the scores at a particular 
level, it was unclear what that level should be.  The main contenders were thought to 
be: 
 
• Above 87.5% - as the sample might be skewed towards the top of the top 
quartile.  It is totally unclear what point might be represented. 
• 87.5% - as the mid point of the top quartile.  This would be almost an 
arbitrary, but perhaps logic choice. 
• Above 75% and below 87.5% - representing the top quartile, but recognising 
that the overall culture is poor and therefore a score below 87.5% would be 
appropriate. 
• At or below 75% - again recognising that the culture is poor and therefore a 
low score would be appropriate.  However, it would make it difficult to 
achieve a high morale score in the full population. 
 
The initial thought was that the most pragmatic approach is to use the 87.5% score.  
Further evidence from the use of the survey on a routine basis would provide better 
evidence of an appropriate score, although the changing culture would always lead to 
doubts about the best score to use. 
 
In order to meet these requirements the following marking system would be used, as 
set out in Table 8.1: 
 











where statement was 
phrased positively:
5 4 3 2 1 0
Scores allocated 
where statement was 
phrased negatively: 0 1 2 3 4 5
Table 8.1: Marking regime for the CINCFLEET HQ cultural 
measurement tool benchmarking exercise.




Seventy staff were nominated for inclusion in the test.  The survey was distributed 
under Appendix J.  Analysis of the test sample is at Table 8.2.  It is not known who 












staff*: 14 4 23 11 4 56
RFA staff: 1 2 1 4
Civilian 
staff: 10 10
Totals: 14 4 24 13 5 10 70
Table 8.2: Analysis of staff to whom the test survey was 
sent.
* Naval ratings may include RFA ratings who have similar rank structure.  
 
This shows that over 50% of those invited to respond were in the middle ranking 
categories that appeared to represent a significant problem in the earlier survey. 
 
Fifty responses were received, although 10 responses contained errors.  This 
represents a response rate of 71%, with an accurate response rate of 80%, giving an 
effective response rate of 57%.  This was an adequate response rate, without using the 
incorrectly marked surveys.  The errors and omissions were generally minor: 
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• One respondent did not mark back of sheet - 14 questions unmarked. 
• One respondent marked 5 questions on the line between two scores. 
• Two respondents did not mark 2 questions. 
• Three respondents did not mark 1 question. 
• One respondent gave 2 marks for 1 question. 
• One respondent returned questionnaire unmarked. 
• One respondent did not mark 1 question and marked 1 question on the line. 
 
It was assessed that in the majority of cases these were minor errors that: 
 
• Could have been ignored (using the remaining valid data);  
• Corrected using some form or averaging method to replace missing scores;  
• Were probably preventable using improved instructions. 
 
The Average (Mean) score was 3.12 for the correctly marked responses.  This equates 
to 62.3%.  The top individual score had an average of 4.22, and the lowest was 1.69.  
These scores still represents quite a poor result for top 25% staff.  Thus this suggests 
that poor organisational culture has been reflected again in this survey, although this 
score does represent a substantial improvement on the Denison survey, and is directly 
tied to a combination of factors, principally: 
 
• The deliberate selection of top 25% staff. 
• Tailoring the model to more specifically meet the organisation culture. 
 
This latter point can be illustrated by looking at the rankings of the 12 sectors as 
scored using the Denison survey compared to the CINCFLEET cultural measurement 
tool, as shown in Table 8.3. 
 



















intent 1 2 1 2 2
Goals and 
objectives 3 3 4 4= 5
Vision 9 7= 10 6 11
Coordination and 
integration 7 6 7 7 7
Agreement 5 4 5 8 8=
Core values 4 9 2 3 10
Capability 
development 10 10 12 10 8=
Team orientation
2 1 3 1 1
Empowerment 6 5 6 9 12
Creating change
12 12 8= 11 3
Customer focus 11 11 11 12 4
Organisational 
learning 8 7= 8= 4= 6
Results of Denison Cultural Survey
Table 8.3: Comparison of ranking of Denison Cultural 








This shows that whilst some dimensions or sectors of the two models show 
reasonably consistent scores, eg Strategic direction and intent, and Team orientation, 
others show a distinct change, eg Creating change and Customer focus.  In the case of 
Customer focus, in the CINCFLEET model this aspect was broadened out to include 
stakeholders and partners, based on such influences as the Balanced Scorecard 
concepts for the non-profit sector and the EFQM model.  (See Appendix F for 
comparison of the wording of the statements between the Denison Model and the 
CINCFLEET Cultural Model.) 
 
It will be recalled from Chapter 7 that the response rate to the earlier culture surveys, 
taking a sample representative of the whole organisation rather than the top 25%, was 
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only about 42%.  The substantially higher response rate here, whilst predicted, may 
also reflect back on these earlier surveys.  If those with a more positive attitude are 
more likely to respond, this may suggest that the responses received in earlier surveys 
were not a truly unbiased sample.  If this is so then the results effectively overstate the 
quality of the organisational culture and the culture is thus even worse than initially 
stated. 
 
Taking the scores for all 36 statements in the CINCFLEET Cultural Survey model 
separately, the median and modal scores for the data are 3.  This suggests a fairly 
normally distributed set of data.  The standard deviation is 0.58.  This suggests that 
around 90% of the scores for this group will lie between 2 and 4.  
 
On the basis of this data, to adjust scores to 87.5% (ie half-way through the top 
quartile) might be slightly excessive since it would give a normal range for the top 
quartile of about 2.75 to 4.75.  If the organisation were suffering from poor culture, 
which were then subsequently improved, this group might become “top limited” in the 
achievable scores.  It was therefore thought that a more conservative adjustment might 
be appropriate: to 76%.  This would put average scores in the top quartile, but at an 
adjustment of only 13.7% this would provide more room for manoeuvre at the top end 
of the scale, whilst the bottom end scores would in any event be “bottom limited” by 
the zero score, and so would always be within the range 0 to 100%, which might not 
be the case with top end scores.  Similarly to adjust from 62.3% to 87.5% is an 
adjustment of 25.2%, which would involve moving all scores more than a quartile.  
This was not deemed reasonable without further substantive evidence that such a level 
of adjustment was wholly appropriate.  Indeed it was also recognised that a 25% 
adjustment would automatically prevent a score in the bottom quartile.  This would 
undermine the model.  This adjustment is therefore what is reflected in Appendix K.  
Appendix L illustrates the data but aggregated to the level of the 12 segments of the 
model rather than at “36 statement” level.  The advantage that this more aggregated 
level confers is that the adjustments are slightly less extreme: adjustment range 
reduced to 7.2% to 20% from -0.5% to 27.5%. 
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5. Measuring the culture in CINCFLEET HQ. 
 
Ainslie, in his work, provides a model of military culture based on Johnson’s Culture 
Web.  This was used in the development of the Military Ethos Measurement Tool, 
which itself may also be regarded as a cultural model.  Wildman has produced a view 
of military culture based on Schein’s model of culture. 40  Other works, eg Henderson 
or the British Military Doctrine help to articulate military culture, but without 
providing an explicit model.  It is argued that development of a cultural model from 
these sources is not necessary in order to obtain a model against which military 
culture can be measured.  Provided the model used is shown to be appropriate, for 
example because it contains appropriate issues and language, any model should 
suffice.   
 
The question is thus about the degree to which a model can be shown to be 
appropriate.  Henderson’s argument is that cohesion is a critical feature of a 
successful military culture.  Such cohesion comes from: 
 
• The internalisation of beliefs;  
• Loyalty to immediate colleagues;  
• Effective delegation of leadership, including the ability to reward or sanction 
deviant behaviour without creating real fear; and  
• The appropriate provision of physical and environment infrastructure that both 
provides the resources necessary for success and removes concerns about the 
supporting environment.  This includes managing the boundary between the 
military and society, and issues beyond the boundary such as societal support 
for the military.   
 
Stated in this way such issues might be seen as relevant to any culture.  To the 
military they will have a particular meaning.  Therefore they probably need to be 
adequately represented in any model that seeks to represent the military culture.  In 
contrast, Denison’s model was primarily designed for the commercial environment 
and thus some of the wording used is less appropriate for the military environment.  
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Nevertheless it provides a well-tested model of organisational culture that can be used 
for measurement purposes.   
 
Adapting a proven model therefore should provide a sound basis for measurement of 
organisational culture in the military environment.  Ainslie’s model is little tested, 
although it does provide an explicitly military view of one dimension of military 
culture.  Conversely, the EFQM model is increasingly widely used in both the public 
and private sector to help drive organisational success.  However, since it is an open 
framework, available as an audit tool rather than providing specific guidance, it may 
be seen as giving pointers to cultural features at the more superficial level of process 
rather than as an in-depth cultural model.   
 
The distillation of the essence of these, and other, military and civilian cultural models 
should therefore provide a reasonable basis for measurement of culture.  Indeed, 
recognition of the relative importance of these features for a particular culture should 
enable any organisation to produce its own cultural model.  This is what has been 
done to produce the cultural survey model for a continuous attitude survey in 
CINCFLEET HQ.  Recognising that the aims of this work are limited by resource, 
particularly time, the objective could not be to produce the “perfect solution”, but 
merely to produce something “fit for purpose” that could probably be developed 
overtime, indeed could be the subject of further research and development. 
 
Nevertheless it is suggested that there is sufficient evidence from the work undertaken 
using the Harrison/Handy, Denison and Continuous Attitude Survey questionnaires to 
determine something about the culture of the CINCFLEET HQ during the period 
September, 2002 to May, 2003.  The general conclusion that can be drawn is that at 
the time there was a relatively poor culture, although the culture varied across 
different sub-groups within the overall organisation.  Specific issues can be identified: 
 
• The disagreement over organisational style. 
• The poor buy-in to the changing style. 
• Low understanding of organisational vision. 
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• The existence of a power and blame culture. 
• Disagreement over the level of empowerment. 
• Perceived poor skill utilisation and development. 
• Low levels of agreement across the organisation. 
• Poor focus on customers. 
 
Such issues suggest the likelihood of continued problems in managing the 
organisation, and in terms of efficient and effective delivery of organisational 
objectives. 
 
Gathering this data was not overly difficult and if conducted on a regular basis, with 
demonstrable management commitment to a remedial action plan, then data could be 
gather systematically and thus more easily.  Similarly development of a tailored 
cultural model was not difficult.  Thus there is little excuse for not giving greater 
attention to culture management.  However, one of the issues that would need to be 
addressed in achieving such an objective is that of acknowledgement and ownership 
of the problem. 
 
The existence of some of the problems highlighted by the survey, and the general 
attitude towards “business management” techniques within the military would 
probably lead to: 
 
• Dismissal of the survey results – All sorts of arguments would probably be 
submitted, including highlighting organisational success, and the fact that 
these surveys were conducted during a period of change.   
• Dismissal of the technique – Such surveys have not been conducted 
previously and managers generally argue that they have a good understanding 
of their staff. 
 
These arguments are not seen as valid. 
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• The three survey results consistently highlighted problems, and in particular 
the Denison Survey is a professionally produced and managed survey.  
However, even that is recognised as having its limitations, such as the use of 
commercial language.  Management could also seek to validate or disprove the 
results by conducting a similar survey, although undoubtedly things will have 
changed in the meantime because no organisational culture is truly static.  The 
survey results are also seen by the researcher as being reasonably consistent 
with the EFQM work conducted at the same time, the results of which were 
accepted by management. 
• The use of such techniques is becoming more widely advocated, eg by Kaplan 
and Norton, and adopted.  Measurable results are to be preferred to the 
variability of perception, particularly when tainted by self interest. 
 
Nevertheless, it would undoubtedly be better to use one instrument consistently over 
time.  This would enable managers to identify the changes in cultural issues, which 
can perhaps be more important than a set of values.  This returns the issue to that of 
having a clear model of requirements. 
 
6. Cultural Management Issues. 
 
It must be remembered that the survey above was only used to set a top boundary for 
the proposed measurement tool; it is not a complete examination of the culture.  
Consequently it can only be used as a guide to the sort of issues that might emerge 
from a wider survey, and thus of the actions that might be most appropriate.  Chapter 
7 demonstrated more fully how the results of the earlier surveys might be turned into 
an action plan.  The action plan developed here to manage cultural issues will also be 
examined for congruence with that in Chapter 7. 
 
Variance across the issues, as shown in Appendix L, is low, and as shown in Table 8.3 
there is not a strong coherence with the earlier Denison Survey.  The strongest 
features of this group are: 
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• Team Orientation. 
• Strategic Direction and Intent. 
• Creating Change. 
 




• Core Values. 
 
Here the key issues are the lack of empowerment to fulfil tasks that the individuals are 
capable of undertaking.  This may suggest to a lack of engagement, perhaps linked to 
not accepting or agreeing with the Vision and a lack of clarity about values which 
undermines confidence, for example as a result of inconsistency by management.  
This suggests a level of alienation from the organisation, which was noted in the 
Harrison/Handy survey, and in the Middle Ranking Naval Officers’ responses to the 
Denison Survey.  However, these issues are less strongly represented than under the 
Denison Survey, probably mainly because this was the top quartile of staff.   
 
In contrast the top scoring items do not show significant improvement for being 
scored by this upper quartile cohort.  This may suggest that the scores are subject to a 
limiting factor, or that the organisation has a relatively poor culture.  The suggestion 
is that people are engaging with the team and committed to the work.  It also suggests 
that the respondents are flexible and adaptable committed to the organisational 
change. 
 
This does represent a significant contrast to the earlier Denison Survey.  It suggests 
that provided this top quartile can be engaged by the Vision and are Empowered they 
will push the organisation forward.  This quartile could therefore have a positive 
impact on the management of culture in the remainder of the organisation.  
Management should therefore: 
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• Work to articulate the organisational vision, linking it to the Strategic 
Direction and Intent, and ensure that staff engage with it. 
• Empower leaders within the organisation to improve their stake in the 
organisation. 
• Build and strengthen Team Orientation to engage people more widely and 
strengthen the Core Values so that they are more readily recognised and 
adopted. 
 
The differences between this action plan and that proposed in Chapter 7 are seen as 
being related to the limited coverage of the community.   
 
7. Analysis, Conclusions and Summary. 
 
The aim of this Chapter was to show how it would be possible to develop a cultural 
measurement tool for collecting quarterly data for the Balanced Scorecard to enable 
managers manage organisational culture.  This is seen as important because it will 
facilitate correct orientation and alignment of attitudes, and enable managers to 
overcome the tendency for behaviours and actions to revert to what they were 
previously, ie to overcome culture’s tendency for stability.  Correct use of the 
Balanced Scorecard should facilitate plans for change, and conceptually it does 
demand and underpin the required attitudinal changes.  However, use of an explicit 
culture measure will facilitate and reinforce such changes. 
 
In this instance the Denison cultural measurement model was used as the base, but 
was changed substantially to fit more closely with the specific culture of the 
organisation being surveyed, that is CINCFLEET.  In the early part of the chapter 
criteria were set for the development.  These are used to assess the outcomes in Table 
8.4 below. 
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Table 8.4: Assessment of the CINCFLEET Cultural Measurement 
Tool against requirement criteria. 
Conducted quarterly. This has not been demonstrated, but there is no reason why 
this tool could not be used quarterly, particularly since it 
meets the criteria on cost discussed below. 
Based on a sample 
size that addresses 
the level of response 
required. 
The testing process was based on a small sample of 70 staff 
and was used to derive a reasonably robust result.  In 
practice for regular surveying a larger sample would 
probably be taken (around 25% of the total population) to 
give confidence that everyone’s views were being sought 
and reflected on a regular basis. 
Based on a sample 




Not tested here, although it was demonstrated by requiring 
the sample to be drawn from the “top 25% of staff”, that a 
taut response could be obtained from a relatively small 
sample.  Defining sample criteria would need to be done 
through “biographical details”. 
Addressed to a 
clearly bounded 
organisation. 
This was demonstrated by defining CINCFLEET HQ and 
reflecting appropriate military, cultural and business models 
in the statements derived.  Appropriate language used 
resulting in the substantial improvement of the scores 
against some sectors of the model. 
Based on a model 
that addresses clearly 
articulates cultural 
features. 
Clearly demonstrated, because the derived model was based 
on an existing and respected cultural model. 




Clearly demonstrated, because the underlying model has 
these features. 
Based on a model 
that addresses the 
specific cultural 
features of the target 
organisation. 
Clearly demonstrated through the use of military models and 
appropriate language. 
Well designed. The trial demonstrated that a satisfactory survey could be 
reasonably well presented without too much effort.  The 
testing process highlighted one or two flaws with the initial 
design, mainly the need for improved instructions. 
Short. Demonstrated.  Although the statements used were long and 
combined two concepts, only one respondent gave two 
marks for one question.  This suggests that broadening the 
coverage of a smaller number of statements may not 
undermine the concepts of the design. 
Anonymous. This test survey was run totally anonymously, but 
potentially additional biographical detail questions might be 
added that would help define the sub-groups within the HQ, 
without undermining anonymity. 




The test questionnaire was very cheap to develop and 
produce, with no external costs, and only the researcher’s 
time and a small material cost. 
 
The additional issue of being able to repeat the process for other organisations is also 
believed to have been demonstrated.  Here the issue is about the selection of 
appropriate cultural and business models that would be used to compile the model.  
Thus, for a non-military organisation the military models would be excluded, but 
other appropriate business models could be included. 
 
Further reflection on the model and associated issues indicated further potential for 
developing and utilising the model. 
 
Clearly effective use of the model as developed would require additional use or 
testing and analysis of results.  However, it was recognised that over time the model 
would need to change to reflect different issues.  Potentially therefore different 
versions of the model might exist at any one time, in order to validate the results of 
one version against another.  Variations might be associated with changing just a few 
statements rather than a complete new version.  This would enable management to 
gather views on a wider range of issues.  For example, analysis of the CINCFLEET 
model shows that there are a number of statements that include reference to 
Leadership, or Teams, or Reward and Recognition.  These were all issues that were 
important to CINCFLEET HQ at the time the model was being developed.  This is 
demonstrated at Appendix M.  This enables a deeper understanding of issues to be 
derived through the aggregation of results across the Denison model dimensions or 
sectors.  Appendix N to this Chapter demonstrates the aggregation of scores in this 
manner for these three examples.  The score for Leadership is 62.6% and the score for 
Reward and Recognition is 59.9%, suggesting a slightly more problematic issue.  
However, the score derived for Team working is 62%.  This includes the three 
specific questions against that dimension in the Culture Model, for which the score 
was 68.8%.  This suggests that a deeper analysis of Team working might highlight 
some problems, because the additional statements from the other dimensions of the 
model have, on average, scored 10% (ie 6 percentage points) lower.  However, as a 
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diagnostic tool that links different issues in a single statement, this difference may not 
be significant and requires further investigation.   
 
Similarly, tailoring questions with greater emphasis to the EFQM model would help 
derive information is support of assessment using that model.  Conversely too much 
instability in the model would lead to a decline in the understanding of the core 
culture model.  But, due to the restriction in the number of statements used in the 
model, even recognising that there would probably be a few additional biographical 
questions, there would still be scope for the inclusion of additional questions to 
address specific issues identified by management.  Such enhancement of the 
questionnaire could be advantageous since it could: 
 
• Enable issues to be explored in greater depth. 
• Provide respondents with the opportunity to provide their own thoughts and 
ideas. 
• Add variety to the questionnaire thus giving it broader appeal. 
 
Thus for example, the test of the CINCFLEET model identified empowerment as a 
problem issue (see Appendix K).  Early running of the questionnaire for measurement 
purposes might thus have included additional specific questions on this topic. 
 
It was also recognised that there was the potential for this questionnaire to be 
automatically using intranet facilities, whilst still retaining anonymity.  CINCFLEET 
had previously experimented with this process. 
 
Thus the model developed for CINCFLEET would appear to be flexible and have 
development potential.  However, the loss of the potential for benchmarking against 
the culture of effective organisations must be recognised.  This would not be a 
permanent loss, since there would always be the potential to run the Denison Survey 
in addition.  This could help provide an independent validation of locally assessed 
performance, but the impact of running a generic rather than a tailored model has 
already been highlighted. 
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In conclusion it is assessed that the development has been successful that further 
validation work is required.  However, it is emphasised that this must be recognised as 
a diagnostic tool rather than a detailed analytical tool in the same manner as 
Denison’s Cultural Survey model.  The combination of issues related to the same 
topic means that the response to any one statement will not provide a clear view on a 
single issue.  But, it is argued, the same would be true of the Denison Cultural Survey.  
There five statements are used to assess a single dimension in order to ensure that 
issues are represented in a variety of ways, and that different aspects of the issue are 
covered.  One simple statement could not be expected, for example, to encapsulate the 
issues of “Strategy”. 
 














Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard.   
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard. 
Using the Denison cultural questionnaire as a basis, because this has 
demonstrated a clear linkage to organisational performance, a cultural 
assessment tool was developed.  This was done using a wide range of 
cultural and business models, including those relating to the military 
environment.  Consolidating these issues into 36 diagnostic statements 
produced a questionnaire tailored specifically to the CINCFLEET HQ.  
Using this on a carefully selected group of highly motivated and high 
performing staff enabled a benchmark score to be set for any future use 
of the tool.  Similarities and differences with the use of the Denison 
model were detected, which may be due either to the changes in the 
questionnaire itself or to the group used to test the questionnaire.  
Further work on this is required. 
Supporting case studies. 
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Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard.   
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard.
Supporting case studies. 
The aim of this Chapter is to look at a selection of other organisations 
using the Balanced Scorecard to assess their implementations of the 
Balanced Scorecard using the models developed in this research. 
Summary of conclusions. 
Figure 9.1 
 
This research has demonstrated that there is a strong and valid link between culture 
and the Balanced Scorecard as an effective management system.  Examination of the 
culture of one particular organisation, CINCFLEET, has shown the issues and 
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pressures that need to be managed.  A survey of the organisational culture 
demonstrated problems, and differences between different sectors of the organisation.  
A survey instrument was designed that could be used in CINCFLEET to manage and 
measure the organisational culture in order to improve the effectiveness of the 
organisation. 
 
The aim of this chapter is present a number of supplementary case studies that look at 
the implementation and use of Balanced Scorecards.  In so doing it will evaluate the 
models developed in this research for effectiveness in analysing the developments, 
and thus potentially in managing and shaping other implementations.  The case 
studies presented here are brief summaries as it is impossible within a relatively short 
timescale to attempt to define the culture of any one organisation, or develop specific 
cultural measurement and management tools for any one organisation. 
 
The organisations selected were gained via contacts made while working within 
MOD, including with its contractors, RMCS Shrivenham, or from an internet search.  
This tended to produce a bias towards Central Government, which is still evident, but 
the researcher did ensure that commercial organisations were included to redress the 
balance somewhat.   Inevitably the selection involves organisations that have 
undergone largely successful implementations, as discussed in Chapter 2.  The six 
organisations finally selected were: 
 
• Home Office, Immigration and Nationality Directorate. 
• Department of Trade and Industry, Business Link website. 
• Department of Constitutional Affairs. 
• Tesco. 
• Suffolk Coastal District Council. 
• BAE Systems, Customer Solutions and Support and Land Systems. 
 
The differing nature of the organisations, its stage of development of the Balanced 
Scorecard, and cultural issues, made a wholly standardised approach to writing up the 
case studies inappropriate.  Consequently the studies are included in the order in 
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which they were undertaken to enable the reader identify any emergent issues in the 
researcher’s methodology. 
 
2. Home Office, Immigration and Nationality Directorate. 
 
2.1. Outline of organisation and aims. 
 
The Home Office (HO) gives its purpose as: 
 
• “To work with individuals and communities to build a 
safe, just and tolerant society … 
• To support and mobilise communities… [and 
encourage] active citizenship … 
• To deliver the Department’s policies and 
responsibilities fairly, effectively and efficiently …” 1 
 
To achieve this purpose, the Department lists seven aims: 
 
• “To reduce crime and the fear of crime … 
• To reduce organised and international crime …and to 
combat terrorism and other threats to national 
security … 
• To ensure the effective delivery of justice … 
• To deliver effective custodial and community 
sentences to reduce reoffending and protect the 
public … 
• To reduce the availability and abuse of dangerous 
drugs … 
• To regulate entry to and settlement in the United 
Kingdom effectively in the interests of sustainable 
growth and social inclusion … 
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• To support strong and active communities in which 
people of all races and backgrounds are valued and 
participate on equal terms …” 2 
 
The organisation of the Department is shown in Figure 9.2 below.  (The 
breakdown of the main Directorates is not given, except for the Immigration 
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Within the Department, the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) is 
responsible for: 
 
• “…for Immigration control… 
• [considering] applications for permission to stay, 
citizenship and asylum.” 4 
 
In recent years the HO has been faced by many challenges.  Key among these 
are the problems of: 
 
• Tackling crime, which is often perceived as rising (the fear of crime), 
and the consequences of crime, such as the high prison population. 
• Immigration, particularly the rise of illegal immigration, the numbers 
of people seeking asylum, and the difficulties of controlling the 
immigration problems, particularly the removal of illegal immigrants. 
• Failure of a major IT development in the immigration department that 
necessitated the reversion to manual processes and procedures. 
 
This study deals primarily with the Immigration and Nationality Directorate.  
This organisation is headed by a Director General (a 3* equivalent).  The 
information used in constructing this case study was mainly supplied by Mr 
Tony Arber who is the Director of Finance and Planning.  Mr Arber also 
checked the draft of this case study and made a few recommendations for 
changes.  Mr Arber has been in post for about 18 months and works for Mr 
David Stephens who is the Senior Director responsible for the Finance and 
Services Directorate. 5, 6 
 
2.2. Before the Balanced Scorecard was introduced. 
 
Prior to implementation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Immigration and 
Nationality Directorate the organisation had gone through a period of rapid 
expansion.   Consequently within the Directorate: 
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• There had been highly centralised command and control with the 
emphasis on delivery of targets. 
• The organisation had become highly dependent on its Operations 
Director; a strong and capable individual. 7 
• There was an unclear governance structure, which was less than fully 
effective. 
• Governance procedures were in their infancy. 
 
There was also a noted lack of cost-consciousness within the Department, with 
little budgetary control and consequently little attempt to ensure VFM.  This 
was driven partly by the responsive nature of the business and by Ministerial 
initiatives, but was particularly striking to someone on loan from MOD where 
budgetary constraints were more rigorous.  As the budgetary regime had 
tightened over the last couple of years this had placed pressure on Finance and 
Planning staff and resulted in the need for a change of culture in the rest of the 
previously free-spending organisation. 
 
EFQM was used in some areas of the HO, particularly within IND, where 
emphasis is on managing the relationship with the public.  EFQM was not 
perceived as competing with the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
2.3. Selection and introduction of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Prior to being rolled out in the IND, the Balanced Scorecard was already being 
developed and used at Departmental level for the Ministerial Board, and for 
the Group Executive Board (the main management board for the HO).  Within 
IND, the Balanced Scorecard had been used within the HR and F&S 
Directorates, for some time, and more recently implementation work had 
started in the Managed Migration (MM) Directorate and the Immigration 
Service.  The aim of introducing the Balanced Scorecard was thus to improve 
measurement and management of outputs and for more collegiate decision 
9 - 7 
making by the directors.  A key driver for IND was the use of the Balanced 
Scorecard at higher levels.  However, there was a degree of personal influence 
also.  This derived in part from the MOD personnel on loan to the HO who 
had a good understanding of MOD’s Balanced Scorecard programme.  Also 
influential were the number of professionally and academically qualified 
administrators in the Directorate who consequently had a basic understanding 
of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
2.4. Implementation phase. 
 
Use of the Balanced Scorecard at Departmental level meant that there was 
already some awareness of the concepts.  However, some presentations had 
been provided by external consultants and by current MOD personnel.  Thus 
there was a broad base of managers with a basic understanding of the 
concepts.  It was not felt that there had not been a particularly strong advocate 
or champion of the process at the higher levels, more a caucus of influence at 
middle management level.  Consequently implementation was not thought 
likely to be vulnerable to personality changes at this, or any immediate future 
stage, unless the Director General were replaced by someone who was 
strongly opposed to the tool. 
 
The Scorecards had been or will be implemented using the classic Kaplan and 
Norton template, but were essentially KPI scorecards.  The KPIs were the 
“Golden Threads” that described the key performance issues at Departmental 
level and cascade to the relevant Directorates.  They derived in part from 
Public Sector Agreements, and partly from other pressures such as Political 
initiatives.  These KPIs are managed at “Joint Programme Board” level, ie at a 
Director General’s own Board level and at Sub Programme Board level below 
that.  Because of the downward cascade, there are problems of aggregating 
scorecards as the information rises through the organisation, and there are also 
problems linking to external organisations with which the HO is linked, and 
with which they receive joint funding for cross-Departmental initiatives, eg the 
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Department of Constitutional Affairs, or the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office. 
 
PIs are underpinned by plans to achieve the required results.  Reporting is 
monthly.  Examples of the issues covered by the “Golden Threads” are: 
 
• Illegal immigration. 
• Eliminating backlogs of asylum claims. 
• Removing illegal immigrants. 
• Resource consumption. 
• Staff wastage. 
• Organisational reputation, covering such issues as stakeholder 
perceptions and clearance of correspondence. 
 
The measures are reported by “BRAG” status: Black for critical or risks 
realised, followed by the normal Red, Amber, Green.  Collection of data goes 
deep into the organisation and although staff at the lower levels will not be 
familiar with the Balanced Scorecard, all staff will be aware of the emphasis 
on correctly recording and reporting issues.  Management strongly emphasise 
the impact of incorrect reporting of data on management action, eg the 
incorrect recording of the nationality of asylum seekers could impact on 
international relations. 
 
The immediate benefits of Balanced Scorecard implementation was that both 
the HR Directorate and the MM Directorate had better understanding of how 
their actions affected other parts of the organisation, with some consequent 
adjustment to management behaviour.  Also there was growing perception of 
the need to roll out the Balanced Scorecard process wider within IND to gain 
greater benefit on cross-directorate initiatives and delivery. 
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2.5. Post implementation. 
 
Development of the Balanced Scorecard concepts within IND continues.  In 
particular the aim is to rebuild the scorecards based on a shared strategic 
perspective among Directors, rather than being based simply on cascaded 
KPIs.  This will hopefully have an impact on the IND’s “measurement 
culture”, where measurement arising from issues and initiatives continues long 
after interest has diminished.  The IND was assessed as lying in the “We never 
seem to get there” quadrant of the grid at Figure 2.11.  There was an assessed 
need for greater emphasis on more structured planning, and better balanced 
assessments of options given the increased constraints on resources.  Active 
consideration is being given to producing the next version of the IND Delivery 
Plan on a Balanced Scorecard basis.  These issues were seen as putting 
pressure on finance and planning staff for changes in attitude; to become 
colleagues assisting in business change rather than as impediments and blocks 
to activity.  This represented something of a challenge due to the high level of 
staff with basic finance skills and insufficient management skills and 
perspectives.  Also there were few people in the finance function with 
operational experience of the IND frontline business, and a notable reliance on 
agency staff in some parts of the business. 
 
2.6. Assessment of the Home Office, Immigration and Nationality 
Directorate Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Brief discussion of Figure 3.12 suggests that the IND fitted into the same 
category as MOD.  Although staff turnover is not excessive it is quite high.  
The stakeholder base is large and complex and quite volatile, whilst the 
organisation, as part of the HO, is long and relatively stable.  Management of 
the organisational culture would therefore seem to be something that needs 
careful management attention.  The IND implementation of the Balanced 
Scorecard has also been assessed against the 21 rules for implementation for 
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implementing and running the Balanced Scorecard in Chapters 2 and 6.  This 
is given below in Table 9.1. 
 
Table 9.1: 21 Factors that impact Balanced Scorecard 
implementation and running –Home Office, Immigration and 
Nationality Directorate. 
1. Top Level 
Commitment. 
Yes – partly.  There is a top level scorecard and senior 
managers are involved in developments at a lower level.  
However, there was no evidence that the senior 
managers themselves are promoting the concept in any 
visible way to the rest of the organisation. 
2. Involving more 
than Top 
Management. 
Yes – partly.  The Balanced Scorecard concepts do 
cascade down the organisation, but only to middle 
management levels.  Being largely driven by senior 
management’s KPI, it is unlikely that all employees will 
see the specific relevance to their own activities. 




Yes.  Use of the Balanced Scorecard extends beyond 
the finance and planning functions.  For example, the 
HR department has its own Balanced Scorecard, and the 
Management Migration Directorate are also conscious 





No.  The Balanced Scorecards were based on existing 
KPIs, which, while they may reflect organisational 
strategy, were produced before any organisational 
strategy at the lower levels.  (See below.) 




Yes – partly.  In that the prime content of the 
scorecards are the senior management’s KPIs, this 
should broadly reflect on the strategic issues of the 
organisation rather than lower level issues. 
6. Avoid focussing 
on worthless 
measures. 
Yes – partly.  KPIs generally reflect strategic issues 
that the HO must control, although not all the factors 
affecting these issues are directly under the 
organisation’s control.  However, the organisation does 
tend to continue to gather data even after the initial 
importance of the issue has waned. 




Yes – partly.  The scorecards are specific to the 
Department.  However, there is a degree to which KPIs 
are cascaded without thinking further about local 
appropriateness.  Thus there is only limited 
development of specific new PIs to address local issues. 




Yes – partly.  The use of cascaded KPIs ensures that 
issues are strategic, but means that they are directly 
dependent on management processes at the lower 
levels. 
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9. Using terms 
consistently. 
Yes.  Cascading the KPIs means that the data has the 
same meaning at different levels. 
10. Utilise pilot 
projects. 
Yes.  An incremental approach is effectively being used 
in the Department.  Early scorecards thus constitute the 
pilots for later work. 





Yes.  Advice sought from external consultants and from 
others using the Balanced Scorecard, eg MOD. 
12. Avoid misusing 
the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Yes.  Although the cascading of Departmental KPIs 
might permit senior management to impose direct 
control, there was no evidence that this has taken place. 




No.  No evidence of a cause-and-effect map was found, 
but will be pursued in the development of the next 
phase activity. 






No.  Standard civil service payment regimes adopted 
which do not facilitate bonus arrangements linked to 
scorecards. 






Yes – partly.  The lack of a cause-and-effect map will 
seriously limit organisational learning, but there was 
some evidence of greater awareness of the broader 
implications of management action.  Initial scorecards 
are also being reviewed with the aim of developing and 





Yes.  Some evidence of a measurement culture and the 
planned review and development of the scorecards 
reflects a proper resourcing strategy. 
17. Properly balance 
the IT issues. 
Yes.  There was no evidence that the scorecards had 
become dominated by IT issues, or that they were not 
playing a full part in the collection, maintenance and 
presentation of data. 





Yes – partly.  Training/education had been provided, 
but only to the extent that the scorecard was 
immediately visible.  Failure to explain the issues fully 
to all levels will limit the effective use of scorecards 






Yes.  The reliance on cascaded KPIs means that the 
system could be implemented fairly quickly and 
developed once in use. 
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Yes.  Stated as to produce more collegiate behaviour 
and address some of the issuing arising from previous 
organisational growth. 
21. Managers, at all 









No.  Not seen as relevant to staff at the lower levels.  
The only emphasis is on accuracy of data.  Thus it is 
unlikely that the vision and strategy will be truly shared 
by all employees. 
 
This suggests that 17 of the 21 rules are being followed to a greater or lesser 
degree.  As this development is still in the early stages then there are good 
prospects for this Balanced Scorecard implementation.  The key issues that 
will need to be addressed are: 
 
• The simple cascade of high level organisational KPIs rather than the 
development of tailored performance measures from examination of 
the local strategy and its implementation. 
• The need to develop and utilise effectively the cause-and-effect model, 
which is a defining characteristic of the Balanced Scorecard process 
and which underpins the local double-loop organisational learning. 
• Effective and consistent communication of the scorecard, the strategic 
direction, and current performance, to staff at all levels in order to 
create consistent and coherent action. 
 
3. Department of Trade and Industry, Business Link website. 
 
3.1. Outline of organisation and aims. 
 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) gives its mission statement and 
strategic objectives as: 
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“The DTI drives our ambition of ‘prosperity for all’ by 
working to create the best environment for business success 
in the UK.  We help people and companies become more 
productive by promoting enterprise, innovation and 
creativity.  We champion UK business at home and abroad.  
We invest in world-class science and technology.  We protect 
the rights of working people and consumers.  And we stand 
up for fair and open markets in the UK, Europe and the 
world.” 8 
 
Within the overall context of these strategic objectives, DTI aims to: 
 
“Through the Small Business Service, deliver our ambition 
to make the UK the best place in the world to start and grow 
a business… The SBS will help to do this by improving the 
quality and market penetration of the Business Link 
contractors and other delivery partners who provide support 
and advice to small businesses.” 9 
 
One of the issues highlighted within the agenda to reform and improve the 
business support activities is to: 
 
“Simplify Government’s electronic interface with business.  
We will do this through the launch of business.gov, a major 
cross-Government initiative designed to bring together all e-
government services for business, by March 2004…” 10 
 
In the following year’s Business Plan, the Department states: 
 
“We launched the businesslink.gov.uk website in November 
2003, to make it easier for smaller businesses and those 
thinking of starting a business to find and understand the 
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government support and services available to them and the 
rues and regulation they need to comply with.  We have built 
the site in collaboration with a number of Government 
Departments and Agencies, including Inland Revenue, HM 
Customs & Excise, Companies House and the Small Business 
Service.  We will further improve this in 2004/05 to enhance 
the customer experience, including integrated, user-friendly 
government transactions.” 11 
 
This case study deals with the Balanced Scorecard developed to manage this 
project.  The organisation of the Department is shown in Figure 9.3 below.  
(The breakdown of the main Directorates is not given, except for the Business 
Group, in which this case study was undertaken.) 12 
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Permanent Secretary 




Office of Science and 
Technology 











9 Regional Directors 
Head of Business 
Support 
Head of Regions 
Head of Business 
Relations 1 
Fair Markets Group
Head of Business 
Relations 2 





The information for this case study was largely provided by Andrew Sheffield 
who works in the Small Business Service and was responsible for developing 
the Business Link web site. 
 
9 - 16 
3.2. Introduction of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
The group responsible for the development of the Business Link was newly 
created and operates on a matrix style.  However the programme had wide 
visibility within the Department at Director General and Ministerial levels, and 
in other Government Departments.  The Project Director required a project 
management tool that would enable the project to be managed effectively 
between the initial “initiative launch” and the “product launch”.  This is 


















Figure 9.4: Level of interest in early stages of project 
life style.   
(After A Sheffield) 
 
 
Figure 9.4 suggests that after initial high levels of interest in a project, as the 
concepts and benefits are explored and articulated, the level of interest rapidly 
declines.  This is the stage during which the product is developed.  Loss of 
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interest, particularly among senior officials and Ministers, will result from the 
amount of detailed work required, to which they are unable to contribute 
effectively.  It may also result from a desire to distance themselves from the 
project, in case it fails.  As the project nears completion levels of interest will 
increase again.  This may result from the desire for the publicity associated 
with the launch of a desired, or potentially successful, product.   
 
The danger associated with such a profile is that the level of interest will 
decline to the extent that there is an inability to gain the necessary resources.  
This will frustrate the project aim and lead to failure.  The Business Link 
website project therefore recognised that there was a need to manage 
expectations and contributions during this dip in the level of interest by 
maintaining clear focus on the expected outcomes and the progress towards 
achievement.  The programme explored a number of tools and models, 
including a number developed in-house.  However, none was seen to articulate 
the issues as clearly and effectively as the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
The Business Link website project is a cross-Departmental initiative, with 
cross-Department funding.  That is, it derived its funding from “new money” 
from the Treasury rather than from the existing funding of any one 
Government Department.  Similarly the project group itself was a new group 
and took some time to find a parent Department that would own the project.  
Eventually it became lodged in the DTI, but took some time to fully integrate 
itself due to the novel nature of the matrix working, and the mix of Civil 
Servants (from various Departments) and consultants and the culture that this 
discrete group quickly developed for themselves.  This seems to be largely a 
matrix structure of groups working together in free-forming cells, within an 
overall structure of responsibilities and accountabilities, to deliver elements of 
the project.  However, there may also be some element of the stellar culture, 
where people have formed their association with the project because of 
personal commitment to the objectives or activity, and because of the personal 
benefits that they derive from this project. 13  Also the website being 
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developed became a replacement for and existing DTI product, and this 
resulted in some tensions with established members of the DTI.   
 
Although the idea was initiated largely by a consultant employed to assist in 
the development of project management, the idea was quickly taken up and 
Championed by the Project Director.  It was “sold” to senior management in a 
series of brief presentations, as it was not felt that an hour long detailed 
presentation would be beneficial in gaining support.  These were joint 
presentations between the Champion and the consultant.  However, there was 
a degree to which the concept was already becoming recognised and accepted 
at senior management levels within Whitehall.  Indeed, the DTI was already 
developing a Departmental level Balanced Scorecard. 14 
 
The project Balanced Scorecard was developed from first principles by the 
consultant using software to develop and articulate a cause and effect model.  
All but one of the PIs were developed locally, based on the need to ensure the 
delivery of benefits.  Partly because this is a project based Balanced 
Scorecard, the quadrants derived do not readily link to Kaplan and Norton’s 
archetypal scorecard.  Much work was done at “desk level” with the project 
team members to articulate the issues involved in delivering the project 
outcome.  Key to this was an attempt to quantify the required outcomes, which 
had previously only been expressed in general terms.  Another specific aim 
was to monitor the delivery of milestones and provide assurance to 
Programme Board members that development and benefit delivery were still 
on track compared to the plan. 
 
3.3. Post implementation. 
 
The Project Director assessed this Balanced Scorecard implementation as 
being very successful, and a number of benefits or issues were identified.  
 
9 - 19 
• The use of the Balanced Scorecard proved useful in securing the buy-in 
of Other Government Departments.  Failures to provide the necessary 
information or support became readily evident through the scorecard 
reports.  This helped to ensure that each Department contributed well, 
rather than being shown to be causing any delay and thus facing 
pressure from other Departments. 
• Low levels of IT skills at senior levels of Departments meant that the 
Balanced Scorecard reports, which were largely automated 
presentations, were not being used effectively.  This led to: 
o The need to answer many questions from senior management 
that could have been answered using the “drill-down” facility in 
the Balanced Scorecard reports. 15 
o Use of black and white hardcopy printouts for Balanced 
Scorecard reports not only negated the drill-down linkages 
provided in the soft-copy reports but also rendered the traffic 
light reporting mechanism ineffective.  Consequently reports 
had to be redesigned to incorporate letters to supplement the 
traffic light colours; “R” for red, etc. 
• Development time for some PIs was quite long. 
• Variation from the plan was not always due to failure, but was 
sometimes due to the plan only being an initial estimate that 
subsequent experience showed to be invalid.  Reporting against the 
plan therefore showed shortfalls in performance until the Programme 
Board could be persuaded to agree to an amendment of the plan.  This 
was seen by some as a good discipline since it enabled the Programme 
Board to retain control and build understanding of the project.  
However, at a lower level this was sometimes seen as a bureaucratic 
impediment that resulted in good performance being shown as failing 
to meet targets.  
 
Once the project had implemented its initial website the project has continued 
to develop the website.   
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3.4. Assessment of the DTI Small Business, Business Link Balanced 
Scorecard. 
 
The Business Link website project Balanced Scorecard was assessed against 
the 21 rules for implementation and running the Balanced Scorecard 
developed in Chapters 2 and 6. 
 
Table 9.2: 21 Factors that impact Balanced Scorecard 
implementation and running – DTI Business Link. 
1. Top Level 
Commitment. 
Yes.  The senior managers of the Project were fully and 
openly involved in promoting the Balanced Scorecard.  
At Departmental level managers and politicians 
accepted and use the concept. 
2. Involving more 
than Top 
Management. 
Yes.  Within the project, staff at all levels were 
involved in developing the performance indicators and 
the cause-and-effect model. 




Yes.  Similarly the Balanced Scorecard was developed 





No.  The Balanced Scorecard was based on the project’s 
vision and emerging strategy, which are linked to or 
directed by Departmental vision and strategy.  
However, there was no specific derivation from 
Departmental requirements.  The project was the result 
of a cross-departmental initiative and was only 
allocated to the DTI after work started. 




Yes – partly.  See above.  Only broadly derived from 
Departmental objectives, not from Departmentally set 
KPIs. 
6. Avoid focussing 
on worthless 
measures. 
Yes – mostly.  All but one performance indicator were 
derived from within the project.  See below. 




Yes.  The scorecard totally tailored to local 
requirements, to the point where it is not explicitly 
recognisable as a Balanced Scorecard. 
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Yes – mostly.  One PI, used at the insistence of senior 
management, provides broad indication of overall 
success, but is crude and susceptible to easy 
manipulation. 
9. Using terms 
consistently. 
No.  There is no data dictionary, although attempts have 
been made to express terms clearly and consistently.  
However, there has been some dispute over the 
tolerances between traffic light measures due to lack of 
specific definition. 
10. Utilise pilot 
projects. 
Yes.  Although a form of Balanced Scorecard exists at 
Departmental level, this project scorecard is effectively 
a pilot project at this level. 





Yes.  Project Balanced Scorecard initiated by Project 
Director and an experienced consultant. 
12. Avoid misusing 
the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Yes.  Deviations from plan result in managers at the 
lower level being required to generate recovery plans 
that are then monitored at higher levels. 




Yes.  Developed during the initial stages of the 
Balanced Scorecard programme. 






No.  Recommended by the consultant but not consistent 
with Civil Service pay arrangements and culture. 






Yes.  Monitoring of performance initiates debate over 
the validity of original plans as well as ensuring that 





Yes – partly.  Initially the development of the Balanced 
Scorecard was properly resourced, but since the 
delivery of the initial product insufficient effort has 
been put into developing new plans and measures. 
17. Properly balance 
the IT issues. 
Yes.  Good use of IT, but does not dominate the 
process. 





Yes – partly.  Training and education provided by the 
consultant as part of the development process, but only 
for those directly involved in developing and using the 
Balanced Scorecard. 





Yes.  Developed rapidly as this was a fast moving 
project. 




Yes.  Project management tool for monitoring progress 
and delivery of benefits. 
21. Managers, at all 









No.  Individuals with specific packages for delivery are 
involved, but the Balanced Scorecard is not used as a 
more general management or communication tool.  
Many staff are specialist who strongly focussed on their 
own activity and are not seen as concerned about wider 
objective that are managed by team leaders. 
 
17 issues score “Yes”, at least in part.  And this suggests that the Balanced 
Scorecard should be effective, which seems to be the case.  The issue here is 
that this scorecard is highly localised and substantially divorced from any 
mainstream developments.  Thus whilst this development is extremely useful 
in demonstrating the use of the Balanced Scorecard for project management, it 
may have limited ability to influence the wider adoption of strategic 
management through the use of scorecards. 
 
The Balanced Scorecard was also assessed against the grid at Figure 2.11.  The 
initial development was assessed as having both good planning and good 
measurement.  However, following the initial implementation less attention 
has been paid to the planning and measurement and thus objectives and 
achievement is less clear.   
 
Similarly the implementation was assessed using the block diagram at Figure 
2.12.  The project team itself was new and was newly associated with the DTI.  
However, it contained a substantial number of established civil servants and 
was clearly linked to a well established management regime.  Nevertheless, it 
was recognised that the public sector has a poor record on the management of 
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IT projects.  It is therefore not clear whether the organisation should be 
considered successful or unsuccessful before implementation of the Balanced 
Scorecard.  The project was assessed as successful and it was recognised that 
the Balanced Scorecard would be retained.  This means that the 
implementation could be assessed in either the “Balanced Scorecard likely to 
be retained for reasons not associated with perceived benefits” or the “Success 
likely to be attributed to implementation of Balanced Scorecard” segments.  
This fits with the perceived outcome of the initial project, ie that the Balanced 
Scorecard provided an extremely helpful management tool, but other factors 
also contributed to the successful outcome, for example avoiding getting 
involved in debate on policy issues, the quality and dedication of staff. 
 
No attempt is made to utilise this Balanced Scorecard to manage cultural 
issues.  When assessed against the model at Figure 3.12, it is easy to see that 
cultural issues are less likely to be significant.  As a group, the project team 
had existed for a short time.  Because it was highly focussed and not readily 
accepted by the parent Department, the organisation can be considered to have 
existed for a short time.  The team have a large number of stakeholders across 
the DTI and in other government Departments, as well as stakeholders across 
industry.  High staff commitment to the project has meant that staff turnover is 
low.  Thus the model label appropriately shows that, “Culture relatively 
insignificant aspect of dealings with the organisation – specialist shop serving 
large clientele, eg via internet sales”. 
 
4. Department of Constitutional Affairs. 
 
4.1. Outline of organisation and aims. 
 
The Department of Constitutional Affairs (DCA) was created in June 2003. 16  
This study was undertaken in November and December, 2004.  The aim of the 
organisation is: “Upholding justice, rights and democracy.” 17  To achieve 
this purpose, the Department lists four Objectives: 
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• “To provide criminal, civil, family and administrative 
justice systems that command public respect and 
confidence. … 
• To ensure that the public, especially the socially 
excluded and vulnerable, have access to excellent 
services, which enable them to exercise their rights in 
law and understand, exercise and fulfil their 
responsibilities. … 
• To enable the development of democratic institutions 
of government that command public confidence. … 
• To create a modern, efficient and effective department 
that has the capacity and capability to deliver 
excellent public services.” 18  
 
This is somewhat confusing since the Departmental Report 2003/4 lists six 
objectives: 
 
• “To ensure the effective delivery of justice … 
• To ensure a fair and effective system of civil and 
administrative law … 
• To reduce social exclusion and protect the vulnerable 
… 
• To modernise the constitution and ensure proper 
access to information by citizens  
• To increase consumer choice in legal services by 
improving information and by promoting competition 
… 
• To deliver justice in partnership with the independent 
judiciary …” 19 
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This difference may be associated with the development, pressures and 
priorities emerging over the year and a half since the organisation was formed.  
This may be understandable in terms of bringing together so many different 
organisations.  Listed in the Departmental Report are the “Sister departments, 
agencies and other offices” 20 that combine to make up the department: 
 
• Northern Ireland Court Service 
• HM Land Registry 
• The National Archives 
• Court Service 
• Public Guardianship Office 
• Legal Services Commission 
• Commission for Judicial Appointments 
• HM Magistrates’ Court Service Inspectorate 
• Judicial Studies Board 
• Council on Tribunals 
• Official Solicitor and Public Trustee 
• Office of the Judge Advocate General 
• Law Commission 
• Office of the Legal Services Ombudsman 
• Information Commissioner 
 
This highlights the complexity of managing a Department with so many semi-
autonomous organisations. An organisational diagram is at Figure 9.5 below.  
The Permanent Secretary’s statement highlights the many new senior 
managers joining the Department, a factor which will add to the issues for the 
new Department. 21 
 
This study deals with the development of the Balanced Scorecard within the 
whole department.  The information used in constructing this case study was 
mainly supplied by Nikki Hunt, Head of Strategic Management.   
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Figure 9.5: Department of Constitutional Affairs.   
Adapted from DCA Departmental Report 2003/04.  Pages 158 and 159. 
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4.2. Development and Introduction of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Chapter 6 highlighted that, in MOD, staff moving out of the Naval areas were 
influential in the development of Balanced Scorecards in other parts of the 
MOD.  A similar sort of issue appears to have occurred within DCA.  Work 
had been undertaken to implement the Balanced Scorecard in the Court 
Service prior to its absorption into the newly formed DCA.  Influential in these 
developments, both in the Court Service and subsequently in DCA, was the 
previous Court Service Chief Executive, who is now 2nd Permanent Secretary 
of the DCA.  However, the general familiarity with the term “Balanced 
Scorecard” at senior levels of Whitehall Departments meant that top managers 
were receptive to the idea when it was proposed for the new Department.  
Whilst Court Service CE/2nd PUS acted as a senior champion, the work to 
produce and develop the Balanced Scorecard was undertaken by Nikki Hunt, 
first in the Court Service and subsequently in DCA.  There was limited, but 
important, consultancy support during the development.  The Court Service 
effectively acted as a pilot project for work in DCA.  Indeed, the Court Service 
continues to be in the lead in the development of the concept within DCA. 
 
Initial implementation within the DCA was quite rapid, as part of the ongoing 
iterative development.  However, a healthy scepticism was evident from the 
start of this study, which is seen as having a beneficial effect on maintaining 
the progress on development of the scorecard.  This scepticism recognises that 
there is a balanced set of measures but that further work needs to be done on 
ensuring that they are the right measures and that the relationships between 
them are increasingly understood and articulated.  As with DTI, HO and MOD 
implementations discussed in this research, support for the Balanced 
Scorecard, both as a concept and for the particular implementation, have been 
built up gradually.  Indeed, this development, like that in the DTI, has not used 
set piece presentations to build commitment among top management, partly, 
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as already noted, because the broad concepts are already becoming recognised 
and accepted by top managers. 
 
Being a new Department has presented some difficulties in terms of creating 
clarity of the key issues to be managed in the Balanced Scorecard.  In this 
context, Departmental Targets and lessons learned from EFQM evaluation 
have proved valuable pointers.  Added to this, some senior managers have 
pressed for “hot topics” to be included.  This is similar in concept to what M G 
Brown calls “idiot lights”; those indicators that flag up issues that would not 
readily be identified within the main management activity and PIs, but yet 
which might represent issues that have a disproportional effect.  The concept 
here is that, such measures only need to be noted when they deviate beyond 
key parameters.  Using the dashboard analogy often associated with the 
Balanced Scorecard, the oil pressure warning light would be considered an 
“idiot light”, because you only take action when the light comes on. 22  This 
represents quite an intelligent and sophisticated use of the scorecard, provided 
the issues are not paid undue attention in routine reports. 
 
Originally the DCA Balanced Scorecard was developed using Kaplan and 
Norton’s key concepts and archetypal layout.  Subsequent senior management 
request’s resulted in the scorecard being rearranged to highlight the key 
aspects of Departmental output.  Supporting activities and issues are grouped 
together in a separate quadrant.  Such tailored scorecards are by no means 
unusual and do not necessarily cause problems provided subsequent 
development does not: 
 
• Result in changes to the overall balance of indicators. 
• Ignore the potential of composite PIs to provide broad coverage of key 
issues whilst using a limited number of PIs thereby preventing growth 
in the overall number of PIs. 
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The development of the Balanced Scorecard provided the DCA with clear, 
consolidated view of Departmental performance.  This was a significant 
benefit early in the development of the organisation. 
 
4.3. Post implementation development. 
 
Whilst the initial Departmental Balanced Scorecard was introduced in about 
three to four months, and has been gradually developed subsequently, this is 
not the extent of the Balanced Scorecard developments in the DCA.  Interest 
in the Balanced Scorecard was noted to increase as the PIs were developed and 
populated with data, but two other issues are worthy of consideration: 
 
• Lower level development – Developments at the Departmental level 
have triggered developments at lower levels in parts of the Department.  
Debate is ongoing about the degree to which some PIs in the 
Departmental Balanced Scorecard need to be replicated in lower level 
scorecards.  Clearly there cannot be a single, simple answer to this.  
Nevertheless as areas are developing their understanding of how they 
contribute to Departmental performance, through the development of 
lower level cause-and-effect maps, they should determine what PIs are 
appropriate.  This seems to be happening in some areas, although not 
all areas are making the same progress. 
• Permanent Secretary’s personal scorecard – Scorecards are not used 
to determine performance pay within the Department, except in relation 
to the Permanent Secretary.  Here the Cabinet Secretary is imposing a 
Balanced Scorecard format on Personal Performance agreements with 
Departmental heads.  Work is currently ongoing to determine the 
whether the Departmental Balanced Scorecard can be used as the basis 
for the relationship between the Cabinet Secretary and the Permanent 
Secretary.  This would then be used to determine the Permanent 
Secretary’s performance pay.  Consequently: 
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o The relationship with the Cabinet Office could have a strong 
influence on the content of the Departmental Scorecards as the 
Permanent Secretary is likely to want to ensure that his personal 
scorecard is correctly orientated towards the same measures that 
the Department is striving to achieve. 
o In turn this puts a significant emphasis on the Cabinet Office 
use of the Balanced Scorecard, and gives them a key role in 
determining that the concepts are implemented and used 
properly.  Failure to do so, for example by simply accepting the 
PIs offered by any Permanent Secretary, could lead to the 
relationship being manipulated by the Department to the 
advantage of the Permanent Secretary.  Key to understanding 
the content and aims of the Balanced Scorecard is the cause-
and-effect map.  This should thus assume a high importance in 
the relationship between Permanent Secretaries and the Cabinet 
Secretary. 
 
4.4. Assessment of the Department for Constitutional Affairs Balanced 
Scorecard. 
 
The assessment of this implementation is difficult due to the nature of the 
organisation; a Department newly formed from the amalgamation of a number 
of existing organisations.  Nevertheless, on initial assessment, using the 21 
factors, the development appears to be quite effective, scoring a very 
creditable 18. 
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Table 9.3: 21 Factors that impact Balanced Scorecard 
implementation and running - DCA. 
1. Top Level 
Commitment. 
Yes – partly.  Top management committed to the idea 
of a Balanced Scorecard, and there are board level 
champions.  However, no formal education programme 
has been undertaken.  Therefore there is no guarantee 
that all senior managers fully understand Balanced 
Scorecard concepts nor that they are thus committed to 
the true concepts.  
2. Involving more 
than Top 
Management. 
Yes.  Work gradually penetrating to lower levels of the 
organisation. 




Yes.  The work is gradually broadening out across the 
Department as the initial Departmental Balanced 





No.  Strategy is now being developed after the initial 
hiatus caused by forming the new Department.  Initial 
scorecards based on existing objectives transferred into 
the Department on formation. 




Yes – partly.  See above.  The scorecard focuses on the 
objectives even though a coherent strategy for 
achieving organisational objectives has yet to be fully 
determined. 
6. Avoid focussing 
on worthless 
measures. 
Yes – partly.  Many of the PIs were developed from 
key objectives, EFQM assessment and cause-and-effect 
mapping.  But some PIs have been implemented as a 
result of senior management direction.  Value of 
additional measures needs to be assessed against the 
emerging strategy to ensure that additional measures are 
not worthless. 




Yes.  Scorecards developed from first principles and 
therefore entirely geared to local requirements.  The 
danger is that by departing from the standardised 
format, influence from those who have not been fully 
educated in the concept may ultimately subvert the 
scorecard by undermining the key concepts. 




Yes.  The scorecard used primarily at Departmental 
level.  Drill-down is not used to initiate senior 
management involvement at a lower level activity. 
9. Using terms 
consistently. 
Yes.  Although no data dictionary was developed, PIs 
were tightly defined as they were developed. 
10. Utilise pilot 
projects. 
Yes.  The Court Service work has effectively 
represented a pilot project for subsequent developments 
in the Department. 
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Yes – partly.  Very limited consultancy support, but 
this has added valuable knowledge and skills, 
particularly in the area of IT. 
12. Avoid misusing 
the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Yes.  Issues identified are delegated to individuals at a 
lower level rather than as a means to impose top-level 
control. 




Yes.  Cause and effect maps used to validate and 
support developments at different levels. 






No.  Only in the context of the Permanent Secretary is 
the Balanced Scorecard considered in relation to bonus 
payments. 






Yes.  Where the cause-and-effect maps are used to 
examine the relationships between activities and outputs 





Yes – partly.  Although not directly and specifically 
resourced, there are adequate resources within the 
Strategic Management area to support the development. 
17. Properly balance 
the IT issues. 
Yes – partly.  This is not a fully automated system, but 
IT support is effectively used to support cause-and-
effect mapping. 











Yes.  Initial scorecard introduced within three to four 
months, with subsequent iterative development as 
learning took place. 




Yes.  Understanding organisational objectives and 
performance. 
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21. Managers, at all 









Yes.  Balanced Scorecard used as a key document to 
build organisational understanding at all levels in a 
newly formed organisation.  Particularly effective in 
Court Service. 
 
Much of the credit for this successful implementation must go to the 
Champion and the programme manager.  Nevertheless there is thus a real risk 
to this programme, particularly since no substantial education programme has 
been undertaken at the higher levels.  The risk is thus that replacement of these 
individuals could leave the systems vulnerable to: 
 
• The process and concepts being overturned by those in the organisation 
who are less well versed in the Balanced Scorecard. 
• New initiatives that force abandonment of the Balanced Scorecard in 
favour of a new “flavour of the month”. 
 
It must be recognised that this Balanced Scorecard is only about 18 months 
old, but many people are coming to believe that it takes years to really gain the 
real benefits of the Balanced Scorecard; indeed arguably the concept is still 
developing.  It would indeed be unfortunate if DCA did not therefore build on 
the solid foundation that they have. 
 
It is also clear where these challenges would come from: 
 
• Senior managers, and  
• Legal/Judicial professions. 
 
Like MOD, DCA is managed by Senior Civil Servants who rarely have 
business qualifications and are thus unlikely to have detailed knowledge of the 
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benefits of alternative management systems, and the conditions that create 
success.  The Cabinet Office is moving to change this by placing increased 
emphasis on professionalism and professional qualifications.  Again like the 
MOD, DCA also has a professional “stream” alongside the management 
stream.  The legal profession are, rightly, primarily concerned with the free 
and fair execution of justice, and are less likely to want to be concerned with 
management process.  They are torn by the same dichotomy that the military 
in MOD face, and which is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.  DCA thus faces 
the same sort of cultural diversity that MOD experiences, and DCA may thus 
well benefit from specifically addressing these issues through the Balanced 
Scorecard, in order to create awareness and improve organisational cohesion.  
No attempts are made at present to define, monitor and manage the culture of 
DCA through a specific model, or in the Balanced Scorecard.  Nevertheless 
there is a perception that the arrival of the new CE of the Court Service did 
precipitate some cultural change.  It was at this point that there was a greater 
emphasis on people, both as deliverers of a service and as customers, rather 
than the previous emphasis on process.  But, staff attitude surveys are also an 
important feed to the Balanced Scorecard in the DCA and may help to manage 
the culture, albeit against a less clearly defined, and potential changing, model. 
 
Recognising that the DCA is only the amalgamation of previously existing 
organisations, and not an entirely new organisation, it is reasonable to classify 
it as a large organisation with a long history.  Consequently in assessing DCA 
against the model of cultural importance at Figure 3.12, and recognising that 
DCA has a large volatile customer and stakeholder base, it shows that the 
culture is likely to be complex.  The issue is about the degree of staff turnover.  
Within the legal and judicial activity stream the turnover is likely to be very 
low.  Within other parts of the organisation the turnover will be higher, but not 
unduly so.  It is thus likely that the culture will be consistently projected 
outside the organisation, and that the culture will be widely understood.  The 
strongest impression will probably be the enduring nature and professionalism 
of the Legal and Judicial elements.  This emphasis again highlights the issues 
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about the difficulty of managing culture in a changing environment, for 
example in one where there are strong pressures for improved efficiency. 
 
This leads on to looking at the Measurement/Planning Matrix at Figure 2.11.  
The use of the cause-and-effects model, alongside such things as EFQM and 
staff surveys, suggests that measurement is likely to be quite effective.  
Similarly there are clearly defined Public Sector Agreement (PSA) targets set 
by Government, which underpin the Balanced Scorecard.  However, the late 
development of strategy suggests that planning is not quite as effective, 
although again the use of the cause-and-effect model, EFQM and staff surveys 
not only suggests that there will be intelligent selection of PIs, the organisation 
learning derived from them will promote effective planning.  The issue is thus 
about the coherence of plans without an effective overarching strategy.  
Without this development, which is understood to be taking place, the DCA 
would be likely to face the classic organisational problem recognised by 
Kaplan and Norton; individuals interpreting the strategy in accordance with 
their own understanding, values and objectives, with the consequence that 
there is no agreement. 23 
 
The evaluation of the DCA scorecard above highlighted the vulnerability of 
this scorecard due to limited education, and thus there is no widespread 
commitment through deep understanding of the concepts.  These issues are 
well illustrated by the analysis of attitudes towards the impact of the Balanced 
Scorecard using the model at Figure 2.12.  The organisation currently lies 
somewhere near the centre of the model, because: 
 
• It would be unreasonable to condemn the organisation as previously 
unsuccessful, although the creation of the DCA resulted from a 
perception that the previous constituent parts were not enormously 
successful.  There was at least a desire and expectation of improved 
efficiency from the reorganisation. 
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• The organisation has been reasonably successful following its creation, 
but it is too early to claim any enormous success. 
• For the immediate future the Balanced Scorecard is likely to remain, 
but could be potentially vulnerable.  The use of a Balanced Scorecard 
concept for the Permanent Secretary’s Performance Partnership with 
the Cabinet Office could ultimately be one of the key influences that 
keeps it alive in DCA since this is an external influence. 
 
There would therefore be some expectation that organisational success would 
be attributed to the Balanced Scorecard.  However, re-examination of Figure 
2.12 demonstrates that this represents only one of eight potential outcomes, 
thus the weak indeterminateness in the three classifications above would 
suggest that there is unlikely to be a strong sense that the Balanced Scorecard 
has produced the success achieved.  The other seven categories in the model 
thus exert a stronger negative influence.  This was borne out in discussions 
where it was suggested that it is the initiatives that have resulted from the 
Balanced Scorecard analysis that are currently more likely seen to be the 
causes of success, rather than the Balanced Scorecard itself.  This fits well 
with most of the other seven boxes where the Balanced Scorecard is largely 
seen as irrelevant or not specifically contributing to success.  Only greater 
success, and a greater understanding and commitment to the Balanced 
Scorecard, is likely to change perceptions. 
 
In summary, because this Balanced Scorecard is at such an early stage of 
development, but can be shown to be an effective implementation of a 
management concept that is not widely and fully understood within the DCA, 
it would be worthy of continued monitoring.  The tools developed in this 
research have been particularly useful in analysing the implementation.  In 
particular the cultural issues are significant in this Department and are likely to 
have an impact on the development of the Balanced Scorecard, and on 
organisational success.  Modelling of the culture, and direct attempts to 
manage it, are therefore likely to worthwhile. 




5.1. Outline of organisational aims and achievement. 
 
Tesco’s Corporate Social Responsibility Review 2001/02 states, 
 
“The principle activity of Tesco is the operation of food 
stores and associated activities in the UK, Republic of 
Ireland, France, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak 
Republic, Thailand, South Korea and Taiwan.” 24 
 
This report goes on to state, 
 
“Business Strategy 
Tesco has a rolling 5 year business plan.  Our long-term 
growth strategy has four elements: 
• Strong UK core business 
Our UK business is based on our obsession of getting it right 
for our customers.  We continue to offer great value, bring 
new innovations and grow market share. 
• Non-food 
We are extending our brand into non-food.  We now have 
over 4% market share and are developing a good one stop 
shop for customers. 
• Retailing services 
Retailing services are a great opportunity for us to bring new 
services to the customer.  We have developed the best 
grocery home shopping system for the customer and Tesco 
Personal Finance offers great products at good prices. 
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• International 
Our strategy of building an international business of scale 
continues to gain momentum.  We have made good progress 
in all markets and now operate 102 overseas hypermarkets.  
We are on track to have the same overseas as in the UK in 
2003.” 25 
 
This report also states, 
 
“Our Core Purpose and Values define the way we do 
business.  This creates the culture and environment in which 
all four parts of our strategy continue to deliver strong 
results, and define our responsibilities to our customers and 
employees, and to the communities where we operate… 
Corporate social responsibility reflects our Values – 
‘treating people how we like to be treated’ … Our 
philosophy of ‘Every Little Helps’ underpins these wide-
ranging responsibilities – we recognise that we cannot 
change the world, but we can do our bit and so play our 
part… We strive to attract and retain the best people to work 
for us by offering support and development, reflecting 
another one of our Values, ‘look after our people so they 
can look after our customers’.  This lies at the heart of our 
business strategy.” 26 
 
This opening statement by the Chief Executive also makes explicit linkage to 
the “Steering Wheel”, the name Tesco gives to its Balanced Scorecard.  The 
report goes on to articulate the,  
 
“…Core Purpose: “To create value for customers to earn 
their lifetime loyalty”  The way we do things at Tesco is 
defined by our Values: No one tries harder for 
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customers…Business Ethics  Tesco is committed to 
conducting business in an ethical and socially responsible 
manner.” 27 
 
It also highlights its commitment to developing its own people, to treating 
them honestly and fairly, responsibility towards the employees of suppliers, 
responsibility towards the community and its organisation, as well as to a 
healthy lifestyle of customers.  It recognises environmental responsibilities in 
terms of the direct impact of their operations, recycling issues, the promotion 
of biodiversity and the promotion of animal welfare. 28 
 
Comparison of the 2001/02 Review with its follow on reports for 02/03 and 
03/04 demonstrate the continued growth of Tesco (see Table 9.4).  In 2004 the 
size of the company ruled it out of contention in the take-over battle for its 
competitor Safeway, which was ultimately won by Morrisons.  However, it 
must be recognised that Tesco does not simply run large supermarkets or 
hypermarkets.  In recent years they have made substantial inroads into the 
neighbourhood convenience stores and by early 2005 they had reached 4th 
place in this sector. 29 
 




report for year: 
01/02 30 02/03 31 03/04 32 
UK Sales: £21.7Bn £23.4Bn £26.9Bn 
UK Sales 
Growth: 
9.1% 7.9% 14.9% 
UK pre-tax 
Operating profit: 
£1.23Bn £1.297Bn £1.526Bn 33 
Non-foods: 4% market share 5% market share 6% market share 34 
UK stores: 729 1982 35 1878 
UK employees: 195,000 221,000 237,000 
Overseas Sales: £3.9Bn 36 £4.7Bn 37 £6.6Bn 
Overseas Profit: £119M 38 £212M 39 £306M 40 
Overseas stores: 250 309 41 440 
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Overseas 
employees: 
65,000 [75,000] 42 89,000 
New countries of 
operation: 
N/A (France no longer 
listed) Malaysia 
Turkey and Japan 
 
These reports concentrate mainly on the discharge of corporate responsibility 
rather than financial results.  However these figures do illustrate the successful 
expansion of the company. 
 
The information provided for this case was substantially derived from an 
interview with Leonie Morris, Head of People Planning at Tesco PLC, who 
has been with the organisation for some three years.  Unlike the scorecards 
used in the Home Office and DTI, covered by the other case studies, the Tesco 
Balanced Scorecard is a mature implementation. 
 
5.2. Introduction and running of the Balanced Scorecard in Tesco. 
 
The Balanced Scorecard was introduced around 1998 after a relatively short 
development facilitated or assisted by a major consultancy firm.  Like many 
organisations, there had previously been a strong financial performance focus, 
and this had resulted in an archetypal “short-termism”.  The aims for the 
Balanced Scorecard were to: 
 
• Provide a mechanism for coordination of change management activity. 
• Improve the long-term perspectives in the organisation. 
• Reduce the emphasis on financial indicators. 
• Improve the focus on staff issues. 
 
The scorecard, known in Tesco as the Steering Wheel, is the main 
management tool for driving the business.  It is seen as highly successful and 
there are strong links all the way from Board level to shop-floor.  The Chief 
Executive is a strong champion for the concept.   
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Tesco’s Steering Wheel has four segments, which correspond largely to the 
Kaplan and Norton model: “People” replaces a wider “Learning and Growth” 
perspective.  However, the make up of the scorecard is reviewed annually to 
ensure that it continues to meet the demands of the organisational strategy. 
 
Although not immediately visible to shoppers, the Steering Wheel will feature 
strongly in staff areas giving details of local performance.  Data is collected 
weekly and monitored using a simple traffic light system for ease of reference.  
The Tesco system utilises “Blue” for performance above target, in addition to 
the normal Red-Amber-Green.  Staff at a low level will be involved in 
collection, reporting and monitoring data, particularly in the stores.  This 
builds engagement with the process.   
 
Store-level Steering Wheels are tailored to meet local issues.  Store managers 
receive a hard-copy version of the quarterly corporate scorecard, and this may 
be used to brief other managers in the stores.  Generally lower grades within 
the store will not be expected know about corporate performance, although 
they will have an interest if they invest in the company (see below).  At the 
lower levels of the organisation performance issues will primarily be geared to 
local Steering Wheel PIs.   However, there is strong linkage between Store 
Steering Wheels and the Corporate Steering wheel; not least through the 
cascade of PI groupings, even if PIs are locally derived.  This facilitates the 
aggregation of data, which is collected by a variety of systems and 
mechanisms.  Senior management will monitor performance and drill down to 
identify problem areas.  Once problems or issues have been identified it is for 
local management to resolve and seek improvement.  Senior management will 
intervene only if problems persist. 
 
Although there are no other major business tools in use, there is a strong 
emphasis on customer and staff surveys.  These surveys are a strong influence 
on development of strategic and tactical measures.  There is deliberately no 
focus on performance of competitors.  The main external performance 
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measure used to track business performance is an overall index of retail 
grocery business performance.  Tesco always aim to exceed this measure.  
Although there was some evidence of “management by initiative”, initiatives 
are clearly related to Steering Wheel performance issues.  The strong focus of, 
and on, the Steering Wheel makes the determination of tactical measures 
easier.  But again, the emphasis is on what is good for Tesco, rather than 
copying ideas from other retailers. 
 
At Management Level 3 and above bonuses are linked to performance.  This 
will not only include Store Managers but Head Office staff, and those working 
in “Distribution”. Bonuses will include an element of personal performance 
and performance assessed by local or corporate Steering Wheels.  Personal 
performance assessments will include an element of 360o reporting.  In the 
same way that failure to achieve required standards against Steering Wheel PIs 
will result in senior management attention, failure to reach required standards 
of personal performance will, not only lead to loss of bonuses, but will also 
lead to management intervention on personal development.  Thus managers 
are directly accountable for personal and organisational performance. 
 
5.3. Tesco’s culture. 
 
There is a strong emphasis in Tesco on people, both the customers and the 
staff.  There is a strong corporate identity, both through staff uniforms and 
branding.  Although Tesco is now the leading UK retailer and has a growing 
overseas business, this emphasis on people means that resources are directed 
towards the “front-line”.  Consequently the registered offices of the company 
are a large concrete office block on a post-war industrial estate.  This contrasts 
strongly with the heavy investment in refitting and building new stores.  This 
emphasis is also evident in the annual report and accounts and in the corporate 
social responsibility reports.  Staff attitudes and perceptions are recognised not 
only from the perspective of “employees” but also from their role as 
“customers”.  Staff are encouraged to invest in the business, but are also 
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recognised as assets and the company is strongly interested in the welfare of 
staff.  The emphasis on core business, and to enable senior staff to get close to 
customers and staff, has resulted in the “TWIST” (Tesco Week in Store 
Together) programme which involves head office staff working in stores for a 
week at a time. 43 
 
Consequently, although staff turnover is considered to be quite high, retention 
is now over 80%.  Turnover is highest among those with less than a year’s 
service, and particularly among the part-time general assistants.  But there are 
incentives for staff who continue their service beyond a year, eg 10% discount 
on purchases.  After this initial period staff loss rates drop off rapidly.  
However, it is inevitable that in an organisation that is expanding at the rate at 
which Tesco is, that length of service will appear low. 44, 45  All staff undertake 
an induction programme, during which they will be introduced to the Steering 
Wheel.  Organisational language is kept simple in order to communicate 
effectively with the largest number of staff, and there is an emphasis on 
pragmatism and empowerment of junior staff, in order to facilitate delivery of 
customer satisfaction. 
 
5.4. Assessment of the Tesco Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Table 9.5 demonstrates that the Tesco implementation of the Balanced 
Scorecard deals effectively with all the issues identified as having a beneficial 
effect on the implementation and running of the scorecard.  The only area 
where the implementation might not be regarded as fully compliant (IT usage), 
the Balanced Scorecard is compliant with wider IT/IS practice in the 
organisation.  Arguably a more extensive automation of the Balanced 
Scorecard might necessitate a new IS strategy.  
 
Table 9.5: 21 Factors that impact Balanced Scorecard 
implementation and running - Tesco. 
1. Top Level 
Commitment. 
Yes.  The Chief Executive is directly involved and uses 
the Balanced Scorecard as the key management tool. 
9 - 44 
2. Involving more 
than Top 
Management. 
Yes.  Staff at all levels involved. 




Yes.  Different sectors of the scorecard allocated across 
different management areas, with centralised 





Yes.  However, strategy, tactics and operational issues 
heavily influenced by key stakeholder groups 
(customers and staff) and consequently there is a 
tendency towards “emergent strategy” within a clear 
framework. 




Yes.  But see above. 
6. Avoid focussing 
on worthless 
measures. 
Yes.  PIs closely focussed on defined issues and 
scorecard reviewed annually to ensure it remains 
focussed on key issues. 




Yes.  Within overall corporate framework, scorecards 
adapted at store level to closely reflect local issues. 




Yes.  Senior management monitor performance and 
only become involved when lower levels are unable to 
resolve issues without assistance. 
9. Using terms 
consistently. 
Yes.  Care taken to ensure terms are clearly understood 
and used consistently.  
10. Utilise pilot 
projects. 
Yes.  Understood that pilot projects were used as part of 
the development phase. 





Yes.  Understood to have used a major consultancy firm 
to assist in the development. 
12. Avoid misusing 
the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Yes.  Management avoid involvement in operational 
level changes.  Consistent difficulty in achieving 
requirements may result a new tactical or strategic level 
initiative to introduce step change. 
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Yes.  At Grade 3 level and above.  There are other 
reward and recognitions systems in existence that are 
used to reinforce objectives at a lower level. 






Yes.  Examination of issues in the cause-and-effect map 
identified important new relationships between 





Yes.  Key management process properly resourced to 
provide sound quarterly reports to Board. 
17. Properly balance 
the IT issues. 
Yes – partly.  Reporting structure and dissemination of 
information only partly computerised in accordance 
with overall company IS/IT strategy. 











Yes.  Company has history of using Rapid Implement 
Teams for new projects.  Balanced Scorecard 
implemented quickly and subjected to annual review. 




Yes.  Aims to give clear direction for longer-term 
issues. 
21. Managers, at all 









Yes.  Used extensively and consistently throughout the 
organisation at corporate and local levels to articulate 
objectives and achievement. 
 
This highly successful Balanced Scorecard implementation is arguably a key 
underlying cause of organisational growth and success demonstrated in Table 
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9.5.  Nevertheless, discussion of the planning measurement grid at Figure 2.11 
highlighted another feature of the Tesco culture linked to organisational 
learning.  This was the idea that employees should not be complacent.  
Consequently, Tesco is reluctant to see themselves as having a complete plan 
of activity, preferring to highlight a partially emergent strategy based on 
reactivity to changing customer needs.  Tesco is thus assessed as lying 
somewhere on the boundary between “Achievement” and “We never seem to 
get there!”  This recognises that measurement is effective.   
 
Whilst it is clear that Tesco is currently very successful and intends to retain 
the Balanced Scorecard as a mechanism for managing the company, 
consideration of past levels of success, in order to plot the organisation against 
Figure 2.12, presents a problem.  Even prior to implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard Tesco was a leading grocery retailer in the UK.  It would therefore 
be unfair to therefore suggest that it was previously unsuccessful.  However, 
the use of the Balanced Scorecard seems to have brought increased success, 
and thus, relatively one might argue that it was previously “less successful”.  
Therefore if the organisation is plotted on the boundary between being 
“Successful” and “Unsuccessful” prior to implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard this gives an interesting and arguably valid interpretation.  It 
suggests that on the one hand that success has been attributed to the Balanced 
Scorecard.  This would certainly seem to be the case.  But it also suggests that 
retention might be for reasons disassociated from the success achieved.  The 
researcher’s assessment is that this is probably true.  The Steering Wheel 
forms such a key management tool within Tesco that its replacement within 
the foreseeable future is neither likely nor possible.  Such a replacement of the 
key management tool would have profound effects on the organisation and its 
culture, which could potentially undermine the success currently being 
achieved.  There is thus no crisis to precipitate change, in terms of the change 
models examined in Chapter 5.  Thus retention of the Balanced Scorecard is 
partly due to the process being so completely embedded into management 
system.  This in-turn demonstrates something of the culture change that has 
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taken place over the past six years that has resulted in Tesco becoming so 
dependent on this management system. 
 
The figures at Table 9.4 show that staff levels in the UK have increased by 
more than 20% in three years.  It is inevitable therefore that length of service 
with the company will be distorted by this trend.  Thus again, in terms of 
analysing Tesco against Figure 3.12, it is necessary to evaluate Tesco as being 
somewhere between having a high and low staff turnover.  Other dimensions 
are easier to assess.  Tesco is a well established organisation with a long 
history.  It is also an organisation with very large customer and stakeholder 
base.  This implies that Tesco will have quite a complex culture which is 
difficult to maintain, but which is important to both those inside and those 
outside the organisation.  This is born out by Tesco’s need to retain staff in 
order to maintain the standards of service required to maintain customer 
loyalty.  Induction and regular communication with staff are a part of the 
process of building staff loyalty.  However, the size of the organisation and the 
staff turnover make this difficult.  Nevertheless, projecting the image of Tesco 
to those outside the customer base is important if they are to win new 
customers.  A strong and visible culture is thus essential. 
 
6. Suffolk Coastal District Council. 
 
6.1. Outline of organisation and aims. 
 
Suffolk Coastal District covers an area of 88,938 hectares and is located on the 
east coast to the north and east of Ipswich, the county town of Suffolk.  The 
District has a population of 115,000 and a generally buoyant and growing 
economy, with a workforce of around 60,000.  Unemployment is low (1.4% at 
October 2003).  
 
The growth of the District has resulted in increasing demands for public 
services, and community facilities, and changes in the make up of local 
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communities, with town and parish councils seeking the support and assistance 
of the District Council in tackling local issues and priorities. 
 
The Suffolk Coastal environment is one of the district’s unique attractions.  No 
less than 37% of the district is designated as an area of outstanding natural 
beauty; there are 71 Sites of Special Scientific Interest, 33 conservation areas, 
and over 2,500 listed buildings. 
 
Suffolk Coastal District Council (SCDC) has developed its vision: 
 
“…building upon the best of the present, it should be a 
District where people: 
• Want to live and to invest 
• Care for others and the environment” 46  
 
Their stated goal is: 
 
“…to help, with other relevant bodies, to realise this vision 
by ensuring that Suffolk Coastal is a place where the 
community continues to enjoy the highest Quality of Life and 
receive top quality efficient services from the Council.” 47 
 
The Council aims to focus on: 
 
• “Strengthening the Economy 
• Tackling rural issues 
• Protecting and enhancing the Environment 
• Meeting housing needs 
• Developing a safe and healthy community with access 
to leisure opportunities 
• Fulfilling its obligations by the quality delivery of all 
its essential services” 48 
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The core values of the Council are: 
 
• “Responding to community and customer needs 
• Valuing all people 
• Ensuring wise use of resources 
• Acting with integrity at all times 
• Being Accountable” 49 
 
This case study was prepared primarily on the basis of information supplied by 
Steve Whelan, Performance and Risk Officer at SCDC.  Mr Whelan had only 
been with the organisation about three months at the point that this case study 
was undertaken in December, 2004.  However, he had done his own research 
within the organisation as part of his work to familiarise himself with the 
requirements of the post.  This case study was reviewed by Mr Whelan and 
Tony Osmanski, SCDC Strategic Director. 
 
6.2. Origins of the Balanced Scorecard programme within Suffolk 
Coastal. 
 
The Balanced Scorecard programme was initiated in 2003 as part of a wider 
programme called “Moving Forward Together”, following the election of a 
new council.  The aim was to review the organisational vision and values and 
realign the culture and structure in order to deliver improvements to, and 
increase efficiency in the delivery of services.  The programme originated 
from recognition of increasing challenges in terms of financial pressures and 
increasing public expectation.  At the time the SCDC was also the beneficiary 
of investment income from previous sales of council houses.  Consequently 
financial pressures were increasing as was public expectation. 
 
Organisational restructuring has already had an impact at the higher levels, but 
planned reorganisation at the lower levels has yet to be implemented.  
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Consultants working on these change programmes have advocated the use of 
the Balanced Scorecard, but the concept is already established in some other 
local authorities.  Barking and Dagenham are well known for their work in this 
area, and SCDC, along with many others, have sought advice from their staff.  
The SCDC Interim Chief Executive became the Champion of the Balanced 
Scorecard.  However, the consultants, although instrumental in the adoption of 
the Balanced Scorecard have had little involvement in the detailed 
implementation.  Instead the Council’s Performance Team became the in-
house experts in this area whilst some of the consultants have been 
instrumental in other changes taking place, such as Business Process 
Improvement, and partnership working.   
 
The consultation with Barking and Dagenham has had a strong influence on 
the development of the Balanced Scorecard within SCDC.  Another key 
influence has been the purchase of QPR as a software engine for the Balanced 
Scorecard.  This, whilst having been given proper Council approval, was 
purchased on the basis of strong advice from the consultants advocating the 
implementation of the Balanced Scorecard.  However, SCDC had insufficient 
knowledge and expertise to use the software to best effect in the early stages of 
the programme.  A software purchase of this nature is also an unusual 
approach, as research by Granland and Malmi in 2002 suggests that the 
majority of Balanced Scorecard users maintain their scorecard on spreadsheets 
or Lotus Notes. 50  As highlighted by this research, this is also true for the 
limited sample of organisations covered. 
 
Clear objectives are set out for the SCDC Balanced Scorecard project: 
 
“Why do we need it? To give us: 
• Focus 
• Clarity 
• A sense of priorities 
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• Simple and consistent presentation of key information 
on how we are performing 
• A clear sense of direction that our staff and partners 
can understand 
How are we going to use it?  To enable us to: 
• Manage and monitor our performance 
• Focus our efforts on the things that most need 
improving 
• Help us match our resources to our priorities 
• Assess whether we are succeeding in achieving our 
aim of securing the highest quality of life for our 
community” 51 
 
6.3. Implementation of the Balanced Scorecard programme within 
Suffolk Coastal. 
 
The initial scorecard took about a year to develop and implement.  The SCDC 
Balanced Scorecard is based on six priority themes: 
 
• Community well-being, 
• Environment, 
• Fiscal and Democratic Services, 
• Housing, 
• Rural issues, and 
• Economy. 52 
 
These are presented in a honeycomb formation around the SCDC’s vision.  
The Balanced Scorecard also has six cross-cutting perspectives: 
 
• Serving our community, 
• Developing our people, 
• Funding for future success, 
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• Optimising organisational performance, 
• Effective leadership, and 
• Improving customer satisfaction. 53 
 
Even early on in the development of the scorecard there was a perception that 
the scorecard should be cascaded down the organisation to help manage 
individual performance.  This has involved the HR department, which 
demonstrates a strong commitment to the process.  The Balanced Scorecard 
process is thus very comprehensive, as shown in Figure 9.6.  Central support is 
being used to help develop the Balanced Scorecards at Service and Team 
level, but the ultimate intention is that these areas will own and run their own 
scorecards.  Thus, although the programme is centrally driven, the emphasis is 
on delegated responsibility and involvement. 
 
































































































Figure 9.6: SCDC Balanced Scorecard cascade.   




This scorecard format was then well publicised.  However, initially there does 
not appear to have been much work underpinning it to ensure that performance 
measures were balanced.  Nor was there any real strategy developed to 
articulate how these strategic priorities were to be achieved.  Thus publicising 
has, to some extent, been a constraint on development.  For example, mouse 
mats have been provided that display the scorecard format.  Any changes to 
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the format or high-level content would thus be highly visible and might seem 
to undermine managements’ previous promotion of objectives. 
 
6.4. Post implementation developments. 
 
Failure to fully understand all the issues when an organisation commits to 
implementing the Balanced Scorecard seems fairly typical; not least because 
the Balanced Scorecard is a complex process that is still developing.  This is 
true for SCDC.  However, SCDC is an organisation that, having made a 
substantial commitment to the Balanced Scorecard, including a significant 
financial commitment, is determinedly developing and improving the process 
to derive benefit.  There are perceived soft benefits.   
 
• There is now much clearer focus on strategic priorities and people are 
developing strategies for their own areas that more clearly recognise 
wider priorities and processes.  Previously people worked in “silos”. 54 
• Clearly defined priorities are starting to have an impact on resource 
management.  Coupled with the financial pressures noted earlier, this 
has promoted clearer decision making at the senior levels.  The need to 
link resources to priorities is recognised, as is the need to think longer-
term, ie beyond the current three year horizon. 
 
Nevertheless, because the development started with perceived existing 
priorities, rather than agreement on high-level strategy, development has 
initially been more “bottom-up” than “top-down”.  Efforts are now being made 
to develop the top level strategy and an associated strategy map.  This should 
improve understanding and agreement on overall priorities and strategy.  It 
should also facilitate the development of leading indicators, since performance 
measures are currently lagging indicators. 
 
SCDC is also developing an award scheme for staff, which places emphasis 
on: 
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• Improved cost efficiency,  
• Improved performance. 
 
There is thus likely to be linkages to the Balanced Scorecard at Team or 
Individual level. 
 
6.5. Assessment of the SCDC Balanced Scorecard. 
 
The SCDC Balanced Scorecard has been running live for less than a year.  It is 
thus too early to be categorical about its quality.  However, the overall 
impression was that this is a scorecard that is being gradually developed in 
accordance with sound principals.  This is demonstrated by a high score (17 
out of 21) on the list of Factors that impact Balanced Scorecard 
implementation and running (see Table 9.6). 
 
Table 9.6: 21 Factors that impact Balanced Scorecard 
implementation and running - SCDC. 
1. Top Level 
Commitment. 
Yes.  The Chief Executive is the Champion and a 
programme manager, the Performance and Risk 
Officer, has been appointed. 
2. Involving more 
than Top 
Management. 
Yes - partly.  The Balanced Scorecard concept has 
been extended down individual level through 
linkage to individual’s performance reports.  
However, see below, the organisational strategy is 
not yet fully developed and is not developed from 
individual contributions. 




Yes.  All parts of the organisation are involved in 





No.  The strategic priorities within each service 
area were recognised (see below) but the overall 
strategy was not agreed in advance. 




Yes – partly.  Individual service area priorities 
recognised at the highest level and only lower level 
scorecards recognise the lower level objectives. 
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6. Avoid focussing 
on worthless 
measures. 
Yes – partly.  Some areas at the lower levels are 
prone to over-report the breadth of performance 
issues.  This measurement culture is being managed 
to reduce this tendency. 




Yes.  Scorecard totally tailored to local 
requirements. 




Yes.  Quarterly reporting means that managers at 
the lower level are able to monitor performance on 
a monthly basis and take appropriate action.  
Consequently senior managers do not get involved 
in detailed issues of routine management. 
9. Using terms 
consistently. 
Yes – partly.  No data dictionary, but PIs tautly 
defined and well understood. 
10. Utilise pilot 
projects. 
Yes – partly.  Barking and Dagenham Council 
provided considerable advice prior to SCDC 
developing their own scorecard.  Some areas of 
SCDC are progressing faster than others and thus 
acting informally as pilots. 





Yes – partly.  Both Barking and Dagenham 
Council and external consultants had strong 
influences on the establishment and initial 
development of the Balanced Scorecard.  However, 
the developments have not involved experienced 
Balanced Scorecard consultants to any significant 
degree. 
12. Avoid misusing 
the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Yes.  Clear delegation of authority and 
responsibility. 


















Yes – partly.  At the same time as the Balanced 
Scorecard was introduced, SCDC have also 
undertaken a Business Process Improvement 
programme.  This links to work with the Balanced 
Scorecard, but the links are not explicit and 
intentional.  However, increasing understanding of 
the Balanced Scorecard is leading to development 
too. 





Yes.  Dedicated project staff and IT system 
purchased. 
17. Properly balance 
the IT issues. 
Yes – partly.  The purchase of QPR has dominated 
and perhaps even constrained development, but this 
has not been a project owned and driven by the IT 
in any other respect. 





Yes.  Linkage to individuals’ PDRs (Personal 
Development Review – annual personal 
performance and development report) has ensured 
that all staff have had to be educated.  Considerable 






Yes.  Initial development took a year, but the 
scorecard concepts have been incrementally 
developed subsequently. 




Yes.  Clearly stated objectives (detailed above). 
21. Managers, at all 









No.  Quarterly reports to Council Members are 
available on the web, but are not specifically used 
as part of a cascade briefing. 
 
The key issue, which is now beginning to be addressed, is the need for the 
overall strategy to be developed and articulated.  This will enable people at the 
lower level to understand their own contribution to the wider context beyond 
their team and service delivery area.  This wider view, and regular reporting of 
overall performance, will create something more of a team atmosphere.  This 
appears to be a key issue for the organisation: high levels of sickness, 
suggestions that morale is low, key people have left the organisation, 
uncertainty about future organisational change.  However, staff turnover is 
low; partly because local employment prospects are relatively poor.  There is 
no attempt within the Balanced Scorecard to manage culture, but there is an 
9 - 58 
Induction Programme run within the overall HR strategy, and recognition that 
relationships within the workplace are increasingly important. This leads to an 
interesting assessment of the overall importance of culture to the organisation 
using the model at Figure 3.12.  Clearly the customer and stakeholder base is 
large but relatively stable.  SCDC, with a staff of only 350 is only a medium 
size organisation, albeit with a relatively long history.  Thus SCDC lies 
somewhere in the bottom left corner of the top right box at the front.  The 
influences of the adjacent boxes to the left and below are thus interesting:  
 
• The culture will be complex internally as the service areas are dealing 
with radically different deliverables, which have historically been 
delivered in silos.  Emphasis tends to be on professionalism, equity and 
entitlement.  Change is likely to be resented; staff will look for 
security, “Buggins’ turn” 55 promotion because skills and knowledge 
will not be readily transportable other than to another council, which 
would involve moving or commuting. 
• Viewed externally the Council is more likely to be viewed holistically, 
and delivery is more likely to be viewed as important rather than the 
process by which services are delivered.  This is because services are 
“single sourced” (ie specialised) and are funded irrespective of 
perceived value for money. 
 
Examining the Balanced Scorecard implementation using the model at Figure 
2.12 is somewhat problematic as the scorecard has been running for less than a 
year.  Past success was at the expense of capital resources, and there is a 
degree of ambivalence towards Council Tax in the area, although there is also 
a reasonable level of satisfaction with services.  Thus the SCDC can only be 
scored somewhere near the middle of the matrix at the back of the model.  
Heavy investment in the Balanced Scorecard is likely to lead to continuing 
commitment, but the wider change programme is currently seen as delivering 
any improved performance rather than the Balanced Scorecard itself.  This 
could change subsequently if the developments lead to the Balanced Scorecard 
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taking a stronger role in the developments, ie currently it is competing with 
organisational change and Business Process Improvement programmes.  This 
is emphasised by examining the situation in relation to the Measurement and 
planning matrix at Figure 2.11.  Currently the SCDC lies somewhere around 
the top-right of the bottom-left quadrant, but with movement up the axis that 
this represents.  Measurement is improving as the organisation understands 
better what it needs to measure.  Planning is improving as the Balanced 
Scorecard starts initiate the challenge of where the Council is heading.  That is 
there is an increased understanding that measurement of the past doesn’t guide 
to future performance, and there is increasing challenge as to whether the right 
things are really being measured. 
 
7. BAE Systems. 
 
7.1. Outline of organisation and aims. 
 
BAE Systems is a large corporate which describes itself as “…an international 
company engaged in the development, delivery and support of advanced 
defence and aerospace systems in the air, on land, at sea and in space”. 56  
The company has an annual turnover that currently exceeds £12Bn, customers 
in 130 countries, 57 and has an order book of £45Bn. 58  Profits before interest 
are running at about £500M per half year, but these are considerably affected 
by exceptional items and the amortisation of goodwill and impairments. 59  
The company consists of its main divisions, plus a number of subsidiary 
companies and joint ventures.  Its structure is thus somewhat complex and this 
is highlighted on its website where there is a description of the evolution of the 
organisation.  The current organisation derives from BAe (British Aerospace), 
which was formed when a number of companies were nationalised in 1977 and 
evolved through acquisition, sales, joint ventures, and partnerships, until it 
merged with Marconi Electronic Systems in 1999. 60  The company states, 
“Our vision is to be the leading systems company, innovating for a safer 
world.” 61  It gives its values as: 
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• “Customers – Our top priority 
• People – Our greatest strength 
• Performance – Our key to winning 
• Partnering – Our future 
• Innovation and Technology – Our competitive edge” 62  
 
This case study deals with the CS&S and Land Systems division (Customer 
Solutions and Support and Land Systems).  This division derives its current 
form from the acquisition of the Alvis company in 2004. 63  Alvis is a 
manufacturer of armoured vehicles.  This company was added to CS&S along 
with the remnants of the former Royal Ordnance, which was purchased by 
British Aerospace in 1987 as part of the privatisation of the public sector.  
Much of the information for this case study was supplied by Jeff Smith, 
Business Improvement Manager for CS&S and Land Systems.  The Balanced 
Scorecard is not used throughout BAE Systems.  (The preliminary 
announcement of 2004 results, posted on BAE Systems website supports the 
trends highlighted above:  
 
• Order Book value - £50Bn 
• 2004 Sales - £13.4Bn 
• Profit before interest - £1Bn 
• Goodwill amortisation and impairment - £1Bn 
• 6 acquisitions in addition to Alvis, and this was followed a week or so 
later by notification of the purchase of United Defence Industries in the 
USA, who, among other things, produce the Bradley fighting vehicle.) 
64, 65 
 
A simplified organisational chart for BAE Systems and the CS&S and Land 
Systems Group is at Figure 9.7.  (This chart is developed from the BAE 
Systems Annual Report 2003 and from the company’s websites. 66  Acronyms 
are covered in the Glossary to avoid overcomplicating the chart, but, for 
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further understanding of named programmes, reference to the company 




Programmes – Hawk, JSF, 
Typhoon, Type 45, Astute, 
LSD(A), Sting Ray, 
Tornado GR4, C4ISR. 
CS&S and Land Systems
International Partnerships 
– MBDA, Saab, Gripen 
International, Atlas 
Elektronik. 
Avionics – integrated 
communications, Captor 
multi-mode radar, Electro-
Optical Targeting System. 
North America – 




Commercial Aircraft – 
Airbus, A400M, customer 
support and servicing. 
Other businesses – CVF.
Operational Services – eg 
Material supply chain 
support for aircraft, ships 
and submarines. 
BAE Systems Australia – eg 
Airborne Early Warning 
systems, air defence systems, 
training. 
International Programmes – 
Al Yamamah, Royal Saudi 
Naval Forces MCMVs, 
Qatari Piranha fighting 
vehicles. 
Military Air Solutions and 
Support – Tornado upgrade, 
aircraft ILS, 3rd Line 
Maintenance. 
Naval – eg Canadian 
Upholder submarine 
reactivation, Brunei OPV, 
ILS. 
Training Solutions – eg 
Hawk Synthetic Training, 
Naval Firefighting, C130J 
simulator. 
Land Systems – eg M777 
howitzer, Tracked and 
wheeled armoured vehicles 
and tactical bridging system. 
Figure 9.7: BAE Systems organisational chart, showing 
breakdown of the CS&S and Land Systems Group. 
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The CS&S Group, without the addition of the Land Systems component, 
produced sales of £2.166Bn in financial year 2003, had an order book of 
£2.6Bn, produced a profit of £411M, and had 10,800 staff. 67, 68 
 
7.2. Origins of the Balanced Scorecard programme within CS&S and 
Land Systems. 
 
The origins of the Balanced Scorecard within CS&S and Land Systems are not 
entirely clear.  The intention to implement the tool was stated as an objective 
for Jeff Smith when he took up post in 2001.  The idea of introducing the 
Balanced Scorecard is thought to have derived from either Ian King (Group 
Managing Director of CS&S and Land Systems) or Peter Fielder (Business 
Development Director of CS&S and Land Systems).  As such the 
implementation of the Balanced Scorecard can be seen to have senior level 
sponsorship and commitment.  Ian King had only recently been appointed as 
Group Managing Director.  As an accountant there was a perceived change in 
emphasis from the previous Group Managing Director whose background had 
been in Marketing.  This case study was compiled in early 2005 using 
information supplied largely by Jeff Smith, Business Improvement Manager, 
CS&S and Land Systems, BAE Systems, who kindly reviewed the draft and 
provided further advice. 
 
The aim for implementation was to improve the management of change within 
the organisation.  The assessment was that the organisation was not very 
effective at implementing change and needed a mechanism to create coherence 
and direction for the various change activities.  In particular there were still 
continuing issues from the merger, in particular the need to create a common 
culture and a common management regime.  Change activities at this time 
were important to the business but measurement concentrated on the “hard” 
aspects of financial performance, and the softer issues were being ignored.  An 
aim was to communicate the broader perspectives of the business, ie business 
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change programme issues.  At merger the organisation effectively ran as a 
collection of independently run and managed business outputs.  Thus there 
was a need for a clear, uncomplicated message of how the organisation would 
be run in the future, both for customers and staff.  The organisation was 
perceived as being “data rich – information poor”: “…a data-swamp”.  It is 
not known whether alternative management tools were considered, but 
certainly the current perception is that there is no clear alternative that would 
deliver the same effect.  However, other management tools are used separately 
or in conjunction with the Balanced Scorecard.  For example, EFQM is used 
and a programme is underway to introduce CMMI (Capability Maturity 
Models Integrated). 
 
In the context of these pressures for change it is useful to refer to the Change 
Models discussed at Section 6 in Chapter 5. 
 
7.3. Development and Implementation of the Balanced Scorecard 
within CS&S and Land Systems. 
 
As with the developments in DCA, this Balanced Scorecard was implemented 
more by stealth than as an overt project.  This was partly to avoid the problems 
of it being seen as yet another initiative or the latest management fad.  As the 
project manager, Jeff Smith is largely self-taught, through attendance at 
courses and reading available literature.  No consultants were used.   
 
Change programmes to be included were selected by the management board.  
Although this exercise was treated as a Balanced Scorecard development, it 
did not delve into the details of Kaplan and Norton’s perspectives, or identify 
explicit relationships between change programmes and strategy.  Each 
candidate project was allocated to a board-level owner who subsequently 
assisted in the development and selection of appropriate measures.  These 
measures were largely measures of achievement rather than descriptive of the 
desired outcomes.  The measures were arranged in the four traditional Kaplan 
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and Norton perspectives, although these were renamed: Performance, 
Capability, Leadership, and Customer.  Although this primarily identified the 
Group objectives, Business Units within the Group were asked what else 
needed to be included.   
 
At this stage the Board did develop and agree a clear strategy for the 
organisation, but it was linked to the Balanced Scorecard.  Thus no attempt 
was made at this stage to build a cause-and-effect or strategy map.  A sub-
agendum existed for the programme at this stage; to get people used to being 
measured, and to make their data available to a wider audience. 
 
The original Balanced Scorecard consisted of just 12 measures, with 
supporting data.  The PIs were almost entirely “lagging” indicators at this 
early stage.  Software support is in the form of Microsoft Excel and 
Powerpoint.  The initial development, from idea to implementation, took about 
12 months. 
 
Balanced Scorecard reports are produced monthly and distributed in advance 
of Board Meetings.  In the early stages of development reported performance 
would often come as a surprise to responsible Board Members.  However, as 
the process developed, Board Members became increasing involved and aware 
of developments on their projects.  Nevertheless, even at this stage, with the 
elementary development undertaken, there were other perceived benefits.  
ISO9001 accreditation was obtained to meet contractual commitments.  
Previously insufficient progress on implementation suggested that this would 
not be achieved.  Nevertheless, the focus created by the Balanced Scorecard 
resulted in a change of attitude and perceptions that led to a successful drive 
towards implementation.  (Arguably this was a desired outcome since it was a 
specific contractual commitment.)  Similarly timeliness of “Phase Reviews” 69 
of projects has also featured as a PI.  Approximately 95% of Phase Reviews 
are now completed on time, against an original performance level of 50%, and 
a target of 85%. 
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7.4. Subsequent developments and issues. 
 
The initial developments were “top down”.  Gradually as the concept became 
recognised business units have developed their own Balanced Scorecards.  
Acceptance and the pace of development have varied between business units, 
but some have now progressed beyond the sophistication of the Group 
Balanced Scorecard.  Thus whilst the Group Balanced Scorecard effectively 
acted as the initial pilot, other areas are now the developmental pilots for 
improvements.  Such lower level scorecards tend to focus on largely on local 
issues, in the same way that SCDC Balanced Scorecards have developed at the 
lower levels.  Thus the Balanced Scorecards in CS&S and Land Systems are 
increasingly built “bottom-up”.  It is thus, for example, in the business units 
that work is starting on building cause-and-effect maps.  But the overall lack 
of connectivity between the agreed strategy and the Balanced Scorecard is 
recognised and work is likely to start on developing this in the coming years.  
Gradually individual business units are becoming independent of Group 
support in the development and use of their Balanced Scorecard.  One business 
unit is now effectively independent.  All Business Units now present a 
complete report that is then integrated into the Group report. 
 
No attempt has been made to impose the Balanced Scorecard on individual 
business units within the group, hence the different rates of progress reflecting 
local attitudes.  However, there is still, after 2½ years some residual reluctance 
for local information to be widely publicised without it being reviewed and 
agreed first by senior management.  This is despite attempts to demonstrate 
that open honesty does not lead to a “blame culture”.  Indeed, in one particular 
instance, a specific individual was named in a report to the board as having 
caused a particular high profile failure.  (The Balanced Scorecard reports are 
included on the company intranet once approved by the Group Board.  Thus 
the decision to publicise meant that the information would be available to all 
employees across the Group.)  The organisation agonised over this before 
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making the decision to publicise, but it was recognised that the failure was so 
acute that failure to publicise could be more detrimental, eg by creating 
rumours and innuendos.  In this instance the individual concerned 
acknowledged his specific failure, but has retained his job.  Thus the Group 
has been successful in using the Balanced Scorecard to manage a difficult 
situation.  The result of these policies is that there is increasingly now much 
more honest reporting of performance.  Previously the some data supplied for 
the reports was adjusted to improve presentation.  This suggests that the Group 
is becoming relaxed and confident with the Balanced Scorecard process, and it 
is becoming embedded into the culture, that is, it is not seen as a threat.  Note 
that Bititci, Mendibil, Nudurupati, Turner and Garengo state that,  
 
“… empirical studies provide evidence that a paternalistic 
culture, that does not punish people’s errors and encourages 
discussion and analysis, can lead to a successful PMS 
[Performance Measurement System] implementation …” 70 
 
One unusual feature of the CS&S and Land Systems Balanced Scorecard is 
that some PIs are based on data agreed with the DLO (Defence Logistics 
Organisation).  Shared objectives, known as “Strategic Milestones”, being 
undertaken jointly by DLO and CS&S and Land System staff are reviewed by 
both the CS&S and Land Systems Board, and in joint Board to Board 
meetings.  In addition the Group Balanced Scorecard has a “Customer Voice” 
measure that reflects their performance as perceived by customers.  This acts 
as a trigger to generate actions to improve customer perception.  The first 
recent biennial review confirms improving performance in relationships with 
customers. 
 
7.5. Future developments. 
 
The Balanced Scorecard is reviewed at least annually to ensure that issues are 
current. 71  This will gradually become linked to strategy and a strategy map as 
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these are developed.  It is recognised that, although there is some linkage 
between objectives and PIs and resource allocation, there is currently 
insufficient linkage to the “bottom line” profit. 
 
Individual Group Board members have responsibility for programmes within 
the Balanced Scorecard.  These are reflected in personal objectives and thus in 
performance bonuses.  However, the Balanced Scorecard is not yet the basis 
for reward.  This is a possible future aspiration.  Discussion with Jeff Smith 
suggests that this is much more likely in CS&S and Land Systems than in any 
of the Government Departments reviewed, simply because performance 
bonuses are a much more significant feature of the remuneration package. 
 
Another anticipate development, for which there are no definitive plans yet, is 
improved automation of the Balanced Scorecard through the purchase of a 
COTS package.  This approach is dictated by the company’s IT policy.  This 
stands in contrast to the MOD, who overtly have a similar policy but 
ultimately developed their own package and sought to market this to other 
potential users, particularly other Whitehall Departments. 
 
Development to date is seen has having helped to “stabilised the ship” 
following the formation of the Group after the BAe merger with Marconi.  





BAE Systems Head Office is a modern office block in Carlton Garden in 
London; between The Mall and Pall Mall.  CS&S and Land Systems have their 
Group Offices in a modern, leafy business park on the edge of Farnborough 
Airfield.  In both cases there would appear to be an intention to present a 
strong image to customers and clients.  However, the set of national and 
international relationships that forms BAE Systems means that the culture is 
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complex.  Consequently, the BAE Systems web site details how the 
organisation should project its image. 72  This is in order to produce some 
consistency.  However, it also illustrates the fact that the organisation pays 
great attention to its image and seeks to project this consistently. 
 
Within the CS&S and Land Systems Group there was evidence that there were 
still some “allegiances” to the pre-1999 organisations; BAe or Marconi.  Such 
allegiances emerge in the differences in the way things are done.  Gradually 
operating practices are being adapted to ensure more common processes.  The 
tensions here are probably significant, although with an operating division in 
Australia, and a major project running in Saudi Arabia there are clearly other 
issues to be addressed also.  For example, cultural differences with Middle 
Eastern countries have to be recognised in terms of working patterns and 
conditions.  Nevertheless, BAE Systems must also recognise that as a UK 
company it is subject to UK law, even for its overseas operations, for example 
in the area of Health and Safety at work.  The addition of Land Systems to 
CS&S will increase annual revenues of the Group by about £700M, 73 but the 
addition could add considerably to the cultural tensions.  For example: 
 
• Adding vehicles to the range of products and services offered may 
enhance the organisation and its product range, but the technology and 
issues are different from those of the aerospace, shipbuilding and 
electronics industries.  The purchase of Alvis made BAE Systems “… 
the largest land systems maker in Europe …” 74 so this is not an 
insignificant business. 
• Alvis owned Alvis Hägglunds in Sweden and Alvis OMC in South 
Africa, thereby adding to the number of national cultures represented in 
the Group.  In addition, RO Defence has a joint venture with GIAT in 
France. 75 
 
However, customers are looking for more “joined-up” solutions, eg in the 
supply chain, and BAE Systems recognise this.  Thus, although there may be 
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difficulties in integrating disparate technologies in different environments, 
achieving such integration potential offers significant advantages. 
 
A further cultural issue that is gradually being addressed is the changing nature 
of the business.  Previously the constituent parts of the businesses, throughout 
BAE Systems, were largely “manufacturing” in nature.  Increasingly, with the 
impact of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and contractorised support 
arrangements, BAE Systems has to reorientate its thinking towards providing 
through-life support, which would dominate the business, compared to the 
manufacturing phase. 
 
Despite this, CS&S and Land Systems have not adopted an existing cultural 
model for the organisation.  Consequently these issues are not explicit in the 
current Balanced Scorecard.  Instead, rather than engineering a particular 
culture, the cultural implications of changes are recognised and considered. 
 
7.7. Assessment of the CS&S and Land Systems Balanced Scorecard. 
 
This implementation of the Balanced Scorecard is similar to that found in most 
of the other situations encountered.  The company recognises that, after 2½ 
years using the Balanced Scorecard, it is relatively early on in its development.  
An incremental approach is being applied, as knowledge and commitment are 
built up.  Assessment of the implementation using the various models applied 
elsewhere promoted some interesting discussions. 
 
Table 9.7: 21 Factors that impact Balanced Scorecard 
implementation and running – BAE Systems. 
1. Top Level 
Commitment. 
Yes.  The programme was initiated or supported by the 
Group Managing Director from the outset. 
2. Involving more 
than Top 
Management. 
Yes – partly.  Initial developments were largely 
directly with Board Members, but subsequent 
developments have increasing gone down, even been 
initiated by, lower levels of the Group structure. 
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Yes – partly.  Again as development has progressed it 






No.  As with many of the Government Departments, the 
initial scorecard was only built on existing perceptions 
of priorities rather than a fundamental review of 
strategy.  Thus the initial Balanced Scorecard was 
largely about Change Objectives rather than overall 
business objectives.  Recognised objective for 
development of the Balanced Scorecard. 




Yes – partly.  Although there was no initial agreement 
or review of strategy there was a review and selection 
of the strategic changes from the existing change 
agenda.  This formed the basis of the initial Balanced 
Scorecard.  Similarly, changes to the Balanced 
Scorecard were agreed against a strategic perspective.  
6. Avoid focussing 
on worthless 
measures. 
Yes – partly.  Programmed change objectives are 
marked “blue” once implementation has been achieved.  
These are then subsequently eliminated.  CS&S and 
Land Systems has a good record of eliminating 
redundant PIs.  However, some more “open ended” 
objectives may tend to remain in the scorecard even 
after a satisfactory performance has been fully 
established, simply to avoid sending the wrong message 
by eliminating them.  Again M G Brown’s “idiot light” 
concept could be usefully applied here. 76 




Yes.  All scorecards developed locally to the basic 
Kaplan and Norton framework. 




No.  There is some tendency for Board Members to 
delve into the weeds, and the scorecard does not yet 
drive overall strategy. 
9. Using terms 
consistently. 
Yes.  All PIs well defined and there is clear articulation 
of the issues. 
10. Utilise pilot 
projects. 
Yes.  Initially the Group Balanced Scorecard was the 
pilot, but this role has migrated to other areas where 
expertise is building. 





No.  No consultants used at all. 
9 - 71 
12. Avoid misusing 
the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
Yes – partly.  Generally measures are included by 
agreement or consensus.  However, occasionally 
measures are implemented in the Balanced Scorecard in 
order to impose Group requirements on laggards that 
are seen as out-of-step. 




Yes – partly.  This is an emerging development in 
some business units and it is intended to pursue this at 
Group level in the future. 






No.  Although linkage of individual measures to 
particular manager’s objectives will occur.  This is a 
potential future aspiration. 






No.  No cause-and-effect map and no linkage to 
strategic agenda.  But the Balanced Scorecard is 
beginning to influence activity and the need to develop 
the Balanced Scorecard process, including 





Yes.  Future developments may demand more, but 
current resources are adequate. 
17. Properly balance 
the IT issues. 
Yes.  Basic office automation tools used currently as the 
system is being developed and understanding is gained.  
Planned development includes the purchase of a COTS 
package now that the organisation has a better 
understanding of the issues and requirements.  





Yes – partly.  Those involved in are gradually educated 
in the Balanced Scorecard concepts, but there has been 





Yes.  Pragmatic incremental development as 
commitment is gained. 




Yes.  The aim was to improve the delivery of change 
agenda issues. 
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21. Managers, at all 









Yes.  Monthly reports used in Team Briefings. 
 
Thus Table 9.6 demonstrates that 15 of the 21 factors are employed at least in 
part.  However, the impression gained was that this development is maturing 
as understanding and support grows.  It was assessed that had key individuals 
left 12 to 18 months ago then there was a risk that the process might have 
collapsed.  Now the system is more established as a core management process 
and is consequently less vulnerable to personality changes. 
 
Examination of the Measurement/Planning matrix at Figure 2.11 suggests that 
CS&S and Land Systems Group are near the middle and moving in the 
direction of achievement.  Measurement is good and planning is effective in as 
far as the planned objectives are concerned, that is, objectives are underpinned 
by good, detailed plans and clearly articulated responsibilities.  The perception 
is that overall performance is improving, but, until plans are better geared to 
strategic objectives, the effective measurement processes is unlikely to result 
in the dramatic improvements to overall performance claimed for the Balanced 
Scorecard in some literature.  However, the name tags applied to the different 
quadrants were an issue.  The annual selection of programmes for the 
scorecard might smack somewhat of, “What shall we do today?”  Scoring the 
organisation in this quadrant would be a little “too condemning” as the 
measurement processes are good and the selection and planning of individual 
change programmes is good too.  This might suggest that the organisation is 
more in the area of “We never seem to get there!”  Nevertheless, since the 
organisation does seem to achieve the things it wants to achieve through its 
Balanced Scorecard, this tag seems inappropriate.  In a strategic sense a 
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description of “Travelling in hope” might seem inappropriate because of the 
lack of explicit, quantified linkages between the strategic planning and 
performance measures.  However, the organisation does have effective 
measurement processes.  Thus in this instance the quadrant tags seem 
inappropriate, but suggest that CS&S and Land Systems is probably in the 
“Achievement” quadrant, but with some weaknesses. 
 
Similarly, discussion of the model of attitudes towards the impact of the 
Balanced Scorecard at Figure 2.12 raised a number of issues that might be 
seen as challenging the model.  The organisation is seen as successful both 
before and following implementation.  The current assessment is that the 
Balanced Scorecard is likely to be retained.  This would suggest that CS&S 
and Land Systems would lie in the box labelled, “Balanced Scorecard likely to 
be retained for reasons not associated with perceived benefits”.  In fact, the 
Board has recently assessed that there is a direct improvement arising from 
Balanced Scorecard implementation and thus the box labelled, “Success likely 
to be attributed to implementation of the Balanced Scorecard” would seem 
more appropriate.  A number of issues need to be considered: 
 
• The term “successful” probably needs to be considered more in relative 
terms rather than absolute.  If significant improvement in overall 
organisational performance has been identified and attributed directly 
to the Balanced Scorecard, then comparatively the organisation was 
performing less well previously.  Thus positioning the organisation on 
the Successful-Unsuccessful scale pre-implementation is somewhat 
problematic.  Also, since this project is still relatively immature, to be 
able to attribute a performance improvement to the Balanced Scorecard 
in just 2½ years suggests that significant improvements are likely to 
arise as the programme develops further. 
• Although the Group has fully adopted the Balanced Scorecard (even in 
Alvis there are plans to roll-out the process) it has not yet fully 
embraced all of Kaplan and Norton’s concepts.  There are also other 
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management tools and systems in operation.  This makes clear 
attribution of success of Balanced Scorecard somewhat problematic, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
• Conversely, and perhaps most importantly, it must be remembered that 
the specific aims of this project, and largely still the current extent of 
use, is to embed change activity.  The reason given is that the Group 
acknowledged that this was a failure at the time when the Balanced 
Scorecard was adopted.  Thus in the context of the specific aims of this 
project, the Group was “unsuccessful”, but has become “successful”.  
This would put it in the category of, “Success likely to be attributed to 
implementation of the Balanced Scorecard”, and this is much more 
acknowledged across the Group. 
 
Thus the model does still seem to have validity. 
 
Finally, the model on the importance of culture was examined (see Figure 
3.12).  Again there was useful challenge to the model.  CS&S and Land 
Systems has a small stable customer and stakeholder base.  It is a large 
organisation with a long history; even though the formation of the organisation 
is constantly evolving through acquisitions, sales, mergers and joint ventures.  
Staff turnover is assessed as low.  This puts the organisation in the box 
labelled, “Culture complex, but stable and readily understood by all – 
quality/luxury product manufacturer employing traditional skills”.  Clearly the 
Researcher’s expectation was that the organisation would lie in the box 
labelled, “Culture of great importance, thus necessary to spend much effort in 
maintaining culture in order to project it consistently to important stakeholders 
– large military equipment supplier”.  Consideration of the issues highlights 
the following: 
 
• The Researcher’s assumption when selecting the “large military 
equipment supplier” was that a significant number of ex-Service 
personnel might be expected to migrate into such organisations after 
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serving, because they would have the knowledge and skill appropriate 
to the task.  Since such individuals would already be a substantial way 
through their working lives, they would not have a full career in 
industry, and thus the turnover would be higher than average.  This was 
based on experience gained in contact with Service personnel.  
Arguably the proportion of people to whom this applies is not 
sufficient within the industry to have a marked impact on staff 
turnover.  Jeff Smith’s assessment was that if anything tended to drive 
high staff turnover it was likely to be disillusionment with not 
constantly working with leading-edge technology.  However, this was 
only likely to impact the early working lives of employees.  That is, as 
someone became established in the organisation they would recognise 
that constant skill change due to emerging technology would not be an 
issue, because of the need to support equipments that had been 
produced previously.  Therefore people would be likely to recognise 
this early in their career and thus would either change early on or stay 
with the company.  Thus the issue here is merely in the selection of the 
example.  For CS&S and Land Systems the move to supply chain 
management, leading edge process and management technologies, 
mean that any staff-turnover problems are seen as likely to decline as 
the opportunities for skill refreshment will increase. 
• However, examination of the example relating to “quality/luxury 
product manufacturer employing traditional skills” also needs to be re-
examined relative to CS&S and Land Systems.   
o Firstly, as demonstrated above, the large size of the organisation 
does produce a complex culture, by virtue of the range of 
products/support provided, and the technologies on which they 
are based, and the range of ways and sites at which products 
and services are delivered. 
o However, the organisation, and thus its culture, is not stable; 
there is seemingly constant evolution.  For example, as 
highlighted above, the integration of the Land Systems business 
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to the Group is likely to have a significant effect.  In contrast, 
BAE Systems is endeavouring to establish a corporate identity 
for the whole organisation that can be readily understood by all.  
Nevertheless, BAE Systems is allowing each group to develop 
its own identity, and for CS&S and Land Systems this will 
revolve around “Service Delivery”.  Thus in the model, 
“product” should perhaps read “product or service”.  The low 
staff turnover should mean that much less resource needs to be 
expended on developing the right attitudes than it would in an 
organisation with a high staff turnover. 
o The “product” produced by CS&S and Land Systems must be a 
“quality” product, but often it employs leading-edge skills 
rather than traditional skills.  However, although traditional 
skills are important, as highlighted previously, large numbers of 
individuals are unlikely to be constantly retrained on new skills.  
For example, bringing together product manufacture, or 
maintenance, for new and existing equipments does not always 
make sense within CS&S and Land Systems; as classic 
rationalisation theories might suggest.  Product life cycles are 
so long that aspects of support may last beyond the currency of 
technologies that replace them.  Thus those knowledgeable and 
skilled in “valve” technology may still have useful skills to 
deploy despite the fact that the subsequent “transistor” 
technology has been replaced by printed circuit boards and now 
“chip” technology.  For example, Typhoon, currently entering 
RAF service, is likely to have a life cycle of 80 years, even 
though there are those who argue, correctly, that it is already 
technologically obsolescent; major equipment gestation periods 
prevent early adoption of leading-edge thinking.  Being a large 
organisation CS&S and Land Systems can afford to maintain a 
broad skill base, which would not be possible in a smaller 
organisation.  The issue is thus about deploying standardised 
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skills rather than individuals needing to constantly refresh skills 
thereby creating a drain on resources and changing individuals’ 
attitudes and perceptions. 
 
The issue of the model is thus more about the selection of examples to 
illustrate the points rather than any fundamental flaw.  On reflection “large 
military equipment supplier” might not have been the best example, and 
perhaps “large computer/software supplier” might have been a better example.  
What is highlighted by this discussion is the nature of CS&S and Land 
Systems and the way that the individual sub-groups of technology workers, 
locations, etc, represent sub-cultures within the organisation (see discussion of 
Trompennaars and Hampden-Turner’s concepts discussed in Chapter 5, 
Section 7.) 
 
This case study has thus been extremely useful in challenging and debating the 
issues of the various models developed in the research.  The implementation 
itself is very similar in maturity, implementation process and concepts to the 
Government Departments looked at.  This may suggest that there is a degree of 
similarity of issues in terms of organisational culture; perhaps springing from 
strong links with the Government sector. 
 
8. Assessment of the supporting case studies. 
 
The case studies presented here are of organisations that have been largely successful 
in their adoption and implementation of the Balanced Scorecard concepts.  However, 
even within this small number of examples there are considerable differences in 
effectiveness of the implementation, and in the degree to which the concepts have 
been adopted.  On initial examination of the Royal Navy implementation the 
assessment was made using a simple “Yes-No” scoring model.  This proved 
inadequate here because there was too little differentiation between the case study 
assessments and perceived results; Tesco’s implementation appears substantially 
better than that of the other organisations yet scored little more.  Under a two-point 
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measurement system used above, failure to adopt a key concept derived no score; 
whilst partial adoption received effectively the same score as full adoption.  
Consequently it was felt that the 21 factors model used to measure the 
implementations needed to be refined further to more accurately reflect achievement 
of concepts.  Whilst a five-point scale of assessment for each rule would produce 
greater accuracy, it would be harder to differentiate the levels of such a scale.  A 
three-point scale was therefore assessed to be easy to use but would have some 
difficulties.  Using 1, 2, and 3 points for the levels of achievement would reward 
failure to implement a rule.  Using 0, 1 and 2 would not adequately reward those fully 
implementing a rule compared to those partially implementing it.  And, since failure 
to adopt a key concept is probably detrimental it was felt that this should be reflected 
in the marking system.  Consequently a -1, 1 and 3 scale was selected, and all the case 
studies reassessed as to the degree of implementation of the 21 rules.  The table below 
thus reflects this improved marking system to increase differentiation between full 
adoption, partial adoption and ignoring key concepts. 
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Table 9.8: Comparative assessment against the key factors for implementing and running the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
  Royal Navy HO DTI DCA Tesco SCDC BAE 
Systems 
1. Top Level 
Commitment. 
Yes 3 Partly 1 Yes 3 Partly 1 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 
2. Involving more than 
Top Management. 
No -1 Partly 1 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Partly 1 Partly 1 
3. Ensuring a broad 
spectrum represented 
in development. 
No -1 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Partly 1 
4. Agreeing strategy 
before developing the 
scorecard. 
No -1 No -1 No -1 No -1 Yes 3 No -1 No -1 
5. Focusing the scorecard 
on strategic objectives. 
Partly 1 Partly 1 Partly 1 Partly 1 Yes 3 Partly 1 Partly 1 
6. Avoid focussing on 
worthless measures. 
Partly 1 Partly 1 Partly 1 Partly 1 Yes 3 Partly 1 Partly 1 
7. Adapt the scorecard to 
meet local 
requirements. 
Yes 3 Partly 1 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 
8. Executives use the 
Balanced Scorecard 
strategically. 
Yes 3 Partly 1 Partly 1 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 No -1 
9. Using terms 
consistently. 
Yes 3 Yes 3 No -1 Yes 3 Yes 3 Partly 1 Yes 3 
10. Utilise pilot projects. Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Partly 1 Yes 3 
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11. Use experienced 
consultants to support 
implementation 
process. 
Partly 1 Yes 3 Yes 3 Partly 1 Yes 3 Partly 1 No -1 
12. Avoid misusing the 
Balanced Scorecard. 
Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Partly 1 
13. Construct and 
understand the cause-
and-effect map. 
Partly 1 No -1 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 No -1 Partly 1 
14. Use the Balanced 
Scorecard to drive the 
compensation process. 
No -1 No -1 No -1 No -1 Yes 3 No -1 No -1 
15. Use the Balanced 
Scorecard to support 
organisational 
learning. 
Partly 1 Partly 1 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Partly 1 No -1 
16. Balanced Scorecard 
must be properly 
resourced. 
Yes 3 Yes 3 Partly 1 Partly 1 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 
17. Properly balance the 
IT issues. 
Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Partly 1 Partly 1 Partly 1 Yes 3 




Partly. 1 Partly 1 Partly 1 No -1 Yes 3 Yes 3 Partly 1 
19. Avoid over-complex 
and lengthy 
development. 
Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 
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20. Clear objectives for 
Balanced Scorecard 
programme. 
Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 Yes 3 
21. Managers, at all levels, 
must use the Balanced 
Scorecard frequently 





No -1 No -1 No -1 Yes 3 Yes 3 No -1 Yes 3 
 Totals: 










 % of range (ie -21=0 
and 63=100): 
 62  62  69  71  98  62  60 
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In examining the conclusions of this revised scoring system, it must be recognised 
that, with the exception of the Royal Navy’s score, the scores were derived from a 
fairly cursory examination.  Note too that the implementations at the DTI and SCDC 
were relatively very recent, and thus the scores are not totally reliable.  However, the 
most striking score is that of Tesco.  This is considered realistic when recognising the 
quality of the implementation, senior management commitment, embedded use at a 
local level, and overall organisational success. 
 
The award of “Hall of Fame” status to MOD’s Balanced Scorecard thus needs some 
explanation (albeit that this scorecard is not actually considered here, but by 
implication will score lower than that of Tesco, because even within MOD it has 
much less a high profile than Tesco’s Steering Wheel).  What this additional work has 
confirmed is the influence that MOD has had on raising the profile of the whole 
Balanced Scorecard concept.  Evidence from a number of sources, not all reported 
here, confirms that MOD staff continue to advise other Government Departments in 
implementation and running issues. 
 
This table also helps highlight common issues: 
 
• Balanced Scorecard reflects existing expressions of strategy rather than shared 
and coherent versions, although these may gradually emerge later. 
• Consequently PIs are not always focused on strategic issues, and some 
worthless PIs may result. 
• Balanced Scorecard well adapted for local use. 
• Senior managers tend to use the Balanced Scorecard strategically rather than 
themselves getting involved in detailed issues. 
• PIs well defined. 
• Use of Pilot areas for development of concepts. 
• Little use made of the Balanced Scorecard in compensation process. 
• Good clear objectives of the programme and avoidance of lengthy 
developments. 
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• Failure to use the Balanced Scorecard to communicate regularly with staff at 
all levels. 
 
The issue of using the Balanced Scorecard for compensation was discussed in Chapter 
2.  Five of the scorecards examined here are from the public sector, where the profit 
motive has no influence and perhaps consequently there is less emphasis on bonuses 
for achievement.  These issues were evident in the two private sector Balanced 
Scorecards, and there was even some evidence of linkage in the public sector areas.  
But in no organisation was this a very strong theme; with personal development and 
personal objectives having as strong if not a stronger influence.  It is not clear if this is 
a cultural issue affecting the US more than the UK. 
 
Note too the subtle, in some cases, almost covert implementations of the Balanced 
Scorecard.  This was most at evidence in the Government Departments, where there 
was a fear of senior management “meddling” in the details.  In particular, a fairly 
common theme was the danger, and reality, of inappropriate PIs being forced onto the 
scorecard.  Issues of political interplay were very evident, which highlights the poor 
organisational culture that is used to stereotype Whitehall Departments: the “Yes 
Minister” culture. 77  For a Balanced Scorecard to work effectively an improved 
culture would be necessary.  Yet, in this survey, it was effectively only Tesco that 
measured real cultural issues, and then not against any defined model that articulates a 
relationship between culture and performance. 
 
The most worrying aspect, yet consistent with Kaplan and Norton’s findings, is the 
lack of development and buy-in to an overall organisational strategy.  This is 
generally replaced by lists of strategic objectives.  The need for cause-and-effect 
maps, or strategy maps, is obvious if these strategic objectives are to have any 
coherence.  Similarly, there is also a need to communicate more effectively with staff 
at the lower levels to ensure that employees are also correctly orientated in attitudes 
and actions.  The implication is that there is little understanding of the changing 
relationship between activities and individuals at the different levels. 
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Chapter 6 highlighted that strategy may have emerged from the double-loop learning 
process associated with an embryonic Balanced Scorecard.  There is evidence in some 
of these case studies to support this, particularly the HO IND where the embryonic 
scorecard helped develop thinking about the relationship with other organisations.  
Similarly the DTI case study and BAE Systems show improved understanding of 
strategic planning importance as a result of using early scorecards.  In contrast the 
danger of failure to gain strategic agreement at the highest levels can be seen to be 
subverting the development of an effective Balanced Scorecard in DCA.  This is 
because of lack of understanding among senior staff of the detailed issues of the 
Balanced Scorecard process: an intellectual arrogance that says the broad concepts are 
good enough, but possessing the power to misdirect and thus frustrate the concept.  
This can arise where there are stovepipe fiefdoms that ignore or deny interaction or 
corporate responsibility in favour of parochial achievement; indeed where internal 
competition for perceived success may exist.  Note that HO IND and DTI case studies 
do not suffer from this problem to anything like the same degree because they are 
conducted at a lower level with more direct support, where inevitably there is less 
arrogance and conflict and people are more likely to be concerned with process.  It 
must also be remembered that the Balanced Scorecard developments in MOD 
originated with naval staff rather than senior civilian staff who might in theory be 
expected to drive business process change.  (The researcher has been told that David 
Norton has provided support to MOD over a long period, at the most senior levels, to 
help ensure that the Balanced Scorecard concepts are embodied in the MOD’s 
programme.)  Thus again there are cultural issues, arising from the management style, 
that directly affect the development of the Balanced Scorecard within an organisation. 
 
The other models developed in this research were useful in helping to analyse the 
organisations.  Tables 9.9 to 9.11 set out the results for the organisations in the case 
studies.  The arrows in Table 9.9 illustrate the direction of movement.  The DTI 
movement reflects the fact that the Balanced Scorecard has not been kept fully up to 
date with developments.  Tesco’s changes reflect the need to constantly determine 
new and emerging requirements.  SCDC and BAE Systems movements reflect 
improvement. 
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Table 9.9: Measurement/Planning matrix. 
 Royal 
Navy 




 X   X  x X 
We never 











       
What shall 
we do today? 
   
x 




X = Strongest position. 
x  = Some tendency towards this position. 
Arrows indicate the direction of movement. 
 
There is some tendency towards the “Achievement” quadrant, but this might be 
expected because this would be seen as the desirable outcome.  However, overall 
there is no clearly discernable pattern here, partly because of the immaturity of many 
of the implementations.  The major issue to emerge from many of these 
implementations was the lack of development of a clear strategy to underpin planning.  
Measurement was generally good. 
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Table 9.10:  Success of the Balanced Scorecard. 
 Royal 
Navy 
HO DTI DCA Tesco SCDC BAE 
Systems 
Success likely to 




X  X  X  x 
Balanced 
Scorecard likely 





x X x X  X x 
Problems likely to 






       
Balanced 
Scorecard likely 
to be seen as 
contributing to 
failure. 
       
Balanced 
Scorecard likely 
to be seen as 
irrelevant. 
       
Success likely to 






 x  x  x x 
X = Strongest position. 
x  = Some tendency towards this position. 
  
Although in all cases there appears to be a continuing commitment to the Balanced 
Scorecard there were few organisations where there was unequivocal recognition of 
the benefits of the system.  Most organisations had invested so much into developing 
and committing to the system that they were unlikely, in the short-term, to replace the 
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system with anything else.  However, most of the implementations were too immature 
to identify any significant benefits, indeed the lack of clear strategic plans militates 
against early recognition of progress. 
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Table 9.11:  Cultural importance for organisations. 
 Royal 
Navy 
HO DTI DCA Tesco SCDC BAE 
Systems 
Complex culture, difficult to maintain or change but 
important to all parties – MOD. 
X X  x X   
Culture of great importance, thus necessary to spend 
much effort in maintaining culture in order to project it 
consistently to important stakeholders – large military 
equipment supplier. 
       
Culture complex and stable.  Consistently projected to 
those outside the organisation and widely understood – 
professional association.  
   x x X  
Culture complex, but stable and readily understood by all 
– quality/luxury product manufacturer employing 
traditional skills. 
      X 
Culture volatile but has no significance since most 
relationships with organisation are transitory – seaside 
promenade ice-cream stall.  
       
Culture important, but difficult to maintain or project 
consistently.  May affect the ability of the organisation to 
develop long-term reputation – product launch executives 
for a larger organisation.  
       
Culture relatively insignificant aspect of dealings with the 
organisation – specialist shop serving large clientele, eg 
via internet sales.  
  X     
Culture simple and relatively stable.  Readily discernable 
by all – local family run corner shop.  
       
X = Strongest position. 
x  = Some tendency towards this position. 
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Precise categorisation of the organisations studied was not always possible due to the 
range of issues affecting the organisation.  In most instances the culture is quite 
complex due to organisational size and staff turnover.  Only one organisation was 
relatively small, and that because it is only a team within a larger organisation.  Two 
organisations were also coming to terms with significant change, making management 
of the organisation that much more complex.  Both the Royal Navy and Tesco have 
significant induction processes and these have the clearest views of their 
organisational culture.  However, neither has overt cultural models linked to 
performance that are used for management; although Tesco does employ explicit 
short-term cultural issues within their Balanced Scorecard, ie relating to “the way we 
work here”.  No conclusions can be drawn from this small sample, and cross reference 
to other issues would also be necessary to validate the model further.  Nevertheless, 
the model proved to be a useful tool for analysing the organisations studied; 
highlighting issues about organisational stability and development.  Even in 
organisations where the culture was relatively manageable, or stable, there were still 
significant issues for debate. 
 
The issue that most seems to complicate this matrix is that of organisational change.  
This is effectively mimicking the impact of staff turnover.  That is, high staff turnover 
means that more staff have to be inducted into the culture and will not be fully 
effective until they exhibit the desired behaviours.  Similarly, organisational change 
will result in a clash of cultures and a new culture will need to be established before 
effective cooperation is assured. 
 
A revised version of the cultural assessment tool might thus look like Figure 9.8 
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Culture important, but 
difficult to maintain or 
project consistently.  
May affect the ability of 
the organisation to 
develop long-term 
reputation – product 


























































Culture simple and 
relatively stable.  Readily 
discernable by all – local 
family run corner shop 
Culture complex, but 
stable and readily 
understood by all –
quality/luxury product
manufacturer, or service 
provider, employing 
standardised skills
Culture of great 
importance, thus 
necessary to spend much 
effort in maintaining 
culture in order to 
project it consistently to 
important stakeholders –
IT equipment  or 
software supplier
Complex culture, 
difficult to maintain or 
change but important to 
all parties - MOD
Culture complex and 
stable.  Consistently 
projected to those 
outside the organisation 
and widely understood –
professional association
Culture relatively 
insignificant aspect of 
dealings with the 
organisation – specialist 
shop serving large 
clientele, eg via internet 
sales 
Culture volatile but has 
no significance since 
most relationships with 
organisation are 
















The organisations using Balanced Scorecards examined in this study are different and 
consequently the scorecards are very different.  Even with strong senior level support, 
implementation is often by stealth due to a lack of corporate strategy development and 
agreement and a lack of understanding of the key Balanced Scorecard concepts.  This 
often stems from the politics within the organisation, and the failure to run formal 
educational processes; often because of a fear of introducing something that will be 
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seen as the latest management fad into what is likely to be a “power” or “stellar” 
culture at board level.  Nevertheless organisational commitment and investment in the 
process gradually builds acceptance of the concept.  The danger is that the Balanced 
Scorecard becomes subverted by a lack of understanding at these most senior levels 
due to an intellectual arrogance that ignores process issues in favour of short-term 
performance measures that arise from competition or conflict at these levels. 
 
The models developed in this research were effective in helping to assess the 
organisations and the Balanced Scorecards they use.  Although the models developed 
categorised issues on axes with two categories (2x2 and 2x2x2 matrices), this testing 
has demonstrated that these categorisations should better be regarded as opposite ends 
of different spectra.  Recognising this would produce more effective models, but they 
would be more difficult to construct and categorise.  However, recognition of 
intermediate positions on the different dimensions does help to interpret the issues 
affecting organisations.  The models are therefore deemed to be effective despite the 
limited categorisation of issues. 
 
All the organisations looked at were relatively large, or part of a much larger 
organisation.  All demonstrated complex cultural issues, such as: 
 
• The integration of new units; 
• Organisational crises of varying degrees and natures; 
• Multiple, diverse, difficult and complex objectives; 
• Competitive and/or dynamic environment; 
• Internal politics. 
 
This suggests that culture management might be a reasonable activity to address 
organisational and staff needs.  The original contention is thus supported that 
inclusion of cultural measures within the Balanced Scorecard would be worthwhile.  
Despite this, only Tesco directly address cultural issues in their Balanced Scorecard, 
but not in the form of a direct cultural model. 
 













Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard.   
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard.
Supporting case studies. 
This Chapter has: 
• Examined a number of organisations using the Balanced Scorecard. 
• Shown that the models are effective in helping to assess 
organisations and their implementations of the Balanced Scorecard. 
• Proposed improvement to the models based on experience. 
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Outline of the research project. 
The aim of the research is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
Culture literature review. 
Research methodology. 
Review of organisational issues. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard.   
Cultural survey results. 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard.
Supporting case studies. 
Summary of conclusions. 
This Chapter summarises the outcomes of the research and identifies 
lessons learned about the process and areas for future research.  The 
Chapter also assess the outcomes of the research to identify the 
benefits and contribution derived. 
Figure 10.1 
 
Having restated the objectives of the research, this Chapter will present: 
 
• A summary of the methodology; 
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• A summary of the findings, conclusions and recommendations; 
• Examination of the limitations of the research and areas for future research;  
• Lessons learned about the research process;  
• An assessment of the value of the research; and 
• A final summary. 
 
The aims of this chapter are therefore to demonstrate the contribution to knowledge 
provided by this research project, and to provide a stepping stone to assist others in 
moving forward. 
 
2. Aim and objectives. 
 
Consideration of the Balanced Scorecard as a research topic gave rise to many 
questions in the mind of the researcher.  Initial study of the topic gave rise to further 
questions, and the key issues were highlighted in Chapter 1. 
 
Is the Balanced Scorecard just another management fad?  If this were the case then the 
likelihood is that it is entering its declining phase because it has now been around as a 
management tool or system since 1992.  If it were in decline, is it because there is 
some real flaw in the process or content, or is it simply changing fashions?  Thus there 
was an issue about whether this really is a worthwhile system; whether its use results 
from an attitude of, “We’ll try anything once”; or whether the Balanced Scorecard 
does not really work.  The Balance Scorecard had to be validated as a tool or process 
in order to determine the course of future research. 
 
The researcher’s own personal experience of the topic was contradictory.  What was 
being used in his own organisation did not seem to follow Kaplan and Norton’s 
concepts, yet was being hailed as enormously successful.  Was this a true Balanced 
Scorecard, a legitimate or deviant variant?  Would analysis of its implementation or 
use provide any new insights that would be worth sharing?  Thus there seemed to be 
the potential for a case study of the use of the Balanced Scorecard in CINCFLEET, 
indeed in the wider Royal Navy, which would provide value to others. 
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Indeed this situation begged the question, “What is a Balanced Scorecard?”  Was 
there a rigid framework and process that allowed no variation; or is it whatever you 
wanted it to be?  Thus there was a need for definition in order to determine whether 
some of the alleged Balanced Scorecards that had been implemented really did not 
justify the name and had merely brought the concept a bad press. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, rather than examining what constituted failure, what 
constituted success?  The researcher was brought up under the maxim, “Self praise is 
no recommendation”.  Yet those proclaiming success were those with a vested interest 
in the topic: the originators; those making money out of the process; those who had 
invested heavily in it (consider “the Emperor’s new clothes”).  The area of defining 
success is important because simply looking for a defined or specific set of outcomes 
may mean that users miss the real benefits that are delivered because they were not 
what were expected.  Conversely, were the attributed benefits real, such that they 
could be anticipated? 
 
Finally there was the area of cultural impact.  Becoming successful would seem likely 
to change the culture: if the culture previously accepted failure it would be like 
“rewriting history”.  Thus if improvement through Balanced Scorecard usage affects 
the culture, is the reverse true?  What precisely is the interaction between the 
Balanced Scorecard and culture? 
 
It was this last area of interest that eventually shaped the final direction of this 
research.  The following objectives were set: 
 
• Demonstrate that implementing the Balanced Scorecard impacts the culture of 
the organisation. 
• Identify the issues relating to the management of culture through the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
• Demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture through the 
Balanced Scorecard. 
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In summary the areas for consideration were: 
 
• Does the Balanced Scorecard constitute a valid management system, or is it 
just a passing management fad? 
• What is the local experience of implementing and using the Balanced 
Scorecard? 
• What is a Balanced Scorecard? 
• How does one define a successful Balanced Scorecard? 
• How are the Balanced Scorecard and culture inter-related? 
• Does implementing the Balanced Scorecard impact organisational culture? 
• Can the management of culture be integrated into the Balanced Scorecard 
process? 
 
This Chapter seeks to summarises the conclusions against these issues, looking at the 
way the Balanced Scorecard was implemented in the Royal Navy and in particular 
looking at cultural issues within CINCFLEET. 
 
3. Summary of methodology. 
 
Figure 1.2 sets out the broad framework and timescales for the activity.  Essentially 
activity can be divided into two parts, with the associated core tasks of reflection and 
writing up the results of the activity: 
 
• Literature review. 
• Surveys. 
 
Each of these activities sub-divides into three as shown in Table 10.1: 
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Table 10.1: Sub-division of main research activities. 
Literature review: Surveys: 
Balanced Scorecard and Research 
Methodology. 
Implementation of the Balanced 
Scorecard in the Royal Navy and in other 
organisations. 
Culture. Determining the culture of the 
CINCFLEET HQ 
Research Methodology. Trial of a cultural measurement tool. 
 
Of these activities, the Literature review of research methodology is an underpinning 
activity.  Thus Figure 10.2 represents the research activity in a diagrammatic form to 






















Literature review - Methodology
Reflection and write-up 
Figure 10.2: Diagrammatic representation of the structure 
of activity in research programme. 
 
 
Chapter 4 highlights that this is primarily phenomenological research, and thus 
subjective in its nature; although this is balanced to a limited degree by using more 
positivistic measures in the surveys; particularly the culture surveys.  The primary 
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study topic was selected from the researcher’s work area in order to ease the problems 
of part-time study.  However, the development and final selection of the research 
topic, and the form of the study only emerged gradually; but this is understood to be 
typical of phenomenological research.  The researcher’s involvement in the main 
organisation considered represents an issue that readers must recognise in interpreting 
the results presented, however, the researcher was not involved in any of the ancillary 
organisations considered in Chapter 9.  In order to help overcome this issue, the 
researcher has extensively quoted the contributors to the Royal Navy Balanced 
Scorecard survey.  The importance of the literature survey is also emphasised as a key 
building block of the research process.  Nevertheless, both the Balanced Scorecard 
and culture represent very significant topics for study.  However, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 2 in relation to the Balanced Scorecard, a core of literature provides a good 
foundation in the issues.  In contrast, large volumes of the literature provide little 
additional value since they tend to be too environment or issue specific, repetitive or 
superficial.  Nevertheless, Chapter 4 highlights the fact that the literature survey 
provided substantial benefit in developing an understanding of, and direction in, the 
topics under consideration. 
 
Early on in the study it was decided to undertake a survey of staff involved in the 
development and use of the Balanced Scorecard within CINCFLEET and the Royal 
Navy.  This was the basis for the main case study.  In the event this survey and 
development of specific interests in the cultural aspects of the Balanced Scorecard 
prompted a narrowing of focus and the research ultimately took a different tack.  
Nevertheless this early survey did form a key building block in the research project.  
It was constructed on the basis of the researcher’s personal observation and 
experience in the organisation, and on the basis of the early reading about the 
Balanced Scorecard; much of which emphasised issues about the construction 
process, content, purpose and early achievement. 
 
Towards the end of the research, additional comparative case studies were undertaken 
to “prove” the tools developed in the context of the work on the Royal Navy.  Unlike 
the postal survey used in the Royal Navy, these case studies were compiled from 
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interviews and literature review.  The question remains about whether these 
comparative surveys were really beneficial.  It is considered that they were effective 
in proving the tools, although each study provided only a limited perspective of the 
organisation and its issues.  Three points are relevant here: 
 
• Entrance to other organisations: The researcher had no substantial access to 
other organisations that were building or using Balanced Scorecards.  The 
access granted, alongside publicly available information, whilst enormously 
appreciated and beneficial, only provides a brief insight into the culture and 
issues of these organisations.  It would have been difficult to build a more 
substantial picture.  Gaining access to all the right people would have been 
problematic, particularly at the senior levels and to staff who have since 
moved on having been involved in key aspects of Balanced Scorecard 
development. 
• Time taken to gain data: Gathering the data from the survey undertaken in 
the Royal Navy took a long time.  Many of the participants were either known 
to the researcher or were thought to be sympathetic to the “personal 
development” objective that underlay the research: many organisations in 
MOD at the time were involved in the process of IIP accreditation.  Capturing 
data on such a scale in other organisations would not necessarily have been as 
easy.  For example, in the other organisations accessed, contact was generally 
limited to one individual.  Focus Groups might have been beneficial as these 
would have provided a wider range of input, but it is unlikely that sufficient 
access, particularly to senior staff, would have been granted and such requests 
could have jeopardised access.  However, from the researcher’s own 
experience on other issues, in MOD organisations, there is considerable scope 
for meetings to follow the lead of senior officers, and this may have 
invalidated any findings from such events. 
• Time available: Allied to this was the issue that, because this was only a part-
time research project, the time available for comparative studies was 
extremely limited.  Indeed the research project would have probably had to 
take a completely different direction as compiling and comparing a substantial 
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volume of data from a range of organisations would have dominated the 
project. 
 
Thus it is considered that the in-depth survey on the introduction of the Balanced 
Scorecard into the Royal Navy, backed up by the six limited case studies, was 
probably the most effective solution for the available resource.  Consequently, 
although there is only limited comparative data from other organisations, particularly 
on their organisational culture, the case study of the Royal Navy stands on its own and 
potentially provides a substantial resource for comparative work for other researchers 
in this area. 
 
In contrast to the work on Balanced Scorecard implementation, the initial cultural 
surveys utilised existing surveys, one of which was a commercial product.  The aim 
was to understand more about the organisational culture of CINCFLEET HQ and 
learn more about measuring the culture of an organisation.  Again a postal survey was 
used.  Although the survey used a stratified sample the poor response meant that the 
survey results were of limited value.  Nevertheless, there was sufficient response to 
provide a reasonable understanding of the culture.  The complexity of the 
Harrison/Handy survey was perceived to be a prime cause of the low rate of return.  
The problems encountered with the responses to this survey suggest that it would be 
better used in a managed intervention.  The Denison survey was seen as too expensive 
for routine measurement of organisational culture and did not fully reflect issues of 
the military organisational culture. 
 
The value of the literature survey, coupled with the researcher’s own experience of 
the Royal Navy, also became important in shaping the research project: the 
development of a measurement tool for CINCFLEET HQ, and its trial usage.  
Important cultural features were identified from both management and military 
literature, and although these features could be grouped under clear and appropriate 
headings these did not immediately suggest a clear model.  It was therefore decided to 
use the Denison model as the basis for the development of an appropriate 
measurement tool.  This had the added advantage that Denison had demonstrated that 
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balanced delivery of the identified cultural features would improve organisational 
effectiveness.  Adapting the model proved relatively simple, and was then 
successfully tested using personnel in the top 25% of performers within CINCFLEET 
HQ.  This enabled the establishment of a clear upper boundary for future marking: the 
lower limit being more likely to be automatically determined.  Some similarity with 
existing cultural perceptions was identified, but also differences.  These differences 
could be due to the changes in the content and wording of the questionnaire, or 
because the sample used for testing was (deliberately) biased towards the high 
achievers. 
 




The aim of this research, as stated in Chapter 1 and above, was: 
 
To demonstrate a mechanism for managing 
organisational culture through the Balanced Scorecard in 
order to improve culture and thus the potential for the 
Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
 
In order to achieve that aim it was necessary to address some key questions, 
which were set out in Chapter 1 and again highlighted above.  The aim of this 
section is to draw the threads of the argument together from the intervening 
Chapters to address those questions specifically. 
 
4.2.  Does the Balanced Scorecard constitute a valid management 
system, or is it just a passing management fad? 
 
Chapter 2 highlighted the role of vested interests in promoting the role of the 
Balanced Scorecard.  It also highlighted the arguments by various supporters 
that suggest the Balanced Scorecard is more likely to be found in high-
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performing organisations.  In contrast, it was noted that a large proportion of 
organisations abandon the tool subsequently.  This was thought to be due to 
the difficulty of introducing what is a complex and costly management tool.  
This was highlighted by the development of the rules for implementation 
produced by consolidating the work of a number of authors.  Chapter 2 
introduced a new model for looking at why such a management tool might be 
seen either as successful or unsuccessful.  Chapter 9 highlighted that this 
model is useful in analysing organisations provided the axis are recognised as 
continuums rather than specific categories.  Success prior to implementation, 
and post implementation, must also be viewed comparatively.  The model is 
reproduced here as Figure 10.3. 
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This suggests that, only in a small proportion of cases will the Balanced 
Scorecard correctly be seen as generating the benefits that are claimed by its 
advocates.  In most other instances the organisation’s success or failure will be 
assessed as independent of the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard.  
There will also be a relatively small proportion that will actually see the 
Balanced Scorecard as detrimental to the organisation. 
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Further validation of this model is required, but this is linked to the issue of 
what constitutes success, which is discussed below.  However, failure to 
implement the Balanced Scorecard properly, for example by not following the 
rules for implementation and making the investments required, are also likely 
to be a contributing factor.  The implementation rules should provide a basis 
for the measurement of effectiveness of the Balanced Scorecard within an 
organisation.  However, there is also the need for an agreed measure of overall 
organisational effectiveness against which implementation success can be 
plotted.  This is made difficult by the different methods of assessing 
organisational effectiveness between private sector (“for-profit”) and the 
public and not-for-profit organisations; although, potentially, these two sectors 
could be plotted separately if each sector could be measured against its own 
common success criteria. 
 
In summary, it is likely that advocates will see the Balanced Scorecard as 
an effective management tool, and will continue to promote its adoption.  
Such organisations will point to the enduring nature of the tool, and of its 
continuing evolution.  In contrast others who see little or no benefit as 
having derived from the Balanced Scorecard will argue that it is just 
another management fad.  Such organisations are likely to argue that the 
value of the tool cannot be directly proven, and that advocates are merely 
trying to justify the investment or commitment to the tool. 
 
The researcher’s view is that Balanced Scorecard represents a rigorous tool for 
developing longer-term organisational success.  The investment in time and 
resources to undertake the implementation successfully means that this is not a 
tool for the “faint-hearted”.  Even in a small organisation the rigorous 
implementation process, and a proportionate investment of time and resources, 
represents a good discipline in clarifying objectives, monitoring achievement 
and refinement of process and objectives.  That is, performance monitoring 
coupled with the impact of the cause-and-effect map (strategic map) and 
effective double loop learning will enable an organisation to develop realistic 
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expectations and methods of achieving them.  Used properly the Balanced 
Scorecard is an effective strategic management tool.  Implemented, or used, 
badly it has the potential to be a resource “sink” and a system for divisiveness 
and disagreement.   
 
4.3.  What is the local experience of implementing and using the 
Balanced Scorecard? 
 
Local experience within the Royal Navy, and particularly within 
CINCFLEET, was that the Balanced Scorecard was enormously 
important.  It changed the ways of working at Management Board level, 
bringing clarity to important business issues that the Board had not 
enjoyed before.  Consequently, significant issues were highlighted and 
resolved in a way that enabled the tool to be strongly advocated to other 
areas of the MOD.  This led to a change in the planning processes for one 
of the largest departments of state in the UK; and improved its external 
perception through strengthened advocacy on key issues.  Ultimately this 
impacted across Whitehall with many Departments committing to the 
idea of a Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Nevertheless there were those who failed to grasp the issues fully, or who saw 
the tool as detrimental.  In part this is due to the fact that they were not 
properly involved in development (in some cases because they arrived in 
relevant posts after initial development), or because there were limitations in 
the rigor with which the Balanced Scorecard was implemented.  Thus for 
example, where high-level scorecards contained many, or merely summarised, 
existing Performance Indicators, the full benefits of the archetypal 
implementation process were not realised. 
 
The “let’s do something quickly” philosophy may be acceptable, 
particularly in organisations such as the military, where there is an 
emphasis on “action”.  However, aggressive implementation should not be 
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allowed to overturn the need for rigour in the longer-term.  It was noted 
that in the majority of the case studies the aim was for quick 
implementation followed by refinement of objectives and process.  Such 
an approach, coupled with the double-loop learning process, may 
overturn the need for senior management pre-agreement on strategy.  In 
this instance it will be essential for senior managers to understand the 
Balanced Scorecard concepts and processes so that they are not 
subverted.  Strong leadership of the board may be essential, but board 
agreement to strategy must be an ultimate goal. 
 
It is the researcher’s view that whilst the strong advocates, who prompted or 
supported the initial implementation, remain in strategic positions, use of the 
Balanced Scorecard will continue.  However, once these individuals have 
gone, any failures of Balanced Scorecard process might be used as an excuse 
for a change of management tool; because this would represent a clearer signal 
of management authority than would simple process improvement or 
incremental change.  Against this potential loss of the Balanced Scorecard in 
MOD is the fact that it is assuming growing importance in other government 
departments, and MOD is still regarded as a key advocate and exponent of the 
process.  As highlighted in Chapters 6 and 9, the failure to properly cascade 
the MOD Balanced Scorecard down the entire organisation, and the failure to 
use it regularly and consistently as the communication agenda means that it is 
in danger of being a marginalised process.  This is despite the clear success 
that MOD has had with the Balanced Scorecard, and the way that their work 
has been praised by Kaplan and Norton.   
 
This effectively reiterates the previous point; if there is no enduring 
commitment to the process it becomes a management fad.  MOD’s 
implementation of the Balanced Scorecard thus has some way to go before it 
can be regarded as fully effective; as demonstrated in the scoring mechanism 
developed in Chapter 9.  In contrast, Tesco has been much more rigorous in 
adopting the concepts and processes.  Arguably the relationship between 
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adoption of the Balanced Scorecard and organisational success has yet to be 
undeniably proved, but there is strong circumstantial evidence in the case of 
Tesco, which is undoubtedly one of the most influential retailers in the United 
Kingdom at present, and which claims not to have any alternative or 
supporting management tools in use. 
 
4.4.  What is a Balanced Scorecard? 
 
Arguably this might be the first question answered; indeed that is why the 
Balanced Scorecard is described in outline at the start of Chapter 1, and why it 
was then fully addressed in Chapter 2 after the initial overview.  However, it is 
also legitimate to argue that this question need only be addressed if the 
Balanced Scorecard is a worthwhile system from which organisational benefit 
is achieved.   
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the Balanced Scorecard is a management tool 
used to drive organisational strategy and organisational achievement.  As 
a tool it is underpinned by a substantial process of: 
 
• Agreement and common orientation of objectives and strategy. 
• Planning and target setting. 
• Responsibility and resource allocation. 
• Performance monitoring and reporting. 
• Personal and organisational learning and development. 
• Balancing objectives. 
 
As such it must be an all-pervasive system, in terms of the people and 
processes within the organisation.  Two issues have been raised: 
 
• It is a motivational tool. 
• Its use must be balanced (planning and measuring – central 
direction and local freedom). 
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Chapter 2 highlighted the NLP Logical Levels model (see Figure 10.4 below) 
as a means of understanding the role of the Balanced Scorecard in shaping 
behaviour.  Essentially the argument is that, if the Balanced Scorecard is 
linked to an individual’s Identity and Belief structure then this will help shape 
Behaviours and Capability.  Failure to link to these higher levels will mean 
that the organisation struggles to change the individual’s, and thus the 
organisation’s, capability and behaviour because there will be a disconnect 
between the different logical levels.  The alternative is to rely on extrinsic 
motivation, particularly financial reward, as the incentive through which 
corporate alignment and motivation is achieved.  (Although it could be argued 
that extrinsic motivation may also change values at the higher levels.)  Further 
research is required into the benefit of extrinsic reward as opposed to intrinsic 
reward as this may represent a cultural view of motivation. 
 











Figure 10.4: NLP Logical levels.




The issue of communication is important to motivation, and the failure to use 
the Balanced Scorecard effectively in this role will limit its impact.  The NLP 
logical levels are thus a clear guide to the need to change behaviours and 
capabilities by linking people together, and to the organisation, at the higher 
levels of beliefs and identity.  Such linkages may also breakdown the 
subcultures within the organisation and encourage the development of a more 
unified culture.  (Total elimination of subcultures may be unnecessary and 
even undesirable.)  Unless employees feel they have a stake in the organisation 
there is no reason for them to work towards corporate goals.  Thus the 
emphasis placed on the Balanced Scorecard is that it should be its own 
motivational tool rather than requiring extrinsic reward.  The Balanced 
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Scorecard would achieve this, as Kaplan and Norton themselves say, by 
encouraging corporate unity through involvement in organisational planning 
and in demonstrating organisational achievement.  Work becomes more 
fulfilling when the effective results against goals are demonstrated.   
 
NLP Logical Levels thus make a considerable contribution to: 
 
• Understanding the structure of organisational objectives. 
• The relationship between strategy and organisational culture. 
• Understanding of communication, motivation and achievement. 
 
Consequently it is the researcher’s view that, reference to this model is an 
effective means of proving products and plans associated with the Balanced 
Scorecard; ensuring that adequate attention is given to the issues at the higher 
levels to facilitate issues at the lower levels.  See for example the way that the 
Logical Levels were used in Chapter 8 to prove the culture survey.  Successful 
use of the Logical Levels will help reduce individual stress through 
improvements to the psychological contract between the individual and the 
organisation (See Chapter 3).  Effective attention to intrinsic motivational 
issues in this manner may render the use of extrinsic reward unnecessary. 
 
Also important to effective use of the Balanced Scorecard is the model 
produced in Chapter 9 that highlights the need for a balance between planning 
and measurement.  Unless resources are correctly attributed to both, the 
Balanced Scorecard will fail to develop as an effective tool.   
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 Poor Planning ------------------------------------ Good Planning 
 
 
Caution must be exercised in using the model at Figure 10.5 as there is likely 
to be prejudice towards the top left quadrant.  The characteristics of good 
planning and measurement need further exploration and definition in order to 
improve assessment against the model.  Effective planning and measurement 
are both necessary for the Balanced Scorecard to be effective.  Both are also 
ongoing processes.  Kaplan and Norton emphasise the role of “double-loop” 
learning to ensure that results obtained from measurement are not just used to 
adjust plans, but also to ensure that the strategies that underpin plans are 
reviewed and adjusted to meet the overall strategic objectives.  The DTI case 
study highlights that good plans need to be updated in line with achievement if 
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they are to be effective: and if the effectiveness of a good measurement system 
is not to be undermined. 
 
The selection and development of measures is also important, because they 
must represent what is most important to the organisation.  That is, they must 
reflect the current position as well as the strategic direction and objectives; by 
having a balance of leading and lagging indicators.  A scorecard comprised 
simply of historic measures will be insufficient to drive forward action 
because the organisation will always be reactive.  It is from this feature, and 
the requirement to reflect the whole range of business issues, that the tool gets 
its name.  Failure to correctly “balance” the scorecard across the different 
business issues and across time will leave management with an ineffective 
viewpoint from which to drive plans and performance. 
 
It is the researcher’s view that the basic Kaplan and Norton perspectives, 
coupled with the cause-and-effect map (strategy map) should be the starting 
point.  Following the basic processes, using the basic tools, is more likely to 
give new starters the solid foundation necessary for development and 
refinement.  Most of the criticism seen of the Kaplan and Norton’s concepts 
seem to be mainly derived from the perceptions and interpretations of their 
authors, despite Kaplan and Norton having continually highlighted the 
flexibility of the model (see Figure 2.4 and the supporting debate). 
 
Most people learn to drive in a basic car.  Attempting to learn to drive in a 
Formula 1 car will not give people the knowledge and skills they need for 
every day motoring.  Therefore, attempting to build an initial scorecard that is 
specially adapted to corporate circumstances is likely to be fraught with 
danger; leading people away from basic steps and concepts resulting in a 
scorecard and cause-and-effect map that are flawed.  Similarly too much 
attention being paid to critics and detractors of the concept is likely to lead to a 
Balanced Scorecard that misses key processes or content. 
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4.5.  How do you define a successful Balanced Scorecard? 
 
This issue has already been partly answered above when looking at the issue 
of whether the Balanced Scorecard represents a worthwhile management tool.  
Unless the scorecard enables the organisation using it to be successful there is 
little point in investing time and resources into the process. 
 
All the evidence provided in support of the Balance Scorecard being a 
successful management tool is at best described as “circumstantial”.  No-
one has demonstrated a fool-proof method of articulating the precise 
impact that the Balanced Scorecard has.  That is not to say that there is 
no impact, or that it is not a positive impact.  Indeed advocates of the 
process point to significant improvements for those organisations using 
effective performance management systems, particularly the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
 
The key issue that prevents definitive proof of the benefits is the inability to 
isolate the impact of the process from other factors.  It is difficult to see how 
this could be achieved: although there are organisations, like Tesco, where the 
Balanced Scorecard is regarded as the only main management tool.  Even so 
this does not isolate it from external factors that may also be relevant.  
Consequently the inter-organisational comparison between those using the 
process and those not using it is likely to be the only effective way of making 
any assessment.  However, assessing disparate organisations in different 
industries on a common basis is problematic.  Similarly, there is also the need 
to assess the degree of effectiveness of the implementation and running of the 
Balanced Scorecard.  Since many implementations are abandoned as failures, 
the Balanced Scorecard is clearly not universally perceived as successful.  
Therefore in order to make the inter-organisational comparison fair, it would 
also be necessary to assess the effectiveness of the implementation. 
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Table 10.2: 21 Factors likely to impact Balanced Scorecard 
implementation. 
1. Gaining and maintaining Top Level commitment. 
2. Involving more than Top Management in the development process. 
3. Ensuring a broad spectrum of the organisations is represented in 
development of the Balanced Scorecard. 
4. Agreeing strategy before developing the scorecard. 
5. Focusing the scorecard on strategic objectives. 
6. Avoid focussing on worthless measures. 
7. Failure to adapt the scorecard to meet local requirements. 
8. Ensuring that Executives use the Balanced Scorecard strategically. 
9. Using terms consistently. 
10. Utilise pilot projects in the implementation process. 
11. Use experienced consultants to support implementation process. 
12. Avoid misusing the Balanced Scorecard as a means of imposing 
unnecessary control. 
13. Construct and understand the cause-and-effect map. 
14. Use the Balanced Scorecard to drive the compensation process. 
15. Use the Balanced Scorecard to support organisational learning. 
16. Balanced Scorecard must be properly resourced. 
17. Properly balance the IT issues to support and not take-over the process. 
18. Ensuring a proper understanding of Balanced Scorecard issues within the 
organisation. 
19. Avoid over-complex and lengthy development. 
20. Clear objectives for Balanced Scorecard programme. 
21. Use the Balanced Scorecard to communicate and reinforce organisational 
direction and achievement. 
 
It is the researcher’s view that the 21 rules of implementation, and running, for 
the Balanced Scorecard (20 derived from the Literature Review and the one 
subsequently added as a result of the research in the Royal Navy) represent a 
good basis for assessing the quality of a Balanced Scorecard, see Table 10.2. 
The scoring mechanism developed in Chapter 9 adds further rigor to 
assessment of effective adoption.  Chapter 9 thus provides a mechanism to 
measure and manage the implementation of a Balanced Scorecard. 
 
Only those organisations triggering a set threshold should then be admitted 
into any comparative appraisal of organisations using the Balanced Scorecard.  
Ideally the comparison would most fairly be made between those who have:  
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• Fully adopted the Balanced Scorecard, 
• “Dabbled” with the Balanced Scorecard – have implemented and 
abandoned or not fully implemented the process, and 
• Not adopted the Balanced Scorecard. 
 
This represents a topic for future research. 
 
4.6. How are the Balanced Scorecard and culture inter-related? 
 
The Balanced Scorecard as a process represents a part of the organisational 
process since it defines, “the way we do things here”.  However, this does not 
define the full relationship.  As an organisation ages, strategy will increasingly 
relate to the historical strengths and capabilities of the organisation.  
Consequently the capabilities, built on the existing infrastructure of the 
organisation, represent both the culture and the future organisational direction.  
Few organisations will completely change direction, because an organisation 
will only exceptionally have a previously untapped capability that would 
confer substantial advantage, and to invest in a completely new infrastructure 
and asset base may require resources that are not immediately available.  New 
organisations with little history are perhaps more likely to change direction in 
this way, and as such they are likely to have little in the way of an established 
culture.   
 
Strategy is an articulation of cultural issues and therefore, in converting 
this into the Balanced Scorecard, the scorecard articulates organisational 
culture.  Even attempts by an organisation to revise established 
infrastructure, such as moving headquarters, will be seen as a move away 
from cultural roots, and thus says something about the organisation.  
Change, could arguably be good, bad or neutral, but it sends out messages 
about the organisation and its culture.  Nevertheless, hopefully, well 
thought-out change should be beneficial.  Thus the quality of change will 
also say something about the organisational culture.  The model 
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introduced in Chapter 3, modified in Chapter 9, and shown here as Figure 
10.6, attempts to demonstrate the importance of culture. 
 
Culture important, but 
difficult to maintain or 
project consistently.  
May affect the ability of 
the organisation to 
develop long-term 
reputation – product 



























































Culture simple and 
relatively stable.  Readily 
discernable by all – local 
family run corner shop 
Culture complex, but 
stable and readily 
understood by all –
quality/luxury product 
manufacturer, or service 
provider, employing 
standardised skills
Culture of great 
importance, thus 
necessary to spend much 
effort in maintaining 
culture in order to 
project it consistently to 
important stakeholders –
IT equipment or 
software supplier
Complex culture, 
difficult to maintain or 
change but important to 
all parties - MOD
Culture complex and 
stable.  Consistently 
projected to those 
outside the organisation 
and widely understood –
professional association
Culture relatively 
insignificant aspect of 
dealings with the 
organisation – specialist 
shop serving large 
clientele, eg via internet 
sales 
Culture volatile but has 
no significance since 
most relationships with 
organisation are 














It is the researcher’s view that there is interdependence between organisational 
culture and the Balanced Scorecard because they are linked by the strategy.  
The more important or complex that culture is, as articulated by the above 
model, the more important it will be to make cultural issues explicit in the 
Balanced Scorecard.   
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Failure to recognise organisational culture when developing a Balanced 
Scorecard could lead organisations to develop new strategies that are 
inconsistent with existing culture.  This is seen as potentially arising in three 
ways: 
 
• Organisational crises give rise to changes of senior management who 
fail to recognise the old cultural norms and generate new strategies that 
are inconsistent with the core of the organisation.  Such changes may 
result from company take-overs.  (Note the way that BAE System, 
CS&S and Land Services had to ensure that they recognised both the 
old BAe and Marconi cultures in developing their new processes.  Note 
too that the DTI and DCA case studies also highlighted the way that 
cultural tensions were recognised and addressed.) 
• There is no real corporate culture merely a collection of strong 
subcultures, one or more of which may feel threatened by change and 
may seek to undermine or frustrate change.  (This may be what is 
highlighted in the CINCFLEET case study.) 
• Senior management style may result in the detailed conceptual and 
process issues ignored and they may impose format and content that 
are contrary to the rules for implementation and use of the Balanced 
Scorecard.  Instead senior management must be fully educated or rely 
on knowledgeable experts.  In particular, senior management 
subcultures in competition or conflict may ignore the need for 
agreement on strategy.  (The DCA case study highlights these issues 
particularly well.) 
 
It is thus the researcher’s view that management must understand 
organisational change, must have a clear model of the desired culture, and 
must seek to manage relevant issues in order to deliver the required cultural 
features.  Managers may have the ability to provide a strong lead in this 
context, but they do not have the ability to dictate culture: you cannot dictate 
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what people believe.  Again the NLP logical levels have an important role to 
play in helping management understand how to manage organisational culture.  
There is a need to promote corporate identity in such a way that all individuals 
associate themselves with the organisation.  The beliefs of the organisation 
must be clearly taught so that they are owned by all the organisational 
members.  The cultural model developed should have a clear linkage to 
organisational efficiency and must be agreed by, and have the commitment of, 
top management.   
 
Mechanisms such as EFQM provide an audit tool for organisational process 
but not for the development of a unique strategy or culture.  Therefore a model 
such as Denison’s cultural model is required, but even this will not itself 
identify an appropriate strategy.  Adoption of a cultural model might enable 
management to produce a defined culture, but unless the cultural factors and 
their linkage to organisational performance are understood, it might not 
necessarily improve efficiency.  Further research is required to examine the 
issue of the linkage between organisational culture and organisational 
effectiveness.  In particular the linkages between organisational culture and 
other factors within the cause-and-effect model may enable organisations to 
define their own cultural model of organisational effectiveness and success. 
 
National culture may also play an important part in the acceptance of the 
Balanced Scorecard.  Apparent French opposition to the Balanced Scorecard 
and a supposed preference for the Tableau de Bord needs to be understood. 
 
It is the researcher’s view that National Culture, and probably organisational 
culture, may well be issues in the acceptability and use of the Balanced 
Scorecard.  For example, only in the commercial companies studied was 
remuneration tied to Balanced Scorecard an important issue.  In the 
Government/Local Government organisations there was much less emphasis 
on this issue.  Further research is needed into the cultural issues that shape 
whether an organisation is likely to find the Balanced Scorecard an acceptable 
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management tool.  This potentially represents a further variable in the 
examination of the success of the Balanced Scorecard, covered above. 
 
4.7. Does implementing the Balanced Scorecard impact organisational 
culture? 
 
There are two issues here: 
 
• Process, and  
• Achievement. 
 
The process of introducing a new management tool, and the rigor with 
which it requires re-examination of, and demands corporate agreement 
to, strategic objectives, dictates the extent to which there will be new levels 
of understanding within the organisation.  Rigorous examination is likely 
to be coupled with new or deeper relationships formed between 
colleagues; resulting from exposure of personal and hidden agendas 
through attempts to surface and agree departmental objectives in a more 
cohesive manner.  For the Balanced Scorecard these changes will only 
apply if it is implemented effectively; a superficial “bolt-on” approach will 
fail to “test” either the organisation or its leaders.  In most of the case 
studies this agreement to strategic objectives seems to be emerging over 
time rather than as a result of initial recognition of the requirement. 
 
Secondly, the aim, indeed arguably the expectation, for the Balanced 
Scorecard is to produce substantially improved organisational 
performance.  Kaplan and Norton have defined this as “break-through” 
performance; where the organisation moves up a quartile within its 
industry within a couple of years.  Such change both demands and will 
produce changes within the organisation in terms of staff attitude.  NLP 
argues that “if you do what you have always done, you will get the same 
results”.   
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Essentially what this is saying is that repeating behaviours produces traditional 
results, but changing behaviours and actions will produce a different outcome.  
People will only change their behaviour if there is a belief that something 
more desirable will result.  This requires new beliefs that are a core part of the 
organisational culture, as well as new actions that represent the more 
superficial levels of culture.  New “myths and legends” will be required to 
support the desired outcomes in preference to the old, established 
performance.  The aim is to establish organisational success as a norm in the 
organisation, where previously it had only been an occasional event: a truly 
legendary event! 
 
It is the researcher’s view that to effect a substantial change of process, and 
make success a routine issue, will change the culture.  The degree to which 
Balanced Scorecard embeds change through the whole organisation will affect 
the degree to which culture change takes place.  The degree to which the 21 
rules for Balanced Scorecard implementation are followed will probably help 
determine the degree to which there is culture change; although a lot will 
depend on the culture in the organisation at the start.  This represents another 
topic for further research. 
 
Thus, in the Royal Navy the degree of culture change was not as significant as 
it might have been because the Balanced Scorecard only became a senior 
management tool.  Nevertheless, attitudes and behaviours at that level were 
changed.  Witness for example the comments by CINCFLEET reported in 
Chapter 5 that illustrate a greater willingness to use business management 
techniques, even in a military environment.  In contrast Tesco use their 
Balanced Scorecard in an overt way throughout the organisation so that 
everyone is clear how they contribute to organisational success.   
 
The originally stated hypothesis was: 
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Implementing the Balanced Scorecard impacts the culture of the 
organisation. 
 
It is asserted that this hypothesis has been upheld. 
 
It is also the view of the researcher that culture is not static.  Core features of 
national culture may be relatively enduring, due to the long-term nature of 
national definition.  However, the changing structure of national definition, 
and the wider pervasive influence of major cultures in the modern world, will 
erode traditional views of national culture.  Similarly, the changes in national 
culture, and the external environment, will impact organisational culture.  
Thus organisational culture cannot be seen as static.  These background 
changes will need to be recognised when seeking to determine the impact of 
the Balanced Scorecard on organisational culture. 
 
4.8. Can the management of culture be integrated into the Balanced 
Scorecard process? 
 
Kaplan and Norton’s book “Strategy Maps” clearly indicates that many 
organisations are increasingly embodying cultural issues into their Balanced 
Scorecard.  Chapter 6 illustrated the fact that the Balanced Scorecard affects 
organisational culture, and Chapter 7 illustrated that there were significant 
cultural issues that needed to be addressed in CINCFLEET HQ.  Chapter 8 
demonstrated an appropriate model based on Denison’s culture management 
questionnaire, but adapted for the specific environment of a military 
headquarters, that forms a basis for the management of that culture. 
 
It is the researcher’s view that, where culture is a significant issue for the 
organisation, culture should be positively managed and is likely to feature in 
the Balanced Scorecard.  Development of a measurement tool is not a difficult 
process, but good cultural measurement tools do exist and might be used in 
place of a local development.  Integrating culture into the Balanced Scorecard 
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will ensure that it is linked correctly to all the other features of strategic 
performance, and thus ensure that culture is developed coherently with 
organisational needs, and contributes to positive outcomes. 
 
Table 10.3: Summary of recommendations. 
1. Users must be clear about how to assess the impact of the Balanced 
Scorecard, but must ensure that implementation and use is conducted with 
rigor if the relationship between these factors is to be assessed effectively. 
2. Not only must the rules for implementing and running the Balanced 
Scorecard be adopted with strong commitment, but there must be a 
recognition that this system is for the whole organisation and for a substantial 
period.  Partial implementation is unlikely to have significant benefit. 
3. There must be recognition of the role of the Balanced Scorecard as a 
motivational and instructional tool.  Consideration must be given to the 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivational methods appropriate to the organisation 
and its aims. 
4. Organisations must ensure that there is an appropriate balance and 
commitment to both planning and measurement systems in support of the 
Balanced Scorecard processes. 
5. Build from the basic Balanced Scorecard model and process to ensure that 
the fundamental concepts are thoroughly embedded before any tailoring of 
the Balanced Scorecard to suit organisational desires. 
6. Organisations should measure the implementation and running of the 
Balanced Scorecard to ensure that their implementation is effective. 
7. Organisations must have a clear understanding of their culture and must 
ensure that this is properly reflected in their Balanced Scorecard 
development. 
8. The impact of organisational culture change resulting from implementing the 
Balanced Scorecard must be understood and managed effectively. 
9. The potential conflict between different management systems must be 
recognised and avoided by integration into an overall framework. 
 
5. Research limitations and areas of future research. 
 
Key limitations to this research are: 
 
• Work on examining organisational change was only initiated after that change 
had started, and consequently there is no independent or robust assessment of 
the organisation prior to the initiation of change. 
• Scrutiny of the organisational culture was undertaken over a short period.  
Because the research was aimed at demonstrating a measurement tool, the 
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ability of management to produce changes in culture over a longer period, and 
the ability of the measurement tool to assist in that management process, have 
not been tested.  A longitudinal study is required. 
• The poor quality of results obtained from the Harrison/Handy measurement 
tool has affected the ability to fully define the issues of the culture within 
CINCFLEET HQ. 
• Further work needs to be done to determine whether the cultural issues 
detected in the CINCFLEET HQ are represented more widely within 
CINCLEET or the MOD, or whether they represent specific issues for a 
specific group of people at a specific time in the evolution of the organisation. 
• The brief studies of the other six organisations covered in Chapter 9 prevented 
any detailed analysis or measurement of organisational culture. 
 
Thus in general, the research is limited in time and scope and needs to be undertaken 
over a much longer period.  This was highlighted in Chapter 8, where a measurement 
tool was developed and tested.  To achieve effective use of such a tool, it is believed 
further research must be specifically sponsored by senior management within the 
organisation, eg MOD.  However, all the other organisations studied would also 
represent in-depth studies in their own right.  Such studies would enable a more 
dedicated resource to be committed to the research and should improve the access and 
facilitation of the research.  For example, the Harrison/Handy survey would probably 
be better handled through focus groups/workshops rather than as a postal survey.  
This requires management support to release staff, even briefly, from routine work.  
Similarly, if the benefits of the cultural measurement tool are to be realised there must 
be both regular measurement and resultant management action.  Again this demands 
specific management commitment. 
 
The previous section has also highlighted some key areas for further research.  These 
were: 
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• Validation of the model of organisational attitude towards the Balanced 
Scorecard, leading to acceptance or rejection, and the perceived contribution 
of the Balanced Scorecard to organisational success.  (See Figure 10.3.) 
• Development of a mechanism to accurately assess the effectiveness of 
organisational planning and performance measurement in order to score 
organisations against Figure 10.5. 
• Intrinsic reward resulting from increased motivation relative to organisational 
objectives, compared to the increased motivation derived from extrinsic 
reward. 
• Further validation of Balanced Scorecard effectiveness compared to the 21 
rules for the implementation and use of the Balanced Scorecard. 
• Development of a model to assess the true impact of introducing the Balanced 
Scorecard on organisational performance and achievement.  This is coupled 
with the need to identify a mechanism to compare organisational success 
across industry/sector boundaries, which effectively incorporates both long 
and short-term issues. 
• Further research to demonstrate the linkage between cultural features and 
organisational effectiveness.  (Chapter 3 also highlighted the need to identify 
various cultural assessment tools that are available, to determine how effective 
they in assessing and managing organisational performance.) 
• Research into the way that the different dimensions of national or 
organisational culture may impact the suitability of a management tool for 
particular nations or organisations. 
• Degree of correlation between adherence to the 21 rules for Balanced 
Scorecard implementation and organisation culture change. 
• Further research into the degree to which national cultures are changing and 
the impact of such change on organisational culture. 
 
These individually represent fairly substantial research topics.  However, they are 
seen as falling into three interactive groups, as shown in Figure 10.7 below. 
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Organisational success  
- defining and measuring 










- National and 
organisational culture 
and its impact on 
defining ways of 
working. 




Whilst each circle contains important topics for research, the interactions between 
them represent demanding issues.  Because the intersections represent areas of 
multiple variables, it will be essential to understand more about the individual 
elements before attempting to look at the intersections; which effectively form a 
hierarchy of issues.  Thus for example: 
 
• What motivates individuals?  (The people circle.) 





• How are changes in national or organisational cultures affecting what 
motivates individuals? 
 10 - 34 
 
• How can individuals become more involved in achieving organisational 
objectives?  (The people circle.) 
• How do you measure organisational success against a background of multiple 





• How does the organisation recognise the contribution that different individuals 
make to the different short and long-term objectives? 
 
Combining these two higher level issues: 
 
• How do changes in national or organisational culture affect the way that 
different people are motivated and recognised for the contribution they make 
to different short and long-term objectives? 
 
Such issues lie at the heart of industrial disputes where individuals feel that their 
contribution is not properly recognised and rewarded.  Against a changing industrial 
base, the value that society places on any one occupational group changes over time, 
leading to changes in social standing for those groups, who may thus feel 
disadvantaged, or whose value may be overstated in a wider context.  Key workers 
may thus have power, or conversely reward, that is not truly proportionate to their 
contribution to achievement of organisational objectives.  So, replacing a senior 
officer/official at short notice may not present an organisation with a problem; whilst 
in contrast, a low ranking individual with specialist skills developed over many years 
may be less easy to replace. 
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6. Value of this research. 
 
The previous section has highlighted substantial further research that is required to 
enable organisations to operate effectively with the Balanced Scorecard in the 
dynamic environment of the 21st Century.  The fact that there is substantial further 
work to do should not be seen as negating the benefits of this research. 
 
Chapter 1 set out the Organisational benefits.  This is expanded here as Table 10.4 to 
demonstrate achievement. 
 
Table 10.4: Organisational benefits. 
Greater 
understanding of the 
issues affecting or 
driving the 
introduction of new 
management systems 
within the Ministry 
of Defence (MOD). 
The study has highlighted the pressures for improved 
management systems to manage the “business issues” of 
MOD.  However, the study has also highlighted the 
conflicts in this area where some individuals see attempts 
to run MOD as a “business” as running counter to 
organisational objectives and culture.  Thus whilst 
arguably these are not new issues, what is new is the real 
championship of business tools by senior Naval Officers 
highlighted by this study.  This demonstrates the 
importance of good quality business training for such 
individuals, to enable them to identify what tools and 
processes would benefit the management task.  Arguably it 
is the role of the civilian staff to advise on such issues, and 
this more traditional relationship was highlighted in the 
CFS.  Nevertheless, the research does support the 
contention that it was the strong advocacy of the Royal 
Navy that extended the use of the Balanced Scorecard 
across the rest of MOD. 
Provision of a 
cultural 
measurement tool for 
use in association 
with the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
The development and testing of a tool that could be used 
for cultural measurement, as highlighted in Chapter 8, 
meets this requirement.  There is no knowledge of any 





As highlighted in Chapter 5, there is increasing 
examination of the cultural issues of MOD.  However, this 
research, in Chapters 7 and 8, highlights specific issues 
about the organisational culture of CINCFLEET HQ.  It 
demonstrates that these cultural issues can easily be 
surfaced by either established or specially developed 
tools. 
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Table 10.5 sets out a model to demonstrate the relationship between data and 
knowledge.  This is used as the basis for the assessment of the outcomes of this 
research to classify the contribution to knowledge.  The contribution to knowledge is 
set out below in Table 10.6.  These two tables use a common colour coding system, 
therefore the key to the colour in Table 10.6 can be found in Table 10.5. 
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Table 10.5: Model showing relationship between data – information – knowledge – contribution. 
      
    Contribution  
    New knowledge.  
   Knowledge  
   Application/evaluation of information – use of 
tools and models to extract understanding from 
situations. 
Knowledge has value, eg by application in multiple 
scenarios. 
 
  Information  
  Aggregation/synthesis of data into coherent whole –development of tools and 
models.  
 Information has meaning but has not been evaluated. 
 
 Data  
 Responses to surveys/questionnaires – extracts from literature surveys.   
Raw data with no meaning on its own. 
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Table 10.6: Contribution to knowledge. 
? The origins, implementation process and 
value obtained from the introduction of 
the Balanced Scorecard into the Royal 
Navy have been highlighted.   
? Historical record of the Royal Navy’s implementation of the 
Balanced Scorecard.  This work was to have a profound effect 
on MOD resulting in the Balanced Scorecard being adopted as 
the MOD’s management planning process.  MOD also had a 
significant impact on the adoption of the Balanced Scorecard 
elsewhere in central Government.  (Note 1.) 
? Indication that prior agreement to strategy may not be essential 
provided double-loop learning allows corporate development 
and agreement to strategy subsequently. 
? This case study has been evaluated 
against rules developed from a literature 
survey, and those rules have been 
enhanced by the additional lesson learned 
from the Royal Navy case study. 
? The rules were consolidated from existing guidance on 
implementation to evaluating effectiveness of implementation 
and thus the likelihood of success of the tool.  (Note 1.) 
? The rules were enhanced from the assessment of the Royal 
Navy’s implementation by an additional rule illustrating a 
perceived failing of that implementation. 
Provision of 
new case 





? Chapter 9 also provides an overview and 
assessment of the development in six other 
organisations.  These case studies would 
form the basis for more extensive 
examination of developments. 
? Rules for implementation are developed further into an 
evaluation tool to improve appreciation of individual 
implementations.  This tool is then successfully applied/tested in 
relation to the supporting case studies to demonstrate 
differences in the implementations.   
? As a contribution to practice, it is proposed that this tool could 
be used to monitor and manage the implementation of the 
Balanced Scorecard. 
? A model has also been developed and demonstrated in relation 
to the case studies that highlights the relationship between 
organisational success and perceptions of the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
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? This research proposes that the Balanced 
Scorecard is both a cultural feature at the 
more superficial levels of culture, and 
also an articulation of the strategy, which 
similarly articulates organisational 
culture.  In particular, organisational 
values underpin the strategy and are also 
feature of culture. 
? The case study demonstrated that business processes are 
changed, which are issues at the artefacts level of Schein’s 
definition.  The use of modern business tools is an issue affecting 
the values of the organisation, as highlighted by the debate in 
Chapter 5. 
? The supporting case studies illustrate the potential for top 
management to subvert the Balanced Scorecard concepts, 
through arrogance, internal conflict or competition, resulting in 
the basic rules of construction being ignored. 
? Kaplan and Norton have demonstrated 
that organisations are increasingly 
embodying culture as an issue to be 
managed in the Balanced Scorecard.  This 
research, that has paralleled their work, 
supports that conclusion and has 
demonstrated, as they have proposed, that 
a local cultural model can/should be 
developed to assist in the measurement 
and management of organisational 
culture.  The contribution made by the 
organisational culture, and its interaction 
with other strategic objectives needs to be 
recognised. 
? Development and demonstration of a model to evaluate the 
importance of cultural issues in management of the 
organisation.   
? Demonstration of a mechanism for developing a cultural 
assessment tool tailored to local issues.  This facilitates cultural 









? Articulation of cultural issues for the 
Balanced Scorecard using the NLP 
logical levels helps articulate the 
relationship between individual 
motivation and organisational 
achievement. 
? Exploration of the NLP logical levels and their relationship to 
motivation.  This is demonstrated in the development of the 
cultural measurement tool where the tool is tested to ensure that 
all the logical levels are adequately addressed. 
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? Chapters 5 to 8 have highlighted the 
change brought about by the introduction 
of the Balanced Scorecard into the Royal 
Navy.  In particular, Chapter 5 
articulated the Fleet First change 
programme in terms of different culture 
change models. 
? Examination of organisational change using established models 
assists in developing an understanding of the change taking 
place. (Note 1.) 
? Chapter 6 demonstrates how the 
organisation has changed through the 
introduction of the Balanced Scorecard, 
and also argues that the Fleet First 
changes were themselves a specific result 
of the introduction of the Balanced 
Scorecard.  (Similarly, the TOPMAST 
programme is also seen as having been 
precipitated by the introduction of the 
Balanced Scorecard, and this has been 
another significant change programme 
within the Royal Navy during this period, 
although it has not been covered here in 
any depth.)  
? The relationship between the introduction of the Balanced 
Scorecard and the organisational change is highlighted.  Again, 
organisational change impacts culture more at the level of 
artefacts, although potentially more enduring due to factors 
such as the move of location and the construction of new HQ 
building. 
Provision of 






? Chapters 7 and 8 illustrate the culture of 
the CINCFLEET HQ in the period shortly 
after the Fleet First changes.  The issues 
highlighted may well be directly impacted 
by the Fleet First programme, even if they 
were not a direct result of those changes. 
? The assessment of the organisational style and culture during a 
period of change using established cultural models 
demonstrates cultural problems existing difficulties. (Note 1.) 
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? Chapter 5 has also looked further at the 
issue of the distance, often referred to as 
“the gap” between the military culture 
and the host culture. 
? Presentation of a model for interpreting “the gap” explains the 
issue and thus provides for its management.   
Note 1: These items represent new information and knowledge to the extent that they represent new collections, compilations or 
arrangements of information or knowledge, eg unique assessments of organisational culture using existing models, new collections of 
information from which later knowledge was obtained through assessment or evaluation. 
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It is therefore argued that this research provides a resource for future work on the 
Balanced Scorecard and culture in any organisation, but will specifically assist the 
MOD in considering cultural issues. 
 
7. Lessons learned from the research process. 
 
Some of the issues that would improve the research have already been highlighted: 
 
• Undertaking research throughout a development period where culture is 
concerned, because the culture can only be effectively determined at the time 
rather than in retrospect when it has already changed. 
• Using the Harrison/Handy survey in a focus group/workshop rather than as 
postal survey. 
 
However, there are other lessons to be learned: 
 
• The researcher had no experience of research projects and would have 
benefited by an earlier grounding in the issues and processes of research.  This 
was particularly so as the researcher’s first and second degrees were both 
“taught”, by correspondence.  Similarly the part-time nature of this study 
created difficulties, with lack of contact with other researchers, and difficulties 
attending the training programme provided.  Better understanding of the issues 
and the process should have enabled a clearer plan for the research to be 
developed at an earlier stage. 
• Being a phenomenological study, where the research topic was finalised fairly 
later on in the study period meant that the focus shifted somewhat.  
Consequently the initial survey on the implementation of the Balanced 
Scorecard was less focussed and clear than it might have been.  This was 
because it was designed for wider use than finally transpired. 
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8. Summary. 
 
This research has highlighted that, in order to increase the effectiveness of the 
Balanced Scorecard, one of the issues that needs to be given careful consideration is 
culture.  This is not a simple issue and there is unlikely to be a simple measure; a 
complex PI will be essential.  The reasons this topic needs consideration is that the 
culture: 
 
• Underlies, even defines, the strategy. 
• Provides understanding of the management and motivation of people and 
enables them to be linked into achievement of objectives, rather than 
potentially undermining the strategy. 
• Helps convert the Balanced Scorecard from a more mechanistic process to one 
that recognises the more “organic” aspects of organisations. 
• Strengthens the role of the learning and growth sector of the Balanced 
Scorecard, which in the past has frequently been weak. 
• Need to be understood in order to manage the implementation of the Balanced 
Scorecard. 
 
The research has also looked at the culture of the MOD: 
 
• Looked further at “the gap” between national and military culture, and 
provided a model that helps to explain the meaning of the gap. 
• Examined the impact of introducing the Balanced Scorecard on the Royal 
Navy, and shown how it created new agendas from a new perspective on 
business issues. 
• Examined the cultural issues within CINCFLEET HQ during a period of 
change, and identified the poor culture resulting from lack of shared vision. 
 
The research has also recognised that further study in a number of areas is required: 
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• Determining means of measuring the effectiveness of individual changes in a 
complex environment. 
• Understanding more about the motivational aspects affecting individuals. 
• Improving understanding of the changing cultures, its measurement and 
management of culture and its relationship with organisational performance. 
• Improving understanding of the relationships between these issues. 
 
The research project has thus achieved its aims to examine the relationship between 
culture and the Balanced Scorecard and to demonstrate a means of managing culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard. 
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 Road Map 
Chapter 1 
Chapter 2 
Outline of the research project. 
Chapter 1 highlights a perceived status of the Balanced Scorecard that 
suggests it is a key management system.  Yet many implementations 
fail.  Is it just another management fad?  This and other questions 
demonstrate the issues that underpin this research.  The Chapter goes 
on to set out the hypothesis for the research that, 
• Implementing the Balanced Scorecard impacts the culture of the 
organisation. 
It then goes on to state the aim of the research, which is, 
• To demonstrate a mechanism for managing organisational culture 
through the Balanced Scorecard in order to improve culture and thus 
the potential for the Balanced Scorecard to deliver benefit. 
Chapter 3 
Balanced Scorecard literature review. 
The Chapter has shown that a core of literature can be used to build a 
good understanding of the concepts of the Balanced Scorecard.  This 
core literature has enable 20 rules for implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard to be produced.  Use of the scorecard itself, and its 
associated “cause-and-effect” model, drives the strategic agenda of the 
organisation, through the concept of “double loop learning”.  Because of 
its comprehensive nature, the other tools available either do not cover 
the same scope or are merely similar sorts of concepts.  French 
preference for the Tableau de Bord appears to be a culturally based “not 
invented here” syndrome. 
Culture literature review. 
Organisational culture is effectively a different way of looking at and 
managing the organisation.  There appears to be a relationship between 
the culture and the success of the organisation.  However, national 
characteristics also need to be borne in mind as these will affect the way 
individuals interact within the organisation.  NLP Logical Levels can also 
be used to help understand the relationship between the organisation, its 
strategy and the values and beliefs of the individuals in the organisation. 
Measurement of organisational culture is possible and a number of tools 
for measuring and managing culture were considered.  To manage 
culture successfully in an on-going manner will mean that the culture 
must not be frozen.  Consideration needs to be given to the linkages 
between cultural characteristics and organisational success. 









This Chapter demonstrates how the researcher has attempted to 
balance the positivistic and phenomenological elements of the research.  
Thus, for example, quantifying cultural issues enables them to be 
measured, but constrains them to the terms and issues presented.  Thus 
the presentation of the culture can be distorted.  Similarly, the 
researcher’s role in the organisation, whilst having the benefit of helping 
to understand and articulate the issues, presents a problem in that it is 
his interpretation that is presented not a true representation.  But culture 
is a transitory phenomenon and will always therefore be difficult to 
capture and represent.  Such problems do not make attempts invalid. 
Case study on the impact of implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard.   
This Chapter demonstrates that the Royal Navy implemented the 
Balanced Scorecard effectively, and that there was a consequent 
change of organisational culture precipitating changes in working 
practices across the MOD.  Specifically, the introduction of the Balanced 
Scorecard is credited with precipitating major changes within the Royal 
Navy; Fleet First and TOPMAST. 
Extensive use of questionnaire respondent input was used to overcome 
any researcher bias in articulating the culture.  However, it was notable 
that there was disagreement among respondents on a whole range of 
issues, suggesting that involvement and perceptions varied significantly.
Review of organisational issues. 
This Chapter has highlighted the environmental pressures for change 
that MOD and CINCFLEET have faced.  It has also examined the 
tensions between social and the military cultural issues.  In particular the 
Chapter touches on disagreements over the adoption of “business 
management” techniques for an organisation that is not a “business” in 
the traditional sense.  The need for training to help individuals cross over 
between the two cultures has been highlighted.  A final model was 
presented for helping to understand the relationship between sub-groups 
within a culture, and the impact of movements of one sub-group relative 
to another. 
Cultural survey results. 
Serious weaknesses in the methodology used to quantify the 
organisational culture of CINCFLEET HQ limited the value of the survey 
undertaken.  However, there was sufficient evidence to suggest that not 
only was the overall culture poor but that there was considerable 
disagreement in the organisation.  This suggests that the organisational 
effectiveness might be low, yet at the time this research was being 
undertaken, CINCFLEET was effectively managing and preparing for 
Operations.  Culture measurement is a precursor to effective 
management, because it facilitates the development of a targeted 
management action plan. 








Chapter 10 Summary of conclusions. 
The Chapter provides an overview of the conclusions of previous 
Chapters, but specifically highlights: 
• Some of the difficulties experienced in undertaking the research: 
particularly the need to improve the process and coverage of the 
data collected. 
• The potential for further research: 
o Specifically extending the work within CINCFLEET HQ to 
measure organisational culture on a quarterly basis. 
o The need to look at the impact of national and organisational 
culture on ways of working. 
o The issues of motivating individuals to engage in the change 
activities. 
o Identifying the causes of organisational success. 
o The inter-relationships between people, culture and 
organisational success. 
The Chapter also concludes that the research has demonstrated the 
importance of the relationship between the Balanced Scorecard and 
organisational culture, and has demonstrated through a case-study how 
culture management would add a new dimension to Balanced Scorecard 
use. 
Figure 10.8 
Developing and testing a cultural measurement tool for 
use with the Balanced Scorecard. 
Using the Denison cultural questionnaire as a basis, because this has 
demonstrated a clear linkage to organisational performance, a cultural 
assessment tool was developed.  This was done using a wide range of 
cultural and business models, including those relating to the military 
environment.  Consolidating these issues into 36 diagnostic statements 
produced a questionnaire tailored specifically to the CINCFLEET HQ.  
Using this on a carefully selected group of highly motivated and high 
performing staff enabled a benchmark score to be set for any future use 
of the tool.  Similarities and differences with the use of the Denison 
model were detected, which may be due either to the changes in the 
questionnaire itself or to the group used to test the questionnaire.  
Further work on this is required. 
Supporting case studies. 
This Chapter has: 
• Examined a number of organisations using the Balanced Scorecard. 
• Shown that the models are effective in helping to assess 
organisations and their implementations of the Balanced Scorecard. 
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Table A2.1: Categorisation of a sample of Balanced Scorecard literature reviewed in this research. 
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(Case study) 
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4.  The HR Scorecard 
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(HR PIs) 
5.  Balanced 
Scorecard points 
to wins for small 
firms 
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(BSC in 
small firms) 
6.  Understanding the 
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Scorecard. 
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(Assessing 
PIs) 
    
9.  Keeping Score. Brown, M G X       
10.  Winning Score. Brown, M G X       








     
12.  Keeping the 
engine humming 
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13.  The balanced 
scorecard: A 
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16.  Management by 
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Scorecard: Will 







     
17.  Implementing 
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18.  Aiming resources 
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23.  The balanced 
scorecard: Not 
just another fad 
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24.  The development 
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28.  Balanced 
Scorecard drives 
overall mission 
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33.  Performance 
Drivers - A 
practical guide to 
using the Balanced 
Scorecard 




      
34.  Winning ways 
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37.  From "vicious" to 
"virtuous" 
scorecards 




38.  Dashboards, 
Smashboards 
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40.  Key Management 
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balanced 
scorecard 
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rules of global 
competitiveness in 
the 21st Century 
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46.  Report on the 
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Organisational Style Questionnaire. 
 
This questionnaire looks at two things: 
 
1) At your personal preferences for an organisational style. 
2) At what you believe are CINCFLEET’s organisational values. 
 
The questionnaire is divided into 15 sections and requires you to rank each of the four statements in each section. 
 
Taking each section in order, read the four statements and then rank them in order of personal preference on the left hand 
side of the sheet by circling one number for each statement (1 = First Preference, or your strongest perception of 
CINCFLEET organisational values).  Then rank the same set of four statements on the right hand side to indicate your view 
of how CINCFLEET, as an organisation, would value these statements. 
 
Please ensure that for each section, on both the left and right hand side of the sheet, each number is only circled once. 
 






1 2 3 4 A good boss is strong, decisive and firm but fair.  He/She is protective, generous 
and understanding of, and tolerant towards loyal subordinates. 
1 2   3 4
1 2 3 4 A good boss is impersonal and correct, avoiding the exercise of their authority for 
their own advantage.  He/She demands from subordinates only that which is 
required by the formal system. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 A good boss is democratic and can be influence in matters concerning the task.  
He/She uses their authority to obtain the resources needed to get on with the job. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 A good boss is concerned and responsive to the needs and values of others.  
He/She uses their position to provide satisfying and stimulating work opportunities 
for subordinates. 
1    2 3 4
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1 2 3 4 A good subordinate is compliant, hard working and loyal to the interests of their 
superiors. 
1 2   3 4
1 2 3 4 A good subordinate is responsible and reliable, meeting the duties and 
responsibilities of their job and avoiding actions that will surprise or embarrass 
their superior. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 A good subordinate is self-motivated to contribute his/her best to the task and is 
open with his ideas and suggestions.  He/She is nevertheless willing to take the 
lead when they can show they have greater expertise or ability. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 A good subordinate is vitally interested in the development of his or her own 
potential and is open to learning and receiving help.  He/She also respects the 
needs and values of others and is willing to help and contribute to their 
development. 
1    2 3 4
Section 3 What does a good member of the organisation give priority to? 
1 2 3 4 A good member of the organisation gives priority to the personal demands of the 
boss. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 A good member of the organisation gives priority to the duties, responsibilities and 
requirements of his own role, and the customary standards of personal behaviour. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 A good member of the organisation gives priority to the requirements of the task 
for skill, ability, energy and material resources. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 A good member of the organisation gives priority to the personal needs of the 
individual involved in each task.  
1    2 3 4
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1 2 3 4 People who do well in the organisation are shrewd and competitive with a strong 
drive for power. 
1 2   3 4
1 2 3 4 People who do well in the organisation are conscientious and responsible with a 
strong sense of loyalty to the organisation. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 People who do well in the organisation are technically competent and effective, 
with a strong commitment to getting the job done. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 People who do well in the organisation are effective and competent in personal 
relationships, with a strong commitment to the growth and development of people. 
1    2 3 4
Section 5 How does the organisation treat the individual? 
1 2 3 4 The organisation treats the individual as though his time and energy were at the 
disposal of the person higher in the hierarchy. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 The organisation treats the individual as though his time and energy were available 
through a contract having rights and responsibilities on both sides. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 The organisation treats the individual as a co-worker who has committed his skills 
and abilities to the common cause. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 The organisation treats the individual as an interesting and worthwhile person in 
his or her own right. 
1    2 3 4
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1 2 3 4 People are controlled and influenced by the personal exercise of economic and 
political power (rewards and punishments). 
1 2   3 4
1 2 3 4 People are controlled and influenced by impersonal, systematic exercise of 
economic and political power to enforce procedures and standards of performance. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 People are controlled and influenced by communication and discussion of task 
requirements leading to appropriate action motivated by personal commitment to 
goal achievement. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 People are controlled and influenced by intrinsic interest and enjoyment in the 
activities to be done; and/or concern and caring for the needs of the other 
individuals involved. 
1    2 3 4
Section 7 How are people’s activities controlled? 
1 2 3 4 It is legitimate for one person to control another’s activities if they have more 
authority and power in the organisation. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 It is legitimate for one person to control another’s activities if their role prescribes 
that they are responsible for directing the other. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 It is legitimate for one person to control another’s activities if they have more 
knowledge relevant to the task in hand. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 It is legitimate for one person to control another’s activities if the other accepts 
that the first person’s help or instruction can contribute to the their own learning 
and growth. 
1    2 3 4
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1 2 3 4 The basis of task assignment is the personal needs and judgement of those in 
authority. 
1 2   3 4
1 2 3 4 The basis of task assignment is the formal divisions of functions and responsibility 
in the system. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 The basis of task assignment is the resource and expertise requirements of the job 
to be done. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 The basis of task assignment is the personal wishes and needs for learning and 
growth of the individual organisation members. 
1    2 3 4
Section 9 Why is work performed? 
1 2 3 4 Work is performed out of hope of reward, fear of punishment or personal loyalty 
towards a powerful individual. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 Work is performed out of a respect for contractual obligations backed up by 
sanctions and personal loyalty towards the organisation or system. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 Work is performed out of satisfaction in excellence of work and achievement 
and/or personal commitment to the task or goal. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 Work is performed out of enjoyment of the activity for its own sake and concern 
and respect for the needs and values of the other individuals involved. 
1    2 3 4
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1 2 3 4 People work together when they are required to by higher authority or believe they 
can use each other for personal advantage. 
1 2   3 4
1 2 3 4 People work together when co-ordination and cooperation are specified by the 
formal system. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 People work together when their joint contribution is needed to progress the task. 1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 People work together when the collaboration is personally satisfying, stimulating 
or challenging. 
1    2 3 4
Section 11 For what do people compete? 
1 2 3 4 Competition is for personal power and advantages. 1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 Competition is for high status position in the formal system. 1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 Competition is for excellence of contribution to the task. 1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 Competition is for the attention to one’s own personal needs. 1 2 3 4 
Section 12 How is conflict managed? 
1 2 3 4 Conflict is controlled by the intervention of higher authority and often fostered by 
them to maintain their own power. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 Conflict is suppressed by reference to rules, procedures and definitions of 
responsibility. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 Conflict is resolved through full discussion of the merits of the work issues 
involved. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 Conflict is resolved by open and deep discussion of personal needs and values 
involved. 
1    2 3 4
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1 2 3 4 Decisions are made by the person with the higher power and authority. 1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 Decisions are made by the person whose job description carries the responsibility. 1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 Decisions are made by the individuals with most knowledge and expertise about 
the problem. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 Decisions are made by the individuals most personally involved and affected by 
the outcome. 
1    2 3 4
Section 14 What is the command and control structure? 
1 2 3 4 Command flows from the top down in a simple pyramid so that anyone who is 
higher in the pyramid has authority over anyone who is lower.  Information flows 
up through the chain of command. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 Directives flow from the top down and information flows upwards within 
functional pyramids, which meet at the top.  The authority and responsibility of a 
role is limited to the roles beneath it in its own pyramid.  Cross-functional 
exchange is constricted. 
1    2 3 4
1        2 3 4 Information about task requirements and problems flows from the centre of task 
activity upwards and outwards, with those closest to the task determining 
resources and support needed from the rest of the organisation.  A co-ordinating 
function sets priorities and overall resource levels based on information from all 
task centres.  The structure shifts with the nature and location of the task. 
1 2 3 4
1        2 3 4 Information and influence flow from person to person, based on relationships that 
are voluntarily entered into for purposes of work, learning, mutual support and 
enjoyment, and shared values.  A co-ordinating function establishes overall levels 
of contribution needed for the maintenance of the organisation.  Tasks are assigned 
by mutual agreement. 
1 2 3 4
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1 2 3 4 The external environment is regarded as a competitive jungle in which everyone is 
against everyone else and those who do not exploit others are themselves 
exploited. 
1 2   3 4
1 2 3 4 The external environment is regarded as an orderly and rational system in which 
competition is limited by law and conflicts yield to negotiation and compromise. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 The external environment is regarded as a complex of imperfect forms and 
systems that are to be re-shaped and improved by the achievements of the 
organisation. 
1    2 3 4
1 2 3 4 The external environment is regarded as a complex system of potential threats and 
support.  It is to be manipulated by the organisation to extract benefit from it, 
overturn its power and reuse it as a source of enjoyment and growth of members. 
1    2 3 4
Thank you for your help.  Please check that each section has been completed correctly with an order uniquely assigned to 
each statement on both the left hand and right hand sides.  Please also complete the accompanying personal data sheet.  You 
will receive your personal results together with an explanatory sheet detailing the different organisational structures. 
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The power culture. 
 
Frequently found in small entrepreneurial 
organisations, but can also be found at the 
centre of much larger organisations that 
control subordinate divisions.  It can best be 
pictured as a web where the power flows out 
from the centre.  Functional responsibilities 
link the lines of power. 
 
Such organisations rely heavily on personal 
trust and good interpersonal communication.  
There are few rules and little bureaucracy 
because control is exercised by selecting key 
individuals.  Consequently it is a highly 
political organisation where decisions are 
based on power and influence rather than 
rationality. 
 
A power culture is aggressive and strong 
rather than being flexible or adaptive.  They 
will result in a proud and dynamic 
organisation.  
 
This is likely to be the original form of most 
organisations, but can also be typical of 
military organisations – particularly in times 
of conflict.  However, many will migrate 
(probably to a role culture) over time as the 
organisation grows and develops functional 
specialisms (or to a task culture if it is 
operating in a dynamic environment). 
Advantages of power cultures. 
 
In a power culture the end justifies the means.  
Consequently they breed tough, risk taking 
managers.  Consequently, a power culture may 
find it easier to survive or thrive in difficult 
circumstances.  
Disadvantages of power cultures. 
 
Because they rely on personal power and 
influence from the centre, they cannot grow to 
any great size.  Consequently, growth has to 
be managed through spawning subordinate 
organisations, with the head of the subdivision 
personally reporting and accountable to the 
power culture. 
 
Decisions made on the basis of power may not 
always be rational.  Consequently, poor 
decisions may be made leading to failure. 
 
Staff selection must be undertaken with great 
care. 
 
Because they breed tough managers, working 
at middle or lower management levels can be 
demoralising and power cultures may result in 
a high staff turnover at these levels, where 
there is a greater requirement for security. 
 
Succession planning can be difficult leading to 
internal struggles.  Over-dependence on one 
powerful individual can result in 
organisational collapse when they leave. 
 
Because ends justify means, a power culture 
may not be well regulated and controlled. 
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The role culture. 
 
This is the typical bureaucracy in its true 
sense, ie an organisation based on rules.  It can 
be pictured as a Greek temple, where the 
pillars are the functional specialisms that are 
coordinated by the “pediment”. 
 
Such organisations select workers for their 
ability to fulfil a particular role specified in 
fundamental terms.  Advancement is up the 
functional pillars.  
 
Personal power is unacceptable and disruptive.  
Instead the organisation is based on rational 
decision-making and will thus be 
conservative.   
 
Employees contract with the organisation and 
keep their personal life separate. 
 
Tends to be a characteristic of large or mature 
organisations that have routine and 
programmable tasks.  Similarly, high capital 
investment, eg in modern technology, will 
tend to lead to a role culture, in order to create 
the functional specialisms and economies of 
scale necessary to exploit the investment.  
Interdependency of tasks will also drive 
towards role cultures in order to create the 
systems for coordination. 
 
Advantages of role cultures. 
 
A role culture will be very efficient and 
effective in dealing with routine or repetitive 
tasks.  This stems partly from the efficiency of 
the functional specialisms.  These provide 
predictability and stable employment.  They 
thus attract the “satisficer”, someone who will 
do enough to get by and no more, by 
providing them with security.  Reward and 
promotion is based on a rational and 
impersonal system. 
 
There is a clear hierarchy and set of 




Disadvantages of role cultures.
 
Being conservative, shifts in the external 
environment will be a considerable threat, 
creating the potential for take-over or large-
scale top-management 
reorganisation/replacement.  These changes in 
the external environment may be difficult for 
the role culture to detect, and it will be slow to 
respond.  This is partly because the 
organisation does not develop individual’s 
capabilities sufficiently. 
 
Will tend to attract people of low calibre. 
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The task culture. 
 
The task culture is represented by a net.  
Power lies at the intersections of the various 
strands and is based on expertise rather than 
organisational or personal power.  
Consequently there is no centre of power, 
although each individual may perceive they 
have more than they actually have. 
 
Activity is centred on tasks that are allocated 




Advantages of task cultures. 
 
Task cultures are very flexible and respond 
well to dynamic situations, reforming 
continually to meet new challenges.  Power is 
delegated to work groups.  This leads to the 
involvement of team members who thus gain 
great satisfaction from the task, and build a 
much broader range of knowledge and skill 
than role culture employees.   
 
Task cultures tend to be the ones regarded as 
the best places to work. 
 
Disadvantages of task cultures. 
 
Task cultures tend to be unstable. 
 
Because task cultures are geared to dealing 
with dynamic or one-off projects, they will not 
be geared to long-term efficiency and 
effectiveness.  Consequently where efficiency 
and effectiveness are required, eg in running a 
large factory, task cultures tend to evolve into 
role cultures. 
 
Control of task cultures is difficult since any 
senior management involvement interferes 
with the running of the task group.  Where 
resources are limited and need to be rationed 
groups may begin to compete for resources 
through the exercise of power.  Personal 
agendas and influence will also develop and 
management may seek to regulate the situation 
to compensate.  Consequently, the task culture 
may evolve into a power or role culture. 
 
Staff selection must be undertaken with great 
care, particularly because of the need to obtain 
well qualified/skilled staff. 
 
Employees are unlikely to gain the same depth 
of technical expertise as employees in role 
cultures. 
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The person culture. 
 
The person culture is rare, if it exists at all.  It 
is represented by galaxy or star cluster, where 
the individual is the centre of activity.  It is 
best seen in the small professional office, eg 
barristers’ chambers. 
 
Conceptually the organisation is subordinate 
to the individual needs.  Individuals contract 
with the organisation/other individuals solely 
on basis of mutual benefit.  Individuals can 
leave the organisation, but the organisation 
would find it difficult or impossible to evict 
one of its members.  There is no management 
hierarchy except by mutual consent. 
 
Influence and power is shared, usually on the 
basis of expert power. 
 
Advantages of person cultures. 
 
Can be of great benefit to the individual in 
helping them to achieve their personal 
objectives. 
 
Disadvantages of person cultures. 
 
Highly unstable, person cultures will tend to 
evolve into one of the other forms, although 
normally to a power or role culture.  This is 
because the organisation will eventually take 
on its own characteristics and will want 
individuals to conform to organisational 
objectives or procedures. 
 
Individuals may be difficult to control, since 
there are no sanctions that the organisation has 
that the individual will respect.  Conversely 
the individual will have little allegiance to the 
organisation and can damage it by leaving. 
 
An organisation may contain a mix of cultures.  This is because work type, pressures from the external environment, the requirements of 
individuals, etc, will all impact differently at different points in the organisation.  Thus for example, despite organisational change and the 
challenge of the external environment, routine functions may continue unchanged resulting in no change in culture, eg the accounting process 
may retain a role culture whilst the rest of the organisation is developing a task culture.  Conversely, an R&D department in a large role culture 
organisation may still be able to develop something of a task culture in order to better meet the task and organisational objectives.  This latter 
example highlights research results that indicate that there is no one culture that is always the most suitable or appropriate.  Successful 
organisations operating in the same sector may have different cultures.  Individuals may also influence the organisational culture, eg by using 
their power to establish something of a power or person culture in their area, in order that the organisation better meets their personal needs.   
Each organisation must develop their own culture to meet their own needs, recognising their own circumstances.  Individual needs are best met 
by belonging to organisations that have cultures similar to those required by the individual. 
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Appendix A to Chapter 4: Development of research questions. 
 
Table 4A.1: List of questions arising during the initial development 
of the research project. 
• Why has the CINCFLEET Balanced Scorecard been constructed with little or 
no underpinning understanding of the concept? 
• Why is the organisation committed to the Balanced Scorecard, particularly 
when there are so many problems associated with the measures being used, and the 
outputs that are identified? 
• What are the perceived benefits of the Balanced Scorecard? 
• Why is the Balanced Scorecard perceived as so successful? 
• Has the Balanced Scorecard, and if so how and why, had such a big impact on 
organisational culture? 
• Why is the Balanced Scorecard not accepted by the French? 
• Does culture matter in terms of the Balanced Scorecard? 
• Why, if culture is impacted by the Balanced Scorecard, do people not seek to 
manage organisation culture through the scorecard? 
• Why, if organisational culture is so important to organisational success, is 
there not more reference to culture management in Balanced Scorecard literature? 
• Can organisational culture be managed through the Balanced Scorecard? 
• What sort of performance measures could be developed and used to manage a 
large concept such as organisational culture? 
• How do morale and the moral component relate to service culture? 
• What do we really mean by organisational culture? 
• What is the culture of the Royal Navy? 
• What is the link between culture and strategy? 
• What is the link between intangible assets such as culture and organisational 
success? 
• What is the link between the Balanced Scorecard and culture?   
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• Does the Balanced Scorecard describe the culture that the organisation is 
trying to achieve? 
• Does an organisation really survive if it changes its culture, and if so to what 
extent can it change its culture before it becomes unrecognisable? 
• Can the reward system be linked to cultural measure? 
• Should the culture be communicated externally through the scorecard? 
• Do cultures have entry and exit barriers that can be used overtly? 
• Is it legitimate to develop an individual cultural model for an organisation 
rather than use generic products? 
• Is the culture of the Royal Navy a strategic issue for the Balanced Scorecard? 
 
 













CHOTS e-mail: FLEET-N8(FCSMA) 
BT:  (01923) 837517 GTN:  9317 37517 
Fax: (01923) 837021 GTN:  9317 37021  
 Reference:  
 
Date: 7th June, 2001 
Dear 





In addition to the “day job” I am currently also a part time student at the Royal Military College of 
Science at Shrivenham.  Thus as part of my training sponsored by CINCFLEET I am undertaking 
research into the introduction and use of the Balanced Scorecard within MOD. 
 
I appreciate that you are very busy, but I would be grateful if you could spare a short time to answer 
a number of questions about the implementation and impact of the Balanced Scorecard on 
CINCFLEET.  Your input would be particularly valuable, as you will be aware of much of the 
history of the development in CINCFLEET.  The aim is to gain a robust picture of the Balanced 
Scorecard in CINCFLEET by taking a number of independently provided perspectives.  The results 
can then be compared with those gained by surveying a number of other organisations, including 
some outside MOD which will be used for comparative purposes.   The attached questionnaire has 
been trialled on a number of people who indicated that it took only 15 to 20 minutes to complete. 
 





Clearly at this stage it is not possible to say what the outcome of this research will be.  However, the 
results will be available to future students at the College and thus provide them with a resource for 
understanding more about the management process of MOD.  This is valuable for the future 
development of management and processes within MOD. 
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Research into the introduction and impact of the Balanced Scorecard 
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Name (Please enter your 
name and title as it should 
appear in the 
acknowledgements when the 
research is published): 
 Position (to set your context 
in the organisation): 
 
Telephone Number:  Organisation (Please enter 
the name and address of the 
organisation to which your 
comments refer): 
 
e-mail address:  
Some organisations will have Balanced Scorecards at more than one level.  If you are commenting on separate developments in 
two or more levels of the organisation, please copy these sheets and provide separate responses.   
 
Section 1: Before the Balanced Scorecard was introduced.  This section aims to try to find out what the 
organisation was like before the Balanced Scorecard was introduced in order to form a baseline for comparison purposes. 
1 Describe briefly the organisational climate in 
the period prior to the introduction of the 
Balanced Scorecard: 
 
2 What were the key management 
processes/concepts/tools used in the management 
and running of the organisation?  (For example, 
Management by Objectives, Total Quality 
Management, Investors in People.) 
 
 
Section 2: Selection and introduction of the Balanced Scorecard.  This section aims to understand why the 
Balanced Scorecard was introduced, what knowledge there was in the organisation of the Balanced Scorecard process before it was 
introduced and what the aims of introduction were at this early stage. 
Focus attention on key issues facing the organisation:  
Replace or improve existing performance monitoring:  
Focus on strategic organisational objectives:  
Improve internal processes:  





Other (please state):  
2 What other management 
processes/concepts/tools were considered as 
supplements or alternatives to the Balanced 
Scorecard? 
 
3 Who (name and position) is recognised as the 
key individual that identified the Balanced 
Scorecard as an appropriate management tool for 
this organisation? 
 
4 Who (name and position) championed the 
introduction of the Balanced Scorecard? 
 
5 What were senior management’s expectations 
of implementing the Balanced Scorecard at this 
time? 
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Substantial (ie they were fully aware of the concept and the issues involved):  
Good (ie they had a broad understanding of the issues but required further training):  
Moderate (ie they were aware of the concept but needed substantial training):  
6 What level of 
knowledge did the 
Board have of the 
Balanced Scorecard 
at this time? 
Poor (ie they had little or no prior understanding of the concept when it was proposed):  
 
Section 3: The Implementation phase.  This section aims to gain an understanding of the implementation process for the 
Balanced Scorecard in this organisation and assess its initial impact. 
Management already understood concept well and needed no further training:  
Training for the Board was provided by internal staff:  
Training for the Board was provided by external training providers:  
External management consultants were used to provide training:  
The Board did its own research:  
1 How was 
commitment to the 
Balanced Scorecard 
obtained and built at 
Board level? Other (please state):  
 
Corporate level:  
Major strategic entity or divisional level:  
Lower business unit, profit or cost centre level:  
At a mix of levels according to local management initiative:  
Using specific pilot implementations in targeted business areas:  
2 At what level of 
the organisation 
was/were the initial 
scorecards built? 
Other (please state):  
 
Using the standard Kaplan and Norton template:  
Using a modified Kaplan and Norton template:  
From first principles or existing management information processes to arrive at a bespoke 
system: 
 
3 How was the 
initial Balanced 
Scorecard built in 
terms of its general 
framework? 
Other (Please state):  
 
4 Please state the number of dimensions and 









5 What was the rationale behind this scorecard 
format? 
 
Level of Involvement None: Low: Moderate: High: Very High: 
The CEO or equivalent:      
The Board (collectively):      
A sub-set of the Board:      
A particular Board 
Member: 
     
The acknowledged 
Champion: 
     
The originator of the 
idea: 
     
An internal project 
manager: 
     
External consultants:      
Others (please state):      
6 Who was 
involved in building 
the Balanced 
Scorecard and how 
significant was their 
involvement in the 
initial scorecard? 
      
 Involved from 
the very outset: 
Involved during 
development, 





Not involved at 
all: 
7 How, and at 
what stages, was 
commitment to the 
Balanced Scorecard The CEO or equivalent:     
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The Board:     
Senior Managers below 
Board level: 
    
The Planning 
Department: 
    
Middle Managers:     
Junior Managers:     
The workforce:     
Consultants:     
Other particular 
individuals or groups 
(please state): 
    
     
built in other parts 
of the organisation? 
     
Start Date: 
 
 8 When did the initial development phase of the 
Balanced Scorecard start and how long did the 
process take? Date initial Balanced Scorecard introduced: 
 
 Balanced Scorecard extended to 
(please give order of roll-out): 
Time taken to extend to this 
level (in months from start date 
given in question 8 above): 
Corporate level:   
Major strategic entity or 
divisional level: 
  
Lower business unit, profit or 
cost centre level: 
  
Personal level:   
Introduced at a mix of levels:   
9 Following the 
initial development 




was the Balanced 
Scorecard extended 
to the remainder of 
the organisation, 
and if so how long 












     
Strategic 
learning: 
     
Culture:      
Climate:      
Other (please 
state): 
     
      
10 What impact did 
this phase have on 
the organisational 
performance, 
culture and climate? 
      
11 Are you able to identify any specific benefits 
that were directly attributable to the Balanced 
Scorecard during this phase? 
 
12 What were the key lessons learned during the 
development and implementation phase? 
 
 
Section 4: Post implementation.  This section seeks to understand what changes have occurred and what impact the 
Balanced Scorecard has had on the organisation since implementation. 
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 To the structure of the 
scorecard: 
To the content of the 
scorecard: 
There has been significant 
change: 
  
There has been moderate 
change: 
  
There has been little change:   
1 Has the Balanced 
Scorecard changed 
since it was initially 
introduced? 
There has been no change:   
2 Where the Balanced Scorecard has changed 











Strategy:      
Financial 
performance: 
     
Output:      
Organisational 
Learning: 
     
Culture:      
Climate:      
Other (please 
state): 
     
      
3 What changes has 
the Balanced 
Scorecard had on the 
organisational 
performance, culture 
and climate since it 
was implemented? 
      
4 Are you able to identify any specific benefits 
that were directly attributable to the Balanced 
Scorecard? 
 
5 What changes have taken place to the business 
processes used within the organisation since the 
Balanced Scorecard was implemented, eg have 
new processes been added or deleted?   
 
Original aims fully met and exceeded:  
Original aims fully met:  
Original aims only partially met:  
Significant shortfall against original aims:  
6 To what extent 
were the original aims 
of introducing the 
Balanced Scorecard 
met or exceeded? Original aims no longer considered relevant:  
7 To what do you attribute this success or 
failure? 
 








At Board level:     
At senior 
management level: 
    
At middle 
management level: 
    
At junior 
management level: 
    
8 What is the level 
of understanding of 
the Balanced 
Scorecard now? 
At workforce level:     
9 Is the organisation committed to continued 
use of the Balanced Scorecard? 
 
10 Are individual’s  Not linked at all: Partially linked: Fully linked: 
The Balanced Scorecard 
 
Research into the introduction and impact of the Balanced Scorecard 
 
 
Appendix C to Chapter 4 Page 5 of 6 
 
At Board level:    
At senior management level:    
At middle management level:    
At junior management level:    
personal objectives 
explicitly linked to the 
organisation’s 
Balanced Scorecard 
and if so how and at 
what levels of the 
organisation? 
At workforce level:    
 Not linked at all: Partially linked: Fully linked: 
At Board level:    
At senior management level:    
At middle management level:    
At junior management level:    
11 Is the reward 
structure of the 
organisation linked to 
the Balanced 
Scorecard and if so 
how? 
At workforce level:    
 
Section 5: The future.   This section aims to look at what further development or implementation of the Balanced Scorecard 
is planned within this organisation. 
1 If the Balanced Scorecard is not fully 
implemented at all levels within the organisation, 
is this planned and if so over what timescales? 
 
2 What changes are planned to the Balanced 
Scorecard and why? 
 
3 What changes are planned to the Balanced 
Scorecard process and why? 
 
4 What are the organisation’s future 
expectations of the Balanced Scorecard? 
 
5 What plans are there to introduce other 
business processes into the organisation? 
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Section 6: General comments.    
Please add any additional comments that you feel 
are relevant at this stage and are not specifically 
covered above.  In particular if you are able to 




Thank you for your help. 
Please indicate whether you would be willing to allow me to 
contact further concerning the development of the Balanced 
Scorecard in this organisation: 
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Appendix D to Chapter 4: Improving the quality of survey responses. 
 
1. The requirement. 
 
Despite efforts to encourage response to the culture surveys the response was 
disappointingly low.  This meant that maximum value needed to be extracted from the 
responses received.  This annex outlines the measures employed to improve the value 
of responses. 
 
The Denison survey merely required individuals to read a short statement and then 
mark it between 1 and 5 according to whether the respondent agreed or disagreed.  In 
contrast, the Handy/Harrison survey required respondents to read four longer 
statements and then rank them in order twice, once for personal preference and 
secondly for perceived organisational preference.  This is a much more complex 
process and requires more care and consideration.  The error rate perceived, and low 
response rate, may be attributed to this greater complexity.  It is thus perceived that 
this method of questionnaire is inappropriate for this type of “mailed” survey.  This 
type of survey may be more appropriate for a managed intervention, eg a workshop 
exercise, or one-to-one intervention. 
 
2. Denison survey responses. 
 
It was noted, before they were dispatched to the US for processing, that, despite clear 
instructions on how to complete the Denison survey, quite a few staff had not 
followed the instructions.  The Denison survey used an “optical mark read” format, 
with instructions to mark the form by blacking-out the appropriate circle representing 
the preferred score.  However, some staff used ticks, crosses or circles to indicate their 
preferred score, thereby almost certainly making manual entry necessary.  This merely 
illustrates the casual manner in which this survey was treated.  No remarking was 
necessary except in the odd instance where a light pencil mark had been used.  In 
these instances the original mark was overwritten in the prescribed manner. 
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3. Handy/Harrison survey responses. 
 
Similarly, the error rate on the Handy/Harrison survey appeared to be due to failure to 
read the instructions provided.  Perhaps the instructions could have been clearer, but it 
may be that because the requirements of the two surveys were different that people 
merely followed the general pattern that was clearly expected in the Denison survey.  
A number of phone calls and internal e-mails were received querying whether the 
Handy/Harrison survey required the preference to be ranked as “1” equalling first 
preference or “4” equalling highest preference.  However, the researcher’s own staff 
were highly dismissive of this being clear that “1” equalled first preference.  Only one 
survey came back annotating this as a query, and when being marked the scores were 
reversed accordingly.  Clearly it is impossible to say at this stage whether any other of 
the surveys received were marked on the basis of “4” equalling highest preference.  
Certainly the perception when marking was that if this was a problem it was more 
likely to be a problem where the survey had been marked incorrectly.  The reason for 
this perception was that the overwhelming proportion of correctly marked surveys 
indicated personal preference and organisational style in the Role and Task areas, 
which is what the researcher anticipated.  However, the initial perception of the 
researcher on remarking was that there was a higher proportion of returns containing 
errors that suggested that personal preference was for Power or Person cultures. 
 
Some respondents also failed to complete, or to fully complete, the biographical 
details.  This made control of the survey more difficult and meant that some staff did 
not receive a response to their survey.  Thus it is impossible to confirm that these 
respondents were content with the outcome of their contribution to the survey, 
particularly in the cases where remarking was required.  See below. 
 
The process by which the survey was marked was to use a spreadsheet template 
divided into two similar sections, one for personal preference and the other for 
perceived organisational preference.  Each section had four lines, one for each of the 
four different organisational types, and 15 columns, one for each of the 15 sections in 
the questionnaire.  In addition there were rows and columns for headings and totals.  
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The response to each statement was then entered into the spreadsheet and the totals, 
representing the survey outcome, were then copied to a separate sheet.  The totals in 
each column were a ready reference to ensure that each section had been marked 
correctly.  That is the sum of each question column had to add up to 10 (1+2+3+4=10) 
and the result column to 150.  The table would also be scanned to check that other 
combinations of 10 had not been entered inadvertently (eg 2+2+3+3=10).   
 
Personal: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Sum
power 1 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 55
hierarchy 4 2 2 1 1 4 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 40
matrix 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 20
stellar 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 1 3 2 2 2 35
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 150
Organisational: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Sum
power 2 1 3 3 3 4 1 3 3 3 2 3 1 1 3 36
hierarchy 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 23
matrix 3 4 2 2 1 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 4 2 38
stellar 4 3 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 1 53
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 150




Where the survey had not been fully completed, or where it was marked correctly, the 
marks provided were recorded as reported above.  This generated an initial score 
indicating a form of preference and a form of perceived organisational preference.  If 
it was simply the case that a couple of sections had not been marked the ranked order 
of personal preference, perceived organisational preference was used to provide 
scores in the areas missing.  Thus for example, if one section had been omitted giving 
a score of 140, the additional 10 marks were added in accordance with the preference 
indicated by the 140 score allocated by the respondent.  Fink indicates that this type of 
adjustment is legitimate, although it does have certain problems with this type of 
survey that are discussed below. 1  However, there were on occasions simple errors 
that were amended by the most expedient means, eg a single score in a group of 
omitted, ie only three of the four statements being marked. 
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Where the scores attributed to the statements were not unique, ie they represented 
some form of agreement or acceptance level a different approach was used.  Thus for 
example a score of 2, 3, 3 and 4 might be allocated.  Here a two-stage process was 
developed: 
 
• First, single scores were maximised or minimised were this did not conflict 
with other scores.  Thus for example in the above example a score of 2, 3, 3, 4 
would be re-scored as 1, 3, 3, 4 on the basis that the “2” represents the highest 
preference.  This change was made without reference to the initial total scores.  
That is, the section scores were remarked keeping them in the same order, 
ignoring any impact on the total score. 
• In the second stage the remaining equal scores were adjusted according to the 
relativities of the total scores for those organisational types.  Thus, continuing 
the example above, if the Role culture had been marked the highest 
preference, and Task culture had been ranked second, then the score 1, 3, 3, 4 
was adjusted to 1, 2, 3, 4.  If the Task culture had been ranked above the Role 
culture then the score would be 1, 3, 2, 4.  That is, the scores in the section 
were adjusted relative to the total scores.  Except where the total scores were 
already showing a difference of more than a couple of marks, or where all four 
scores were involved in the process, this could lead to a change in the order of 
the total scores, ie where one score was unaffected by the changes but was 
within the range of movement resulting from the adjustment. 
 
This process could be used in the majority of instances without any difficulty.  But 
there were a few instances where difficulties or variations occurred: 
 
• Where all four scores in a section were the same, ie no preference was shown, 
the first stage had to be omitted. 
• Where initial reference to the ranking of the four organisational culture types 
gave no clear guidance about the potential ranking for a particular score no 
amendment was made until preference was clear. 
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• Where double scores at the top or bottom of the scale were allocated, eg 1, 1, 
2, 2 or 3, 3, 4, 4, then stage one might be adjusted to clearly differentiate 
between the scores during second stage adjustment.  Thus 1, 1, 2, 2 would be 
adjusted to 1, 1, 3, 3. 
• Where no ranking between two alternatives was evident, eg both Power 
culture and Role culture total scores before the final adjustment is made both 
have the same score, say, 30, then the standard deviation is used to determine 
which should be allocated the lowest score. 
• Where scores were missing from a section the section was left until the end 
and interpreted in accordance with the general trend revealed. 
• One survey was incompletely marked and the level of omission of scoring was 
too high to use the methods described above.  However, the questionnaire was 
annotated with comments that indicated that those items left blank were seen 
as unworkable within the organisation.  Therefore in order to rank these in 
accordance with the perceived perceptions of the respondent, those items 
where there was no score were initially allocated a score of “5”.  The two-
stage methodology for remarking was then applied.  This appeared to produce 
a result consistent with the annotated comments in ranking terms, although 
comments below on the impact of the remarking process may apply, 
particularly in relationship to the perceived organisational culture. 
• A second questionnaire that only contained one mark per section was 
remarked similarly using “5”.  But since in the personal preference section 
there were two options that received no marks at all, this remarking process 
could not be used entirely satisfactorily.  These two sections were alternately 
marked “3” and “4”, with the balance being aligned to that of the 
organisational preference, ie there were 105 marks to be attribute and therefore 
it was not possible to distribute these entirely evenly and there was no other 
method of choosing between the options but to make an arbitrary choice. 
 
These techniques were developed over time and then re-applied after all the initial 
scores had been produced and reported.  Some changes were noted and the issues 
arising are discussed below.   
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4. Assessment of the remarking of the Handy/Harrison survey. 
 
The marks allocated to the questionnaires that were marked incorrectly did not reflect 
the available scores and thus the raw data was invalid.  However, it is argued that this 
raw data does represent the balance of the perception of the respondent.  Therefore it 
is valid to use that information as a basis to interpret the result and allocate the marks 
available.  Nevertheless it was noted that the process of remarking described above 
could have an impact on the outcome.  The main issues were: 
 
• The remarking could alter the ranking of the preference for the different types 
of culture.  For example if remarking affected one culture type more than 
others, or if additional scores equalised or tipped the balance between closely 
marked culture types. 
• Where a significant amount of remarking was required, because the same 
score was entered for multiple culture types frequently, in these circumstances 
remarking tended to exaggerate the differences between scores. 
 
Tests were undertaken to determine whether the order in which the sections were 
remarked made an impact on the outcome.  In some instances the result was the same 
or so close that the difference was minimal.  However, there were some instances 
where the result was notably different.   
 
Insufficient information is available to conclusively prove the validity of the 
remarking process.  However, in providing the promised feedback to respondents, 
those whose survey was remarked were offered the opportunity to complete the 
survey again.  To date only two respondents replied to this offer.  One provided a new 
survey, and this produced a radically different result.  The other respondent merely 
stated that she did not feel the revised score reflected her views.  However, she went 
on to indicate that she felt that she was highly committed to the organisation despite 
what the survey had said.  But this was somewhat contradictory since the remarking 
process had suggested that she had an extremely strong psychological contract with 
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the organisation.  Thus the problems highlighted above do not conclusively indicate 
whether or not these remarked surveys can legitimately be included in the overall 
results.  Thus there are three possible approaches: 
 
• Inclusion of all the remarked surveys. 
• Inclusion of some of the surveys based on the degree of remarking and the 
perceived reliability of the outcome. 
• Exclusion of all the remarked surveys. 
 
All but the last of these could distort the outcomes of the survey.  But it is recognised 
that non-response distorts the results of a survey, and the exclusion of some responses 
provided increases that distortion. 2   
 
Where the original marking was in error, the gradual development of the remarking 
methodology outlined above meant that a consistent process was not applied when the 
questionnaires were first marked.  This is regrettable but inevitable.  The second 
remarking process, or checking, of the original scores provided an opportunity to 
apply the developed remarking process more consistently and assess its impact.  This 
second remarking process also highlighted that a number of simple errors had 
occurred.  Thus there were a number of surveys where the results supplied to the 
respondent were either incorrect or, perhaps, not the most robust interpretation of the 
survey response.  No significant movements of scores were detected.  Since the 
ranking process was in any event somewhat subjective it is considered that these 
minor adjustments are legitimate, even without referring the new score back to the 
respondent.  This is true even where the changes involve a different ranking of the 
culture types, ie because the scores were already close together.  This would be 
particularly true where the culture styles were not ranked at the extremes, ie strongest 
or least preference. 
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End notes: 
                                                 
1 Fink, A.  (1995).  How to Sample in Surveys.  Sage Publications.  Page 55 and 56. 
2 Ibid.  Page 54. 
Appendix E to Chapter 4 - 1 
Appendix E to Chapter 4: What is a case study? 
 
1. The requirement. 
 
This research claims to present a case study.  The main case study is supported by a 
number of subsidiary case studies.  In order to support this claim it is also necessary to 
examine what is meant by a case study.  As such this is an ancillary argument to the 
main body of Chapter 4, but needs to be covered in sufficient depth because case 
studies represent a somewhat controversial issue.  To embed this argument in the 





Yin defines a case study defines it thus: 
 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
 
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when  
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident.” 1 
 
However, Yin is also concerned with the design of the case study and provides a 
second part to his definition covering the technical characteristics: 
 
“The case study enquiry 
 
• copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there 
will be many more variables of interest than data points, and 
as one result 
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• relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulation fashion, and as another result 
• benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis.” 2 
 
This concern for the design process stems from concerns that, 
 
“The case study has long been (and continues to be) stereotyped as 
a weak sibling among social science methods.  Investigators who 
do case studies are regarded as having downgraded their 
academic disciplines.  Case studies have similarly been denigrated 
as having insufficient precision (ie quantification), objectivity, or 
rigor. …I wish I could paint a different picture.  However, the 
stereotype does exist, and the warning is therefore quite simple: 
Do cases studies, but do them with understanding that your 
methods will be challenged from rational (and irrational) 
perspectives and that the insights resulting from your case studies 
may be unappreciated.” 3 
 
This concern for methodology and preplanning of the research activity might be seen 
as stifling for a phenomenological study.  So much so that almost in contrast Stake in 
the introduction to his book states,  
 
“A case study is expected to catch the complexity of a single case. 
… Case study is the study of the particularity and complexity of a 
single case, coming to understand its activity within important 
circumstances.  In this book, I develop a view of case studies that 
draws from naturalistic, holistic, ethnographic, phenomenological, 
and biographic research methods.  I do not pay as much attention 
to quantitative case studies that emphasise a battery of 
measurements of the case, a collection of descriptive variables, 
common in medicine and special education.” 4 
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In an associated footnote, he refers specifically to Yin and his “excellent guide for a 
more quantitative approach”.  Zikmund 5 talks of the “case study method” and talks 
of the study of “one or a few situations that are similar to the researcher’s problem 
situation.”  As such he sees it as exploratory research.  Collis and Hussey 6 (drawing 
on the work of Scapens, and Otley and Berry) identify six categories: 
 
• Exploratory – used where the body of knowledge is deficient or there are few 
theories. 
• Descriptive – case studies that are purely describing current practice. 
• Illustrative – research that seeks to illustrate new and innovative ideas in 
organisations. 
• Experimental – describing and evaluating innovations, and the problems 
encountered. 
• Explanatory – where existing theories are used to explain what is happening 
in a particular organisation. 
• Serendipity – the chance opportunity to study and record the aspects of life of 
a particular organisation. 
 
This breakdown looks at investigation purely in the context of existing business 
organisations, and the definitions need to be adapted to consider wider applications; 
although that is not necessary in the context of this research.  (The term “case study” 
is also used in teaching, where a real, or tailored/constructed, case may be presented 
as a means of enabling students to learn about particular issues.  This situation is not 
considered further.) 
 
However, Collis and Hussey define, “A case study is an extensive examination of a 
single instance of a phenomenon of interest …” 7  Similarly Stake states,  
 
“A case may be simple or complex.  It may be a child or a 
classroom of children or a mobilisation of professionals to study a 
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childhood condition.  It is one among others.  In any given study, 
we will concentrate on the one.” 8   
 
These suggest that a case study is an individual instance of a phenomenon, albeit that 
this may be a single collective instance.  Blakie, noting that there are various 
definitions of case study,  quotes from the work of Goode and Hatt, emphasising the 
unitary nature of the study; “The case study … is a way of organising social data so 
as to preserve the unitary character of the social object being studied.” 9  Yin on the 
other hand suggests that case studies range from single cases in a single context to 
multiple cases in multiple contexts.  Similarly, Blakie also quotes from the work of 
Eckstein who criticises the concept of even the individual as a single entity because of 
the complex milieu of issues affecting the individual.  Thus Eckstein talks of 
“comparative research”, defined as,  
 
“…the study of numerous cases along the same lines, with a view 
to reporting and interpreting numerous measures of the same 
variables of different ‘individuals.’  The individuals … can be 
persons or collectivities, or the same person or collectivity at 
different points in time, in different contexts, or under different 
treatments.” 10 
 
Thus a key issue in the debate about case studies is the use of singular or multiple 
cases.  But what is clear from all this, irrespective of where the case study boundary is 
drawn, is that the issue or phenomenon being studied takes place in an environmental 
context that must be understood because it will directly affect the observations being 
made.  It is therefore important to study that context.  This will be addressed in the 
next section. 
 
In summary, it is concluded that a case study is the study of a phenomenon in a 
particular context.  This study may be used independently, or in conjunction with 
other case studies, 
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• to compare and contrast outcomes with other similar events elsewhere, or 
different events in the same environment,  
• in order to develop new theories,  
• refine, adapt or challenge existing theories, and/or 
• provide reference for further work. 
 
In the context of the research into the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard 
within the Royal Navy, the case study can be seen either as a single case study (the 
Royal Navy) or multiple case studies (ACNS, CINCFLEET, FOSF, 2SL, CFS and 
CGRM).  Either of these views is sustainable given the views highlighted above.  
However, it does again emphasise the need to examine the context. 
 
3. Case study context. 
 
A key idea in NLP is that, “The map is not the territory”. 11  In other words, a picture, 
a map, model, or case study is only an attempt to illustrate to the receiver what the 
object is like.  It cannot completely replicate the original.  Even were it possible to 
produce an exact replica, it would not occupy the same space in time or place and 
would thus be subject to different influences.  Stake puts it thus, 
 
“Many a researcher would like to tell the whole story but of course 
cannot; the whole story exceeds anyone’s knowing, anyone’s 
telling.  Even those inclined to tell all find strong the obligation to 
winnow and consolidate.  A continuum runs from telling lots to 
telling nothing.” 12 
 
Thus, since everything is truly unique, two issues arise: 
 
• The picture, map, or model will only give an impression of the original, which 
will be subject to the selectivity of the producer and the way that they have 
represented those issues, and will be subject to the interpretation of the 
receiver and the way they interpret what is represented. 
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• Deletion, Distortion and Generalisation are essential for representation as the 
original cannot be replicated.  But, in this way the original is destroyed; by 
false representation. 13 
 
In a similar vein, Stake refers to  
 
• “petite generalisations” – small generalisations about a case or a few cases 
that are made throughout the representation of the case and are not 
immediately recognised as generalisations. 
• “grand generalisations” – generalisations that are used to specifically 
articulate the issues, and which may be challenged by the case study. 14 
 
Thus the views of Eckstein (multiple instances) and Yin (single instance), reported 
above, are, at the extreme, incompatible.  However, both scenarios still rely on some 
form of generalisation.  In order to make sense of the world, deletion, distortion and 
generalisation are essential, but it may be necessary to understand what has been 
deleted, distorted and/or generalised.  This is because the resultant image projected is 
not the reality; it is only an attempt to convey the original and will be subject to 
interpretation according to the “map” of the receiver.  The issues are thus about how 
much information can be or is shared in order to convey the image. 
 
As an example this section attempts to convey something of the environmental 
influences impacting the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard in MOD.  Figure 
4E.1 below thus tries to represent the development of the Balanced Scorecard in the 
MOD over time (it pre-empts the evidence presented in Chapter 6, which needs to be 
read to determine its validity).  It is based on evidence gathered and the researcher’s 
own understanding and recollection of events. 
 




Figure 4E.1: Representation of Balanced Scorecard 






















This illustrates that the work in the various parts of the Royal Navy preceded the work 
elsewhere in MOD.  The implication (asserted as correct) is that the Navy work was 
instrumental in the roll out to the remainder of the MOD.  However, the diagram 
above does not illustrate either the wider (external) influences, nor the lower level 
personal influences, issues or pressures.  Stake states, 
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“Uniqueness is likely to be pervasive, extending to 
 
1. the nature of the case 
2. its historical background 
3. the physical setting 
4. other contexts, including economic, political, legal, and 
aesthetic 
5. other cases through which this case is recognised 
6. those informants through whom the case can be known 
 
To study the case, many researchers will gather data on all the 
above.”  15 
 
Thus, in this research, Chapter 6 represents the implementation of the Balanced 
Scorecard in the Royal Navy, Chapter 5 some of the wider contextual setting 
(including political, economic, social and technological), and Chapter 3 highlights 
some of the internal cultural issues (which are explored and measured in Chapters 7 
and 8).  This thus attempts to address the issues highlighted by Stake.  Consequently, 
Figure 4E.1 only represents one slice through a multi-dimensional model that is more 
fully, but not completely, represented elsewhere in this research.   
 
Key to the transmission of this overall model is the ability of the reader to reconstruct 
sufficient of the other aspects of the environment in order to understand and utilise the 
data successfully.  What is not clear is whether the model presented will be interpreted 
successful, or the volume of data needed to construct the model successfully.  This 
will depend largely on the “map” that the individual has initially, and the degree to 
which they hold this rigidly and inflexibly.  Rigidity will cause the individual to either 
reject or wrongly interpret what is presented; although they may also do this because 
of the way that it is presented by the researcher. 
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Another key issue is that of when something is purely “environmental”, or whether or 
“specific” to the case study.  This would seem to be best articulated in the form of a 




Issues that describe 
the immediate 
context but which do 
not directly and 
discernibly impact 
the issue. 
Issues that relate 
directly to the issue 
and can be seen to 
have a direct impact 
on it. 
Figure 4E.2: Continuum of issues relating to the topic 




Those issues that are truly “environmental” issues, using the definition of above, 
could arguably be dismissed as irrelevant.  Thus for example, the weather during the 
period of this research is not seen as irrelevant and has not been described.  
Conversely, issues such as the economic and political climate have been mentioned, 
because they are seen as having a bearing on the issues, albeit indirect and 
unquantifiable.  Such issues would lie more towards the centre of the continuum.  
Issues of personalities, and personality type, are referred to, because these are seen as 
having a direct and specific impact on the topic.  In a different case study the positions 
of these issues could be reversed, eg sales of ice-cream between 1998 and 2004.  Thus 
although the environment might be common the immediately relevant features are 
different. 
 
Referring back to the previous section, if each case study has its own context (because 
each case study is unique), much will depend on the degree of similarity of context as 
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to the number of case studies that can easily be handled within a given project.  That 
is, if a company is used as the basis of a case study, other companies in the same area 
or the same industry will have some contextual features in common.  If there is little 
in common, then considerable time will need to be expended building up the different 
contexts to illustrate the different case studies.  It would then be difficult to draw 
parallels between the different issues.  Indeed, it could be argued that the selection of 
alternative cases for study presupposes that there is some connection.  However, the 
existence of some common theme could be argued as creating something of a 
common context, eg the implementation of the Balanced Scorecard.  The ability to 
provide effective comparative case studies thus depends on the degree of contextual 
similarity. 
 
Thus in summary, the reader is always dependent on the researcher for describing the 
context of his/her study.  That description of the context will be subject to a level of 
generalisation according to the frame of reference of the researcher, ie the researcher 
identifies what they believe is important and describe it in ways that hopefully 
articulate the relevance and importance of the issues.  Interpretation of the 
environment will similarly be subject to the reader’s own frame of reference.  The 
broader the description, the better will be the picture created.  Multiple case studies 
will only be beneficial if sufficient time and capacity is available to describe the 
context of each different case.  The degree of perceived commonality will affect the 
decision, as will the range of issues necessary to adequately describe the context.  
Thus one detailed case study may, in the long-term, be more valuable than multiple 
case studies where little or no context is supplied, ie there is an implicit generalisation 
that the events described were largely independent of other factors.  Thus Collis and 
Hussey state, 
 
“A case study is an extensive examination of a single instance of a 
phenomenon of interest … The importance of context is essential 
and Eisenhardt … refers to the case study as ‘a research study 
which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within a 
single setting’ …” 16 
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4. Case Study process. 
 
“Yin’s (1989) definition [substantially the same as that used in 
2003] distinguished a case study from other types of research 
design, or what he called research strategies: experimentation, 
survey, archival analysis and a history. …By defining the case 
study as a research strategy, Yin has been able to argue that there 
is no connection between case studies and qualitative research: 
‘case studies can include, and even be limited to, quantitative 
evidence’ …” 17 
 
This quote from Blakie highlights something of a dilemma, in that a case study is 
clearly a phenomenological research strategy or methodology.  Similarly Gray, again 
commenting on Yin, states, “However, just a brief look at case studies shows why 
they are more often used qualitatively”. 18  These quotes effectively points to a, 
perhaps failing, attempt to position the methodology into a quantitative category with 
its greater emphasis on measurement.  This would appeal to a more “natural science”, 
“social science” or “business science” community.  This view is perhaps supported by 
Robson,  
 
“… the positivist ‘standard view’ of science has been 
comprehensively demolished, although its ghostly presence lingers 
on in the views and practices of many quantitatively inclined social 
researchers.”  19 
 
Yet the data sources proposed by Yin, “ …documents, archival records, interviews, 
direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artefacts”  20 and some of 
the skills proposed for a good case-study investigator: 
 
• an ability to ask good question and effectively interpret answers, and 
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• an ability to be a good listener without becoming trapped by their own ideas 
and preconceptions, 21 
 
point to much more phenomenological techniques.  Even the references to the conduct 
of “surveys” seem to reflect a preference for multiple sources of information, gathered 
perhaps by multiple skilled investigators, through the sensitive and intelligent use of 
core questions in a face-to-face interview.  Thus some more quantitative data 
collection methods seem to be disdained,  
 
“You will be collecting data from people and institutions in the 
everyday situations, not within the controlled confines of a 
laboratory, the sanctity of a library, or the structured limitations of 
a rigid questionnaire. … the human “respondent” to a survey 
questionnaire cannot deviate from the agenda set by the questions.  
The respondent’s behaviour is constrained by the ground rules of 
the investigator.” 22 
 
Despite taking such an explicitly phenomenological position, it can be difficult to see 
where deletion, distortion and generalisation have an effective role, because they 
inevitably detract from the view and agendas presented by interviewees.  It is 
therefore argued that the predetermination, by the researcher, of issues to be covered 
is not substantially different to any subsequent filtering and categorisation of 
information.  This will be particularly true if the questionnaire invites individuals to 
highlight any additional information or views that they themselves have; as was the 
case with the questionnaire used for the Balanced Scorecard implementation (see 
Chapter 4 Appendix C and Chapter 6).  It is admitted that the rapport between 
researcher and interviewee will be different, but then personality types also vary such 
that some people may feel more free to express themselves on paper.  Similarly 
questionnaires that rely on graded scales allow the interviewee/respondent to make the 
assessment and this takes the interpretation out of the hands of the interviewer to a 
greater extent. 
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In summary most writers emphasise the methodology when describing case-studies.  
Even where this is linked with the concept of “quantitative” research, the emphasis is 
more on the extent and variety of data collection methods rather than on any truly 
numerical process.  Thus none of the researcher’s reading on case study highlights 
any linkage between the use of questionnaires and case study methodology, indeed 
Yin, often seen as a key authority, would seem to disdain such a connection. 23 
 
5. Questionnaires as a case study methodology. 
 
Based on the definitions supplied in a number of the texts referred to above, this 
research could be described, perhaps loosely, as a case study.  It sets out to study a 
particular issue in depth looking particularly at the context, recognising the multiple 
influences.  The key issue that appears to distinguish this work from the general 
category of case studies is the use of questionnaires to collect data. 
 
Berdie, Anderson and Niebuhr describe a questionnaire as, “… a series of 
predetermined questions that can be either self-administered, administered by mail, 
or asked by interviewers”. 24  Similarly Fink describes a survey as,  
 
“… a system for collecting information to describe, compare, or 
explain knowledge, attitudes, and behaviour.  Surveys involve 
setting objectives for information collection, designing research, 
preparing a reliable and valid data collection instrument, 
administering and scoring the instrument, analysing data, and 
reporting results. … The questions in survey instruments are 
typically arranged into, taped, or self-administered questionnaires 
(on paper or on a computer) and into in-person (face-to-face) or 
telephone interviews”. 25 
 
Thus it is possible to talk of a “questionnaire”, or more correctly perhaps of a 
“survey”, since this embraces the wider function of preparing the questionnaire 
through to the analysis, interpretation and reporting of the results.  This implies that 
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survey work, even when administered remotely (mail, telephone or computer), is a 
complex process.  Berdie, et al, emphasise that, “… each study using questionnaires is 
unique and must be tailored to fit the individual circumstances of that study”. 26  Like 
Yin in respect of case studies, they go on to highlight criticisms of questionnaires,  
 
“Many people are quick to criticise the reliability and validity of 
all questionnaires; these criticisms are only legitimate when 
directed at poorly designed questionnaires.  Well-designed 
questionnaires are reliable and valid.” 27 
 
Similarly Oppenheim distinguishes between: 
 
• Research design – the plan or strategy of the research and the underlying logic 
that will facilitate the research and process of drawing valid conclusions, and 
• Research techniques – the methodological issues of what to measure and how 
the data will be collected. 28 
 
He highlights that, “Too often, surveys are carried out on the basis of insufficient 
design and planning or the basis of no design at all.” 29  Oppenheim sets out 14 
stages for a survey design: 
 
Table 4E.1: Stages of a survey. 30 
1. Deciding on the aims of the study, the issues to be investigated and the 
variables to be measured. 
2. Reviewing relevant literature and other information sources. 
3. Conceptualisation of the study, including initial detailed interviews and 
review. 
4. Feasibility study of the proposal, matching potential objectives with 
resources. 
5. Determining specific hypothesis for testing. 
6. Developing, including possibly by adaptation, the proposed survey 
instrument. 
7. Piloting the survey and refining it as necessary. 
8. Designing the sample to be surveyed. 
9. Identifying the sample to be surveyed. 
10. Data collection using the survey instrument. 
11. Data preparation and compilation. 
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12. Analysis of the data. 
13. Testing the hypothesis using the data. 
14. Writing the final report. 
 
This process has been broadly followed in the research, as demonstrated in the main 
Chapter.  Therefore it is argued that the process used is reasonably robust and the 
surveys undertaken are thus valid for research purposes.  Similarly, issues about the 
limitations of questionnaires are covered in this chapter; question design, attitudes of 
respondents, etc.  So there are issues about whether this is the most appropriate 
mechanism for collecting data.  However, Mangione suggests questionnaires are most 
appropriate where: 
 
• Respondents are widely dispersed. 
• It is better to give respondents more time to consider their answers. 
• Respondents have a moderate or high interest in the topic. 
• Questions are predominately closed. 31 
 
It is argued that all these applied to a lesser or greater extent in the surveys 
undertaken.  Similarly, Blakie highlights questionnaires as an appropriate mechanism 
for quantitative research; 32 and the main Chapter argues that this research lies away 
from the extremes of either quantitative or qualitative research.  The limitations of the 
questionnaire for qualitative research are seen as partly being overcome by the 
researcher’s personal observation and informal data gathering.  Robson prefers to talk 
in terms of “flexible design research” where “… so-called qualitative designs can 
incorporate quantitative methods of data collection.” 33  Here Robson is contrasting 
flexible design research with a more quantitative fixed design research approach 
which would tend to be underpinned by pre-existing theory and pre-determination of 
research question and methodology.  But Robson also argues for a “Realism” research 
paradigm that “… permits a new integration of what are usually referred to as 
subjectivist and objectivist approaches to social theory.” 34  He goes on to state, 
“Within the realist framework it is held that theory, rather than data or the methods 
used to produce those data, is central to explaining reality.” 35 
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6. Mini case studies. 
 
So far the argument of this appendix has been about the main case study of 
CINCFLEET, within the wider context of the Royal Navy.  It is also necessary to 
consider the mini case studies conducted towards the end of this research, partly 
because they differ radically from the main case study. Table 4E.2 below highlights 
some of the perceived key differences. 
 
Table 4E.2: Comparison of the main case study and subsequent mini 
case studies. 
CINCFLEET (Royal Navy) Mini case studies. 
Researcher extensive experience working 
within the organisation, or within 
associated parts of MOD. 
Researcher external to the organisations. 
Extensive written material readily 
available about the organisational culture. 
Material not readily available about the 
organisational culture. 
Data gather mainly by mailed 
questionnaires or surveys. 
Data gathered mainly by face-to-face 
interviews. 
Couple of short interviews ancillary to 
case study. 
Interviews main source of case study 
material. 
Case study compiled over long period. Case studies conducted over a relatively 
short period. 
Substantial analysis of environmental 
factors. 
Summary examination of environmental 
factors.  (Although many of the wider 
environmental factors relating to the 
broader context of MOD will have some 
read-across to the other Government 
Departments covered in the mini case 
studies, for example the general political 
and economic pressures on Government 
Departments in the 1990s.) 
No “user” validation of overall results.  
(Although individuals were provided with 
feedback on the Harrison/Handy survey 
and were invited to comment.) 
Interviewee validation of case study 
report. 
 
The contrast continues in that the mini case studies are multiple instances of the issues 
covered in the main case study.  In that sense therefore they represent the other end of 
the spectrum discussed by Yin and others; single study in a single context, multiple 
studies in multiple contexts.  The issues here are that the common theme is the 
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implementation of the Balanced Scorecard.  The underpinning theory and theoretical 
framework is thus common.  Indeed, there are also significant commonalities of 
context as three of the comparative organisations are Government Departments, one is 
a local authority and one is a company dealing, substantially, with equipment needs of 
the military.  The issues are thus largely around whether sufficient of the issue and 
context has been examined in each instance to justify the term “case study”, and 
whether the methodology is also sound.   
 
The contention here is that, although the examinations of these additional six 
organisations was cursory compared to the base case study, the essential ingredients 
were present.  Yin, above, highlights three methodological issues: 
 
• Recognition of technical complexity. 
• Multiple sources of data. 
• Underpinning theoretical frame work. 
 
These three issues are clearly linked.  However, to examine each in turn: 
 
• Recognition of technical complexity – Work on the main case study 
highlights that the researcher has understood the technical complexity of 
issues affecting that environment.  None, of the other instances studied is 
likely to be any the less complex.  However, it is argued that the main case 
study will have made the researcher more aware of the issues likely to be 
important.  Similarly, interviewees will also be aware of the issues that they 
regard as important and will seek to inject these into the discussion.  As with 
the literature surveys, and following the Pareto Distribution rules, it is 
suggested that a “rich picture” of the issues can probably be determined in a 
relatively short period.  The issues are thus about the skills of the researcher as 
an interviewer and analyst.  As a senior middle manager within MOD, the 
researcher has years of experience interviewing people: as an auditor; in 
recruitment, promotion and appointment; in project management; preparation 
of internal reports; contractor appointments.  Similarly, having had roles in the 
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management of projects and programmes, as policy advisor, and as a senior 
financial manager, it is argued that the researcher is also adept at analysis of 
complex issues. 
• Multiple sources of data – Data has essentially been derived from three 
sources for each of the case studies given: documents, interviews, personal 
observation during visits to each of the organisations.  Similarly, as has 
already been argued, general background (environmental) information will be 
available to the research from study of the main case study and from media.  
None of the case study situations were of an organisation unknown to the 
researcher, although neither were they familiar to him. 
• Underpinning theoretical framework – The initial case study of the Royal 
Navy provided the theoretical framework both in terms of the study of the 
Balanced Scorecard and culture.  From this initial study were developed the 
concepts and models that were used as a basis for the subsequent work in the 
follow-up case studies.  For example, it is noted that all the interviewees (with 
possible the exception of the BAE Systems case study) were people who had 
only comparatively recently joined the organisation: maximum of three years 
with the organisation and as little as about 9 months.  This means that 
organisational culture would be an issue that each was conscious of. 
 
It is therefore argued that although these studies were brief they were soundly based 
from a theoretical perspective.  Their limitations must be recognised, because of this 
brevity.  Yin and others might thus argue that they are not valid case studies, because 
they are not “in-depth” and use only limited reference points.  Consequently the 
contextual information is also limited.  This argument is recognised, but it is 
suggested that the previous research enabled the researcher to focus in on the key 
issues and present a picture which was recognised by the interviewee as a good 
representation of the situation. 
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7. Conclusion. 
 
Writers on case study as a research methodology do not refer to the use of 
questionnaires as a data collection technique.  The emphasis is much more on the 
face-to-face interview and the interpretation of data retrieved from this more rich form 
of communication.  However, it is argued that the quality of methodological design 
and execution of a case study can be successful, or undermined it.  So too the quality 
of a survey, using a questionnaire remotely, can be valid or invalid in terms of the 
information derived.  This researcher does not claim to be an expert, either in case 
studies or surveys.  The limitations of the work undertaken are highlighted in this 
research project.  It is therefore argued that just as face-to-face interviews are open to 
misrepresentation through deletion, distortion and generalisation, so too are 
questionnaires.  The advantage that a questionnaire has over an interview is that the 
question is received by all participants in exactly the same way and is therefore better 
controlled.  It is also more available for subsequent scrutiny and analysis.  Similarly, 
the use of graded scales reduces the potential for the interviewer to misinterpret or 
misrepresent the input received from the interviewee/survey respondent.  It is 
therefore argued that a questionnaire is a valid instrument for use in a case study, 
where it is the resultant data and its interpretation that is important.  In particular, the 
emphasis of a case study is on the multiple sources of data, and upon the importance 
and connection with the environmental context.  This has been the case with this 
study, where material has been presented looking at local, national and international 
issues.  This argument is supported by the realism research paradigm which allows for 
greater flexibility in the execution of research by reducing the distinction of 
quantitative and qualitative methods. 
 
This research has also been about hard measurement: the need to have clearly defined 
and measurable interpretation of culture in order to promote a wider understanding 
and management of cultural issues.  This research aims to demonstrate that this is 
possible, and indeed possible within a particular context.  The study is about culture 
changed and the ability to measure and manage this through the Balanced Scorecard.  
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The issue is not primarily about the questionnaires, although these are seen as a quick 
and cost effective means of gathering the data. 
 
It is therefore proposed that a survey using a remote questionnaire is a valid technique 
to be employed alongside other data sources for a case study.  The researcher is 
therefore justified in claiming that this research presents a “case study”.  Similarly, 
although the brevity of the supporting case studies is recognised, because they follow 
the basic principals outlined by Yin, these too qualify for the title of “case study”. 
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Hudson highlights that the organisation of CINCFLEET prior to the Fleet First 
reorganisation had lasted since 1982.  The considerable reduction in the size of the 
Fleet in the intervening years is given as the prime reason for change, but he 
continues, “Unfortunately the size of various HQs has not mirrored the drawdown, in 
fact they became bigger!” 1  This latter reason is believed to have been a prime cause 
of change, but other key issues were: 
 
• Lack of ability to control substantial elements of costs at lower budgetary 
levels, rendering redundant these lower level structures and the overhead 
involved. 
• Duplication of functions across organisational stovepipes. 
• Manpower pressures and the difficulties of manning a London HQ and the 
poor working conditions of many staff across the different HQs. 
 
This Appendix describes the changes and analyses the changes using established 
change models. 
 
2. Fleet First. 2 
 
During 2002 CINCFLEET was restructured.  This restructuring mainly affected the 
Headquarters (HQ), and was aimed at improving efficiency by reducing overheads.  It 
was intended that the reorganisation would therefore improve the delivery of output, 
which for the purposes of this research we will describe as the delivery of operational 
capability and readiness to meet the requirements placed on it by the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD).  The reorganisation was a significant event and is germane to this 
research work. 
 
Prior to the reorganisation the organisational structure was as shown in Figure 5A.1: 





Figure 5A.1: CINCFLEET prior to Fleet First reorganisation. 
DCINC 










The CINC was accommodated at the Northwood HQ and also held a senior NATO 
appointment.  Thus much of the management of CINCFLEET was undertaken by 
Deputy CINC Fleet (DCF or DCINC).  Figure 5.2 highlights the members of the Fleet 
Management Board (FMB) (the Glossary explains the individual posts).  In addition 
ACOS(Pol), a 1* Naval Officer, was required to be “in attendance”, and may 
therefore be considered to be part of the FMB.  Essentially, this organisation consisted 
of “Type Commands”, where the different “arms” of the Navy were managed by a 2* 
officer.  COMUKTG (Commander UK Task Group) was the senior naval officer 
afloat responsible for the execution of major exercises or operations.  FOST was 
responsible for the training standard of naval surface vessels (including the RFA).  
The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) is the Merchant Navy manned vessels used in 
support of naval activity at sea and was headed by a 1* Merchant Navy Commodore.  
The Command Secretary post was raised from 1* level (Grade 5/ML3) to 2* level 
(Grade 3/ML2) during the period of this research.  This post was responsible for the 
“political” advice to the CINC (eg answering Parliamentary Questions and providing 
advice to MOD’s Ministers on matters of importance), as well as the financial 
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management of the Command and the management of civilian staff within the 
Command. 
 
Figures 5A.2 and 5A.3 place the Command in the broader context of the MOD. 
 
 
 Ministry of Defence 
Chief of Naval Staff 
(CNS) 
Chief of General Staff 
(CGS) 
(The Army) 





(Head Office and 
common services)  
CINCFLEET 
(Commander in Chief 
Fleet – Head of the 
operational Navy) 
2SL
(Second Sea Lord – 
responsible for Naval 
Manpower issues) 
CFS 
(Chief of Fleet Support – 
responsible for naval 
equipment maintenance 
and support) 
(This area subsequently 
merged with the 
equipment support areas 
for the Army and RAF 
and moved to the MOD 
Corporate HQ) 
Figure 5A.2: Outline of MOD 












Figure 5A.3: Navy Grouping or Sector. 
2SL/CINCNAVHOME 
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During the period of this research there were other structural changes that took place.  
Most important of these changes was the creation of the Defence Logistics 
Organisation (DLO), which brought together CFS, Quartermaster General (QMG) and 
Air Member for Logistics.  This resulted in changes for the Navy Sector.  CFS was 
abolished as a post, with the Navy Board member being provided by a 2* Naval 
Officer from the NBSA/WSA (Naval Base and Supplies Agency and the Ships 
Support Agency, which was merged as the Warships Support Agency).  
2SL/CINCNAVHOME (Second Sea Lord/Commander-in-Chief Naval Home 
Command) was reduced from a 4* to a 3* post.  Also during these reorganisations, 
FONA moved to become AOC 3 Group in HQSTC, into which the Fast Jet naval 
aircraft were absorbed, while troop carrying naval helicopters were transferred to the 
Joint Helicopter Command (JHC) in Land Command.  Whilst AOC 3 Group 
continued to be the head of Naval Aviation, and retained a seat on the FMB, the 1* 
post of Commodore Naval Aviation (COMNA) was also created as an FMB post with 
responsibility for the remaining Naval Aviation issues within CINCFLEET 
(essentially Anti-Submarine warfare helicopters and Naval Air Stations). 
 










FOST COS(W) COS(Spt) COM(Ops) 
Figure 5A.4: CINCFLEET post Fleet First reorganisation. 
COMUKMARFOR COMUKAMPHIBFOR 
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This organisation was established in Portsmouth, with DCINC moving from 
Northwood; although both the CINC and COM(Ops) remained at Northwood (partly 
because they both retained their respective roles in the NATO organisation based at 
Northwood).  Again this diagram reflects the management board members.  Those in 
the bold outlined boxes were members of the new Fleet Executive Board, along with 
the Non-Executive Directors, whilst all those at 2* level were members of DCINC’s 
Fleet Management Group (FMG).  Whilst “Tribal Chiefs” were retained for the 
different functional specialisms of the fighting arms, the new organisations were 
broader cross arm functional specialisms.  Thus, COMUKAMPHIBFOR, responsible 
to providing the operational lead on amphibious operations was also CGRM; 
COM(Ops),  responsible for directing Naval operations, was also Flag Officer 
Submarines; COS(W),  responsible for operational readiness of the fleet, was the 
tribal chief for the surface fleet.  Thus a matrix organisation was being created.  
ACOS(Pol) became ACOS(P&P) (ie Plans and Programmes) and assumed 1* 
responsibility for finance issues in addition to the planning and programming 
functions and continued “in attendance” at the FMG. 
 
3. Process of change. 
 
Above is a description of the Fleet First restructuring.  Originally “Fleet First” was the 
title given to that restructuring programme.  Although subsequently the title was used 
to refer to the whole of the Change Programme aimed at delivering the capability to 
operate effectively in the new structure, the title did not gain wide recognition in that 
context.  In order to effect cultural change within the new organisation eight new 
“Ways of Working” were articulated. 
 
• Consider the “big picture”. 
• Focus on service and outcomes for Fleet. 
• Think and operate as a Fleet HQ team player. 
• Take ownership and responsibility. 
• Build relationships and communicate effectively. 
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• Develop people and their capability. 
• Challenge and improve Fleet HQ working practices. 
• Share your knowledge and make use of corporate knowledge. 
 
Further issues about the change process are also covered in Chapter 7. 
 
In order to build further understanding of the culture of CINCFLEET the process that 
precipitated these changes is described.  A Brown highlights different models of 
culture change.  Some of these models are used as a basis for explaining the change 
process.  In each case the change model is briefly described and then organisational 
issues are explained in terms of that model. 
 
Lundberg's model. 3  This is based on learning cycle concepts, but gives emphasis to 
external environmental factors as well as internal issues.  Organisational problems 
create surprise, this prompts enquiry leading to discovery.  Four internal conditions 
also impact levels of change: 
 
• Internal resources to undertake change. 
• People's readiness to accept change. 
• Internal coordination and communication mechanisms. 
• Stable and effective leadership. 
 
Four types of pressure can precipitate change: 
 
• Atypical performance, eg higher productivity. 
• Stakeholder pressure. 
• Pressures for change in organisational size. 
• Crises, eg resource constraints. 
 
But there must also be a triggering event, which may fall into one of five categories: 
 
• Environmental calamities eg recession, 
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• Environmental opportunities, eg technological change, 
• Internal revolutions, eg a new management team, 
• External revolution, eg nationalisation, 
• Managerial crises, eg serious blunder by manager. 
 
Such events will lead to enquiry leading to "visioning".  Vision leads to change 
strategy, action plans that consider pace, scope and time span.  Plans must cover: 
 
• Inducement - creating the need for change. 
• Action - enabling people to redefine the culture. 
• Stabilisation - institutionalising the new culture. 
 
Culture change must affect all aspects including the artefacts and assumptions.  
Multiple interventions are more likely to facilitate change rather than single 
interventions. 
 
Interpretation of CINCFLEET changes using Lundberg’s model.  The 
researcher’s personal recollection of the events leading to the Fleet First 
reorganisation is as follows.  Financial pressures, in an organisation that was 
managing a smaller output, triggered examination of overhead costs.  Consideration of 
change to the financial management structure led to consideration of organisational 
change.  Strong leadership provided the resource to manage change, ensure proper 
communication of proposals and overcome potential opposition.  The triggering event 
was the difficulty in meeting the “savings wedge” in the financial planning round that 
followed the appointment of a new Commander in Chief.  The motivating vision was 
of a Headquarters located at a main operating base: “close to the customer”.  Planning 
involved approximately 36 working groups redefining HQ organisational elements 
and work processes.  A succession of “Breakthrough” events run by senior and line 
management were held to articulate and embed the new culture. 
 
Dyer’s model. 4  Dyer's cycle of cultural evolution is based on understanding of 
culture at four levels: 
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• Artefacts, 
• Perspectives (ie rules and norms), 
• Values, and 
• Assumptions. 
 
His model identifies six consecutive (but possibly overlapping or even concurrent) 
phases. 
 
• Stage 1 – Leadership and current practices are called into question, caused by 
triggering event or crisis that cannot be solved by traditional methods.  This 
results in a search for new solutions. 
• Stage 2 – The crisis results in the rejection of the previous culture.  Thus the 
leadership might have to change.  With the destruction of the previous culture 
there is the potential for disorder. 
• Stage 3 – The destruction of the old order does not create, but does facilitate 
the emergence of a new order, eg a new leadership. 
• Stage 4 – The emergence of a new order may result in conflict with remaining 
advocates of the old order.  This needs to be handled carefully in order to 
prevent the remnants of the old order coalescing into an effective force that 
can sabotage the new regime.  This stage may last for years. 
• Stage 5 – The new order establishes itself through: 
o The apparent solution of the crisis. 
o Credit for the solution of the crisis being attributed to the new 
order/leader. 
• Stage 6 – The new order establishes new cultural symbols, beliefs, structures 
etc.  Supporters of the new culture are recognised and any remaining non-
conformists are gradually rooted out.  History is rewritten. 
 
Interpretation of CINCFLEET changes using Dyer’s model.  The model might be 
seen as applying as follows: 
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• Stage 1 – The previous methods of dealing with efficiency changes was to 
disaggregate them to a low level and seek a variety of changes that reduced 
cost.  The increasing difficulty in identifying savings measures resulted in a 
large wedge that could not easily be bought out.  An alternative strategy was 
therefore required. 
• Stage 2 – Leadership changes within the Services are generally fairly routine 
and systematic and are not seen as applying in this instance.  However, 
location can be seen as great significance but Northwood (with its Bunker) 
might be seen as relating to the Cold War era.  Thus moving from Northwood 
might be seen as significant organisational break and move forward from that 
era.  The pace of change imposed by the CINC and the promotion of the CINC 
to CNS effectively committed subsequent leadership to the change 
programme. 
• Stage 3 – Acceptance of authority and its determination to change, coupled 
with acceptance of growing problems of instability around the world, 
indicated the need for new directions. 
• Stage 4 – The move to Portsmouth resulted in substantial changes in the 
civilian staffing, ie many new jobs created in Portsmouth eliminating staff 
from Northwood and Yeovilton who generally did not want to relocate.  Thus 
there was considerable change of civilian staff and those staff at Portsmouth 
generally had new jobs.  The creation of the new HQ at Portsmouth was also 
used as an opportunity to rotate Naval staff into and out of the HQ, and 
consequently many tour lengths were adjusted. 
• Stage 5 – The DCINC stamped his authority on the programme and thus 
became closely associated with its success.  Success was well publicised and 
the significant changes attracted much attention across other areas of MOD as 
a potential model for change and improved efficiency. 
• Stage 6 – Relocation and the construction of a new HQ Building, with this and 
other buildings being named after Falklands War leaders, help to create new 
culture.  This is supplemented by development of new IT based products and 
processes changing the way people work. 
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Schein’s Model. 5   Schein’s Model is based on the idea that different cultures exist at 
different stages of the organisational life cycle.  And different change mechanisms 
apply at the different stages.  These different stages are: 
 
• Birth and early growth – there are four different types of evolution in this 
stage: 
o Natural evolution - which is a developing internal harmony and 
effectiveness through "what works fits".  This may be: 
? General evolution - an increased complexity to address more 
of the issues presenting themselves. 
? Specific evolution - where specific capabilities/strengths 
develop to meet market needs and/or organisational 
strengths/interests. 
o Self-guided evolution - through organisational therapy.  External 
consultants become involved and precipitate/facilitate organisational 
change and development.  However, this requires: 
? That the consultants are skilful at unfreezing the organisation, 
changing it and embedding the new culture. 
? Organisational willingness/commitment to change. 
o Managed evolution through hybrids - Strategic manipulation of key 
appointments, where these are given to those within the organisation 
who will support the required cultural change.  (Outsiders can be used 
provided they serve an appropriate "apprenticeship" first, to become 
part of the organisation and its culture.) 
o Managed revolution through outsiders - organisational growth may 
result in crises that require additional professional staff who have the 
skill/knowledge to resolve the problems.  But this may result in 
conflict with the existing culture.  The culture will either adjust to the 
outsiders or ultimately may eject them, based on perceptions of the 
added value they bring. 
• Organisational midlife - refers to a period where the organisation is well 
established but has many choices strategically eg growth, diversification, 
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acquisition options.  The culture is firmly embedded in the organisation but 
strong subcultures are also emerging making the culture complex.  Schein 
identified four change mechanisms in this period: 
o Planned change and organisational development - Based on internal 
conflict, the organisation culture is unfrozen, remodelled through 
establishing a mutual agreement between the factions, and then 
refrozen. 
o Technological seduction - Introduction of new technology unfreezes 
and changes social patterns in the organisation.  However this type of 
change can also be so fundamental that is may (seem to) challenge the 
whole nature and mission of the organisation (at least as far as some 
employees are concerned). 
o Change through scandal, scandal of myths - Occurs where there is 
(perceived) incongruity between the espoused and actual cultural 
values and beliefs of the organisation. 
o Incrementalism - Managers lead the organisation, intentionally, 
through a long-term programme that gradually shifts the culture. 
• Organisational maturity - the organisation becomes stable and cultural static 
and possibly dysfunctional, probably borne of past success.  But the culture 
may no longer be appropriate in changing environment.  The organisation 
must re-establish itself by either: 
o Turnaround - large scale reorganisation internally. 
o Reorganisation - through external change, eg break-up or merger. 
Three cultural mechanisms operate in this phase: 
? Coercive persuasion - leadership forces through cultural 
change and employees has no option because they have 
nowhere else to go.  Consequently people accept the discomfort 
of the new ideas.  Highly skilled change managers are needed 
to make the changes succeed quickly. 
? Turnaround - this again involves unfreezing the culture 
changing it through visionary leadership and the subtle use of 
change agents, and then refreezing. 
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? Reorganisation, destruction and rebirth - rarely used as a 
deliberate strategy. 
 
Interpretation of CINCFLEET changes using Schein’s model.  The model 
proposes that organisations go through phases and that different cultural change 
mechanisms apply at different phases of the organisation’s life.  Consequently, 
whereas with the previous models the entire model was relevant, here only a small 
part of the model will be relevant.  CINCFLEET, as a Royal Naval Command, was 
formed in 1968, but essentially this was a re-formation or restructuring, which, 
although it would have had an impact on culture, was only organisational change and 
would have retained many of the underlying aspects of Royal Navy culture.  On this 
basis it is difficult not to perceive CINCFLEET as a mature organisation, even though 
there were intervening changes.  No attempt will therefore be made to apply the “birth 
and early growth” or “organisational midlife” stages.  Similarly, this has to be seen as 
a “Reorganisation” since no other elements of MOD were involved.  Again it would 
be difficult to apply the ideas of “reorganisation, destruction and rebirth” to the Fleet 
First changes.  One of the key messages publicised throughout the period was that 
change had to be accomplished in the HQ without affecting support to the operational 
units that thus largely untouched by the changes.  This leaves two change mechanisms 
that operate in this phase of organisational life: “coercive persuasion” and/or 
“turnaround”.  Certainly in the context of CINCFLEET’s Fleet First change 
programme there was a strong element of coercive persuasion since the whole ethos 
of the organisation is based on military “Command and Control” principles where the 
Commander-in-Chief makes the key decisions, and junior staff are required to obey.  
The only alternative for both civilian and military staff is to “opt out”, by seeking a 
new posting or resigning.  The changes were made comparatively quickly, and 
external consultants were hired to manage and run the “change programme” through a 
series of jointly facilitated events and newsletters.  Alternatively, it could be argued 
that the “turnaround” was used since the ideas underpinning Fleet First were quite 
visionary for the organisation, particularly the relocation to Portsmouth (albeit that the 
“Prospect” reorganisation of MOD in the mid 1990s had seen the formation of new 
Commands and the construction of new HQ buildings, eg at Innsworth and Wyton, 
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and indeed these changes may have been influential in Fleet First because they 
provided staff with better working conditions).  Secondly, it could be argued that the 
use of Change Agents in the unfreezing, changing and refreezing of the culture was 
quite subtle.  Only at senior to middle management level were the consultants much in 
evidence and the main change events although stage-managed by a joint 
MOD/consultant team were totally “fronted” by Command senior management.  
There was also something of a culture of employment of consultants for the more 
novel and demanding tasks.  And of course there is a degree to which MOD civilians 
and consultants are visibly similar (ie no uniform). 
 
These three models have been used to explain the recent changes that have taken 
place within CINCFLEET.  This section thus demonstrates that the models can be 
seen to have some validity even in the context of a public sector organisation.  The 
underlying purpose of this section is neither to validate these models nor to 
demonstrate their effectiveness within the public sector environment but to provide 
possible frameworks for demonstrating cultural and culture change issues within 
CINCFLEET.  However, in that they can be seen to have some validity it would be 
possible to use them further within the public sector to help explain and manage 
cultural change issues.  Use of further models to explain the Fleet First programme 
would probably become repetitive without providing significant benefit, 6 unless the 
objectives were changed to include identification of a “best fit” model.  What was 
interesting in these changes was the specific intention that, “We are aiming to change 
the culture” that was articulated by senior management at the time.  This is in strong 
contrast to the stated intention that the researcher recalls from the earlier, much larger 
Prospect change programme where the stated intention was, “We are changing the 
organisation; we are not changing the culture”.  Indeed this later statement might 
seem bizarrely naïve, but is included more to demonstrate the increasing awareness of 
business management issues, even within the military.  Hopefully also, this section 
has highlighted the greater recognition of, and preparedness to adopt, commercial best 
practice by highlighting the efforts that were put into addressing the cultural issues 
arising from largescale change. 
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As has been shown in Appendix A to Chapter 5, organisations need some impetus to 
make changes.  Often these pressures have to be extreme to overcome organisational 
inertia.  This Appendix set out in detail some of the key pressures affecting MOD, and 
CINCFLEET in particular, that resulted in the changes described elsewhere.  For a 
more generic assessment of many of these issues see Stewart, “The reality of 
Organisations”. 1 
 
2. Why change? 
 
MOD does not operate in isolation from the external environment.  Its activities are 
directed by the political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal 
factors of the surrounding world.  Whilst the political, economic and technological 
factors might seem to have a more direct impact, the social, environmental and legal 
factors have had an increasing impact over the last 50 years.  A Brown argues that 
such factors, which create competitive challenge, will continue to accelerate. 2  Some 
of these changes are more subtle than others, but all must be considered to create the 
context of this study.   
 
Throughout the latter part of the 20th Century the growth of world trade resulted in 
increased global competition.  One example of how whole industries have changed 
over the last 50 years in response to these pressures is that of the car industry, where 
the rise of Japanese manufacturers has reshaped international markets.  Such stories 
have been replicated across many industries, with the result that companies have a 
much more global reach, not only in terms of their product but also in terms of the 
management philosophy. 3  Instrumental in these changes was Deming. 
 
Reference has been made in Chapter 2 to Deming, Baldrige and the EFQM 
Excellence Model. 4  This illustrates how a management philosophy has migrated 
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around the world in industries’ attempts to try to combat the impact of global 
competition.  In recent years knowledge transmission has been enhanced by the ease 
of information transmission, eg via the Internet.  Consequently organisations no 
longer simply look for the best advice available locally but will look for new ideas 
internationally, recognising that potential competitors, partners or parents may come 
from anywhere in the world.  It was early recognition of this that resulted in the 
development of the “World Class” concept during the 1970s.  This idea recognised 
that one way to sustain competitive advantage was to seek always to be the “best” in 
the world. 
 
Business management is thus becoming much more complex a process as the short, 
medium and long-term impacts of management action are assessed by wider 
audiences in greater detail than previously.  Pressure groups are much more 
knowledgeable; can operate on an international basis; are often prepared to take 
extreme action against an organisation, or against governments who are seen as failing 
to control effectively in accordance with popular demand.  Business managers are 
thus more accountable whilst facing a much more dynamic environment.  The TQM 
philosophy of “right first time” applies as much to the management process as to the 
physical product, because the consumer and business world is much less forgiving of 
failure.  Society is becoming more litigious and there are increasing pressures for 
individuals, as well as organisations, to become liable for products and services 
provided by their organisation. 
 
Business is no longer simply a matter of making money for the investor.  The wider 
range of competing pressures needs to be reconciled.  High profile business failures 
have given rise to increased pressure for proper scrutiny of business process has given 
rise in Government to the development of the role of Non Executive Directors, such 
as those appointed to the FMB/FEB from the business world, to give independent 
advice on business management. 
 
These issues have come relatively more recently to the public sector, where the 
philosophy of providing what is directed from the political arena, or on the basis of 
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professional judgement, enabled a much more arrogant attitude to remain for longer.  
For example, the retention of children’s organs following autopsy can perhaps be seen 
as a good example even in the later years of the 20th Century of a degree of arrogance 
in the provision of public services, arising perhaps in part from a denial of 
accountability.  Only as costs have risen and the (perceived) gap between the 
adequacy of service provision, or performance, has widened between public and 
private sectors have politicians come under greater pressure to match the commercial 
world’s customer accountability.  Consequently the politicians have in turn put 
pressure on the public services to reform service provision.  This drive, in Britain, was 
probably at its peak during the Thatcher era when the public sector went through a 
period of radical reform with privatisation of nationalised industries and increased 
public accountability of government departments through the creation of Agencies, 
such as those in CFS/DLO referred to earlier. 5  This accountability was aimed at 
providing, both to politicians and the public, a means of increasing visible control.  In 
that sense it was a classic example of publicly measuring performance in order to gain 
service improvements: “You get what you measure”.  In particular Agencies have 
been required to publish their key performance targets and then report against them.  
Agencies were also created as a means of trying to inject modern business 
management into government because of the dogmatic belief that “Private sector – 
Good: Public sector – Bad”.  But a key cause of the Thatcherite reforms was the 
growing cost of the public sector at a time of economic difficulties.  Thus public 
services were being provided at increased cost from an economy that could ill afford 
them.  In part this was due to the conservative, inflexible, unresponsive and labour 
intensive nature of bureaucracies, which to a large extent therefore deserved the 
“Public sector – Bad” tag.  The drive was for increased efficiency, for example by 
radical reductions in staff numbers and elimination of public sector involvement in 
various activities.  The MOD’s “Capital” programme to introduce RAB highlights the 
requirement to “Apply commercial principles” as one of its key principles. 6  Not all 
agree that the Thatcherite reforms were appropriate, because the issues go wider than 
pure economic management.   
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“In extending the privatisation programme to the Armed Services 
the Thatcher government hoped to bring about the improvements 
in efficiency and savings that it was achieving in the private sector.  
When applied to defence some of the intended gains have turned 
out to be illusory, but whatever the economic impact of this 
approach it risks turning the military vocation into a trade, thereby 
eroding the moral content of military service and diminishing the 
serviceman in his own eyes.  The end result of this process will not 
be the end of war, but the destruction of the ethos which enables 
men to fight wars with courage and honour.” 7 
 
Whilst these changes continued to some extent throughout the early and mid ‘90s, by 
the time the Blair Government took office there was a perception that the public 
sector had again become stagnant and needed to have a fresh injection of ideas in 
order to further improve efficiency, hence the “Modernising Government” initiative.  
Demands for increased efficiency were also made in order that resources could be 
reallocated to reflect changes in Government and Public perception of priorities 
arising from a changing world, hence the Defence Review of 1998; although earlier 
reviews sought to obtain a “Peace Dividend” to reflect more directly the end of the 
Cold War. 8, 9  Historically, radical shifts in the provision of public services have been 
inhibited by structural costs, which have resulted in a fairly consistent division of 
available resources. 
 
In the public sector the increasingly diverse and ageing population has given rise to 
calls for services to be more accessible and less discriminatory.  Consequently, all 
sectors have had to pay greater attention to customer issues.  These issues form an 
important part of the Balanced Scorecard, where the need to “delight customers” and 
not simply “satisfy” them is recognised by the “Customer Perspective” as one of the 
four quadrants. 
 
One of the driving forces behind the Balanced Scorecard was the failure of companies 
who had been winners of the Baldrige Quality award.  And the Baldrige, and EFQM, 
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models were themselves attempts to broaden the perspective of Quality from the 
production of “quality products”.  Defence Standards, British Standards, ISO, have all 
been attempts to ensure that product meets defined criteria, either by inspecting the 
product or by ensuring that the process of management and production are controlled 
by strict criteria.  Stevenson describes the changing policy on quality in relation to 
MOD procurement,  
 
“By the early 1970s, it was recognised that the direct inspection 
approach to quality taken by the MOD was failing.  It became 
obvious that 100 per cent inspection did not translate to finding 
100 per cent of faults.  The increased use of then new technologies 
like electronics and software, along with changes in 
manufacturing methods such as continuous production processes, 
meant that direct inspection became more and more difficult to 
apply.” 10     
 
This led to the development of the Defence Standards, which placed the onus on the 
supplier to produce quality products through the establishment of adequate quality 
assurance arrangements in firms that were vetted for technical competence.  As 
quality standards were developed on an increasingly international scale these have 
been increasingly adopted or subsumed into Defence Standards.  Writing in the 1990s 
Cartwright sees enormous changes in management style, but also refers to the 
continuing resistance to the “quality culture”. 11 
 
Some scepticism has surrounded quality systems, such as ISO, due to them involving 
self-certification following an internal self-audit process.  There has been little overall 
impact, in the Western industrial cultures, on the quality lead held by the Far East.  
Even attempts to copy management philosophies, eg TQM 12, and processes have 
failed to radically improve product quality.   
 
“It is a hazard to copy.  It is necessary to understand the theory of 
what one wishes to do or make.  Americans are great copiers … 
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QC-Circles contribute vitally to industry in Japan.  American 
management, without understanding management’s role in a QC-
Circle, try to copy QC-Circles, only to find some time later that 
they have a dud.” 13  
 
For example, vehicles made in the west are generally not regarded as reaching the 
standard of those produced in the east; although if they are produced by an Eastern 
owned company the quality can be expected to be higher than those produced by 
Western owned companies. 14  It has been reported that it takes less man-hours to 
produce some cars than it does to repair cars coming off the production line of 
Germany’s luxury car producers. 15  Part of the western problem may be due to their 
inability to directly copy Japanese methodologies because, as Cartwright claims, these 
embody Japanese social customs and cultural values. 16  He goes on to refer to Landes 
who suggests that it is the team culture of eastern Asia that has produced the 
economic miracle of the late 20th Century. 17 This would suggest that the TQM 
process, for example, has to be adapted to fit the particular western culture proposing 
to take on the methodology. 
 
But product reliability is only one aspect of the issue.  Design and delivery are also 
important, as well as price.  The increasing pace of technological change means that 
there are potential benefits in having the latest design, and consequently “time to 
market” has become a key issue.  In order to reduce cost of holding stock at all stages 
of production there has been increased emphasis on “Just in Time” (JIT) philosophies, 
with the consequence that delayed delivery may cost substantial lost production.  (The 
pressure to introduce JIT in an organisation, such as MOD, that needs to hold huge 
stockpiles produces conflicting objectives.)  This wholesale increase in the pressure to 
reduce process cycle time militates against improvements in product quality.  
Similarly the increasing sophistication of products, including their miniaturisation, 
serves to increase the problems of production, although the improvements in 
technology have also enabled organisations to improve their effectiveness, albeit often 
at a cost. 
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The increased costs of technology must be more than offset by increases in product 
quality and performance if military capability is to be enhanced against the 
background of declining resources.  Matthews quotes Kirkpatrick as indicating that 
military equipment unit costs rise on average by 10% per year. 18  In order to 
compensate for the reduced unit purchases that can be afforded, equipment must 
achieve more, and often collaboration is used to spread development costs.  
Cordesman in contrast highlights military reform in the US in the early part of the 21st 
Century, and suggests that technological investments are bankrupting the military 
whilst failing to deliver an effective military force able to deal with the emerging 
threats. 19 
 
Social changes make the armed forces less attractive as a career with the result that it 
is harder to attract the personnel who are able to operate and maintain sophisticated 
equipment.  Consequently the pressure is for better, more reliable, simple to operate 
equipment, ruggedised to protect it from the environment and users.  This emphasis 
on better quality, more sophisticated and capable products is exemplified in recent 
conflicts where Western powers have sought to use high technology weapons to 
prosecute war at a distance, thus minimising their own potential losses whilst 
inflicting very specific damage on the enemy.  Added to this are the increasing 
expectations worldwide that collateral damage is to be minimised if not eliminated.  
Failure of weapons, or intelligence, can be damaging and/or embarrassing.   
 
These issues are not restricted to the military world.  A series of quality failures have 
been highly embarrassing for the space industries of Europe and the US.  Repeated 
Ariane failures and the Challenger disasters have been costly in many respects.  The 
nuclear and chemical industries have also had a number of notable failures, for 
example failures of quality procedures, where the economic impacts have often taken 
second place to environmental considerations.  Weick argues that these problems arise 
because the systems have become more complex than the humans who operate and 
manage them.  He sees complex social structures as helping to provide a solution, 
through a unifying culture. 20 
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Thus MOD operates in an increasingly sophisticated technological environment where 
the quality of products is vital.   
 
“Currently, MOD expects its suppliers to be totally responsible for 
the quality of the products they supply.  MOD QA policy requires 
suppliers to have an appropriate [Quality Management System] in 
place that has been certified by an accredited certification body.” 
21 
 
But of course there is a whole different dimension to the problem once the product has 
been delivered, stored, perhaps reworked/relifed, issued before it is finally used.  The 
consequence of failure is high in many respects, eg in terms of international politics, 
domestic social expectations, or cost.  The need to ensure the quality of products and 
procedures to ensure success merely adds an inflationary twist to the cost spiral.  
Widely publicised problems with quality, which include nuclear submarine safety 
issues, army rifles, and failures in procurement processes, have been embarrassing 
and costly for MOD and have added to the pressures for quality improvements.  In the 
wider government service awards such as Charter Mark have sought to reassert the 
consumers’ rights to a quality service.  Renewed emphasis on process management 
monitoring, such as IiP and EFQM, have sought to improve quality, but may have 
also added to the cost.  The degree to which these mechanisms are adding real value is 
not yet clear.  If the MOD, and organisations in general, are to win the quality battle 
then quality must not be seen as a separate end in itself but must become integrated 
into the evaluation of the overall outcomes, which themselves are becoming more 
complex and acting across a wider environment. 
 
Historically the conflict in capitalist society has been between the providers of capital 
and the labour market.  The industrial revolution, and the move towards automation 
on an increasingly large scale, continues even into the present time.  For example, the 
robotics introduced into the automotive industry during the last fifty years has 
changed it from a labour intensive industry to one where capital-intensive 
development and production has resulted in industry consolidation.  Whilst there are 
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many driving factors for this, one is the high labour content and labour cost in the 
western world.  Whilst a machine may be cheaper to buy and run than a “fickle” 
labour force, the result is that the labour that remains must be increasingly capable if 
it is to operate and maintain increasingly complex machinery. 
 
A similar picture is also true of the military world where the “cannon fodder” of the 
First World War trenches are replaced by smaller numbers of troops operating more 
complex weapons and relying on a substantial “tail” that extends, increasingly, back 
to manufacturers.  Whilst it is unlikely that the foot soldier will ever be totally 
displaced there is now at least one instance known where troops have surrendered to 
an unmanned aerial reconnaissance vehicle: the potential for an air strike or artillery 
barrage being recognised.  Thus the importance of technology must not be 
understated, not least since deploying technology remotely reduces risk to one’s own 
troops.  Whilst attempts are made to simplify the technology at the point of use (for 
example, fire-and-forget) this only serves to increase the complexity of it and thus 
demand increasingly complex and costly maintenance support. 
 
Thus whilst MOD needs better-educated staff, and the education system is being 
enhanced to provide this nationally, like the rest of the public services, MOD is 
unable to compete with salaries to obtain the best, because of cost.  “Join the Navy 
and see the world” no longer has the same relevance in the 21st Century global village.  
 
“But from the 1970s those anxious to better the world could do so 
through a range of voluntary and non-government organisations.  
Young men and women could experience overseas adventure and 
foreign travel without donning uniform.” 22 
 
The poor status of public services and the potential for wealth creation in the “City” 
financial world means that the Services, increasingly involved in highly visible 
“bloody” conflict, no longer have the same attraction.  Thus whilst attracting enough 
people to reach full manning levels is proving difficult, despite opening up jobs to a 
wider employee market (including WRNS at sea 23), recruiting and retaining staff of 
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the right intellectual calibre is even harder.  Henderson is opposed to such moves, 
suggesting that, “Women in [combat areas] seriously impede the development of unit 
cohesion”. 24  O’Beirne also presents a scathing attack on the enhanced role of women 
in the armed forces, based mainly on women’s physical attributes or abilities. 25  
Brown quotes an example of an Italian Bank that was ultimately “forced” to accept 
women into high-ranking positions only because there was a shortage of suitable men. 
26  Thus the acceptance of women in wider roles is not something that is universally 
readily accepted.  With the growth of world airline traffic operating to organised 
schedules, service pilots have been enticed away from the vicious circle of operational 
overstretch caused by under-manning, which undermines the whole manning stability 
of such crucial areas.  Even acceptance of women into combat pilot roles has failed to 
have any impact because of the demanding nature of the requirements; typically only 
something like 1 in 500 of male applicants achieved operational status.  
 
“The new post-industrialised societies of the Western world, in 
which work has been feminised and gender relations put on a new 
basis, are experiencing the greatest social disruption since the 
industrial revolution.” 27   
 
This wider perspective of social pressures seems to summarise the situation well. 
 
At a higher level, business has also suffered considerably from high interest rates and 
the volatility of international markets caused by political, environmental and social 
factors at the national and international levels.  Attempts to reduce the risk and the 
impact of financial pressures have resulted in the growth of a range of tradable 
financial instruments.  But the existence of these, and a ready market, has also led to 
their being traded for speculative purposes.  Increasingly financial institutions have 
relied on profits on turnover of stocks, shares and financial instruments in order to 
create distributable profit rather than income from stocks and shares themselves.  
Consequently, declining interest rates, and reduced values for shares arising from 
economic downturn have resulted in loss in value of long-term investments and in the 
potential for profit from turnover of financial holdings and instruments.  This has hit 
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many investors badly.  It is thus little wonder that companies tend to focus on the 
short-term when they are under such pressures from the financial communities.  But it 
must also be recognised that the global industrial restructuring and pronounced 
economic swings of the late 20th Century will also have created such uncertainty that 
the long-term is sacrificed for short-term perspectives, for example the need to 
survive. 
 
Within Government it is only in very recent years that the hand-to-mouth existence of 
annual budgets has supposedly been broken, primarily with the introduction of RAB 
overturning the annuality rules.  Few Departments budgeted beyond the three-year 
Public Expenditure Survey cycle, even though their projects may have substantial life 
cycles.  Although the MOD bucked the trend by having a 10 year Long Term Costing 
process, now replaced by a four year Short Term Plan and a 15 year Equipment 
Programme, there has been no hard linkage between the approvals process for major 
equipment programmes and the running costs of these equipments during their service 
life.  Whole Life Costing attempts to bring these together, but there are still 
substantial issues to be resolved.  The efficiency programmes, brought about in part 
by the economic pressures have focussed minds on short-term savings and reductions, 
possibly even at the expense of long-term efficiency.  For example, there are many 
anecdotal stories of investment in infrastructure at MOD establishments, to ensure 
long-term effectiveness, being overturned by closure of the establishment in a 
subsequent review or cost saving programme. 
 
These pressures have applied equally to business management skills.  This growth has 
been both through professional and academic qualifications.  Consequently most 
universities have business schools providing a wide range of courses through full-
time, part-time and distance learning.  At an international level this is a response to 
the success of Insead and Harvard, although Warwick was one of the UK’s early 
successes in gaining an international standing.  More recently, despite the growth in 
availability of such courses, the Open University MBA programme has grown to the 
level where the number of graduates each year exceeds the number of other MBA 
graduates from all other UK universities. 
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This growth in business training has been slow to permeate Government and the 
MOD in particular.  However, the advent of Agencies as part of the Government’s 
reform programme to improve the management of the Civil Service has led to a 
growth in the number of staff with accounting qualifications, which also embed wider 
business skills.  Attempts have been made to improve the quality of work in other 
functions, such as HR and purchasing, by increasing the level of professionalism.  The 
senior civil service has responded to this by encouraging the uptake of MBAs among 
fast-stream members: providing such staff with a broader and higher level 
qualification.  Similarly, Officers in the Services recognising the longer-term need for 
them to have a second career outside the Services have sought to prepare themselves 
early by studying Business Management. 28  Early achievement of such qualifications 
may enhance career prospects through the development of potential, and thus create a 
demand for such training among those with greater aspirations for a full career within 
the Service.  Obtaining such qualifications also helps to counter Government 
arguments regarding the poor quality of knowledge and ability within Government 
organisation.  However, Zoll contends that the military do not adapt well to political 
or administrative appointments, having neither the knowledge nor interest in such 
domains to make a success of them.  Indeed, Zoll also argues that the military should 
be encouraged to focus more on the military issues, and that subversion into these 
domains is causing a decline in the military ethic and professionalism. 29  In contrast 
Dandeker refers to the emergence of the soldier-statesman and the soldier-scholar, to 
meet the emerging issue of the late 20th Century political and security problems that 
cannot be adequately addressed by the political and academic communities. 30 
 
There are many environmental factors that surround the Fleet First programme and 
the introduction of the Balanced Scorecard into MOD.  This section has attempted to 
give a flavour of some of these.  There is no suggestion that any one of these is 
substantially more relevant than any other, nor that all have been covered.  
Nevertheless, one cannot ignore these environmental factors since they set the 
external context of MOD.  Some of these issues have direct reach into MOD and 
therefore will resurface in an examination of internal influences. 
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
Section 1: Before the Balanced Scorecard was introduced.  
Describe briefly the 
organisational climate in the 
period prior to the introduction 
of the Balanced Scorecard:
* Stovepiped – ie functional isolationism or insularity.
* Traditional hierarchy.
* Narrow, short-term focus on local input and output 
issues.
* Conservatism.
* Parochialism leading to adversarial attitudes.
* Reporting culture.
* Non-strategic in outlook.
* Becoming aware of the need for a more strategic 
approach.
What were the key management 
processes/concepts/tools used in 
the management and running of 
the organisation?  (For example, 
Management by Objectives, 
Total Quality Management, 
Investors in People.)
* Management by exception.
* Reporting and briefing regime.
* Key influence of cash limits.




* Use of rudimentary and subjective performance 
indicators.
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
Section 2: Selection and introduction of the Balanced Scorecard.
What was the purpose of 
introducing the Balanced 
Scorecard?
Focus attention on key issues 
facing the organisation:
Replace or improve existing 
performance monitoring:




What other management 
processes/concepts/tools were 
considered as supplements or 





* Provide common process.
* Improve and provide common understanding of key 
issues.
* Improve management control of key issues.
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
Who (name and position) is 
recognised as the key individual 
that identified the Balanced 
Scorecard as an appropriate 
management tool for this 
organisation?
* Captain Simon Lister as DNRP/BS.
* Admiral Jonathon Band as ACNS.
* Admiral Essenhigh as CINCFLEET.
* Admiral Boyce, both as CINCFLEET and CNS.
* Brian Brader as DCS(RF), but only in the context of 
CINCFLEET.
* David Gould as AUS(NS), but only in the context of the 
NSC.
* PriceWaterhouseCoopers as the ASI.
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
Who (name and position) 
championed the introduction of 
the Balanced Scorecard?
* Admiral Jonathon Band as ACNS.
* Admiral Essenhigh as CINCFLEET.
* Admiral Boyce, both as CINCFLEET and CNS.
* David Gould as AUS(NS), but only in the context of the 
NSC.
* Cdre David Smith RN, Director Naval Personnel 
Corporate Planning.
What were senior 
management’s expectations of 
implementing the Balanced 
Scorecard at this time?
* Emotional:
  #   Keen.
  #   Cautious.
  #   Sceptical.
  #   Reticence.
  #   Concern.
  #   Optimism.
* Practical:
  #   Improvement in corporate performance.
  #   Move towards output management and focus on 
output.
  #   Improved cooperation and more cohesive 
management.
  #   Improved management and reporting focus.
  #   Improved management process.
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
Substantial (ie they were 
fully aware of the concept 
and the issues involved):
Good (ie they had a broad 
understanding of the issues 
but required further training):
Moderate (ie they were 
aware of the concept but 
needed substantial training):
Some perception that the understanding was moderately 
good, but mainly in the "follow-on" areas or where 
substantial training was provided.
Poor (ie they had little or no 
prior understanding of the 
concept when it was 
proposed):
Mainly perceived as poor.
What level of knowledge did the 
Board have of the Balanced 
Scorecard at this time?
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
Section 3: The Implementation phase.  
How was commitment to the 
Balanced Scorecard obtained 
and built at Board level?
Management already 
understood concept well and 
needed no further training:
Training for the Board was 
provided by internal staff:
In many areas the majority of the training was provided by 
internal staff.
Training for the Board was 
provided by external training 
providers:
There was some use of external training.
External management 
consultants were used to 
provide training:
Within the CINCFLEET area, external management 
consultants were used, and also in the NSC where the 
training was provided jointly by internal and external staff.
The Board did its own 
research:
Some evidence to suggest that the Board did its own 
research.
Other (please state): Some individuals did their own research.
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
Corporate level: Initiated at Corporate level.
Major strategic entity or 
divisional level:
In some cases there may have been simultaneous, or early 
follow-on work at divisional level.
Lower business unit, profit or 
cost centre level:
At a mix of levels according 
to local management 
initiative:
Using specific pilot 
implementations in targeted 
business areas:
Other (please state):
Using the standard Kaplan 
and Norton template:
Using a modified Kaplan and 
Norton template:
Most thought that a modified template was used.
From first principles or 
existing management 
information processes to 
arrive at a bespoke system:
A few thought that a bespoke design emerged from 
analysis using first principles of the Balanced Scoreard.
Other (Please state):
Number of Scorecard 
Dimensions:
4, in some cases this was expanded to 5 before reverting to 
4.  The CINCFLEET scorecard may have started with 5.
At what level of the 
organisation was/were the initial 
scorecards built?
How was the initial Balanced 
Scorecard built in terms of its 
general framework?
Please state the number of 
dimensions and number of 
measures used in the initial 
B l d S d
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
Number of Scorecard 
Measures:
Variously reported to be between 16 to 30, or as many as 
200 to 250.
Balanced Scorecard:
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
What was the rationale behind 
this scorecard format?
Following organisational structure; business outputs and 
the inputs needed to create output; but most scorecards 
were constructed on the basis of following what was done 
elsewhere within the organisation.
The CEO or equivalent: High involvement in ACNS, CINCFLEET and NSC areas 
but low in 2SL and FOSF.
The Board (collectively): Moderate involvement in ACNS, CINCFLEET, and NSC 
areas, but low in 2SL and FOSF.
A sub-set of the Board: Moderate to High in CINCFLEET, Moderate in NSC and 
FOSF, but no Sub-set of the Boards involved in ACNS and 
2SL.
A particular Board Member: Very high involvement in ACNS, High to Very High in 




High to Very High in ACNS, CINCFLEET and NSC, High 
in FOSF, and Moderate in 2SL.
The originator of the idea: Very High in ACNS, High to Very High in CINCFLEET, 
High in and NSC, Moderate to High in FOSF.  The 
situation in 2SL is unclear.
An internal project manager: Very High in 2SL, High to Very High in NSC, High in 
CINCFLEET.  The situation in ACNS and FOSF is 
unclear.
External consultants: High to Very High involvement in CINCFLEET and NSC, 
High in FOSF.  None used in ACNS.
Others (please state): Insufficient evidence of the involvement of others.
Who was involved in building 
the Balanced Scorecard and 
how significant was their 
involvement in the initial 
scorecard?
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
The CEO or equivalent: CEOs in ACNS, CINCFLEET, FOSF and NSC involved in 
the initial or early stages.  CEO in 2SL not involved until 
development was complete.
The Board: Board Members generally involved, but probably mainly 
after initial work but before Balanced Scorecard complete.
Senior Managers below 
Board level:
Senior Managers generally involved, but probably mainly 
after initial work but before Balanced Scorecard complete.
The Planning Department: Planning Departments involved early in the process, and 
probably from the initiation of the work.
Middle Managers: Middle Managers involved late in the process, and possibly 
not at all in the case of the ACNS area.
Junior Managers: Junior Managers probably involved only after the Balanced 
Scorecard complete, or not at all.
The workforce: The workforce probably not involved at all.
Consultants: Consultants not involved in ACNS and 2SL areas, but in 
other implementations the involvement was probably at the 
initial stages.
Other particular individuals 
or groups (please state):
Little evidence of additional involvement.
How, and at what stages, was 
commitment to the Balanced 
Scorecard built in other parts of 
the organisation?
Appendix A to Chapter 6 Page 10 of 23
Appendix A to Chapter 6
Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
When did the initial 
development phase of the 
Balanced Scorecard start and 
how long did the process take?
Start Date: ACNS - around late 1997 to early 1998.
CINCFLEET - Unclear, but sometime during 1998 or 
1999.
FOSF - 1999.
2SL - Possibly 1998.
NSC - around late 1997 to early 1998.
Date initial Balanced 
Scorecard introduced:
ACNS - Sometime during 1998.
CINCFLEET - Unclear, but sometime between late 1998 
and mid 2000.
FOSF - 2000.
2SL - Possibly late 1998.
NSC - between 1998 and late 1999.
Corporate level: Introduced generally first at Corporate level.  Initial 
implementation was about six months or so before 
extended further.
Major strategic entity or 
divisional level:
Generally the second level at which the Balanced 
Scorecard introduced.  Took about a year or more before 
rolled out further.
Lower business unit, profit or 
cost centre level:
Rolled out to this level in some areas.
Personal level: No evidence that the Balanced Scorecard rolled out at this 
level.
Introduced at a mix of levels:
Not rolled out further:
Following the initial 
development of the Balanced 
Scorecard, including any pilot 
implementations, was the 
Balanced Scorecard extended to 
the remainder of the 
organisation, and if so how long 
did this take?
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
Management process: Mainly viewed as having a positive impact.
Strategic learning: Mainly viewed as having a positive impact.
Culture: Viewed as having a detrimental impact in FOSF, but 
elsewhere, generally seen as only having a slightly positive 
impact.
Climate: Viewed as having a detrimental impact in FOSF, and 
definitely positive in ACNS, but elsewhere generally seen 
as only having a slightly positive impact.
Other (please state): Some sense of significant impact on change and focus.
Are you able to identify any 
specific benefits that were 
directly attributable to the 
Balanced Scorecard during this 
phase?
• Improvement in management process (recognised in, or 
prompted by, the previous question) and recognition of the 
need for better management tools.
• Shorter more focussed management board meetings.
• A more strategic or holistic view.
• Better focus or targeting of the issues requiring 
management.
• Improvements in PIs.
What impact did this phase have 
on the organisational 
performance, culture and 
climate?
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
What were the key lessons 
learned during the development 
and implementation phase?
• The importance of top-level commitment and the need to 
demonstrate commitment.
• The need to restrict the number of measures used on the 
Balanced Scorecard.  
• Produce something relatively quickly and develop it 
rather than expect to get it right first time.
• Establishing the relationships between scorecards at 
different levels.
• The need for predictive measures.
• Need for education, which will also help build 
commitment.
• It takes time and effort to effect the cultural change 
needed.
• Balanced Scorecard will change as the organisation 
develops.
• Starting with existing measures.
• Keep the development team small.
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
Section 4: Post implementation.  
There has been significant 
change:
There has been moderate 
change:
There has been moderate to significant levels of change to 
the Balanced Scorecard structure and content.
There has been little change:
There has been no change:
Where the Balanced Scorecard 
has changed what caused those 
changes to be made?
• Changes in the structure and content were driven by the 
need for greater consistency across the organisation.  
• Changes to PIs resulted from a number of different 
issues:
  o Better understanding of the business and management 
requirements to manage performance.
  o Changes in strategy.
  o Improvement in the structuring of information.
Has the Balanced Scorecard 
changed since it was initially 
introduced?
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
Strategy: Generally felt to have had a positive impact in all areas.
Financial performance: Felt to have had only a slightly positive impact.
Output: Generally felt to have had a positive impact in all areas, 
although there is a suggestion that its impact in 
CINCFLEET was detrimental.
Organisational Learning: Had a positive impact.
Culture: Generally felt to have had a positive impact in all areas, 
although there is a suggestion that its impact in 
CINCFLEET was detrimental.
Climate: Generally felt to have had a positive impact in all areas, 
although there is a suggestion that its impact in 
CINCFLEET was detrimental.
Other (please state): Demonstrates Senior Management's awareness and 
engagement with current problems.
What changes has the Balanced 
Scorecard had on the 
organisational performance, 
culture and climate since it was 
implemented?
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
Are you able to identify any 
specific benefits that were 
directly attributable to the 
Balanced Scorecard?
• Process benefits, such as:
  o Better management board functioning.
  o Better output focus.
  o Better decision-making.
  o Better focus on key issues.
• Outcome benefits, such as:
  o Sea Harrier problems.
  o Lynx problems.
  o Medical issues.
  o Fleet First.
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
What changes have taken place 
to the business processes used 
within the organisation since the 
Balanced Scorecard was 
implemented, eg have new 
processes been added or 
deleted?  
Nothing new emerged in response to this question.
Original aims fully met and 
exceeded:
Original aims fully met: General consensus was that aims were fully met, although 
some argue they were exceeded and others that they were 
not fully met.
Original aims only partially 
met:
Significant shortfall against 
original aims:
Original aims no longer 
considered relevant:
To what do you attribute this 
success or failure?
• Lack of initial understanding of the tool and its benefits.
• The benefit of having a strong champion or corporate 
drive to introduce the tool.
• The strength of the tool itself.
• The problems and cost of introducing the tool.
To what extent were the original 
aims of introducing the 
Balanced Scorecard met or 
exceeded?
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
At Board level: Generally seen as good to very good.
At senior management level: Mainly seen as good.
At middle management level: Mainly seen as good to fair.
At junior management level: Generally seen as fair.
At workforce level: ACNS suggest that it is not understood at all, whilst NSC 
believe that the workforce have a fair understanding.  In 
other areas the view is that the workforce has a less than 
fair understanding.
Is the organisation committed to 
continued use of the Balanced 
Scorecard?
Yes.
At Board level: Some divergence of views, but overall that personal 
objectives are only partially linked to the Balanced 
Scorecard.
At senior management level: General consensus that personal objectives are only 
partially linked to the Balanced Scorecard.
At middle management level: No consensus as to whether personal objectives are not 
linked or only partially linked to the Balanced Scorecard.
At junior management level: Generally felt that personal objectives are not linked to the 
Balanced Scorecard.
What is the level of 
understanding of the Balanced 
Scorecard now?
Are individual’s personal 
objectives explicitly linked to 
the organisation’s Balanced 
Scorecard and if so how and at 
what levels of the organisation?
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
At workforce level: Personal objectives are not linked to the Balanced 
Scorecard.
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
At Board level: The overall consensus is that reward is not linked to the 
Balanced Scorecard.  Only in NSC is there a view that 
there is a stronger linkage.
At senior management level: The overall consensus is that reward is not linked to the 
Balanced Scorecard.  Only in NSC is there a view that 
there is a stronger linkage.
At middle management level: The overall consensus is that reward is not linked to the 
Balanced Scorecard.  Only in NSC is there a view that 
there is a stronger linkage.
At junior management level: The overall consensus is that reward is not linked to the 
Balanced Scorecard.  Only in NSC is there a view that 
there is a stronger linkage.
At workforce level: Not linked at all.
Section 5: The future.   
If the Balanced Scorecard is not 
fully implemented at all levels 
within the organisation, is this 
planned and if so over what 
timescales?
Generally staff are unclear on future plans.  Also there is 
uncertainty resulting from organisational changes and a 
perception that Balanced Scorecards are only required at 
Senior Management levels.
What changes are planned to the 
Balanced Scorecard and why?
Incremental improvements to PIs.
Is the reward structure of the 
organisation linked to the 
Balanced Scorecard and if so 
how?
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
What changes are planned to the 
Balanced Scorecard process and 
why?
• Improvements to the IS support of the process.
• Improved alignment of Balanced Scorecards, both 
vertically and horizontally.
• Wider involvement in the process.
• Better trend analysis and forecasting leading to more 
proactive management.
• Risk management.
• Improved decision management.
• Need to learn from experience.
What are the organisation’s 
future expectations of the 
Balanced Scorecard?
• Don’t know.
• Strong commitment to embedding the concept at the heart 
of the management process.
• It will provide a strategic management tool.
• It will drive organisational learning and improvement.
• It will drive communication and objective cascade.
What plans are there to 
introduce other business 
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
Section 6: General comments.   
Please add any additional 
comments that you feel are 
relevant at this stage and are not 
specifically covered above.  In 
particular if you are able to 
supply supporting evidence this 
would be most helpful:
• The Balanced Scorecard became mandated as a corporate 
management system.
• Those people who did move on to other organisations 
were well placed to help in develop of the concept in new 
areas.
• Improvement of management process.
• Improvement in management focus.
• Improvement in the understanding of important and 
strategic issues.
• Danger of not including all the important issues in the 
Balanced Scorecard.
• Increased work at the lower levels to support the 
Balanced Scorecard.
• Proper use of IS to support Balanced Scorecard.
• Need for accurate information.
• Measurement is not management.
• A number of specific improvements resulted directly 
from the use of the Balanced Scorecard.
• Improved management of the relationship with other 
MOD and external bodies.
• Important role of Champion.
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Table 6A.1: Summary of responses to survey on the implmentation of the Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy.
• Management’s adversarial behaviour prior to the 
implementation of the Balanced Scorecard, due to 
individuals promoting their own organisational issues and 
agenda.
• Benefit of having an external manager as a Non-
Executive Director to provide high level advice on 
management issues.
• Influence NSC brought to the development of 
management processes in DLO.
• Balanced Scorecard drives managers to examine 
underlying problems. 
• The requirement for effective management is not 
overturned by the use of the Balanced Scorecard.
• The Balanced Scorecard is more than an IS reporting 
tool.
• Seen as possible to implement early version of the 
Balanced Scorecard before fully understanding the 
business processes and issues.
• Benefits of having consultants (business process experts) 
albeit that they are extremely costly.
• Introduction of the Balanced Scorecard may have started 
in different places at about the same time.  However, the 
Royal Navy’s use of the Balanced Scorecard was 
influential in driving its use across the remainder of MOD.
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Table 6B.1: Listing of responses to survey on implementation of 
Balanced Scorecard in the Royal Navy. 
Section 1: Before the Balanced Scorecard was introduced.  This section aims to try 
to find out what the organisation was like before the Balanced Scorecard was 
introduced in order to form a baseline for comparison purposes. 
1 Describe briefly the 
organisational climate 
in the period prior to 
the introduction of the 
Balanced Scorecard: 
• Lacking corporate focus.  Reactive.  Stovepiped. 
• The TLB Management Plan consisted of a 
"traditional" collection of PIs, primarily measuring 
output in terms of ship ready days at Readiness. 
• Was not present before introduction but the 
organisation is characterised by a traditional deeply 
hierarchical and multidivisional structure. 
• Stove-piped output by Type Commander. 
• Hierarchical in Fleet at FMB. 
• It was input rather than output based. 
• As a primarily naval establishment within MOD, 
CINCFLEET was highly organised with clear objectives 
and financial targets to meet. 
• Unrationalised! 
• Not able to comment on this in detail.  My role was 
to re-engineer an existing scorecard to develop it from 
scratch.  However, what was clear was that the then 
CinCFleet was having to work hard to get his 
management board to take collective decisions.  
Furthermore, the organisation was measuring what was 
easy to measure rather than what counted. 
• Operated on a day-to-day basis tackling problems 
as they arose.  Little business/finance linkage, and 
limited consideration of strategic issues. 
• Sub FMB - primarily fire-fighting and meeting 
day-to-day challenges in a less focussed and time 
consuming manner. 
• The management board tended to focus on issues 
closest to their hearts or that were politically sensitive.  
There was only token attention paid to finances. 
• Recently formed from separate organisations 
(CINCNAVHOME, CED, CFS) adversarial. 
• Management desperate to establish overall health 
of Navy.  RAB about to be introduced.  Focus on outputs 
growing. 
• Conservative - action avoidant - continually 
searching more information - producing reports on past 
activity, and amending reports on past activity.  Long 
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Hours culture to justify importance of the directorate - 
brief compiling. 
• Well intentioned but lacking objective measurable 
data on which to make management decisions. 
• Good.  The management board had identified key 
performance indicators and monitored them through an 
MIS. 
• Hierarchy of budgets with limited output focus, 
management reports provided periodically against 
objectives in Annual Management Plan.  
2 What were the key 
management 
processes/concepts/tools 
used in the 
management and 
running of the 
organisation?  (For 
example, Management 
by Objectives, Total 
Quality Management, 
Investors in People.) 
• Management by exception against set objectives. 
• Fleet used a system of Qtrly, Mid Year and EOY 
reports etc which was cascaded down through the HLBs.  
IiP was implement at the same time as the BSC 
(coincidentally, not as a result of). 
• IiP present.  Standardisation of skills, norms and 
work processes.  Financial control based on historical 
information.  Direct supervision through the hierarchy. 
• Outputs were monitored but retrospectively and 
hence little overall control and inability to pre-empt 
crises. 
• At FMB.  Series of briefs, and reviews by 
CINCFLEET, followed by verbal direction.  IiP 
introduced. 
• IiP 
• Management by tasks and cash limits. 
• Management by Objectives.  Regular reporting on 
Fleet activities, unit availability, performance against in 
year cash management control totals. 
• At the time of re-engineering the management 
board scorecard Fleet already had a scorecard (derived 
using the critical success factor approach), and Fleet 
was accredited as IiP. 
• Committee based; input focussed, IiP; bottom fed 
and influence. 
• Management by objectives drawn from the Fleet 
Plan, which cascades to the FOSF Plan.  Focus was on 
issues raised at the Sub FMB, EG or Morning Briefs - 
usually initiated from sea. 
• Monthly management boards, based on a 
developing set of management plans.  Early PIs mainly 
focused on those things easy to measure or based on 
people's jobs (ie to justify their existence).  Little 
consideration of the future (strategy) and finance based 
around in-year cash management within own HLB. 
• Key Performance Indicators relating to an output 
based management plan reviewed on a Personnel 
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Management Information System (PERMIS) and IiP. 
• Management by Objectives, IiP, Resource 
Accounting and Budgeting. 
• Various performance management systems, mainly 
subjective.  
• An attempt to develop objectives - each desk 
responsible for monitoring the activity of others at TLB 
level and below and being ready to explain rather than 
direct work. 
• Management by objectives and priorities.  Non-
strategic planning.  Focus on financial inputs. 
• Probably mainly management by objectives. 
• Supposedly MBO and IiP, but tended towards a 
very traditional military approach. 
• Where defined at all, rudimentary and largely 
traditional.  No performance management system in 
place.  
    
Section 2: Selection and introduction of the Balanced Scorecard.  This section 
aims to understand why the Balanced Scorecard was introduced, what knowledge 
there was in the organisation of the Balanced Scorecard process before it was 
introduced and what the aims of introduction were at this early stage. 
1 What was the 




• Pressure/direction from TLB to use the BSC. 
• Essentially all the [four given options] above.  It 
provided a general overhaul of the business process. 
• To bring common understanding of key issues 
across all top-level budget areas. 
• To turn strategy into action - and improve the 
availability of management information to the Board. 
• Understand causal relationships within the 
organisation and identify real cost drivers. 
• The original purpose of the work was to 
understand the relationship between outputs, costs and 
activities and to use "systems thinking" to begin to 
understand these relationships.  Having developed a 
"cause and effect" model (which focused on the 
relationship between activities and outputs in the 
absence of detailed cost information), it was then used to 
develop a new set of measures for the management board 
reflecting what was important to them as well as their 
level of control. 
• Dock with NAVB processes. 
• Improve identification and achievement of actions. 
• Link outputs to finance. 
• Single page top level report to Navy Board. 
• Identify levers to improve performance. 
• Encourage corporate as opposed to divisionalised 
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behaviour. 
• Introduce cohesion among the previously separate 
parties. 
• To support a corporate approach to management. 
• Apply coherent reporting throughout TLB and 
HLBs.  
2 What other 
management 
processes/concepts/tools 
were considered as 
supplements or 
alternatives to the 
Balanced Scorecard? 
 
• Customer supplier agreements, RAB, IiP 
(achieved). 
• Business Excellence Model. 
• Too long ago to be sure. 
• There was substantial debate about EFQM, which 
at the time was seen as a rival to the balanced scorecard 
rather than as a complement to it. 
• Performance indicators.  Clear lines of 
accountability. 
• None - introduction of BSC followed an MOD 
initiative. 
• None at the time (although the relationship with 
EFQM was documented). 
• TQM. 
• IiP, Corporate Governance. 
• Status quo. 
• None that I'm aware of. 
• The BSC was initiated at TLB level.  HLBs 
developed by same team of consultants. 
• None. 
• EFQM and TQS [ie TQM ?] considered as 
complementary in that they offered measurement tools 
over time and benchmarking. 
• Initially EFQM was assumed to offer an additional 
organisational tune up tool in order to assess the validity 
of current strategic direction.  Balanced Scorecard 
viewed as the dials on the organisation, rather than the 
road map. 
• EFQM not taken up. 
• Status Quo. 
• Brief consideration was given to the EFQM or a 
simple, non-axis, type BSC.  Initiative driven by TLB and 
ultimately the HLB just followed. 
• None in particular.  However, the methodology of 
Performance Management (PM) at the time was 
recognised as inadequate and the BSC forced 
"ownership" of the objectives in the plan. 
• None that I know of. 
• None at the time.  
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3 Who (name and 
position) is recognised 
as the key individual 
that identified the 
Balanced Scorecard as 
an appropriate 
management tool for 
this organisation? 
 
• Cdr (now Cdre) Simon Lister.  [Reply from Adm 
Dunt, COS 2SL.] 
• Corporate decision from [2SL] TLB Board of 
Management. 
• CSO(P) and SO2N5(MPR) took decision after 
promulgation of TLB plans. 
• Use of the BSC was a natural (essential) 
development of its use higher up the management chain 
(FMB, DMB, etc). 
• CINCFLEET Adm Essenhigh. 
• Me [Admiral Band] and the then Cdr Simon Lister. 
• ACNS and DNRP/BS.  [That is, Admiral Band and 
Cdr Lister.] 
• No one person - it was a Board decision but work 
was led by the then ACNS.  [Reply from Admiral 
Essenhigh.] 
• I cannot comment on the original scorecard, but 
the sponsor for the re-engineering work was Brian 
Brader (endorsed by the Fleet Management Board). 
• Brian Brader, Deputy Command Secretary. 
• Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh. 
• Not known. 
• D Gould - AUS(FS), A Cumming - NED (BA 
Engineering).  [Reply from David Gould.] 
• I can't remember for certain but it may have been 
me that led the decision making process, on advice from 
the ASI(PWC). 
• Lost in time, but based on NSC Board. 
• David Gould, then AUS(FS). 
• Price Waterhouse consultants.  [Reply from Brian 
Brader.] 
• I believe it was Adm Essenhigh. 
• Brian Brader - DCS(RF). 
• ? N5/N8 combination.  [The Planning and finance 
organisations within CINCFLEET.] 
• CINCFLEET.  [Unclear from this whether it was 
meant to refer to Admiral Boyce or Admiral Essenhigh.] 
• CINCFLEET personally - first under Adm Boyce, 
then continued more forcefully under Adm Essenhigh. 
4 Who (name and 
position) championed 
the introduction of the 
Balanced Scorecard? 
 
• Cdre David Smith RN, Director Naval Personnel 
Corporate Planning. 
• Rear Adm Jonathan Band – ACNS. 
• Within FOSF - Plans division. 
• [FOSF] CSO(P).  
• ACNS and DNRP/BS. 
• ACNS 
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• Initially at Board level ACNS - Adm Jonathon 
Band prompted by Simon Lister, then SO1. 
• [Adm Band] plus DNS/DNRP team. 
• DCF Adm Malbon (for CINCFLEET). 
• I cannot comment on the original scorecard, but 
the sponsor for the re-engineering work was Brian 
Brader (endorsed by the Fleet Management Board). 
• [Brian Brader] plus successive Commanders-in-
Chief and Command Secretaries. 





• CINCFLEET personally - first under Adm Boyce, 
then continued more forcefully under Adm Essenhigh. 
• Adm Essenhigh. 
• Adm Essenhigh. 
• D Gould. 
• David Gould, Command Secretary for the NSC. 
• CFS - Vice Admiral John Dunt. 
• David Gould, then AUS(FS). 




Balanced Scorecard at 
this time? 
 
• Some considered it another management fad, 
others recognised it gave them the opportunity to 
manage their business differently. 
• Keen to utilise. 
• Identify performance of corporate Fleet and 
suggest improvements. 
• Move towards output based management.  Set 
achievement of Operational Capability (OC) as prime 
mover. 
• Cautious: uncertainty about its applicability and 
relevance to an operational naval command. 
• More cohesive management. 
• Monitor performance of the business, focus on 
essentials, report to Navy Board. 
• Better performance management; more 
cooperative behaviour. 
• Improved performance effectiveness. 
• Greater focus on all issues within the scorecard. 
• That it would meet their expectations in terms of 
content presentation. 
• Greater visibility and comparability of elements. 
• To bring a common understanding to the 
management board of key issues which needed their 
attention. 
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• Mixed, with much scepticism, apart from Adm 
Essenhigh and ACNS. 
• More focussed board meetings considering 
performance and management priorities for now and 
future. 
• Not too clear.  Certainly some reticence to 
embrace yet another initiative.  Some concern over 
additional work-load. 
• Rationalised material covered at SFMB.  Focus on 
key issues and thorough review of PIs.  Highlight areas 
that SFMB should work on, chart progress and target 
management action. Improve trend analysis. 
• Slightly sceptical. 
• "Wait and see" but generally optimistic. 
• Engagement by Board members collectively in key 
performance issues. 
• Difficult to say.  Many would not have experience 
of a BSC but would have been persuaded. 
6 What level of 
knowledge did the 
Board have of the 
Balanced Scorecard at 
this time? 
Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
    
Section 3: The Implementation phase.  This section aims to gain an understanding 
of the implementation process for the Balanced Scorecard in this organisation and 
assess its initial impact. 
1 How was 
commitment to the 
Balanced Scorecard 
obtained and built at 
Board level?  
Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
2 At what level of the 
organisation was/were 
the initial scorecards 
built? 
Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
3 How was the initial 
Balanced Scorecard 
built in terms of its 
general framework? 
Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
4 Please state the 
number of dimensions 
and number of 
measures used in the 
initial Balanced 
Scorecard: 
Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
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5 What was the 
rationale behind this 
scorecard format? 
• It met our needs. [ACNS area.] 
• 4 subordinate users and one summarising their 
performance measures [ACNS area.] 
• It was a fairly purist approach to the K&N theory.  
[NSC] 
• Measuring performance, and the enablers 
influencing performance.  [NSC] 
• Common approach to other TLBs in Naval Sector 
and NAVB. [2SL] 
• I believe it was aimed at providing a non-profit 
making/output focused organisation and that 4 enabling 
axes were seen to culminate in the output of 
capable/ready forces.  [CINCFLEET] 
• Adapted to fit the already existing reporting 
formats.  [CINCFLEET] 
• Reflected key output measures and monitored 
input.  [CINCFLEET] 
• Followed standard format and identified major 
areas of business.  [CINCFLEET] 
• Output management.  [CINCFLEET] 
• Combination of simplicity and useful information.  
[CINCFLEET] 
• Not sure - first attempt.  [CINCFLEET] 
• Coherent with the higher level BSC used by FMB.  
[CINCFLEET] 
• It was in line with the TLB's format.  
[CINCFLEET] 
6 Who was involved 
in building the 
Balanced Scorecard 
and how significant was 
their involvement in the 
initial scorecard? 
Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
7 How, and at what 
stages, was 
commitment to the 
Balanced Scorecard 
built in other parts of 
the organisation? 
Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
8 When did the initial 
development phase of 
the Balanced Scorecard 
start and how long did 
the process take? 
Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
Appendix B to Chapter 6 – Page 9 of 24 
 
9 Following the initial 
development of the 
Balanced Scorecard, 
including any pilot 
implementations, was 
the Balanced Scorecard 
extended to the 
remainder of the 
organisation, and if so 
how long did this take? 
Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
10 What impact did 




Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
11 Are you able to 
identify any specific 
benefits that were 
directly attributable to 
the Balanced Scorecard 
during this phase? 
 
• Performance metrics established. 
• Focus on key issues. 
• Corporate behaviour. 
• The CEO [CFS] became much more focused on key 
outputs and cost drivers. 
• Greater focus on non-output issues. 
• A more holistic approach to management of the 
NSC.  But a need to manage by exception. 
• In terms of the FMB scorecard the benefits were 
that they were presented with information that really 
counted and which they could control, thus reducing the 
amount of information they were presented with and so 
leading to better decision-making.  However, the tool is 
still being used to report progress rather than manage 
the business so further work is required before the full 
benefits of the scorecard will be derived. 
• Began to change attitudes (for the better) about the 
need for useful management tools. 
• Linking outputs to inputs. 
• Clearer objectives. 
• Shorter board meetings (more focussed). 
• Much work carried out to identify the business 
processes, an education for some. 
• Better able to monitor and predict under-
performance and risk. 
• Yes, board meetings more focussed and became 
shorter. 
• Board engaged much more directly in management 
process. 
• Promoted greater understanding between customer 
and supplier. 
• Definite feeling that the Board are committed to 
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managing better, and the introduction of such methods is 
a measure of their commitment to this. 
• Concentrated on what was important and what 
they could control or have significant influence over. 
• Quick improvement of understanding the principles 
of output based management. 
• Started a major move within department.  Within 
2/3 years top level of department (DMB) were 
developing their own. 
• £48M additional money for SHAR, £90M 
additional for Lynx [main rotor hub assembly], 
realisation of [electrical mechanic] recruiting poor 
performance, Merlin IPT funding posts at Culdrose. 
• Focus, Focus, Focus. 
• Yes - see section 6. 
• It brought a welcome focus to discussion at Board 
Level and forced agreement on actions required. 
• Greater overall awareness of Forecast strengths 
and weaknesses from "traffic lights". 
• A good management learning process, as Senior 
Management were made to consider how they 
"managed". 
• Clear focus on PM (Both PIs, their targets and 
scores). 
12 What were the key 
lessons learned during 
the development and 
implementation phase? 
 
• There is no right answer.  Aggregate lower level 
data sensibly. 
• Need for consistency with level above. 
• Top down support and consultant (or experienced 
staff) back up essential. 
• Support from external advisors/consultants vital to 
maintain momentum and direct effort. 
• Too many performance measures cloud the issue? 
• Focus, Focus, Focus. 
• Keep the top pages visually engaging, always be 
ready for drill down for more detail, keep it to bulleted 
text, graphics and coloured boxes.  Must always show 
past and forecast trend.  Must keep visibility of absolute 
requirement, in year target and current performance 
always, never separate.  Only 50% senior managers 
confident to use Chots displayed information.  Need to 
push then to explore this medium by CEO.  1SL example. 
• Needed to think through axis.  Initial PIs too 
numerous, too input focussed. 
• That the balanced scorecard is dynamic - and must 
change with the business as it develops. 
• It's a slow process to enable/facilitate a profound 
culture change in a large organisation.  More investment 
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in people aspects is needed. 
• Start quickly and allow the scorecard to improve 
with use. 
• Simplicity and commonality. 
• Keep the development team small.  If you try to 
involve too many people it takes longer (hence why it 
took 7 months to develop the business model - over 50 
people were involved). 
• Buy-in to the process takes time – systems-thinking 
is a difficult concept for some people. 
• Ensure that a discipline is maintained throughout 
the process otherwise nebulous measures will creep into 
the scorecard. 
• BSC had to demonstrate its relevance; and limit 
measures to a manageable number. 
• Understand the linkages to prevent unnecessary 
work. 
• Relationship between top-level BSC and 
underlying data is crucial but difficult.  Predicting future 
is difficult but valuable. 
• Don't expect to get it right first time.  Ensure 
format dovetails with other BSC within organisation. 
• The need to measure carefully those elements that 
you control or influence. 
• Using existing management plans/information is a 
good place to start building a scorecard in order to start 
the process and get the board used to using a scorecard, 
rather than embarking on detailed business analysis. 
• It is difficult to do but the commitment of the top 
man is vital. 
• Importance of identifying the right performance 
indicators to maximise Board influence on performance - 
measure what is manageable or needs to be influenced. 
 
Section 4: Post implementation.  This section seeks to understand what changes 
have occurred and what impact the Balanced Scorecard has had on the organisation 
since implementation. 
1 Has the Balanced 
Scorecard changed 
since it was initially 
introduced? 
Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
2 Where the Balanced 
Scorecard has changed 
what caused those 
changes to be made? 
 
• Mainly changes at Fleet or above, and the 
transition to an Access based BSC. 
• Axis change driven by TLB/Centre and content 
(PIs) changed as organisation learnt about BSC. 
• Decision to reduce from 5 to 4 axis necessitated by 
subsequent FMB decision. 
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• Changes in the strategic plan - fresh issues 
requiring Board visibility - new hierarchical structure 
enabled less crucial information, in more detail to still 
be available but [without] clutter[ing] senior managers 
view of overall business performance. 
• Alignment with MOD HQ. 
• Refinement of what we wanted and aligned with the 
Departmental BSC. 
• Organisational change; better understanding of 
performance etc issues. 
• Refinements to performance measures are better 
[management information]. 
• Development with time. 
• Organisational restructuring.  New objectives, 
programmes, drivers etc. 
• Reduction to 4 quadrants driven by higher 
corporate needs (MOD level). 
• Implementation of a 4-axis scorecard based on the 
results of Fleet Business Modelling, in order to capture 
business critical success factors - those parameters 
important to Fleet and over which Fleet has a high 
degree of influence. 
• Continued development - primarily by consultants. 
• Detailed business analysis conducted and 
alignment of structure with Kaplan and Norton. 
• The need to better measure output. 
• Redesign of the BSC iaw competing requirements 
to match card to the business or conform to that of 
higher organisation. 
• MOD used different format. 
• Need to be more relevant to Fleet's activities and 
management requirements. 
3 What changes has 
the Balanced Scorecard 
had on the 
organisational 
performance, culture 
and climate since it was 
implemented? 
Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
4 Are you able to 
identify any specific 
benefits that were 




• Isolation of problem output areas, eg Lynx rotor 
head, SHAR recovery programme; and kept at Board 
level on a monthly basis. 
• Focus on underlying causes of performance 
shortfalls; better resource allocation. 
• Focus on key issues. 
• Very clearly focused Sub FMBs.  Key issues 
usually highlighted.  Senior management make better use 
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of time, at some expense to middle management. 
• Senior management more focused; improved 
strategic outlook; improved management boards. 
• Infinitely better management of the Navy both as a 
customer and as a supplier. 
• Made department as a whole focus on balanced 
performance/change. 
• Ability to show non-performing suppliers, both 
public and private sector eg DLO, Surgeon General, 
Westlands, that their performance is being monitored, 
and its clear, auditable relationship with RN outputs.  
Raised performance has followed all briefs (except Surg 
Gen as yet - although we now have ministerial interest in 
the issue again through the balanced scorecard briefing 
at Admiralty Boards.) 
• Clearer understanding of the business. 
• Useful planning tool to assess impact of savings 
measures. 
• Output management better. 
• Greater awareness of relationships between 
activities, cost drivers and the value of useful 
management information. 
• The Fleet First management process has developed 
directly from the lessons learnt from BSC. 
• Much greater awareness throughout Fleet 
Command of challenges facing its separate component 
parts. 
• Identification of potential issues and ability to 
better prioritise. 
• More informed decision making from increasingly 
timely and relevant information.  Reduction in the 
exhaustive staffing process that delivered carefully 
crafted words to the board(s) that were then just noted. 
• More coherent management of FMB [meetings] - 
more focused and productive. 
• More effective Board functioning. 
• Better approach to STP review of 
enhancements/savings.  Promotes/facilitates output 
focused management perspective.  Better decisions. 
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5 What changes have 
taken place to the 
business processes used 
within the organisation 
since the Balanced 
Scorecard was 
implemented, eg have 
new processes been 
added or deleted?   
 
• Greater focus on strategic leadership and change 
management at higher levels.  BSC evolving. 
• BSC takes some management action to prepare.  
This has undoubtedly increased workload on a quarterly 
cycle.  New database system administrator will, however, 
spread this load. 
• A monthly/quarterly process has been put into 
place to deliver the BSC for each Management Board.  
For some staff this has been redirection of their efforts, 
but for other has meant new (extra) work. 
• None that I would attribute to the BSC, since most 
changes have been dictated by the personal management 
style of the TLB Holder. 
• Planning process modified to reflect scorecard 
focus. 
• It stimulated new performance management 
processes, but had less influence over other business 
processes. 
• Enormous and profound - ie break-up of NSC and 
formation of WSA. 
• Business processes radically restructured with the 
advent of the DLO. 
• Attempts to reduce bureaucracy in run up to Fleet 
First are resulting in minor changes to some processes. 
• There should have been a smarter information 
collection process - enter once use many times. 
• Yes, substantial change to performance 
management. 
• Both.  Business processes were more refined and 
effective. 
• None as at Oct 00. 
• Complete restructuring. 
• Financial process markedly improved.  BSC has 
significantly improved ability to brief facts to CINC. 
6 To what extent were 
the original aims of 
introducing the 
Balanced Scorecard 
met or exceeded? 
Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
7 To what do you 
attribute this success or 
failure? 
 
• Dedication of individuals and the flexibility of the 
BSC. 
• It is easy to understand. 
• Not as successful as could be due to inadequate 
supporting MIS and management resistance to a 
paradigm shift. 
• The strength of the tool.  The enthusiasm of the 
champion and the project team. 
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• Strong leadership, availability of management 
trained desk officers, and timing. 
• The ability of the BSC to focus management 
attention where it is needed at all levels. 
• For the HLB clear guidance and support was 
provided by the TLB. 
• The failure is due to insufficient knowledge of the 
CEO who was unable to fully understand the 
implications of the information being presented on the 
BSC. 
• Allowing SO1 to develop scorecard and more 
importantly, the reporting system with little interference, 
and substantial financial backing (I bought 40 days 
programmer time to build my reporting system which I 
designed).  It is the system, and hierarchy of information 
that the board perceive to be the balanced scorecard 
rather than the top-level scorecard itself. 
• Persuading interest of CEO. 
• Because we initially didn't realise what a useful 
tool it was. 
• There was immediate benefit but further benefit 
will develop gradually over time. 
• Determination of CINC to adopt BSC. 
• Corporate ownership. 
• Strong leadership from CINCFLEET. 
• High-level commitment and quality (ie expensive) 
consultants. 
• Commitment of the Board supported by good staff 
work in the HQ to develop options between Board 
Meetings. 
• Inability to measure or agree input PIs. 
• Limited expectations of BSC. Its potential has 
surprised many managers. 
• Drive from the top, in Fleet and at NAVB. 
8 What is the level of 
understanding of the 
Balanced Scorecard 
now? 
Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
9 Is the organisation 
committed to continued 
use of the Balanced 
Scorecard? 
 
• Yes (MOD Policy). 
• I believe they are, but there is much work to be 
done to (a) educate all staff, and (b) derive the full 
benefits from the scorecard. 
• Organisation no longer exists - amalgamated into 
a larger organisation where BSC was mandated from 
more senior levels. 
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10 Are individual’s 
personal objectives 
explicitly linked to the 
organisation’s 
Balanced Scorecard 
and if so how and at 
what levels of the 
organisation? 
Responses tabulated in main body of Chapter 6. 
11 Is the reward 
structure of the 
organisation linked to 
the Balanced Scorecard 
and if so how? 
 
• Partially linked (civilians only). 
• Not linked at all, although for civilians the reward 
system does have a performance link. 
• Not linked at all (although the board have agreed 
to specific objectives that will be linked to performance 
related pay). 
    
Section 5: The future.   This section aims to look at what further development or 
implementation of the Balanced Scorecard is planned within this organisation. 
 
1 If the Balanced 
Scorecard is not fully 
implemented at all 
levels within the 
organisation, is this 
planned and if so over 
what timescales? 
 
• Continued development with onset of Fleet First. 
• Some new scorecards will be developed for the new 
HQ.  It is likely that FMB and FMG will use the same 
(current) scorecard (although we have recommended 
that each have their own to reflect the nature of the 
business).  FOST and COS(Support) will have their own 
scorecards.  Fleet has yet to decide whether other 
functional groups will have their own scorecards.  FOST 
and COS(Support) scorecards will be developed by 
1/4/02. 
• Continuous development and improvement. 
• Yes - 1 to 2 years. 
• Intention is for BSC to be implemented only at 
senior levels of management. 
• Under development within FOST to support 
CINCFLEET BSC. 
• Should be fully implemented by now - probably 
being amended to suit Fleet First. 
• It will change with Fleet First, although Type 
Commanders already have their own and these will 
essentially just be "cut" in a different way post Fleet 
First. 
• Linkage to individual objectives is planned. 
• The BSC is being progressively implemented. 
• New DBSA will involve most of the organisation.  
This is being implemented now. 
• Not planned to take it to lower levels. 
• Ask Rear Admiral McClement.  [The new ACNS.] 
• ? 
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• to 3 years. 
• Not known. 
• No - not needed as such at the lowest levels. 
• Yes mandated at HLB level, being implemented at 
BLB level and below.  Full implementation within 2 
years. 
2 What changes 




• Alignment (vertical). 
• Vision for horizontal alignment. 
• Not sure, but it will change as we develop and 
adapt organisationally. 
• Not known. 
• Ongoing refinement in the light of experience. 
• More strategy focused, linked to objectives and 
target setting to measure success of strategy and instil 
correct corporate behaviour.  Databased version to 
reduce staff workload.  Ownership of KPIs/PIs and more 
explicit description of algorithmic aggregation for top 
level colours. 
• Continued developmental changes. 
• Changes to reflect major reorganisation and 
ongoing internal and external business change. 
• Refinement of PIs. 
• Only changes to reflect organisational changes. 
• Don't know. 
• ? 
• No current visibility. 
• Incremental improvement of PIs. 
• Web browser, underpinned by an access database, 
to dock completely into MOD centre and D P+A 
requirements. 
• None at present. 
• Presently introducing the Access based BSC, that 
will involve even more staff. 
• Moving to the DBSA to keep in step with Fleet, and 
others. 
3 What changes 
are planned to the 
Balanced Scorecard 
process and why? 
 
• Involve more staff at a junior level.  A requirement 
of the DBSA and to spread the workload.  Also supports 
the new HQ organisation. 
• More staff will be involved in the performance 
assessment as the access based BSC is rolled out. 
• None at present. 
• Ask DNRP BD.  [The post specifically responsible 
for the development of ACNS’s Balanced Scorecard.] 
• Greater emphasis on trend analysis to encourage 
proactive rather than reactive management. 
• No current visibility. 
Appendix B to Chapter 6 – Page 18 of 24 
 
• All new scorecards will be developed using the 
systems thinking approach to ensure consistency and 
coherency with the FEB scorecard. 
• ? 
• Don't know. 
• None. 
• Better identification of corporate decisions. 
• None. 
• Recognition of need to learn and develop. 
• Process will change partly because of Fleet First 
changes and partly to reduce compilation effort and 
maximise the value added to management information 
contained within it. 
• None in mind although future implementation of 
corporate governance and EFQM may have an impact. 
• Not known. 
• Greater use for forward looking and risk 
management; less use as a reporting tool. 
• Now delivered electronically.  Development of PIs, 
including risk. 
4 What are the 
organisation’s future 
expectations of the 
Balanced Scorecard? 
 
• The BSC will continue to be used, and will migrate 
to the new Fleet HQ. 
• Tied to HQ reorganisation, but intend to retain the 
BSC. 
• Develops into major day to day management tool. 
• Ask DNRP BD. 
• Further improvements in our ability to manage our 
business. 
• To enable the Board to give and monitor 
implementation of strategic directions. 
• A fully populated, database driven version that 
permits transfer of data up to NAVB/DMB and even 
across to DLO etc.  A Balanced Scorecard that may be 
examined and provide the examiner with a clear view of 
what Fleet strategy is.  A way of measuring the success 
or otherwise of in year achievement or corporate 
objectives, as distilled down to SO1 level throughout the 
new HQ. 
• To develop in utility and acceptability. 
• All down to middle management to have personal 
objectives tied to scorecard.  Fundamental part of 
performance management. 
• Continued improvement. 
• It will continue to provide a strategic overview of 
business processes and performance. 
• Improved output management. 
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• High. 
• I have not asked them [the Fleet Management 
Board] this specific question, but I would hope that they 
would be as follows: 
o Will help Fleet to monitor implementation of their 
strategy. 
o Will give an early indication when things are 
going wrong. 
o Will help Fleet to understand the impact of their 
decisions. 
o Can be used to communicate strategy to staff. 
o Contribute to making Fleet a learning 
organisation. 
o It will provide a framework for consistency of 
reporting up to the management board. 
• No current visibility. 
• Not known. 
• That it will continue to be at the heart of business. 
• It is the principal XB agenda item and is the 
preferred management medium. 
5 What plans are 
there to introduce 
other business 
processes into the 
organisation? 
 
• EFQM considered, but all initiatives on hold due 
to HQ reorganisation. 
• Very much dictated by the TLB/Centre. 
• Possible linkage with a risk register. 
• Ask DNRP BD. 
• Business development process instituted - EFQM 
next - greater focus on learning in the workplace - new 
organisational structure under Fleet First at Fleet. 
• No current visibility. 
• EFQM may be introduced in the next five years. 
• Continuing readiness to introduce useful tools and 
techniques. 
• Measurement of OC. 
• None. 
• Too many! 
• EFQM 
• Performance Management in its totality. 
• Not known. 
• Potential for benchmarking and EFQM. 
• Many! Eg EFQM. 
• Integration with EFQM. 
• Many - ISO 9000/2000, IiP, ROSPA, etc etc. 
• Not known. 
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Section 6: General comments.    
Please add any 
additional comments 
that you feel are 
relevant at this stage 
and are not specifically 
covered above.  In 
particular if you are 
able to supply 
supporting evidence 
this would be most 
helpful: 
 
• My involvement was some 12-18 months ago, I left 
the organisation 12 months ago. 
• The Balanced Scorecard concept has now been 
developed with the Defence environment and has become 
a mandated system for reporting.  This development was 
not due to work undertaken in …, but … has been well 
positioned to meet emergent requirements from the wider 
implementation. 
• I left … over a year ago, so my recollection of 
events has been clouded by a busy past year at … - 
where I have incidentally influenced a BSC for our newly 
formed Management Board! 
• Within …, the BSC has been introduced, primarily, 
due to direction from Fleet.  Though there was some 
resistance at the outset, the BSC has focused 
Management Board business, resulting in streamlined 
meetings.  Board Members are aware of their 
responsibilities and know where to focus their attention. 
• But the BSC is only as good as the effort put into 
its construction and subsequent updating.  Areas or 
issues not identified (and given PIs) are not included and 
can then risk exclusion from SFMB business.  … 
operates an annual review and the new DBSA can accept 
updates at any time. 
• Though the BSC has simplified some of senior 
management's work, there is a considerable chain of 
work below and this has been an area of some growth.  
(The DBSA may reduce and spread this work.) 
• As is common with IT systems, rubbish in at the 
lower levels will deliver rubbish to the SFMB.  Extra 
effort is expended to check most inputs; future 
developments must rely on a central pool of data that is 
collected once, checked once and used many times.  
Finally, in using the tool, it is absolutely crucial that a 
constant review of management actions is in place.  
Capturing and presenting so much fine grained 
information can easily seduce Board Members into 
thinking effective action is in hand, when it is plainly not. 
• The BSC has proved to be a very good learning 
tool that is has focused attention on the more important 
aspects of the HLB's business.  It has also improved 
consideration of strategic issues and helped to link 
finance to all other business. 
• The downsides are two-fold.  Firstly the BSC relies 
on a significant input from many members of staff.  
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Counter to this is the (probable) reduced workload for 
senior management.  Secondly the BSC uses the PIs in 
the Management Plan and is therefore only as good as 
the PIs (rubbish in, rubbish out).  However, over time 
this, both these problems, should become less of a 
problem. 
• But has scorecard approach been of any practical 
value?  A few examples: 
o £48M additional for SHAR from DMB. 
o SHAR pilot FRI.  [Programme to improve 
retention.] 
o Transfers within DLO to improve Lynx 
availability. 
o DLO internal funding of submarine repair 
programme. 
o Enhancements to [HMS] Ocean - no cost to naval 
TLBs. 
o Speeding up strategic manpower review 
(Topmast). 
o Pressure to explore short-term palliatives to front 
line manning problems such as understanding of 
extent of medical downgrading and allied DCSA 
under performance. 
o This is NAVB taking a strategic view of business 
performance - analogy is to shining a torchlight 
rather than using a screwdriver. 
• Other benefits: 
o Empowerment of board through information. 
o Navy at a glance. 
o Dealing with matters outside direct control (DLO, 
DPA) ie enabling the intelligent customer function 
and ... 
o Dealing with other suppliers eg … - Westland 
• One of my specific objectives (self set) when I 
became … was to modernise the Navy Board's 
management tools.  I therefore instituted a programme to 
develop: 
o Output based performance plan. 
o Balanced scorecard. 
o Strategic plan. 
All in place within 2 years.  Original versions held in 
DNRP. 
• This inevitably crosses the boundary of the 
integration of the NSC into the DLO. 
• We do need to align the DLO BSC with other TLBs 
- eg Fleet, DPA etc. 
• Thank you for your letter of 5th July about the 
introduction of the balanced scorecard in MOD.  As you 
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will be aware, the Naval Support Command was 
abolished just over two years ago, and I left the Defence 
Logistics Organisation a year ago.  Inevitably therefore 
my memory of some of the dates is a bit hazy, but I have 
tried to fill in your questionnaire as best I can.  You may 
find some additional background helpful. 
As far as I know, the Naval Support Command was the 
first part of the MOD to use the balanced scorecard, at 
least at TLB level.  There were a number of stimuli, but 
two I think were particularly significant. 
When I arrived in 1994, the NSC had only just been set 
up, with the constituents coming from previously 
independent baronies including CINCNAVHOME, Chief 
Executive Dockyards, DGST(N), and CFS himself.  Most 
of these had not taken kindly to coming under a single 
command.  I felt strongly that there was both a need to 
find a consistent method of measuring and then 
managing performance across these different areas, and 
that focussing on collective performance would be a 
good way of stimulating corporate as opposed to 
adversarial behaviour.  It was originally at the 
suggestion of Mr Alistair Cumming, then Managing 
Director of British Airways Engineering and our non-
Executive Director, that we started trying to develop a 
balanced scorecard - which he had introduced into BA 
Engineering. 
The second stimulus was the Capital/RAB programme.  
You will recall the original capital vision of "a 
department managing by outputs at all levels".  This 
required us to develop metrics for measuring output 
performance in CSAs with our main customers.  It also 
required us to understand the lower level outputs (for 
example in the NBSA, DGA(N), and Ship Support 
Agency) which contributed to the intermediate ones in 
our CSAs with Fleet.  These then needed to be brigaded 
together to the level of the TLB in order to monitor our 
performance internally, and adjust effort and resource 
allocations to areas requiring remediation. 
Although we had a rudimentary scorecard up and 
running within six months, it really took about two years 
before the scorecard was making a real difference to 
behaviour at Board Level, and the performance of the 
Command.  About that time we started forming up the 
Defence Logistics Organisation, and we were able 
therefore to take the Naval Support Command Model 
and adapt it to the new circumstances.  In this respect 
the scorecard proved particularly powerful in providing 
a corporate overview of what had previously been three 
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entirely separate TLBs.  I would strongly recommend 
that you talk to … in the DLO about subsequent 
developments.   
Just before I left the DLO I recall a particularly strong 
example of the power of the scorecard in focussing in 
Board level attention to analyse particularly persistent 
problems, which was poor availability of the Lynx 
helicopter, in both its Army and Navy versions.  Usually 
poor performance is summarily attributed to lack of 
resource, and poor performance in the supply chain.  It 
is certainly true that the supply chain was put under 
great strain by the failure of the mono-block rotor head, 
but on further analysis it was discovered that there was 
also poor practice in not dis-engaging the auto 
stabilisation system when the helicopter was firmly tied 
to the deck with engines running: this meant that the 
aircraft was effectively trying to stabilise the ship, which 
was putting appalling strain on the rotor-heads!   
Similarly, poor availability of the Army Lynx was often 
attributable to lack of second line maintenance 
manpower as to lack of the correct spares supplier.  
What this shows is that the scorecard is not only a 
powerful way of providing strategic management, but it 
is also a good way of forcing managers to look 
underneath the obvious when persistent problems arise.  
• The BS is a fine tool and a very poor master.  Its 
main use is to act as template for describing the 
business, reporting and, most of all, for looking ahead at 
what must be done to move forward. 
• Unfortunately my memory does not serve me well, 
and it isn't helped by the change of organisational and 
personal responsibility to a unified defence logistics 
organisation as … and now …. 
• I would feel that the introduction of a BSC 
approach in any area where I was involved in the future 
would be a very high priority. 
• Phil. Sorry - can't help.  Aged brain cells and 
rapidly fading memory. 
• The IT systems are inadequate for everyone to 
embrace the culture.  Therefore the process is time 
consuming. 
• These comments are based primarily upon the 
development of the Fleet BSC but also reflect the process 
cascaded to my current organisation at … where we are 
continuing to develop our own lower level BSC in 
support of our business. 
• A crucial stage in developing a scorecard is to 
undertake a thorough business analysis, this does not 
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have to be an early stage as use of the scorecard as a 
process and tool ought to be embedded early on. 
• As I remember, the BSC was originally proposed 
by the ASI who were implementing Project Capital 
within Fleet TLB at the time.  CINC became engaged 
with this as a modern management method which he 
could use effectively.  I believe this was one of the first 
BSCs to be delivered in Defence, and was produced with 
the heavy backing of the N8 leadership and costly 
consultants.  The Fleet BSC preceded the founding of the 
Directorate of Performance and Analysis (DP&A) in 
Main Building which was responsible for the FPMG 
(now DMB) BSC, thus starting a "BSC fever" across the 
defence organisation. 
 
Appendix A to Chapter 7.






1 The organisation has a clear mission that gives 
meaning and direction to our work
2 The organisation has a long-term purpose and 
direction
3 The strategic direction of this organisation is clear to 
me
4 The organisation has a clear strategy for the future
5 Our organisation's strategy is leading other firms to 
change the ways that they compete
External/ 
Stable
Mission Goals and 
objectives
1 There is widespread agreement about the goals of this 
organisation
2 The leaders of this organisation set goals that are 
ambitious, but realistic
3 The leadership of this organisation has "gone on 
record" about the objectives we are trying to meet
4 We continuously track our progress against our stated 
goals
5 The people in this organisation understand what 
needs to be done for us to succeed in the long run
Stable Mission Vision 1 We have a shared vision of what this organisation will 
be like in the future
2 The leaders in this organisation have a long-term 
orientation
3 Short-term thinking often compromises long-term 
vision
4 Our vision creates excitement and motivation for our 
employees
5 We are able to meet short-term demand without 
compromising our long-term vision
Stable Consistency Cordination and 
integration
1 Our approach to doing business is very consistent and 
predictable
2 There is good alignment of goals across levels of this 
organisation
3 People from different organisational units still share a 
common perspective
4 It is easy to coordinate projects across functional units 
in this organisation
5 Working with someone from another part of this 
organisation is like working with someone from a 
different company
Denison’s Cultural Survey Questionnaire.
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Table 7A.1: Denison Cultural Survey Questionnaire
Denison’s Cultural Survey Questionnaire.
Stable/ 
Internal
Consistency Agreement 1 When disagreements occur, we work hard to achieve 
win-win solutions
2 This organisation has a strong culture
3 There is clear agreement about the right way and the 
wrong way to do things in this organisation
4 It is easy for us to reach concensus, even on difficult 
issues




Consistency Core Values 1 There is a clear and consistent set of values in this 
company that governs the way we do business
2 This company has a characteristic management style 
and a distinct set of management practices
3 The managers in this company "practice what they 
preach"
4 This organisation has an ethical code that guides our 
behaviour and tells us right from wrong






1 This organisation delegates authority so that people 
can act on their own
2 The capability of the people in this organisation is 
viewed as an important source of competitive 
advantage
3 This organisation continuously invests in the skills of 
its employees
4 The "bench strength" of this organisation is constantly 
improving
5 Problems often arise in my organisation because we 
do not have the skills necessary to do the job
Internal/ 
Flexible
Involvement Team orientation 1 Cooperation and collaboration across functional roles 
are actively encouraged in this organisation
2 Working in this organisation is like being part of a 
team
3 Work is sensibly organised in this organisation so that 
each person can see the relationship between his/her 
work and the goal of the organisation
4 Teams are the primary building block of this 
organisation
5 The organisation relies on horizontal control and 
coordination to get work done, rather than hierarchy
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Table 7A.1: Denison Cultural Survey Questionnaire
Denison’s Cultural Survey Questionnaire.
Flexible Involvement Empowerment 1 Most employees in this organisation are highly 
involved in their work
2 Decisions in this organisation are usually made at the 
level where the best information is available
3 Information is widely shared in this organisation so 
that everyone can get the information s/he needs 
when it is needed
4 Everyone in this organisation believes that s/he can 
have a positive impact
5 Business planning in our organisation is ongoing and 
involves everyone in the process to some degree
Flexible Adaptability Creating change 1 The organisation is very responsive and changes 
easily
2 This organisation responds well to competitors and 
other changes in the external business environment
3 This organisation continually adopts new and 
improved ways to do work
4 Attempts to change this organisation usually meet with 
resistance




Adaptability Customer focus 1 Customer comments and recommendations often lead 
to changes in this organisation
2 Customer input directly influences our decisions
3 All members of this organisation have a deep 
understanding of customer wants and needs
4 We encourage direct contact with customers by 
members of the organisation
5 The interests of the final customer often are ignored in 
our decisions
External Adaptability Organisational 
learning
1 This organisation encourages innovation and rewards 
those who take risks
2 We view failure as an opportunity for learning and 
improvement
3 Lots of things "fall between the cracks" in this 
organisation
4 Learning is an important objective in our day-to-day 
work
5 We make certain that the "right hand knows what the 
left is doing"
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1 = Strategic 
direction and 
intent. 
2 = Goals and 
objectives. 




5 = Agreement. 
6 = Core values. 
7 = Capability 
development. 




10 = Creating 
change. 




Figure 7C.1: CINCFLEET HQ overall assessment 
against Denison organisational cultural assessment tool.   






Appendix D  to Chapter 7  























1 = Strategic 
direction and 
intent. 
2 = Goals and 
objectives. 




5 = Agreement. 
6 = Core values. 
7 = Capability 
development. 




10 = Creating 
change. 




Figure 7D.1: Senior and Junior Naval staff, RM and 
RFA overall assessment against Denison organisational 
cultural assessment tool.   
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intent. 
2 = Goals and 
objectives. 




5 = Agreement. 
6 = Core values. 
7 = Capability 
development. 




10 = Creating 
change. 




Figure 7E.1: Middle ranking Naval officers’ assessment 
against Denison organisational cultural assessment tool.   
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1 = Strategic 
direction and 
intent. 
2 = Goals and 
objectives. 




5 = Agreement. 
6 = Core values. 
7 = Capability 
development. 




10 = Creating 
change. 




Figure 7F.1: Civilian staff assessment against Denison 
organisational cultural assessment tool.   
Adapted from the original by showing segment scores with “traffic 
light” colours. 
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Table 8A.1: Military, Cultural and Management models used in compiling an organisational measurement instrument.
Model: Ainslie’s 6 measures of 
Military Ethos.
Stouffer’s Cohesion and 
combat effectiveness.
Shils and Janowitz’s 
Cohesion in the 
Wehrmacht.
Features: Empowerment Loyalty, discipline and 
aggression
Code of masculinity Small group ties
Team Orientation Cohesion Loyalty to group Proximity to other groups
Capability development Leadership Loyalty to officers Devotion to Hitler (ideology)
Core values Operational training Trust in medical care Family protection
Agreement Pride, history and customs Pride in accomplishment of 
unit
Loyalty to leaders
Coordination Organisational commitment Friendship, affection and 
good humour
Creating change Sense of humour (altruism)
Customer focus Patriotism
Organisational learning Hate for enemy
strategic direction and intent
Goals and objectives
Vision
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Table 8A.1: Military, Cultural and Management models used in compiling an organisational measurement instrument.
Model:
Features:








Small group cohesion Charismatic leadership Confidence in leaders Loyalty to group
Fast integration of new 
members
Shared values Confidence in peers Training together
Deep friendships Cultural arefacts Confidence in oneself Willingness to risk death for 
others
Ability to cope with battle 
conditions
Group cohesion Confidence in weapons Goals of individuals, small 
groups and leaders must be 
congruent
Role models Relations with peers and 
leaders
Fear of enemy and aftermath 
of combat
Realistic training for combat
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Table 8A.1: Military, Cultural and Management models used in compiling an organisational measurement instrument.
Model:
Features:
Price’s Factors influencing 
psychiatric casualties.
Grossman’s Learning to 
kill in war.
CSIS Report Measuring US 
Military culture.
Johnson’s culture web.
Success of the unit Training Training standards and 
readiness
Stories and myths
Professionalism Military slang and group 
culture
Leadership Symbols
Conflict duration Fairness, trust, teamwork, 
duty and commitment
Rituals and routines
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Table 8A.1: Military, Cultural and Management models used in compiling an organisational measurement instrument.
Model:
Features:
Cartwright's Nine Factors. EFQM Hofstede’s key elements of 
culture. 
Schein’s key elements of 
culture. 
Identification Leadership Values Basic assumptions (covering 
the environment and human 
aspects of behaviour)
Equity People Rituals Beliefs, values and attitudes
Equality Policy and strategy Heroes Artefacts (covering the 
outward forms of culture that 
are displayed and conveyed 
between individuals)




Group Dynamics Society results
Internalisation Key performance results
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Table 8B.1: Alignment between elements of the Military, cultural and management tools.





Shils and Janowitz’s 




Team orientation Organisational 
commitment





Sense of humour 
(altruism)










Individual Involvement Empowerment Loyalty, discipline and 
aggression
Agreement Cohesion
Beliefs Consistency Customer focus Patriotism Devotion to Hitler 
(ideology)
Hate for enemy Family protection
Trust in medical care
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Small group cohesion Group cohesion Confidence in peers Loyalty to group
Fast integration of 
new members






Realistic training for 
combat
Training together Professionalism
Confidence in oneself Willingness to risk 
death for others





Ability to cope with 
battle conditions
Goals of individuals, 
small groups and 
leaders must be 
congruent
Cultural arefacts Success of the unit
Role models
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Power structures Policy and strategy
Controls systems



















Military slang and 
group culture
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elements of culture. 
Schein’s key 
elements of culture. 












style and personality 
of the organisation's 


















Values Beliefs, values and 
attitudes
Societal or national 
culture within which 
and organisation is 
physically situated












Type of business an 
organisation conducts 




Rituals Artefacts (covering the 
outward forms of 




Reward systems and 
measures
Organisational Glue




Symbols Organisational history 
and tradition
Practices
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Table 8C.1: Grouping of the related elements of the Military, cultural and management tools.
Category: Team and Groups Leaders Training, learning 
and development
Individual Beliefs Task Organisation
Related 
elements:
Team orientation Coordination Organisational 
learning





Empowerment Customer focus Strategic direction 
and intent
Core values
Loyalty to group Loyalty to officers Operational training Agreement Patriotism Goals and 
objectives




Loyalty to leaders Creating change Loyalty, discipline 
and aggression
Hate for enemy Vision Pride in 
accomplishment of 
unit




Realistic training for 
combat
Cohesion Devotion to Hitler 
(ideology)
Ability to cope with 
battle conditions
Cultural arefacts




Training together Confidence in 
oneself
Family protection Goals of individuals, 
small groups and 
leaders must be 
congruent
Code of masculinity
Small group ties Organisational 
structures
Professionalism Willingness to risk 
death for others





Power structures Training Satisfaction with 
service
Conflict duration Key performance 
results
Success of the unit
Fast integration of 
new members
Controls systems Training standards 
and readiness
Identification Trust in medical 
care
Society results Military slang and 
group culture
Deep friendships Policy and strategy Development Internalisation Confidence in 
weapons
Customer results Stories and myths
Group cohesion Vision, 
management style 
and personality of 
the organisation's 
founder or other 
dominant leader
Equity Fairness, trust, 
teamwork, duty and 
commitment
Type of business an 
organisation 
conducts and the 











Confidence in peers Legislation and 
organisational 
environment
Consensus People results Rituals and routines




Values Processes The paradigm
Loyalty to group Influence of a 
dominant leader
Beliefs, values and 
attitudes
Rituals










Criteria for success Societal or national 
culture within which 
and organisation is 
physically situated
Symbols








the outward forms 
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Table 8D.1: Military, Cultural and Management models aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool.
Ainslie’s 6 measures of 
Military Ethos.
Stouffer’s Cohesion and 
combat effectiveness.
Shils and Janowitz’s 
Cohesion in the Wehrmacht.























Consistency Core Values Pride, history and customs Patriotism Devotion to Hitler (ideology) Ability to cope with battle 
conditions
Cultural arefacts
Organisational commitment Hate for enemy Family protection
Trust in medical care






Operational training Small group ties Role models





Cohesion Loyalty to group Loyalty to leaders Small group cohesion Group cohesion
Loyalty, discipline and 
aggression
Friendship, affection and good 
humour
Fast integration of new 
members
Loyalty to officers Deep friendships
Code of masculinity
Sense of humour (altruism)
Flexible Involvement Empowerment






External Adaptability Organisational 
learning
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Tool.
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Mission Goals and 
objectives
Stable Mission Vision























External Adaptability Organisational 
learning
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Tool.
Gal’s Unit morale or climate. Henderson’s Human element 
in combat.
Price’s Factors influencing 
psychiatric casualties.
Grossman’s Learning to kill 
in war.
CSIS Report Measuring US 
Military culture.
Confidence in leaders Leadership
Training standards and 
readiness
Success of the unit
Conflict duration
Goals of individuals, small 
groups and leaders must be 
congruent
Fear of enemy and aftermath 
of combat
Willingness to risk death for 
others
Military slang and group 
culture
Fairness, trust, teamwork, duty 
and commitment
Realistic training for combat Training together Professionalism Training
Confidence in weapons




Confidence in oneself Satisfaction with service
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Mission Goals and 
objectives
Stable Mission Vision























External Adaptability Organisational 
learning
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Tool.
Johnson’s culture web. Cartwright's Nine Factors. EFQM Hofstede’s key elements of 
culture. 











The paradigm Key performance results
Organisational structures Identification Policy and strategy Practices
Rationality Processes
Key performance results
Controls systems Internalisation Key performance results
Power structures Consensus
Stories and myths Equality People Symbols Artefacts (covering the 
outward forms of culture that 
are displayed and conveyed 
between individuals)
Symbols Equity Values Basic assumptions (covering 
the environment and human 
aspects of behaviour)
Rituals and routines Rituals Beliefs, values and attitudes
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Mission Goals and 
objectives
Stable Mission Vision























External Adaptability Organisational 
learning
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Tool.
A Brown’s Sources of 
organisational culture. 
Drennan’s Additional 
sources of organisational 
culture. 
Cameron & Quinn's 
Organisational Culture 
Assessment Instrument. 
Type of business an 
organisation conducts and the 





Vision, management style and 
personality of the 
organisation's founder or other 
dominant leader
Technology, products and 
services.
Criteria for success
Type of business an 
organisation conducts and the 
nature of its business 
environment
Goals, values and beliefs. Organisational Leadership
Vision, management style and 
personality of the 
organisation's founder or other 
dominant leader
Influence of a dominant leader.
Technology, products and 
services.
Information and control 
systems.
Procedures and Policies.





Vision, management style and 
personality of the 
organisation's founder or other 
dominant leader
Goals, values and beliefs. Dominant Characteristics
Societal or national culture 
within which and organisation 
is physically situated
Organisational history and 
tradition.
Reward systems and 
measures.





Information and control 
systems.
Reward systems and 
measures.
Organisational structure and 
resources.
Organisational structure and 
resources.
Technology, products and 
services.





Organisational structure and 
resources.




Technology, products and 
services.
Information and control 
systems.
Organisational structure and 
resources.
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1 The organisation has a clear 
mission that gives meaning and 
direction to our work
Policy and 
Strategy
Shared values Strategic 
emphases
2 The organisation has a long-term 
purpose and direction




3 The strategic direction of this 
organisation is clear to me




4 The organisation has a clear 
strategy for the future
5 Our organisation's strategy is 
leading other firms to change the 
ways that they compete
External/ 
Stable
Mission Goals and 
objectives
1 There is widespread agreement 
about the goals of this 
organisation
Results Loyalty to leaders
2 The leaders of this organisation 
set goals that are ambitious, but 
realistic
Leadership Fairness, trust, 
teamwork, duty 
and commitment
3 The leadership of this 
organisation has "gone on record" 






4 We continuously track our 






5 The people in this organisation 
understand what needs to be 






Cultural artefacts (covering the outward forms of culture 
that are displayed and conveyed between individuals)
Type of business 
an organisation 
conducts and the 
nature of its 
business 
environment
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool. Related Cultural issues.
Type of business an organisation conducts and the 
nature of its business environment
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Table 8E.1: Military, Cultural and Management models aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool. Related Cultural issues.
Stable Mission Vision 1 We have a shared vision of what 




2 The leaders in this organisation 
have a long-term orientation
Success of the 
unit
Identification





4 Our vision creates excitement 
and motivation for our employees
Results Reward systems 
and measures
5 We are able to meet short-term 




Stable Consistency Cordination and 
integration
1 Our approach to doing business 
is very consistent and predictable
Processes Leadership
2 There is good alignment of goals 
across levels of this organisation
Shared values Controls systems
3 People from different 





4 It is easy to coordinate projects 
across functional units in this 
organisation
Results Procedures and 
Policies
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Table 8E.1: Military, Cultural and Management models aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool. Related Cultural issues.
5 Working with someone from 
another part of this organisation is 
like working with someone from a 
different company
Cohesion
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Table 8E.1: Military, Cultural and Management models aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool. Related Cultural issues.
Stable/ 
Internal
Consistency Agreement 1 When disagreements occur, we 




Military slang and 
group culture
2 This organisation has a strong 
culture
Consensus Group cohesion
3 There is clear agreement about 
the right way and the wrong way 
to do things in this organisation
Internalisation Power structures
4 It is easy for us to reach 




5 We often have trouble reaching 
agreement on key issues




Consistency Core Values 1 There is a clear and consistent 
set of values in this company that 





Leadership Pride in 
accomplishment 
of unit
2 This company has a 
characteristic management style 







3 The managers in this company 
"practice what they preach"
Power structures Equity
4 This organisation has an ethical 
code that guides our behaviour 







leaders must be 
congruent
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Table 8E.1: Military, Cultural and Management models aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool. Related Cultural issues.
5 Ignoring the core values of this 
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Table 8E.1: Military, Cultural and Management models aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.





1 This organisation delegates 
authority so that people can act 
on their own
Training People Group Dynamics
2 The capability of the people in 
this organisation is viewed as an 








3 This organisation continuously 
invests in the skills of its 
employees
Role models Training together
4 The "bench strength" of this 







5 Problems often arise in my 
organisation because we do not 
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Table 8E.1: Military, Cultural and Management models aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool. Related Cultural issues.
Internal/ 
Flexible
Involvement Team orientation 1 Cooperation and collaboration 
across functional roles are 
actively encouraged in this 
organisation
Loyalty to group Group Dynamics
2 Working in this organisation is like 
being part of a team




3 Work is sensibly organised in this 
organisation so that each person 
can see the relationship between 






4 Teams are the primary building 




Proximity to other 
groups
5 The organisation relies on 
horizontal control and 
coordination to get work done, 
rather than hierarchy
People results People
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Table 8E.1: Military, Cultural and Management models aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool. Related Cultural issues.
Flexible Involvement Empowerment 1 Most employees in this 




Results Confidence in 
peers
2 Decisions in this organisation are 
usually made at the level where 
the best information is available
Instrumentality Loyalty to group
3 Information is widely shared in 
this organisation so that everyone 
can get the information s/he 




4 Everyone in this organisation 






5 Business planning in our 
organisation is ongoing and 
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Table 8E.1: Military, Cultural and Management models aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool. Related Cultural issues.
Flexible Adaptability Creating change 1 The organisation is very 
responsive and changes easily
Results Cohesion
2 This organisation responds well 
to competitors and other changes 






3 This organisation continually 




4 Attempts to change this 





5 Different units in this organisation 
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Table 8E.1: Military, Cultural and Management models aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool. Related Cultural issues.
Flexible/ 
External
Adaptability Customer focus 1 Customer comments and 
recommendations often lead to 
changes in this organisation
Customer results Processes
2 Customer input directly influences 
our decisions
Society results Policy and 
strategy
3 All members of this organisation 
have a deep understanding of 





4 We encourage direct contact with 
customers by members of the 
organisation




5 The interests of the final customer 






within which and 
organisation is 
physically situated
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Table 8E.1: Military, Cultural and Management models aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool. Related Cultural issues.
External Adaptability Organisational 
learning
1 This organisation encourages 
innovation and rewards those 
who take risks
Development Training
2 We view failure as an opportunity 





3 Lots of things "fall between the 
cracks" in this organisation
Processes Loyalty to group
4 Learning is an important objective 





5 We make certain that the "right 
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1 The organisation has 
a clear mission that 
gives meaning and 
direction to our work
Policy and 
Strategy
Shared values Strategic 
emphases
1 CINCFLEET HQ has a clear 
mission that provides long-
term direction and a clear 
framework for current work 
2 The organisation has 




Internalisation 2 There is pride in the history 
and traditions of the Navy and 
these values are maintained in 
the future strategy of 
CINCFLEET HQ
3 The strategic direction 




3 The CINCFLEET HQ strategy 
shows clearly how 
organisational objectives will 
be achieved
4 The organisation has 


















5 Our organisation's 
strategy is leading 
other firms to change 






Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool.
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Table 8F.1: Statements developed for a new measurement model aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
CINCFLEET cultural 
measurement tool
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool.
External/ 
Stable
Mission Goals and 
objectives
1 There is widespread 
agreement about the 
goals of this 
organisation





1 Organisational goals are clear, 
challenging but achievable, 
and achievement is 
continuously monitored and 
publicised
2 The leaders of this 
organisation set goals 
that are ambitious, but 
realistic




2 Leaders visibly promote 
organisational goals and 
inspire loyalty and confidence 
so that staff are committed to 
achieving organisational goals
3 The leadership of this 
organisation has 
"gone on record" 
about the objectives 





3 Everybody's responsibilities 
are clearly defined and cover 
the full range of tasks required 
to achieve organisational goals
4 We continuously track 








the nature of 
its business 
environment
5 The people in this 
organisation 
understand what 
needs to be done for 
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Table 8F.1: Statements developed for a new measurement model aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
CINCFLEET cultural 
measurement tool
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool.
Stable Mission Vision 1 We have a shared 
vision of what this 
organisation will be 
like in the future
Concensus Organisational 
commitment
1 All staff understand the long-
term vision of this organisation 
and are committed to 
achieving it
2 The leaders in this 
organisation have a 
long-term orientation
Success of the 
unit
Identification 2 This organisation is highly 
successful and all staff share 
in that success





Shared values 3 CINCFLEET HQ is robust and 
well structured and can 
maintain its long-term direction 
even when faced with short-
term difficulties
4 Our vision creates 
excitement and 
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Table 8F.1: Statements developed for a new measurement model aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
CINCFLEET cultural 
measurement tool
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool.
Stable Consistency Cordination and 
integration
1 Our approach to doing 
business is very 
consistent and 
predictable
Processes Leadership 1 Business processes and 
activities are well defined, 
consistent, integrated and 
orientated to achieving the 
organisational goals
2 There is good 
alignment of goals 
across levels of this 
organisation
Shared values Controls 
systems
2 Staff cooperate and work well 
together across internal 
organisational boundaries to 
achieve organisational goals
3 People from different 
organisational units 






3 Leaders and managers 
provide strong coordination 
and control across the whole of 
the organisation
4 It is easy to coordinate 
projects across 




5 Working with 
someone from another 
part of this 
organisation is like 
working with someone 
from a different 
company
Cohesion
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Table 8F.1: Statements developed for a new measurement model aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
CINCFLEET cultural 
measurement tool
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool.
Stable/ 
Internal
Consistency Agreement 1 When disagreements 














1 Focus on our organisational 
goals promotes cooperation 
and the search for win-win 
solutions to difficult problems




2 The organisational culture 
clearly defines the values of 
this HQ, and the way we work 
in it
3 There is clear 
agreement about the 
right way and the 
wrong way to do 




3 Staff strongly identify with their 
team and CINCFLEET HQ, 
and readily accept and 
promote the values of both
4 It is easy for us to 
reach concensus, 
even on difficult issues
Results Organisational 
commitment
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Table 8F.1: Statements developed for a new measurement model aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
CINCFLEET cultural 
measurement tool
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool.
Internal 
Focus
Consistency Core Values 1 There is a clear and 
consistent set of 
values in this 
company that governs 







Leadership Pride in 
accomplishme
nt of unit
1 CINCFLEET HQ inspires pride 
and loyalty among its staff and 
thus provides a strong 
framework for staff conduct 
2 This company has a 
characteristic 
management style 





Equity 2 Managers and Leaders inspire 
confidence and commitment 
and they support, direct, 
encourage and care for their 
staff 









3 Individual and team 
contributions' towards 
organisational goals and 
objectives are promptly, 
properly, and consistently 
recognised and rewarded
4 This organisation has 
an ethical code that 
guides our behaviour 






5 Ignoring the core 
values of this 
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Table 8F.1: Statements developed for a new measurement model aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
CINCFLEET cultural 
measurement tool





1 This organisation 
delegates authority so 
that people can act on 
their own
Training People Group 
Dynamics
1 CINCFLEET HQ delegates 
effectively, empowering and 
developing individuals, helping 
them to meet their personal 
aspirations
2 The capability of the 
people in this 
organisation is viewed 
as an important 







Leadership 2 CINCFLEET HQ develops 
individuals and teams and 
provides them with effective 
tools to achieve their 
objectives
3 This organisation 
continuously invests in 
the skills of its 
employees
Role models Training 
together
3 Leaders and managers play a 
key role in driving the 
development of teams through 
work and social activities
4 The "bench strength" 







5 Problems often arise 
in my organisation 
because we do not 
have the skills 
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Table 8F.1: Statements developed for a new measurement model aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
CINCFLEET cultural 
measurement tool
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool.
Internal/ 
Flexible
Involvement Team orientation 1 Cooperation and 
collaboration across 
functional roles are 






1 Team working is important to 
CINCFLEET HQ and matrix 
working is used to promote 
effective working across 
organisational boundaries
2 Working in this 
organisation is like 






2 Every individual is important 
and is valued for the work and 
social contributions that they 
make to the team and the 
team's output
3 Work is sensibly 
organised in this 
organisation so that 
each person can see 
the relationship 
between his/her work 







3 Team members seek to rapidly 
integrate new members and 
when people leave there is a 
sense of loss
4 Teams are the primary 







5 The organisation 
relies on horizontal 
control and 
coordination to get 
work done, rather than 
hierarchy
People results People
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Table 8F.1: Statements developed for a new measurement model aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
CINCFLEET cultural 
measurement tool
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool.
Flexible Involvement Empowerment 1 Most employees in 
this organisation are 




Results Confidence in 
peers
1 Responsibility and authority 
are clearly aligned at an 
appropriate level thereby 
enabling everyone to make a 
positive contribution
2 Decisions in this 
organisation are 
usually made at the 
level where the best 
information is 
available
Instrumentality Loyalty to 
group
2 Information is shared 
effectively across CINCFLEET 
HQ, to enable staff to improve 
their contribution to 
organisational objectives
3 Information is widely 
shared in this 
organisation so that 
everyone can get the 
information s/he 






3 Individuals are confident and 
capable operators and place 
the team and organisational 
objectives above personal 
advancement
4 Everyone in this 
organisation believes 








5 Business planning in 
our organisation is 
ongoing and involves 
everyone in the 
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Table 8F.1: Statements developed for a new measurement model aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
CINCFLEET cultural 
measurement tool
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool.
Flexible Adaptability Creating change 1 The organisation is 
very responsive and 
changes easily
Results Cohesion 1 CINCFLEET HQ responds 
positively, creatively and 
effectively to internal and 
external pressures for change
2 This organisation 
responds well to 
competitors and other 








2 CINCFLEET HQ staff and 
teams are adaptable and 
cooperate effectively, even in 
response to changes in  
resources or objectives 
3 This organisation 
continually adopts 
new and improved 
ways to do work
Policy and 
strategy
3 CINCFLEET HQ and its staff 
actively seek ways of changing 
things in order to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness
4 Attempts to change 
this organisation 





5 Different units in this 
organisation often 
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Table 8F.1: Statements developed for a new measurement model aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
CINCFLEET cultural 
measurement tool
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool.
Flexible/ 
External
Adaptability Customer focus 1 Customer comments 
and recommendations 




Processes 1 CINCFLEET HQ effectively 
involves its stakeholders, 
partners and customers in its 
processes in order to better 
meet organisational objectives
2 Customer input 
directly influences our 
decisions
Society results Policy and 
strategy
2 CINCFLEET HQ has the 
respect and support of society, 
other external stakeholders, 
partners and customers and is 
regarded as a responsible and 
trustworthy organisation
3 All members of this 
organisation have a 
deep understanding of 







3 Staff have a clear 
understanding of what the 
organisation's stakeholders, 
partners and customers want 
and always seek to provide 
them with a high standard of 
service
4 We encourage direct 
contact with 
customers by 






5 The interests of the 
final customer often 
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Table 8F.1: Statements developed for a new measurement model aligned to the Denison cultural measurement tool statements.
CINCFLEET cultural 
measurement tool
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness Tool.
External Adaptability Organisational 
learning
1 This organisation 
encourages innovation 
and rewards those 
who take risks
Development Training 1 CINCFLEET HQ promotes 
professionalism among its staff 
by encouraging learning and 
development, innovation and 
sensible risk-taking









2 CINCFLEET HQ ensures staff 
understand what is going on 
elsewhere within MOD and 
adapt accordingly
3 Lots of things "fall 
between the cracks" in 
this organisation
Processes Loyalty to 
group
3 Difficulties and failures are 
used by staff and the 
organisation as learning points 
for improvement rather than as 
opportunities to apportion 
blame
4 Learning is an 







5 We make certain that 
the "right hand knows 
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Table 8G.1: NLP Logical Level assessment of statements developed for a new measurement models aligned to the Denison cultural 
measurement tool statements.






1 CINCFLEET HQ has a clear mission that provides long-
term direction and a clear framework for current work 
Identity and 
Beliefs
2 There is pride in the history and traditions of the Navy and 




3 The CINCFLEET HQ strategy shows clearly how 





Mission Goals and 
objectives
1 Organisational goals are clear, challenging but achievable, 
and achievement is continuously monitored and publicised
Beliefs and 
Behaviour
2 Leaders visibly promote organisational goals and inspire 




3 Everybody's responsibilities are clearly defined and cover 




Stable Mission Vision 1 All staff understand the long-term vision of this 
organisation and are committed to achieving it
Identity and 
Beliefs 




3 CINCFLEET HQ is robust and well structured and can 




Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
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Table 8G.1: NLP Logical Level assessment of statements developed for a new measurement models aligned to the Denison cultural 
measurement tool statements.
CINCFLEET cultural measurement toolDenison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Stable Consistency Cordination and 
integration
1 Business processes and activities are well defined, 




2 Staff cooperate and work well together across internal 
organisational boundaries to achieve organisational goals
Identity and 
Behaviour
3 Leaders and managers provide strong coordination and 





Consistency Agreement 1 Focus on our organisational goals promotes cooperation 
and the search for win-win solutions to difficult problems
Identity and 
Behaviour
2 The organisational culture clearly defines the values of this 
HQ, and the way we work in it
Identity and 
Behaviour
3 Staff strongly identify with their team and CINCFLEET HQ, 





Consistency Core Values 1 CINCFLEET HQ inspires pride and loyalty among its staff 
and thus provides a strong framework for staff conduct 
Identity and 
Behaviour
2 Managers and Leaders inspire confidence and 
commitment and they support, direct, encourage and care 
for their staff 
Belief and 
Behaviour
3 Individual and team contributions' towards organisational 
goals and objectives are promptly, properly, and 
consistently recognised and rewarded
Identity and 
Behaviour
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Table 8G.1: NLP Logical Level assessment of statements developed for a new measurement models aligned to the Denison cultural 
measurement tool statements.





1 CINCFLEET HQ delegates effectively, empowering and 




2 CINCFLEET HQ develops individuals and teams and 




3 Leaders and managers play a key role in driving the 





Involvement Team orientation 1 Team working is important to CINCFLEET HQ and matrix 




2 Every individual is important and is valued for the work and 




3 Team members seek to rapidly integrate new members 
and when people leave there is a sense of loss
Identity and 
Behaviour
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Table 8G.1: NLP Logical Level assessment of statements developed for a new measurement models aligned to the Denison cultural 
measurement tool statements.
CINCFLEET cultural measurement toolDenison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Flexible Involvement Empowerment 1 Responsibility and authority are clearly aligned at an 




2 Information is shared effectively across CINCFLEET HQ, 




3 Individuals are confident and capable operators and place 




Flexible Adaptability Creating change 1 CINCFLEET HQ responds positively, creatively and 
effectively to internal and external pressures for change
Behaviour and 
Environment
2 CINCFLEET HQ staff and teams are adaptable and 
cooperate effectively, even in response to changes in  
resources or objectives 
Belief and 
Environment
3 CINCFLEET HQ and its staff actively seek ways of 
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Table 8G.1: NLP Logical Level assessment of statements developed for a new measurement models aligned to the Denison cultural 
measurement tool statements.
CINCFLEET cultural measurement toolDenison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Flexible/ 
External
Adaptability Customer focus 1 CINCFLEET HQ effectively involves its stakeholders, 




2 CINCFLEET HQ has the respect and support of society, 
other external stakeholders, partners and customers and is 
regarded as a responsible and trustworthy organisation
Identity and 
Environment
3 Staff have a clear understanding of what the organisation's 
stakeholders, partners and customers want and always 
seek to provide them with a high standard of service
Belief and 
Environment
External Adaptability Organisational 
learning
1 CINCFLEET HQ promotes professionalism among its staff 




2 CINCFLEET HQ ensures staff understand what is going on 
elsewhere within MOD and adapt accordingly
Behaviour and 
Environment
3 Difficulties and failures are used by staff and the 
organisation as learning points for improvement rather 
than as opportunities to apportion blame
Belief and 
Behaviour
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1 CINCFLEET HQ has a clear 
mission that provides long-term 
direction and a clear framework for 
current work 
2 There is pride in the history and 
traditions of the Navy and these 
values are maintained in the future 
strategy of CINCFLEET HQ
3 The CINCFLEET HQ strategy 
shows clearly how organisational 
objectives will be achieved
R The CINCFLEET HQ strategy fails 
to show clearly how organisational 
objectives will be achieved.
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Tool.
Statement reversal
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Mission Goals and 
objectives
1 Organisational goals are clear, 
challenging but achievable, and 
achievement is continuously 
monitored and publicised
2 Leaders visibly promote 
organisational goals and inspire 
loyalty and confidence so that staff 
are committed to achieving 
organisational goals
3 Everybody's responsibilities are 
clearly defined and cover the full 
range of tasks required to achieve 
organisational goals
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Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Tool.
Statement reversal
Stable Mission Vision 1 All staff understand the long-term 
vision of this organisation and are 
committed to achieving it
2 This organisation is highly 
successful and all staff share in 
that success
3 CINCFLEET HQ is robust and well 
structured and can maintain its 
long-term direction even when 
faced with short-term difficulties
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Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Tool.
Statement reversal
Stable Consistency Cordination and 
integration
1 Business processes and activities 
are well defined, consistent, 
integrated and orientated to 
achieving the organisational goals
2 Staff cooperate and work well 
together across internal 
organisational boundaries to 
achieve organisational goals
3 Leaders and managers provide 
strong coordination and control 
across the whole of the 
organisation
R Leaders and managers fail to 
provide strong coordination and 
control across any part of the 
organisation
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Consistency Agreement 1 Focus on our organisational goals 
promotes cooperation and the 
search for win-win solutions to 
difficult problems
2 The organisational culture clearly 
defines the values of this HQ, and 
the way we work in it
3 Staff strongly identify with their 
team and CINCFLEET HQ, and 
readily accept and promote the 
values of both
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Consistency Core Values 1 CINCFLEET HQ inspires pride and 
loyalty among its staff and thus 
provides a strong framework for 
staff conduct 
2 Managers and Leaders inspire 
confidence and commitment and 
they support, direct, encourage 
and care for their staff 
3 Individual and team contributions' 
towards organisational goals and 
objectives are promptly, properly, 
and consistently recognised and 
rewarded
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1 CINCFLEET HQ delegates 
effectively, empowering and 
developing individuals, helping 
them to meet their personal 
aspirations
2 CINCFLEET HQ develops 
individuals and teams and 
provides them with effective tools 
to achieve their objectives
3 Leaders and managers play a key 
role in driving the development of 
teams through work and social 
activities
R Leaders and managers play no 
part in driving the development of 
teams through work or social 
activities
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Involvement Team orientation 1 Team working is important to 
CINCFLEET HQ and matrix 
working is used to promote 
effective working across 
organisational boundaries
2 Every individual is important and is 
valued for the work and social 
contributions that they make to the 
team and the team's output
3 Team members seek to rapidly 
integrate new members and when 
people leave there is a sense of 
loss
R New team members receive no 
help in integrating into their team, 
and the loss of a team member 
has no real impact on the team
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Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Tool.
Statement reversal
Flexible Involvement Empowerment 1 Responsibility and authority are 
clearly aligned at an appropriate 
level thereby enabling everyone to 
make a positive contribution
2 Information is shared effectively 
across CINCFLEET HQ, to enable 
staff to improve their contribution 
to organisational objectives
R Information is not shared 
effectively across CINCFLEET 
HQ, and this limits the ability of 
staff to improve their contribution 
to organisational objectives
3 Individuals are confident and 
capable operators and place the 
team and organisational objectives 
above personal advancement
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Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Tool.
Statement reversal
Flexible Adaptability Creating change 1 CINCFLEET HQ responds 
positively, creatively and effectively 
to internal and external pressures 
for change
2 CINCFLEET HQ staff and teams 
are adaptable and cooperate 
effectively, even in response to 
changes in  resources or 
objectives 
3 CINCFLEET HQ and its staff 
actively seek ways of changing 
things in order to improve 
efficiency and effectiveness
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Adaptability Customer focus 1 CINCFLEET HQ effectively 
involves its stakeholders, partners 
and customers in its processes in 
order to better meet organisational 
objectives
2 CINCFLEET HQ has the respect 
and support of society, other 
external stakeholders, partners 
and customers and is regarded as 
a responsible and trustworthy 
organisation
3 Staff have a clear understanding of 
what the organisation's 
stakeholders, partners and 
customers want and always seek 
to provide them with a high 
standard of service
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Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Tool.
Statement reversal
External Adaptability Organisational 
learning
1 CINCFLEET HQ promotes 
professionalism among its staff by 
encouraging learning and 
development, innovation and 
sensible risk-taking
2 CINCFLEET HQ ensures staff 
understand what is going on 
elsewhere within MOD and adapt 
accordingly
R Staff in CINCFLEET HQ do not 
understand what is going on 
elsewhere within MOD and cannot 
adapt accordingly
3 Difficulties and failures are used by 
staff and the organisation as 
learning points for improvement 
rather than as opportunities to 
apportion blame
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Table 8I.1: New cultural assessment tool developed for CINCFLEET HQ.
CINCFLEET HQ Continuous Attitude Survey
Please rate each of the statements below according 
to the degree to which you agree or disagree.  Mark 









CINCFLEET HQ has a clear mission that provides long-
term direction and a clear framework for current work.
The CINCFLEET HQ strategy fails to show clearly how 
organisational objectives will be achieved.
R
There is pride in the history and traditions of the Royal 
Navy and these values are maintained in the future 
strategy of CINCFLEET HQ.
Organisational goals are clear, challenging but 
achievable, and achievement is continuously monitored 
and publicised.
Leaders visibly promote organisational goals and inspire 
loyalty and confidence so that staff are committed to 
achieving organisational goals.
Everybody's responsibilities are clearly defined and, taken 
together, cover the full range of tasks required to achieve 
organisational goals.
All staff understand the long-term vision of this 
organisation and are committed to achieving it.
This organisation is highly successful and all staff share 
in that success.
CINCFLEET HQ is robust and well structured and can 
maintain its long-term direction even when faced with 
short-term difficulties.
Business processes and activities are well defined, 
consistent, integrated and orientated to achieving the 
organisational goals.
Staff co-operate and work well together across internal 
organisational boundaries to achieve organisational 
goals.
Leaders and managers fail to provide strong coordination 
and control across any part of the organisation.
R
Focus on our organisational goals promotes co-operation 
and the search for win-win solutions to difficult problems.
The organisational culture clearly defines the values of 
the CINCFLEET HQ, and the way we work in it.
Staff strongly identify with their team and CINCFLEET 
HQ, and readily accept and promote the values of both.
CINCFLEET HQ inspires pride and loyalty among its staff 
and thus provides a strong framework for staff conduct.
Leaders and Managers inspire confidence and 
commitment and they support, direct, encourage and care 
for their staff.
Individual and team contributions' towards organisational 
objectives and goals are promptly, properly, and 
consistently recognised and rewarded.
CINCFLEET HQ delegates effectively, empowering and 
developing individuals, helping them to meet their 
personal development goals.
CINCFLEET HQ develops individuals and teams and 
provides them with effective tools to achieve their 
objectives.
Leaders and managers play no part in driving the 
development of teams through work or social activities.
R
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Table 8I.1: New cultural assessment tool developed for CINCFLEET HQ.
Team working is important to CINCFLEET HQ, and 
matrix management is used to promote effective co-
operation across organisational boundaries.
Every individual is important and is valued for the work 
and social contributions that they make to the team and to 
the team's output.
New team members receive no help in integrating into 
their team, and the loss of a team member has no impact 
on the team.
R
Responsibility and authority are clearly aligned at an 
appropriate level, thereby enabling everyone to make a 
positive contribution.
Information is not shared effectively across CINCFLEET 
HQ, and this limits the ability of staff to improve their 
contribution to achieving organisational objectives.
R
Individuals are confident and capable and place the team 
and organisational objectives above personal 
advancement.
CINCFLEET HQ responds positively, creatively and 
effectively to internal and external pressures for change.
CINCFLEET HQ staff and teams are adaptable and 
cooperate effectively, especially in response to changes 
in resources or objectives.
CINCFLEET HQ and individuals actively seek ways of 
changing things in order to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness.
CINCFLEET HQ effectively involves its stakeholders, 
partners and customers in its processes in order to better 
meet organisational objectives.
CINCFLEET HQ has the respect and support of society, 
other external stakeholders, partners and customers and 
is regarded as a responsible and trustworthy 
organisation.
Staff have a clear understanding of what the 
organisation's stakeholders, partners and customers 
need and always seek to provide them with a high 
standard of service.
CINCFLEET HQ promotes professionalism among its 
staff by encouraging learning and development, 
innovation and sensible risk-taking.
Staff in CINCFLEET HQ do not understand what is going 
on elsewhere within MOD and so cannot adapt 
accordingly.
R
Difficulties and failures are used by staff and the 
organisation as learning points for improvement rather 
than opportunities to apportion blame. E
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From: P M WOODLEY, Finance Director, DCDS(Pers)  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
Room 658, St Giles Court, 1-13 St Giles High Street, 
London WC2H 8LD 
 
 Telephone (Direct dial) 020 7218 1745 
  (Switchboard) 020 7218 9000 
  (Fax) 020 7807 8839 
    
 



















INTRODUCTION OF CONTINUOUS ATTITUDE SURVEY 
 
You may already be aware that it is planned to replace the annual Staff Attitude Survey with a 
Continuous Attitude Survey.  This was agreed by the Fleet Management Group last year.  The aim 
is to provide quarterly input to the Fleet Balanced Scorecard from a sample survey conducted in 
the Headquarters.  The new survey tool has been developed, but now needs to calibrated for when 
it goes live in the new financial year.  You have been specially selected by management to assist 
in this process.  I would therefore be grateful if you would complete the attached form, indicating 
the degree to which you agree or disagree with the statements listed.  Please return the form in the 
envelope provided as soon as possible.  The aim is to provide the results to a workshop in Fleet 
HQ on 6th May, 2003. 
 
Although I have changed jobs since starting this work, this activity stems partly from my studies 
at RMCS Shrivenham, sponsored by CINCFLEET.  I will therefore be continuing this part of the 
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Table 8K.1: Results of the CINCFLEET HQ Cultural Measurement Tool calibration test.














CINCFLEET HQ has a 
clear mission that 
provides long-term 
direction and a clear 
framework for current 
work. 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 5 4 5 4 3 4 4 4 3 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 1 142 3.55 71.00% 0.75 4.00 4 0 1 1 15 21 2 5.00%
R
The CINCFLEET HQ 
strategy fails to show 
clearly how 
organisational 
objectives will be 
achieved. 4 4 4 3 3 4 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 2 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 3 1 3 2 2 3 3 4 4 3 3 1 120 3.00 60.00% 0.85 3.00 3 0 2 8 18 12 0 16.00%
There is pride in the 
history and traditions of 
the Royal Navy and 
these values are 
maintained in the 
future strategy of 
CINCFLEET HQ. 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 5 1 3 3 2 1 3 5 3 4 3 4 5 4 4 3 3 4 5 3 3 4 2 1 4 5 4 3 4 3 2 3 135 3.38 67.50% 1.05 3.00 3 0 3 3 15 14 5 8.50%
Organisational goals 
are clear, challenging 




4 4 4 4 3 2 4 4 4 3 3 2 3 2 3 4 3 4 1 4 4 5 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 5 4 3 3 0 131 3.28 65.50% 1.04 3.00 4 1 2 3 15 17 2 10.50%
Leaders visibly 
promote organisational 
goals and inspire 
loyalty and confidence 
so that staff are 
committed to achieving 
organisational goals.
4 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 2 3 2 4 2 2 4 2 3 2 4 4 4 5 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 1 2 3 4 2 5 3 2 1 1 124 3.10 62.00% 1.06 3.00 4 0 3 9 11 15 2 14.00%
Everybody's 
responsibilities are 
clearly defined and, 
taken together, cover 
the full range of tasks 
required to achieve 
organisational goals. 3 4 4 4 3 3 2 5 4 3 2 3 4 1 4 4 4 4 1 4 2 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 2 2 2 3 130 3.25 65.00% 0.93 3.00 4 0 2 6 13 18 1 11.00%
All staff understand the 
long-term vision of this 
organisation and are 
committed to achieving 
it. 3 3 4 3 2 3 4 2 3 3 2 3 3 1 1 3 3 4 1 4 2 3 4 4 2 3 4 2 3 3 1 1 3 4 2 3 3 3 2 1 108 2.70 54.00% 0.97 3.00 3 0 6 8 18 8 0 22.00%
This organisation is 
highly successful and 
all staff share in that 
success. 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 1 2 4 3 3 2 3 3 4 5 3 3 3 4 3 2 2 2 1 3 4 3 4 3 3 1 1 121 3.03 60.50% 0.97 3.00 3 0 4 5 18 12 1 15.50%
CINCFLEET HQ is 
robust and well 
structured and can 
maintain its long-term 
direction even when 
faced with short-term 
difficulties. 3 1 4 4 3 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 1 3 4 3 2 0 2 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 2 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 1 1 123 3.08 61.50% 1.12 3.00 4 1 4 4 14 16 1 14.50%
Business processes 
and activities are well 
defined, consistent, 
integrated and 
orientated to achieving 
the organisational 
goals.
2 3 4 3 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 3 2 1 3 4 1 3 1 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 3 3 1 3 2 3 2 1 97 2.43 48.50% 0.93 3.00 3 0 9 8 20 3 0 27.50%
Staff co-operate and 
work well together 
across internal 
organisational 
boundaries to achieve 
organisational goals.
4 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 2 4 3 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 5 4 4 3 4 4 2 4 1 2 4 4 4 5 4 4 2 2 143 3.58 71.50% 0.90 4.00 4 0 1 5 7 24 3 4.50%
CINCFLEET HQ Cultural 
Measurement Survey 
Calibration Test
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Table 8K.1: Results of the CINCFLEET HQ Cultural Measurement Tool calibration test.


















Leaders and managers 
fail to provide strong 
coordination and 
control across any part 
of the organisation.
4 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 3 5 4 4 2 5 4 3 3 1 3 2 4 3 5 4 4 2 1 127 3.18 63.50% 1.01 3.00 3 0 2 8 14 13 3 12.50%
Focus on our 
organisational goals 
promotes co-operation 
and the search for win-
win solutions to difficult 
problems.
3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 1 2 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 3 4 3 5 4 3 2 2 121 3.03 60.50% 0.77 3.00 3 0 1 7 23 8 1 15.50%
The organisational 
culture clearly defines 
the values of the 
CINCFLEET HQ, and 
the way we work in it.
3 3 4 4 3 4 1 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 4 5 3 4 1 2 3 3 4 4 1 3 4 3 3 2 1 2 3 4 3 4 4 4 2 2 121 3.03 60.50% 1.00 3.00 3 0 4 6 16 13 1 15.50%
Staff strongly identify 
with their team and 
CINCFLEET HQ, and 
readily accept and 
promote the values of 
both. 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 2 2 2 2 4 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 3 3 3 1 2 3 4 4 4 2 3 1 2 120 3.00 60.00% 0.88 3.00 3 0 2 8 19 10 1 16.00%
CINCFLEET HQ 
inspires pride and 
loyalty among its staff 
and thus provides a 
strong framework for 
staff conduct.
3 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 2 5 3 3 1 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 5 3 3 2 2 1 3 4 4 5 3 3 1 2 125 3.13 62.50% 0.99 3.00 3 0 3 5 19 10 3 13.50%
Leaders and Managers 
inspire confidence and 
commitment and they 
support, direct, 
encourage and care for 
their staff.
4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 2 4 3 3 3 3 2 4 2 3 2 4 3 4 4 5 4 3 4 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 5 4 4 1 2 125 3.13 62.50% 0.97 3.00 3 0 3 5 18 12 2 13.50%
Individual and team 
contributions' towards 
organisational 
objectives and goals 









helping them to meet 
their personal 
development goals.
4 3 4 4 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 1 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 5 2 2 3 4 3 4 1 3 3 3 3 5 4 3 1 2 123 3.08 61.50% 0.94 3.00 3 0 3 5 20 10 2 14.50%
CINCFLEET HQ 
develops individuals 
and teams and 
provides them with 
effective tools to 
achieve their 
objectives. 4 2 4 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 2 2 4 3 4 3 1 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 0 3 3 3 2 3 4 4 1 2 114 2.85 57.00% 0.92 3.00 3 1 2 8 20 9 0 19.00%
R
Leaders and managers 
play no part in driving 
the development of 
teams through work or 
social activities.
3 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 4 2 3 5 3 4 3 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 3 2 2 1 2 4 3 2 5 5 2 2 125 3.13 62.50% 1.04 3.00 3 0 2 9 15 10 4 13.50%
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Table 8K.1: Results of the CINCFLEET HQ Cultural Measurement Tool calibration test.














CINCFLEET HQ Cultural 
Measurement Survey 
Calibration Test
Team working is 
important to 
CINCFLEET HQ, and 
matrix management is 




3 4 4 4 4 2 1 4 4 3 3 4 4 2 2 4 3 4 2 3 3 5 4 5 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 4 3 2 3 2 3 129 3.23 64.50% 0.92 3.00 4 0 1 8 14 15 2 11.50%
Every individual is 
important and is valued 
for the work and social 
contributions that they 
make to the team and 
to the team's output.
3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 5 2 3 3 3 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 0 5 131 3.28 65.50% 0.96 3.00 3 1 1 2 21 12 3 10.50%
R
New team members 
receive no help in 
integrating into their 
team, and the loss of a 
team member has no 
impact on the team.
5 4 4 5 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 3 5 4 5 5 3 3 3 4 2 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 3 4 2 4 3 3 4 3 5 5 2 4 153 3.83 76.50% 0.87 4.00 4 0 0 3 10 18 9 -0.50%
Responsibility and 
authority are clearly 
aligned at an 
appropriate level, 
thereby enabling 
everyone to make a 
positive contribution. 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 1 4 3 4 3 5 4 4 2 3 131 3.28 65.50% 0.75 3.00 3 0 1 3 21 14 1 10.50%
R
Information is not 
shared effectively 
across CINCFLEET 
HQ, and this limits the 





objectives. 3 2 4 3 4 3 3 2 3 2 2 1 2 3 1 3 1 4 2 2 2 3 4 2 3 1 4 4 3 0 1 1 3 4 2 3 2 2 2 2 98 2.45 49.00% 1.04 2.00 2 1 6 14 12 7 0 27.00%
Individuals are 
confident and capable 








effectively to internal 
and external pressures 
for change.
3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 2 2 3 3 3 2 5 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 122 3.05 61.00% 0.71 3.00 3 0 1 5 26 7 1 15.00%
CINCFLEET HQ staff 
and teams are 
adaptable and 
cooperate effectively, 
especially in response 
to changes in 
resources or 
objectives.
4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 4 3 2 5 3 3 2 3 3 4 5 4 3 4 5 3 3 2 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 5 2 3 135 3.38 67.50% 0.84 3.00 3 0 0 5 19 12 4 8.50%
CINCFLEET HQ and 
individuals actively 
seek ways of changing 
things in order to 
improve efficiency and 
effectiveness.
4 3 4 4 3 1 3 3 5 3 3 3 4 3 1 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 5 4 4 2 3 134 3.35 67.00% 0.86 3.00 3 0 2 1 21 13 3 9.00%
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Table 8K.1: Results of the CINCFLEET HQ Cultural Measurement Tool calibration test.


















effectively involves its 
stakeholders, partners 
and customers in its 




4 3 4 4 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 3 4 3 2 3 126 3.15 63.00% 0.66 3.00 3 0 0 5 25 9 1 13.00%
CINCFLEET HQ has 
the respect and 
support of society, 
other external 
stakeholders, partners 
and customers and is 




4 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 5 3 3 4 2 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 1 3 132 3.30 66.00% 0.82 3.00 3 0 1 4 19 14 2 10.00%
Staff have a clear 
understanding of what 
the organisation's 
stakeholders, partners 
and customers need 
and always seek to 
provide them with a 
high standard of 
service.








sensible risk-taking. 4 2 4 4 3 3 3 5 3 3 2 3 4 2 3 5 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 5 3 4 4 4 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 2 2 133 3.33 66.50% 0.89 3.00 3 0 1 5 17 14 3 9.50%
R
Staff in CINCFLEET 
HQ do not understand 
what is going on 
elsewhere within MOD 
and so cannot adapt 
accordingly.
4 3 4 3 4 3 3 1 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 1 3 4 3 3 2 4 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 5 3 4 3 3 5 3 3 0 132 3.30 66.00% 1.02 3.00 3 1 2 1 19 14 3 10.00%
Difficulties and failures 
are used by staff and 
the organisation as 
learning points for 
improvement rather 
than opportunities to 
apportion blame.
3 3 3 3 3 2 3 4 3 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 2 3 2 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 2 2 2 1 4 3 4 3 5 2 2 1 3 117 2.93 58.50% 0.86 3.00 3 0 2 9 20 8 1 17.50%
124 110 140 132 117 104 114 113 112 106 102 108 117 87 97 152 101 125 80 107 105 130 148 138 112 124 142 117 106 98 61 93 111 128 105 137 126 119 64 76 4488 112.20 62.33% 20.74 112.00 117 7 85 214 632 431 71 13.67%
3.44 3.06 3.89 3.67 3.25 2.89 3.17 3.14 3.11 2.94 2.83 3.00 3.25 2.42 2.69 4.22 2.81 3.47 2.22 2.97 2.92 3.61 4.11 3.83 3.11 3.44 3.94 3.25 2.94 2.72 1.69 2.58 3.08 3.56 2.92 3.81 3.50 3.31 1.78 2.11 3.12 0.58 3.00 3.00
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Table 8L.1: Results of the CINCFLEET HQ Cultural Measurement Tool calibration test at 12 segment level.










score 0 1 2 3 4 5
Dif to 76%
CINCFLEET HQ 
has a clear mission 
that provides long-
term direction and a 
clear framework for 
current work.
4 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 5 4 5 4 3 4 4 4 3 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 1
R
The CINCFLEET 
HQ strategy fails to 
show clearly how 
organisational 
objectives will be 
achieved.
4 4 4 3 3 4 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 2 4 4 4 2 3 4 3 3 1 3 2 2 3 3 4 4 3 3 1
There is pride in the 
history and 
traditions of the 
Royal Navy and 
these values are 
maintained in the 
future strategy of 

















and inspire loyalty 
and confidence so 





4 4 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 2 3 2 4 2 2 4 2 3 2 4 4 4 5 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 1 2 3 4 2 5 3 2 1 1
Everybody's 
responsibilities are 
clearly defined and, 
taken together, 
cover the full range 




3 4 4 4 3 3 2 5 4 3 2 3 4 1 4 4 4 4 1 4 2 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 2 2 2 3 385 3.21 64.17% 1.00 3.00 4.00 1 7 18 39 50 5 11.83%
External/ 
Stable
Mission Goals and 
objectives
All staff understand 
the long-term vision 
of this organisation 
and are committed 
to achieving it.
3 3 4 3 2 3 4 2 3 3 2 3 3 1 1 3 3 4 1 4 2 3 4 4 2 3 4 2 3 3 1 1 3 4 2 3 3 3 2 1
This organisation is 
highly successful 
and all staff share 
in that success.
3 4 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 3 1 2 4 3 3 2 3 3 4 5 3 3 3 4 3 2 2 2 1 3 4 3 4 3 3 1 1
CINCFLEET HQ is 
robust and well 
structured and can 
maintain its long-
term direction even 
when faced with 
short-term 
difficulties.
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Table 8L.1: Results of the CINCFLEET HQ Cultural Measurement Tool calibration test at 12 segment level.


























2 3 4 3 1 1 2 1 2 3 3 3 2 1 3 4 1 3 1 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 3 3 1 3 2 3 2 1
Staff co-operate 







goals. 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 4 2 4 3 5 4 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 4 5 4 4 3 4 4 2 4 1 2 4 4 4 5 4 4 2 2
R
Leaders and 
managers fail to 
provide strong 
coordination and 
control across any 
part of the 
organisation. 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 3 5 4 4 2 5 4 3 3 1 3 2 4 3 5 4 4 2 1 367 3.06 61.17% 1.06 3.00 3.00 0 12 21 41 40 6 14.83%
Stable Consistency Coordination and 
integration
Focus on our 
organisational goals 
promotes co-
operation and the 
search for win-win 
solutions to difficult 
problems. 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 1 2 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 3 4 3 5 4 3 2 2
The organisational 
culture clearly 
defines the values 
of the CINCFLEET 
HQ, and the way 
we work in it.
3 3 4 4 3 4 1 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 4 5 3 4 1 2 3 3 4 4 1 3 4 3 3 2 1 2 3 4 3 4 4 4 2 2
Staff strongly 
identify with their 
team and 
CINCFLEET HQ, 
and readily accept 
and promote the 





inspires pride and 
loyalty among its 
staff and thus 
provides a strong 
framework for staff 





they support, direct, 
encourage and care 
for their staff.
4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 2 4 3 3 3 3 2 4 2 3 2 4 3 4 4 5 4 3 4 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 5 4 4 1 2
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Table 8L.1: Results of the CINCFLEET HQ Cultural Measurement Tool calibration test at 12 segment level.























them to meet their 
personal 
development goals.




teams and provides 
them with effective 
tools to achieve 
their objectives.
4 2 4 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 2 2 4 3 4 3 1 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 0 3 3 3 2 3 4 4 1 2
R
Leaders and 
managers play no 
part in driving the 
development of 
teams through work 
or social activities.














boundaries. 3 4 4 4 4 2 1 4 4 3 3 4 4 2 2 4 3 4 2 3 3 5 4 5 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 4 3 2 3 2 3
Every individual is 
important and is 
valued for the work 
and social 
contributions that 
they make to the 
team and to the 




no help in 
integrating into their 
team, and the loss 
of a team member 
has no impact on 
the team.





authority are clearly 
aligned at an 
appropriate level, 
thereby enabling 
everyone to make a 
positive 
contribution. 3 3 4 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 1 4 3 4 3 5 4 4 2 3
R
Information is not 
shared effectively 
across CINCFLEET 
HQ, and this limits 






3 2 4 3 4 3 3 2 3 2 2 1 2 3 1 3 1 4 2 2 2 3 4 2 3 1 4 4 3 0 1 1 3 4 2 3 2 2 2 2
Individuals are 
confident and 
capable and place 




advancement. 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 1 2 3 3 5 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 3 3 3 2 3 3 1 2 2 336 2.80 56.00% 0.92 3.00 3.00 1 10 27 58 22 2 20.00%
Flexible Involvement Empowerment
 Appendix L to Chapter 8 - Page 3 of 5
Appendix L to Chapter 8.
Table 8L.1: Results of the CINCFLEET HQ Cultural Measurement Tool calibration test at 12 segment level.
























3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 2 2 3 3 3 2 5 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3
CINCFLEET HQ 








objectives. 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 4 3 2 5 3 3 2 3 3 4 5 4 3 4 5 3 3 2 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 5 2 3
CINCFLEET HQ 
and individuals 
actively seek ways 
of changing things 
in order to improve 
efficiency and 
effectiveness. 4 3 4 4 3 1 3 3 5 3 3 3 4 3 1 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 5 4 4 2 3 391 3.26 65.17% 0.81 3.00 3.00 0 3 11 66 32 8 10.83%





customers in its 
processes in order 
to better meet 
organisational 
objectives. 4 3 4 4 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 3 4 3 2 3
CINCFLEET HQ 
has the respect and 




customers and is 




4 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 5 3 3 4 2 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 1 3







and always seek to 
provide them with a 
high standard of 
service.













4 2 4 4 3 3 3 5 3 3 2 3 4 2 3 5 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 5 3 4 4 4 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 2 2
R
Staff in 
CINCFLEET HQ do 
not understand 
what is going on 
elsewhere within 
MOD and so 
cannot adapt 
accordingly. 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 1 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 1 3 4 3 3 2 4 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 5 3 4 3 3 5 3 3 0
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Table 8L.1: Results of the CINCFLEET HQ Cultural Measurement Tool calibration test at 12 segment level.


















failures are used by 
staff and the 
organisation as 




3 3 3 3 3 2 3 4 3 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 2 3 2 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 2 2 2 1 4 3 4 3 5 2 2 1 3 382 3.18 63.67% 0.93 3.00 3.00 0 5 15 56 36 7 12.33%
External Adaptability Organisational 
learning
124 110 140 132 117 104 114 113 112 106 102 108 117 87 97 152 101 125 80 107 105 130 148 138 112 124 142 117 106 98 61 93 111 128 105 137 126 119 64 76 4488 3.12 0.95 3.00 3.00 6 85 214 632 431 71
3.44 3.06 3.89 3.67 3.25 2.89 3.17 3.14 3.11 2.94 2.83 3.00 3.25 2.42 2.69 4.22 2.81 3.47 2.22 2.97 2.92 3.61 4.11 3.83 3.11 3.44 3.94 3.25 2.94 2.72 1.69 2.58 3.08 3.56 2.92 3.81 3.50 3.31 1.78 2.11
3.12
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Table 8M.1: Examples of additional perspectives available from CINCFLEET cultural model.
CINCFLEET cultural measurement tool







1 CINCFLEET HQ has a clear mission that provides 
long-term direction and a clear framework for 
current work 
2 There is pride in the history and traditions of the 
Navy and these values are maintained in the 
future strategy of CINCFLEET HQ
3 The CINCFLEET HQ strategy shows clearly how 
organisational objectives will be achieved
External/ 
Stable
Mission Goals and 
objectives
1 Organisational goals are clear, challenging but 
achievable, and achievement is continuously 
monitored and publicised
2 Leaders visibly promote organisational goals and 
inspire loyalty and confidence so that staff are 
committed to achieving organisational goals
x
3 Everybody's responsibilities are clearly defined 
and cover the full range of tasks required to 
achieve organisational goals
Stable Mission Vision 1 All staff understand the long-term vision of this 
organisation and are committed to achieving it
2 This organisation is highly successful and all staff 
share in that success
x
3 CINCFLEET HQ is robust and well structured and 
can maintain its long-term direction even when 
faced with short-term difficulties
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Tool.
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Table 8M.1: Examples of additional perspectives available from CINCFLEET cultural model.
CINCFLEET cultural measurement tool
Leadership Teams Reward and 
Recognition
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Tool.
Stable Consistency Cordination 
and integration
1 Business processes and activities are well 
defined, consistent, integrated and orientated to 
achieving the organisational goals
2 Staff cooperate and work well together across 
internal organisational boundaries to achieve 
organisational goals
3 Leaders and managers provide strong 




Consistency Agreement 1 Focus on our organisational goals promotes 
cooperation and the search for win-win solutions 
to difficult problems
2 The organisational culture clearly defines the 
values of this HQ, and the way we work in it
3 Staff strongly identify with their team and 
CINCFLEET HQ, and readily accept and promote 
the values of both x
Internal 
Focus
Consistency Core Values 1 CINCFLEET HQ inspires pride and loyalty among 
its staff and thus provides a strong framework for 
staff conduct 
2 Managers and Leaders inspire confidence and 
commitment and they support, direct, encourage 
and care for their staff 
x
3 Individual and team contributions' towards 
organisational goals and objectives are promptly, 
properly, and consistently recognised and 
rewarded x x
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Table 8M.1: Examples of additional perspectives available from CINCFLEET cultural model.
CINCFLEET cultural measurement tool
Leadership Teams Reward and 
Recognition






1 CINCFLEET HQ delegates effectively, 
empowering and developing individuals, helping 
them to meet their personal aspirations x
2 CINCFLEET HQ develops individuals and teams 
and provides them with effective tools to achieve 
their objectives x
3 Leaders and managers play a key role in driving 







1 Team working is important to CINCFLEET HQ and 
matrix working is used to promote effective 
working across organisational boundaries
x
2 Every individual is important and is valued for the 
work and social contributions that they make to 
the team and the team's output x x
3 Team members seek to rapidly integrate new 
members and when people leave there is a sense 
of loss x
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Table 8M.1: Examples of additional perspectives available from CINCFLEET cultural model.
CINCFLEET cultural measurement tool
Leadership Teams Reward and 
Recognition
Denison’s Organisational Effectiveness 
Tool.
Flexible Involvement Empowerment 1 Responsibility and authority are clearly aligned at 
an appropriate level thereby enabling everyone to 
make a positive contribution
2 Information is shared effectively across 
CINCFLEET HQ, to enable staff to improve their 
contribution to organisational objectives
3 Individuals are confident and capable operators 
and place the team and organisational objectives 
above personal advancement
x
Flexible Adaptability Creating 
change
1 CINCFLEET HQ responds positively, creatively 
and effectively to internal and external pressures 
for change
2 CINCFLEET HQ staff and teams are adaptable 
and cooperate effectively, even in response to 
changes in  resources or objectives x
3 CINCFLEET HQ and its staff actively seek ways of 
changing things in order to improve efficiency and 
effectiveness
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Table 8M.1: Examples of additional perspectives available from CINCFLEET cultural model.
CINCFLEET cultural measurement tool
Leadership Teams Reward and 
Recognition






1 CINCFLEET HQ effectively involves its 
stakeholders, partners and customers in its 
processes in order to better meet organisational 
objectives
2 CINCFLEET HQ has the respect and support of 
society, other external stakeholders, partners and 
customers and is regarded as a responsible and 
trustworthy organisation
3 Staff have a clear understanding of what the 
organisation's stakeholders, partners and 
customers want and always seek to provide them 
with a high standard of service
External Adaptability Organisational 
learning
1 CINCFLEET HQ promotes professionalism among 
its staff by encouraging learning and development, 
innovation and sensible risk-taking
2 CINCFLEET HQ ensures staff understand what is 
going on elsewhere within MOD and adapt 
accordingly
3 Difficulties and failures are used by staff and the 
organisation as learning points for improvement 
rather than as opportunities to apportion blame
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CINCFLEET HQ has a clear 
mission that provides long-term 
direction and a clear framework 
for current work. 142 3.55 71.00% 0.75 4.00 4 0 1 1 15 21 2 5.00%
R
The CINCFLEET HQ strategy 
fails to show clearly how 
organisational objectives will 
be achieved. 120 3.00 60.00% 0.85 3.00 3 0 2 8 18 12 0 16.00%
There is pride in the history 
and traditions of the Royal 
Navy and these values are 
maintained in the future 
strategy of CINCFLEET HQ. 135 3.38 67.50% 1.05 3.00 3 0 3 3 15 14 5 8.50%
Organisational goals are clear, 
challenging but achievable, 
and achievement is 
continuously monitored and 
publicised. 131 3.28 65.50% 1.04 3.00 4 1 2 3 15 17 2 10.50%
Leaders visibly promote 
organisational goals and 
inspire loyalty and confidence 
so that staff are committed to 
achieving organisational goals.
124 3.10 62.00% 1.06 3.00 4 0 3 9 11 15 2 14.00%
x
62.00%
Everybody's responsibilities are 
clearly defined and, taken 
together, cover the full range of 
tasks required to achieve 
organisational goals.
130 3.25 65.00% 0.93 3.00 4 0 2 6 13 18 1 11.00%
All staff understand the long-
term vision of this organisation 
and are committed to achieving 
it. 108 2.70 54.00% 0.97 3.00 3 0 6 8 18 8 0 22.00%
This organisation is highly 
successful and all staff share in 
that success. 121 3.03 60.50% 0.97 3.00 3 0 4 5 18 12 1 15.50%
x
60.50%
CINCFLEET HQ is robust and 
well structured and can 
maintain its long-term direction 
even when faced with short-
term difficulties. 123 3.08 61.50% 1.12 3.00 4 1 4 4 14 16 1 14.50%
CINCFLEET HQ Cultural 
Measurement Survey Calibration 
Test
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CINCFLEET HQ Cultural 
Measurement Survey Calibration 
Test
Business processes and 
activities are well defined, 
consistent, integrated and 
orientated to achieving the 
organisational goals. 97 2.43 48.50% 0.93 3.00 3 0 9 8 20 3 0 27.50%
Staff co-operate and work well 
together across internal 
organisational boundaries to 
achieve organisational goals.
143 3.58 71.50% 0.90 4.00 4 0 1 5 7 24 3 4.50%
R
Leaders and managers fail to 
provide strong coordination 
and control across any part of 
the organisation.
127 3.18 63.50% 1.01 3.00 3 0 2 8 14 13 3 12.50%
x
63.50%
Focus on our organisational 
goals promotes co-operation 
and the search for win-win 
solutions to difficult problems.
121 3.03 60.50% 0.77 3.00 3 0 1 7 23 8 1 15.50%
The organisational culture 
clearly defines the values of 
the CINCFLEET HQ, and the 
way we work in it. 121 3.03 60.50% 1.00 3.00 3 0 4 6 16 13 1 15.50%
Staff strongly identify with their 
team and CINCFLEET HQ, 
and readily accept and 
promote the values of both. 120 3.00 60.00% 0.88 3.00 3 0 2 8 19 10 1 16.00%
x
60.00%
CINCFLEET HQ inspires pride 
and loyalty among its staff and 
thus provides a strong 
framework for staff conduct.
125 3.13 62.50% 0.99 3.00 3 0 3 5 19 10 3 13.50%
Leaders and Managers inspire 
confidence and commitment 
and they support, direct, 
encourage and care for their 
staff. 125 3.13 62.50% 0.97 3.00 3 0 3 5 18 12 2 13.50%
x
62.50%
Individual and team 
contributions' towards 
organisational objectives and 
goals are promptly, properly, 
and consistently recognised 
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CINCFLEET HQ Cultural 
Measurement Survey Calibration 
Test
CINCFLEET HQ delegates 
effectively, empowering and 
developing individuals, helping 
them to meet their personal 
development goals. 123 3.08 61.50% 0.94 3.00 3 0 3 5 20 10 2 14.50%
x
61.50%
CINCFLEET HQ develops 
individuals and teams and 
provides them with effective 
tools to achieve their 




Leaders and managers play no 
part in driving the development 
of teams through work or social 
activities.
125 3.13 62.50% 1.04 3.00 3 0 2 9 15 10 4 13.50%
x
62.50%
Team working is important to 
CINCFLEET HQ, and matrix 
management is used to 
promote effective co-operation 
across organisational 
boundaries. 129 3.23 64.50% 0.92 3.00 4 0 1 8 14 15 2 11.50%
x
64.50%
Every individual is important 
and is valued for the work and 
social contributions that they 
make to the team and to the 






New team members receive no 
help in integrating into their 
team, and the loss of a team 
member has no impact on the 
team. 153 3.83 76.50% 0.87 4.00 4 0 0 3 10 18 9 -0.50%
x
76.50%
Responsibility and authority are 
clearly aligned at an 
appropriate level, thereby 
enabling everyone to make a 
positive contribution. 131 3.28 65.50% 0.75 3.00 3 0 1 3 21 14 1 10.50%
R
Information is not shared 
effectively across CINCFLEET 
HQ, and this limits the ability of 
staff to improve their 
contribution to achieving 
organisational objectives.
98 2.45 49.00% 1.04 2.00 2 1 6 14 12 7 0 27.00%
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CINCFLEET HQ Cultural 
Measurement Survey Calibration 
Test
Individuals are confident and 
capable and place the team 
and organisational objectives 
above personal advancement.
107 2.68 53.50% 0.76 3.00 3 0 3 10 25 1 1 22.50%
x
53.50%
CINCFLEET HQ responds 
positively, creatively and 
effectively to internal and 
external pressures for change.
122 3.05 61.00% 0.71 3.00 3 0 1 5 26 7 1 15.00%
CINCFLEET HQ staff and 
teams are adaptable and 
cooperate effectively, 
especially in response to 
changes in resources or 
objectives. 135 3.38 67.50% 0.84 3.00 3 0 0 5 19 12 4 8.50%
x
67.50%
CINCFLEET HQ and 
individuals actively seek ways 
of changing things in order to 
improve efficiency and 
effectiveness. 134 3.35 67.00% 0.86 3.00 3 0 2 1 21 13 3 9.00%
CINCFLEET HQ effectively 
involves its stakeholders, 
partners and customers in its 
processes in order to better 
meet organisational objectives.
126 3.15 63.00% 0.66 3.00 3 0 0 5 25 9 1 13.00%
CINCFLEET HQ has the 
respect and support of society, 
other external stakeholders, 
partners and customers and is 
regarded as a responsible and 
trustworthy organisation.
132 3.30 66.00% 0.82 3.00 3 0 1 4 19 14 2 10.00%
Staff have a clear 
understanding of what the 
organisation's stakeholders, 
partners and customers need 
and always seek to provide 
them with a high standard of 
service. 129 3.23 64.50% 0.83 3.00 3 0 1 5 20 12 2 11.50%
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CINCFLEET HQ Cultural 
Measurement Survey Calibration 
Test
CINCFLEET HQ promotes 
professionalism among its staff 
by encouraging learning and 
development, innovation and 
sensible risk-taking. 133 3.33 66.50% 0.89 3.00 3 0 1 5 17 14 3 9.50%
R
Staff in CINCFLEET HQ do not 
understand what is going on 
elsewhere within MOD and so 
cannot adapt accordingly.
132 3.30 66.00% 1.02 3.00 3 1 2 1 19 14 3 10.00%
Difficulties and failures are 
used by staff and the 
organisation as learning points 
for improvement rather than 
opportunities to apportion 
blame. 117 2.93 58.50% 0.86 3.00 3 0 2 9 20 8 1 17.50%
Totals 4488 112.20 62.33% 20.74 112.00 117 7 85 214 632 431 71 13.67% 62.63% 62.06% 59.88%
3.12 0.58 3.00 3.00
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